Determinism and predictability

Theoretical determinism, as it is usually ascribed to Laplace, is neither verifiable nor falsifiable and has therefore no real content. It is not the same as predictability of actually observable phenomena. On the other hand, predictability is not an abstract principle; rather it is true to a certain degree, depending on the phenomena considered. It can be discussed only by examining the scientific state of affairs. This is done in some detail for classical statistical mechanics. Much of a recently published debate on determinism (Amsterdamski et al. 1990) is thereby obviated.     

Time and Determinism

This paper gives an overview of logico-philosophical issues of time and determinism. After a brief review of historical roots and 20th century developments, three current research areas are discussed: the definition of determinism, space-time indeterminism, and the temporality of individual things and their possibilities.     

Determinism and Inevitability

The paper discusses one of the central arguments in Dennett’s Freedom Evolves, an argument designed to show that a deterministic universe would not necessarily be a universe of which it could truly be said that everything that occurs in it is inevitable. It suggests that on its most natural interpretation, the argument is vulnerable to a serious objection. A second interpretation is then developed, but it is argued that without placing more weight on etymological considerations than they can really bear, it can deliver only a significantly qualified version of the conclusion that Dennett is seeking. Moreover, the new argument depends upon an intermediate conclusion which, on the face of it, looks to be self-contradictory. Dennett is able to avoid the appearance of self-contradiction only by utilising a possible-worlds framework for the understanding of “could have done otherwise” judgements which is argued to be unsatisfactory. It is suggested that a different framework might hold the key to understanding how better to defend these same judgements from purported threats from determinism.     

Structural Essentialism and Determinism

The paper tries to develop Bartels’s modern essentialism as a structural-role theory of identity for spacetime points. I adopt Hoefer’s idea of denying primitive identity for this theory and apply it to GTR and prerelativistic physics to find different versions of essentialism and different definitions of determinism which are coherent with them. I also try to argue that modified essentialism helps us to refute objections raised against essentialism and offers us the best understanding of prerelativistic and relativistic theories.     

On Separating Predictability and Determinism

There has been a long-standing debate about the relationshipof predictability and determinism. Some have maintained that determinism impliespredictability while others have maintained that predictability implies determinism. Manyhave maintained that there are no implication relations between determinism andpredictability. This summary is, of course, somewhat oversimplified and quick at least in thesense that there are various notions of determinism and predictability at work in thephilosophical literature. In this essay I will focus on what I take to be the Laplacean visionfor determinism and predictability. While many forms of predictability areinconsistent with this vision, I argue that a suitably restricted notion of predictability,consistent with the practice of physicists, is implied by the Laplacean notion of determinism.It is argued that limitations on predictability are of an in principle nature in the Appendix.     

Betting Against Hard Determinism

The perennial fear associated with the free will problem is the prospect of hard determinism being true. Unlike prevalent attempts to reject hard determinism by defending compatibilist analyses of freedom and responsibility, this article outlines a pragmatic argument to the effect that we are justified in betting that determinism is false even though we may retain the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible. The basic argument is that as long as we accept that libertarian free will is worth wanting, there is a defensible rationale, given the uncertainty which remains as to whether determinism is true or false, to refrain from acting on hard determinism, and thus to bet that libertarian free will exists. The article closes by discussing two potentially decisive objections to this pragmatic argument.     

Determinism and locality in quantum systems

Models of the EPR-Bohm experiment usually consider just two times, an initial time, and the time of measurement. Within such analyses, it has been argued that locality is equivalent to determinism, given the strict correlations of quantum mechanics. However, an analysis based on such models is only a preliminary to an analysis based on a complete dynamical model. The latter analysis is carried out, and it is shown that, given certain definitions of locality and determinism for completely dynamical models, locality implies, but is not implied by, determinism. Further, it is suggested that a local deterministic model has not been ruled out by Bell's theorem. It is suggested that such a model could naturally deny the independence of initial complete states from the settings of the apparatuses (a crucial assumption in the derivation of Bell's inequality).     

Determinism, possibility, and ethics

This essay reexamines the age-old "determinism-free will" problem from a psychoanalytic perspective. The first section recapitulates the author's (1985) earlier argument on the nature of causation in psychoanalysis; the second part examines the compatibility of determinism and freedom; and the final section looks at the ethical ramifications of the issues at hand. The author exposits his adherence to universal determinism and attempts to answer the question, "What sort of possibility and ethics are permitted in a deterministic universe?"     

Determinism and locality in quantum mechanics

In current philosophical debate Bell's theorem is often refered to as a proof of the impossibility of determinism in nature. It is argued here that this conclusion is wrong. The main consequence of the theorem is the non-local character of quantum theory itself and it is shown how this quality leads to a contradiction with the theory of relativity. If hidden variable theories are impossible, it is so because no empirically founded interpretation at all can be compatible with both quantum mechanics and relativity.     

Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability

The inference from determinism to predictability, though intuitively plausible, needs to be qualified in an important respect. We need to distinguish between two different kinds of predictability. On the one hand, determinism implies external predictability, that is, the possibility for an external observer, not part of the universe, to predict, in principle, all future states of the universe. Yet, on the other hand, embedded predictability as the possibility for an embedded subsystem in the universe to make such predictions, does not obtain in a deterministic universe. By revitalizing an older result—the paradox of predictability—we demonstrate that, even in a deterministic universe, there are fundamental, non-epistemic limitations on the ability of one subsystem embedded in the universe to predict the future behaviour of other subsystems embedded in the same universe. As an explanation, we put forward the hypothesis that these limitations arise because the predictions themselves are physical events which are part of the law-like causal chain of events in the deterministic universe. While the limitations on embedded predictability cannot in any direct way show evidence of free human agency, we conjecture that, even in a deterministic universe, human agents have a take-it-or-leave-it control over revealed predictions of their future behaviour.     

Variability and Determinism in Motor Behavior

In investigations into perception-action systems, variability of observable behavior may be considered to (a) interfere with inquiry, (b) be neither detrimental nor particularly useful to inquiry, or (c) play a crucial role in inquiry. The authors underscore recent suggestions that alternative (c) is a preferred strategy for the study of many motor behaviors. In tutorial fashion, the authors review the concepts of variability and determinism with respect to postural and rhythmic movements. Study of the variability of those behaviors has revealed crucial features suggestive of underlying mechanisms and control, such as particular blends of noise and determinism (piecewise determinism). It has also revealed general lessons (for example, more variable does not mean more random and more controllable does not mean more deterministic) that may extend to other classes of perceptual-motor behavior.     

Meaning and ontology

These are two related essays. The first, “Meaning,” defends the so‐called reference theory against current criticisms. Exemplification and the intentional tie are two subsistents. Subsistence is a mode of existence; mere possibility is another. That requires two distinctions; one among four uses of ‘possible'; one among three uses of ‘same’ in the phrase ‘the same fact'; which in turn permits an adequate account of false belief. The second essay, “Inclusion, Exemplification, and Inherence in G. E. Moore,” displays the impact of the fundamental ontological dialectic on the development of Moore's thought. His notion of nonnatural properties provides the early cue. His eventual failure to account for false belief is traced to his eventual nominalism.