Do physicians make too much money?

The average net income of physicians in the USA is more than four times the average net income of people working in all domestic industries in the USA. When critics suggest that physicians make too much money, defenders typically appeal to the following four prominent principles of economic justice: Aristotle's Income Principle, the Free Market Principle, the Utilitarian Income Principle, and Rawls' Difference Principle. I shall show that no matter which of these four principles is assumed, the present high incomes of physicians cannot be defended.     

Is the Generality Problem too General?

Reliabilism holds that knowledge is true belief reliably caused. Reliabilists should say something about individuating processes; critics deny that the right degree of generality can be specified without arbitrariness. It is argued that this criticism applies as well to processes mentioned in scientific explanations. The gratuitous puzzles created thereby show that the "generality problem" is illusory.     

A step too far? Leader racism inhibits transgression credit

Prior research established that when in‐group leaders commit serious transgressions, such as breaking enforceable rules or engaging in bribery, people treat them leniently compared with similarly transgressive regular group members or out‐group leaders (‘transgression credit’). The present studies test a boundary condition of this phenomenon, specifically the hypothesis that transgression credit will be lost if a leader's action implies racist motivation. In study 1, in a corporate scenario, a transgressive in‐group leader did or did not express racism. In study 2, in a sports scenario, an in‐group or out‐group leader or member transgressed rules with or without a racist connotation. Both studies showed that in‐group transgressive leaders lost their transgression credit if their transgression included a racial connotation. Wider implications for constraining leaders' transgressions are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Modularity and the social mind: are psychologists too self-ish?

A modular view of the mind implies that there is no unitary "self" and that the mind consists of a set of informationally encapsulated systems, many of which have functions associated with navigating an inherently ambiguous and competitive social world. It is proposed that there are a set of cognitive mechanisms--a social cognitive interface (SCI)--designed for strategic manipulation of others' representations of one's traits, abilities, and prospects. Although constrained by plausibility, these mechanisms are not necessarily designed to maximize accuracy or to maintain consistency with other encapsulated representational systems. The modular view provides a useful framework for talking about multiple phenomena previously discussed under the rubric of the self.     

Is vocational assessment training in counseling psychology programs too restricted?

To gather information about vocational assessment training in counseling psychology programs, we surveyed the 64 programs that comprised the Council of Counseling Psychology Training Programs. A total of 56 (88%) directors returned their questionnaires. The survey data suggest that the Strong Interest Inventory (SII), in comparison to other vocational assessment methods, is taught in far more graduate programs and seemingly is accorded a relatively exclusive place in vocational assessment training. In discussing the results, we acknowledge the psychometric soundness and usability of the SII, lament the fact that students appear to receive limited exposure to other valuable vocational assessment tools during their training, and recommend that greater diversity be incorporated into the vocational assessment training of counseling psychology students.     

How to Husserl a Quine — And a Heidegger,too

Is consciousness or the subject part of the natural world or the human world? Can we write intentionality, so central in Husserl's philosophy, into Quine's system of ontological naturalism and naturalized epistemology — or into Heidegger's account of human being and existential phenomenology? The present task is to show how to do so. Anomalous monism provides a key.     

Attention and stuttering: Do stutterers think too much about speech?

In this investigation the ability of stutterers and nonstutterers to simultaneously perform speech and nonspeech tasks was compared. Subjects were 10 stutterers and 10 nonstutterers. Two experiments were conducted. In the first, subjects performed a non-attention-demanding gross-motor task while they read aloud. In the second, subjects performed an attention-demanding task (reading comprehension) during speech. Results indicated that there was no significant change in the disfluency values of stutterers during the motor activity or as a result of the reading comprehension task. However, stutterers were found to perform significantly poorer than nonstutterers on the reading comprehension task. This finding was taken as evidence that stutterers devote more attention to speech than do nonstutterers.     

Just health care (II): Is equality too much?

In a previous essay I criticized Engelhardt's libertarian conception of justice, which grounds the view that society's obligation to assure access to adequate health care for all is a matter of beneficence [1]. Beneficence fails to capture the moral stringency associated with many claims for access to health care. In the present paper I argue that these claims are really matters of justice proper, where justice is conceived along moderate egalitarian lines, such as those suggested by Rawls and Daniels, rather than strong egalitarian lines. Further, given the empirical complexity associated with the distribution of contemporary health care, I argue that what we really need to address the relevant policy issues adequately is a theory of health care justice, as opposed to an all-purpose conception of justice. Daniels has made an important start toward that goal, though there are some large policy areas which I discuss that his account of health care justice does not really speak to. Finally, practical matters of health care justice really need to be addressed in a ‘non-ideal’ mode, a framework in which philosophers have done little.     

Integration and authority: rescuing the ‘one thought too many’ problem

Four decades ago, Bernard Williams accused Kantian moral theory of providing agents with ‘one thought too many’. The general consensus among contemporary Kantians is that this objection has been decisively answered. In this paper, I reconstruct the problem, showing that Williams was not principally concerned with how agents are to think in emergency situations, but rather with how moral theories are to be integrated into recognizably human lives. I show that various Kantian responses to Williams provide inadequate materials for solving this ‘integration problem’, and that they are correspondingly ill-positioned to account for the authority of morality, as Williams suspected all along.     

Is it really too far? Overestimating walk time and distance reduces walking

In this paper we use an intercept survey of 1,297 people at seven locations in New Jersey to answer three questions about perceived distances and walk times to nearby destinations. First, we seek to clarify conflicting results from the literature by asking: what factors are associated with perceived distance and walk times? Like other studies, we find that people overestimate both walk times and distances. We find that characteristics of the route matter. People are more likely to overestimate in car-dependent locations, along routes with many turns or barriers, or for destinations that are relatively closer. In terms of personal characteristics, experience walking and familiarity with the area both lead to lower estimates, while concerns about crime, getting lost, or carrying something heavy increase estimates. Next, we explore whether overestimating walk times and distances reduces the likelihood of walking. We find that people who overestimate are less likely to walk, everything else equal. Together, these results suggest that wayfinding campaigns that clarify the travel time to nearby destinations and ease the fear of getting lost are likely to improve perceptions and increase walking. We make an additional contribution by highlighting important differences between our university and town center samples, which raises questions about the reliance on student samples in research.     

Is it possible to be too happy? Happiness,personality, and psychopathology

The types of relationship between happiness, personality and psychopatholgy are assessed in an available sample (n = 321, adults, both sexes). Empirical results from two happiness scales and two questionnaires, one of personality (NEO-PI-R) and other of personality disorders (Loranger's scale), do not confirm the Diener's threshold hypothesis, that makes a distinction between optimum and maximum happiness; or the Seligman's supposition, that assumes that happiness has no limits; The main results are: a) negative affect (Neuroticism) is negatively related to happiness across its full range; b) Extraversion and Openness to experience are positively related to happiness across its full range; c) in the rest of the basic personality factors, relationships are not linear, though not in the sense anticipated by Diener, and d) in personality disorders, the tendencies observed diversify according to the type of disorder, and the type of happiness factor. On most occasions, the close relationship between personality disorders and the Neuroticism dimension is verified in a consistent manner. These results are discussed within the context of clinical psychology, and the general theory about happiness.     

Making too many enemies: Hutto and Myin’s attack on computationalism†

We analyse Hutto & Myin's three arguments against computationalism [Hutto, D., E. Myin, A. Peeters, and F. Zahnoun. Forthcoming. “The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation In Its Place.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by M. Sprevak, and M. Colombo. London: Routledge.; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2012. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2017. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]. The Hard Problem of Content targets computationalism that relies on semantic notion of computation, claiming that it cannot account for the natural origins of content. The Intentionality Problem is targeted against computationalism using non-semantic accounts of computation, arguing that it fails in explaining intentionality. The Abstraction Problem claims that causal interaction between concrete physical processes and abstract computational properties is problematic. We argue that these arguments are flawed and are not enough to rule out computationalism.     

When choice is demotivating: can one desire too much of a good thing?

Current psychological theory and research affirm the positive affective and motivational consequences of having personal choice. These findings have led to the popular notion that the more choice, the better-that the human ability to manage, and the human desire for, choice is unlimited. Findings from 3 experimental studies starkly challenge this implicit assumption that having more choices is necessarily more intrinsically motivating than having fewer. These experiments, which were conducted in both field and laboratory settings, show that people are more likely to purchase gourmet jams or chocolates or to undertake optional class essay assignments when offered a limited array of 6 choices rather than a more extensive array of 24 or 30 choices. Moreover, participants actually reported greater subsequent satisfaction with their selections and wrote better essays when their original set of options had been limited. Implications for future research are discussed.