Aborting the zygote argument

Alfred Mele??s zygote argument for incompatibilism is based on a case involving an agent in a deterministic world whose entire life is planned by someone else. Mele??s contention is that Ernie (the agent) is unfree and that normal determined agents are relevantly similar to him with regards to free will. In this paper, I examine four different ways of understanding this argument and then criticize each interpretation. I then extend my criticism to manipulation arguments in general. I conclude that the zygote argument is no threat to compatibilism.     

Hylemorphic animalism

Roughly, animalism is the doctrine that each of us is identical with an organism. This paper explains and defends a hylemorphic version of animalism. I show how hylemorphic animalism handles standard objections to animalism in compelling ways. I also show what the costs of endorsing hylemorphic animalism are. The paper’s contention is that despite the costs, the view is worth taking seriously.     

Children's Resilience as Assets for Safe Schools

In this article I argue that employing positive psychology conceptions in research allows for a continuum of findings for educational psychology. I illustrate my contention by means of a participatory action research (PAR) survey-based case study in which methodological decisions were informed by an asset-focused resilience conceptual framework. First I provide a rationale, as well as contextual information for the article. Then I explicate asset-focused resilience as a conceptual framework. Subsequently, I present the methodological background of the PAR survey-based case study, after which I align the scope of the findings to the contention of my article. I conclude that the choice of a positive psychology theoretical stance enriched the scope of the findings.     

Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress*

I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalism that ascribe foundational status to experiential beliefs. It can also be used to generate a version of internalist foundationalism based on reliabilist principles.     

Good Women and Bad Men: A Bias in Feminist Research

The variety of feminist thought has produced many fruitful discussions and debates. Liberal, radical, postmodern, psychoanalytic, and other feminists have criticized each others' work and underlying presuppositions. The aim of this paper is to point out a prejudice which has not yet received sufficient attention, although it lies at the base of a fair amount of feminist research: the bias that whereas men are bad and aggressive, women are good and peaceful. Although as an explicit view this contention has been debated, its distortive influence on feminist research has so far remained undiscussed. In what follows I present examples of the effect of this bias on feminist research (sections 1 and 2). Then I suggest why the bias has not yet been discussed (section 3). Finally I argue that feminist research should be as critically received and treated as any other (section 4).     

Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds

A common argument for atheism runs as follows: God would not create a world worse than other worlds he could have created instead. However, if God exists, he could have created a better world than this one. Therefore, God does not exist. In this paper I challenge the second premise of this argument. I argue that if God exists, our world will continue without end, with God continuing to create value‐bearers, and sustaining and perfecting the value‐bearers he has already created. Given this, if God exists, our world—considered on the whole—is infinitely valuable. I further contend that this theistic picture makes our world's value unsurpassable. In support of this contention, I consider proposals for how infinitely valuable worlds might be improved upon, focusing on two main ways—adding value‐bearers and increasing the value in present value‐bearers. I argue that neither of these can improve our world. Depending on how each method is understood, either it would not improve our world, or our world is unsurpassable with respect to it. I conclude by considering the implications of my argument for the problem of evil more generally conceived.     

VOLKER PECKHAUS (ed.), Oskar Becker und die Philosophie der Mathematik.

It has been contended that it is unjustified to believe, as Weyl did, that formalism's victory against intuitionism entails a defeat of the phenomenological approach to mathematics. The reason for this contention, recently put forth by Paolo Mancosu and Thomas Ryckman, is that, unlike intuitionistic Anschauung, phenomenological intuition could ground classical mathematics. I argue that this indicates a misinterpretation of Weyl's view, for he did not take formalism to prevail over intuitionism with respect to grounding classical mathematics. I also point out that the contention is false: if intuitionism fails, in the way Weyl thought it did, i.e. with respect to supporting scientific objectivity, then one should also reject the phenomenological approach, in the same respect.     

Fanciful Fates

Fanciful fates is a discussion of ideas put forward by D.Z. Phillips in his book Wittgenstein and Religion , Ch. 13 –'Authorship and Authenticity: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein'. I begin by opposing the contention that Kierkegaard attacked Socrates (and that Josiah Thompson, one of Kierkegaard's biographers, attacked Kierkegaard) because of a worry connected with the 'the demise of foundationalism'. I then deal with Phillips's claim that a similarly motivated attack on Wittgenstein has been undertaken by me. I show that Phillips's account of my treatment of two problematic remarks by Wittgenstein is radically misconceived and I argue that his own approach to the problem is unsatisfactory.     

An Introduction to the Horizon Model: An Alternative to Universalist Frameworks of Mystical Development

Critics have pointed out that the content and sequence of mystical development reported by different traditions do not seem very congruous with the contention that there is a universal path of mystical development. I propose a model of mystical development that is more subtle than traditional ‘invariant hierarchical’ models, and which explains how the apparently differing accounts of mystical development between traditions and thinkers can be reconciled with each other in a more convincing fashion, and brought together under one umbrella. The model preserves both the objective core of perennialism and the culturally subjective element of mystical ‘specialization’ that is undeniably evidenced in the mystical literature, and which hierarchical and invariant ‘universalist’ accounts struggle to integrate.     

Applying the Concept of Gender: Unsettled Questions

In commenting on Susan Bordo's discussion of gender bias, 1 both support and build on her contention that women's exclusion from philosophical discourse has been epistemologically and politically significant. But I also explore difficulties associated with applying the concept of gender and I voice concern about how to characterize the perspectives we share as women. Finally, I consider some theoretical and political limitations of utilizing gender as an analytical category.     

“Signed,Sealed, Delivered ... I’m Yours”: Calibrating Body Ownership through the Consensual Mastery/slavery Dynamic

I argue that our bodies are “owned” bodies—that proprietary rights over our bodies are shared with others whose bodies are, in turn, shared by us. Drawing from literature on the self, I develop a theory of body ownership centered on the notions of multiple selves and “controlling interests.” Proprietary sentiments are evidenced in linguistic constructions, cultural artifacts, traditions, and social and sexual behaviors. Using a single case study, I explore dimensions of body ownership within a social/sexual community based on consensual Mastery and slavery in the US. The case study illustrates a variety of ownership patterns and centralizes ownership as a point of contention among inhabitants of sexual worlds.     

EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT, RELIABILITY, AND HUME'S PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

Necessity holds that, if a proposition A supports another B, then it must support B. John Greco contends that one can resolve Hume's Problem of Induction only if she rejects Necessity in favor of reliabilism. If Greco's contention is correct, we would have good reason to reject Necessity and endorse reliabilism about inferential justification. Unfortunately, Greco's contention is mistaken. I argue that there is a plausible reply to Hume's Problem that both endorses Necessity and is at least as good as Greco's alternative. Hence, Greco provides a good reason for neither rejecting Necessity nor endorsing inferential reliabilism.     

Is the Same‐sex Marriage Debate Really Just about Marriage?

In What is Marriage? One Man and One Woman: A Defense, Sherif Girgis, Ryan Anderson and Robert George defend the ‘conjugal marriage’ while claiming to make no moral judgments about homosexuality. My contention in this article is that the argument of What is Marriage is not sufficiently different from the arguments of classical new natural law theorists (NNLT), and, therefore, What is Marriage does not remain neutral on the question of whether homosexuality is moral. First, I give an overview of some classical NNLT arguments on the nature of marriage and their sexual ethic. Next, I present What is Marriage's account of conjugal marriage as a comprehensive union of two people, focusing on what makes a genuinely bodily union. I then move to the central contention of this article. By drawing on its understanding of genuinely bodily union and its account of the harm of same‐sex marriage, I argue that What is Marriage is committed to the view that same‐sex sexual unions cannot be good, since on its account of things there can be no shared sexual goods in a same‐sex sexual ‘union’.     

Umwelt,food, and the limits of control

This paper draws on the work of the early 20th century ethologist Jakob von Uexküll to formulate a notion of food as a process of bodies becoming other bodies. I begin by situating my argument in relation to two strands of critical food research – feminist-inspired work on food and embodiment, and posthumanist approaches that focus on non-humans as mediators of food assemblages. I then discuss Uexküll's work, focusing on three key concepts: umwelt, “the island of the senses” that envelops each being; subjectivity as an intra- and intercorporeal phenomenon; and the variation among umwelten available to humans. These ideas, I contend, illustrate the inherently political nature of ‘food,’ which in turn calls for a realignment of food ethics and critical food scholarship. To illustrate this contention, I draw on my research with the Oklahoma Food Cooperative, considering this socio-ecological experiment as an effort to create a food system in better accord with the affective imperatives (or umwelten) of its constituent components. Throughout the paper, I develop the argument that food systems will always present limits to control by even those actors who seem to enjoy hegemonic positions. Uexküll's work helps us understand these limits in a way that allows critical analysis of dominant food systems and the alternatives proliferating in response to them, but does not prematurely foreclose the actual and virtual possibilities contained in the present heterogeneity of foodways.     

Getting a little closure for closure

Synthese - In this paper, I’ll survey a number of closure principles of epistemic justification and find them all wanting. However, it’ll be my contention that there’s a novel...     

Parallelism and Functionalism

It has recently been argued by Paul Thagard (1986) that parallel computational models of cognition demonstrate the falsity of the popular theory of mind known as functionalism. It is my contention that his argument is seriously mistaken and rests on a misunderstanding of the functionalist position. While my primary aim is to defend functionalism from Thagard's attack, in the process I hope to provide some much needed clarification of matters both philosophical and computational. Since I intend to untangle issues that are often troublesome in cognitive science, the paper should prove useful even for those unfamiliar with Thagard's original piece.     

Immunity,thought insertion,and the first-person concept

Philosophical Studies - In this paper I aim to illuminate the significance of thought insertion for debates about the first-person concept. My starting point is the often-voiced contention that...     

Body Temperature Influence on Time Perception

The chemical clock hypothesis implies a causal link between body temperature and the perception of duration. A strict interpretation of this construct requires a common slope value in an Arrhenius plot that relates time to temperature for every individual tested. Previous studies testing this proposition have confirmed a general relationship for data summed across multiple subjects. However, the same studies raise doubts as to whether this relationship holds for each and every individual tested. Unfortunately, these investigations have been limited by methodological constraints, thus, one could argue that the strong isomorphism intrinsic to the chemical clock hypothesis has yet to be fairly tested. In the present experiment, I sought to distinguish the effects of selective head temperature changes on the estimation of duration. Nonlinear decreases in estimated duration were observed with ascending deep auditory canal temperature. These findings support the contention of a thermally stable region of temporal perception bounded by conditions in which temporal estimates directly depend on body temperature. In contradicting physiological adequacy as an explanatory construct, the present results suggest a direct relationship between time perception and the homeothermic platform. I compare these results with earlier findings concerning the chemical clock concept and examine respective discrepancies as a basis for a fuller understanding of a temporal phenomenon that is frequently referred to as me internal clock.     

Platonism and metaphor in the texts of mathematics: Gödel and Frege on mathematical knowledge

In this paper, I challenge those interpretations of Frege that reinforce the view that his talk of grasping thoughts about abstract objects is consistent with Russell's notion of acquaintance with universals and with Gödel's contention that we possess a faculty of mathematical perception capable of perceiving the objects of set theory. Here I argue the case that Frege is not an epistemological Platonist in the sense in which Gödel is one. The contention advanced is that Gödel bases his Platonism on a literal comparison between mathematical intuition and physical perception. He concludes that since we accept sense perception as a source of empirical knowledge, then we similarly should posit a faculty of mathematical intuition to serve as the source of mathematical knowledge. Unlike Gödel, Frege does not posit a faculty of mathematical intuition. Frege talks instead about grasping thoughts about abstract objects. However, despite his hostility to metaphor, he uses the notion of ‘grasping’ as a strategic metaphor to model his notion of thinking, i.e., to underscore that it is only by logically manipulating the cognitive content of mathematical propositions that we can obtain mathematical knowledge. Thus, he construes ‘grasping’ more as theoretical activity than as a kind of inner mental ‘seeing’.