IV. Does a generalized Heisenberg principle operate in the social sciences?

It is argued that a generalization of Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy is possible in the social sciences. The empirical grounds for this contention lie with interference phenomena induced by transference distortions that may occur when human beings investigate the behaviour of one another.     

Natural concepts and generalization classes

The results of an experiment performed by Herrnstein, Loveland, and Cable (1976) show that pigeons possess concepts that are not based on common elements. The conclusion they draw from these results is that these concepts are largely determined by genetic factors. In the present paper it is argued that, at least for some of the concepts, the conclusion is incorrect. These concepts-called here uncommon generalization classes-were acquired by the pigeons as a consequence of certain experiences through which they went during the experiment. The discussion will also suggest the fruitfulness of replacing the vague and misleading notion of concept by the more adequate notion of generalization class.     

Comparisons between exemplar similarity and mixed prototype models using a linearly separable category structure

Nosofsky and Zaki (2002) found that an exemplar similarity model provided better accounts of individual subject classification and generalization performance than did a mixed prototype model proposed by Smith and Minda (1998; Minda & Smith, 2001). However, these previous tests used a nonlinearly separable category structure. In the present work, the authors extend the previous findings by demonstrating a superiority for the exemplar generalization model over the mixed prototype model in a case involving a linearly separable structure. Because this structure has numerous features that Minda and Smith argued should be conducive to prototype-based processing, the results pose a significant challenge to the mixed prototype view.     

Propensities in a non-deterministic physics

Propensities are presented as a generalization of classical determinism. They describe a physical reality intermediary between Laplacian determinism and pure randomness, such as in quantum mechanics. They are characterized by the fact that their values are determined by the collection of all actual properties. It is argued that they do not satisfy Kolmogorov axioms; other axioms are proposed.     

‘Just is’-Statements as Generalized Identities

Abstract

Identity is ordinarily taken to be a relation defined on all and only objects. This consensus is challenged by Agustín Rayo, who seeks to develop an analogue of the identity sign that can be flanked by sentences. This paper is a critical exploration of the attempted generalization. First the desired generalization is clarified and analyzed. Then it is argued that there is no notion of content that does the desired philosophical job, namely ensure that necessarily equivalent sentences coincide in this kind of content, and such pairs of sentences consequently are on a par with respect to metaphysical explanations.     

Reality orientation with psychogeriatric patients

To date, all empirical studies of Reality Orientation have been carried out as part of a ward or group programme in which, in addition to the orientation procedure, patients have been exposed to a variety of other physical and social activities. It is argued that the efficacy of providing information about time, place and person alone, and its generalization to other forms of behaviour, remain unknown. Results of three single case studies suggest that providing such information can increase orientation and that generalization to other forms of behaviour does occur.     

Status generalization in context: The moderating role of groups

Status generalization has been described as a process directly linking social status at the societal level to influence in interpersonal interactions, providing one mechanism through which status inequalities in society are maintained. It is argued in this paper that groups can moderate status generalization when a status characteristic is non-prototypical of the group. Two experiments are reported that measured the relative influence of an older and younger target within different group contexts: an undergraduate student group and a broader university group. In both experiments, the older target was more influential than the younger target in the context of the university group, but the younger target was more influential in the context of the undergraduate student group. Findings are discussed in relation to status generalization and referent informational influence as separate influence processes.     

When can non‐commutative statistical inference be Bayesian?

Based on recalling two characteristic features of Bayesian statistical inference in commutative probability theory, a stability property of the inference is pointed out, and it is argued that that stability of the Bayesian statistical inference is an essential property which must be preserved under generalization of Bayesian inference to the non‐commutative case. Mathematical no‐go theorems are recalled then which show that, in general, the stability can not be preserved in non‐commutative context. Two possible interpretations of the impossibility of generalization of Bayesian statistical inference to the non‐commutative case are offered, none of which seems to be completely satisfying.     

Generalization,similarity, and Bayesian inference

Shepard has argued that a universal law should govern generalization across different domains of perception and cognition, as well as across organisms from different species or even different planets. Starting with some basic assumptions about natural kinds, he derived an exponential decay function as the form of the universal generalization gradient, which accords strikingly well with a wide range of empirical data. However, his original formulation applied only to the ideal case of generalization from a single encountered stimulus to a single novel stimulus, and for stimuli that can be represented as points in a continuous metric psychological space. Here we recast Shepard's theory in a more general Bayesian framework and show how this naturally extends his approach to the more realistic situation of generalizing from multiple consequential stimuli with arbitrary representational structure. Our framework also subsumes a version of Tversky's set-theoretic model of similarity, which is conventionally thought of as the primary alternative to Shepard's continuous metric space model of similarity and generalization. This unification allows us not only to draw deep parallels between the set-theoretic and spatial approaches, but also to significantly advance the explanatory power of set-theoretic models.     

Visual classes and natural categories in the pigeon

After being trained on an oak leaf pattern, pigeons responded to other oak leaf patterns but not to leaf patterns of other species. Thus, graphic variation among the instances of a species is "transparent" to the visual system. At this taxonomic level, concept formation is spontaneous rather than inductive. It is argued that such immediate generalization may be critical to the survival of the organism.     

Measurement and the interpretation of quantum mechanics and relativity theory

The axiomatic approaches of quantum mechanics and relativity theory are compared with approaches in which the theories are thought to describe readings of certain measurement operations. The usual axioms are shown to correspond with classes of ideal measurements. The necessity is discussed of generalizing the formalisms of both quantum mechanics and relativity theory so as to encompass more realistic nonideal measurements. It is argued that this generalization favours an empiricist interpretation of the mathematical formalisms over a realist one.     

Do Our Psychological Laws Apply Only to College Students?: External Validity Revisited

That most psychological research is conducted with students led to concerns that psychological laws apply only to this population. These fears are based on Campbell and Stanley’s concept of external validity that specifies the extent to which research findings can be generalized. This concept is based on an inductivist philosophy. As philosophers of science have argued since Hume, one cannot derive general laws from singular observations. Instead, one develops theories and uses empirical studies to test these theories. This solves the problem of generalization because the domain of applicability is specified by the theory. Reports that studies result in different findings when conducted in different cultures are unproblematic as long as these differences can be explained with psychological theories.     

Phenomenology,Objectivity, and the Explanatory Gap

There has been much recent discussion of whether Husserlian phenomenology might be relevant to the explanatory gap—the problem of explaining how conscious experience arises from nonexperiential events or processes. However, some phenomenologists have argued that the explanatory gap is a confused problem, because it starts by assuming a false distinction between the subjective and the objective. Rather than trying to solve this problem, they claim that phenomenology should dissolve it by undermining the distinction upon which it is based. I shall argue that adopting a phenomenological approach does not provide reason to think that the explanatory gap is not a genuine problem. In assessing the assumptions underlying the gap, we must distinguish between objectivity understood as a stance we can take toward the world and objectivity as the world's having a structure independent of any experience. The explanatory gap can be understood as the problem of finding a place for consciousness in this objective structure. This does not force us to take an objective stance or reduce the methods of phenomenology to those of the natural sciences.     

Identifying rotated letter-like symbols

Previous research has shown that the identification of rotated alphanumeric symbols seems to be performed via the extraction of critical features encoded invariant to the symbol’s orientation. The present research argued that the use of such feature extraction processes might be a function of, first, a subject’s familiarity with the symbols, and second, the number of symbols from which a presented symbol is sampled. Earlier research has used highly over learned alphanumerics, in sets of six symbols; this practice is argued here as being seemingly conducive to feature extraction. In two experiments, the generality of a feature extraction interpretation, in contrast to one of mental rotation, was tested by having subjects previously trained to relative high- vs. low-familiarity criteria identify novel symbols in conditions in which a presented symbol was 1 of either 5 or 20 possibilities. Identification response times were found to be constant across all nonstandard orientations of presented symbols, irrespective of symbol familiarity or symbol set size. The findings support the generalization of a feature extraction interpretation to varying numbers of novel symbols of varying familiarity.     

Global Model Analysis of Cognitive Variability

Residual fluctuations produced in typical experimental methodologies are examined as correlated noises. The effective range of the correlations was assessed by determining whether the decay over look-back time is better described as a power law or exponential. Both of these decay laws contain free parameters and it is argued that it is not possible to distinguish their models on the basis of simple measures of goodness-of-fit. Global analyses that evaluate models on the basis of how well they generalize are conducted. The models are examined in terms of three constructs that all bear on generalization: cross-validity, flexibility, and representativeness. Quantitative assessment of a large ensemble of data suggests that the correlations decay over time as a power law. The conclusion is that human residual fluctuation is a correlated fractal.     

Conscious behavior explained.

Current neurobiological research on temporal binding in binocular rivalry settings contributes to a better understanding of the neural correlate of perceptual consciousness. This research can easily be integrated into a theory of conscious behavior, but if it is meant to promote a naturalistic theory of perceptual consciousness itself, it is confronted with the notorious explanatory gap argument according to which any statement of psychophysical correlations (and their interpretation) leaves the phenomenal character of, e.g., states of perceptual consciousness open. It is argued that research on temporal binding plays no role in a naturalistic theory of consciousness if the gap argument can be solved on internal philosophical grounds or if it turns out to be unsolvable at the time being. But there may be a way to dissolve or deconstruct it, and the accessibility of this way may well depend on scientific progress, including neurobiological research on the neural correlate of perceptual consciousness.     

The Role of Mediated Conditioning in Acquired Equivalence

In Experiment 1 rats received initial training in which delivery of a sucrose pellet was signalled by an auditory cue. This cue was then paired with shock in a second phase of training. In a test the rats showed an unwillingness to perform an instrumental response that yielded the sucrose pellet. This was interpreted as indicating that the associatively activated representation of the pellet had acquired aversive properties during the shock-reinforced stage of training. Experiment 2 replicated this mediated conditioning effect making use of a Phase 1 training procedure, modelled on that used by Honey and Hall (1989) to demonstrate acquired equivalence of cues, in which two auditory cues were each used to signal sucrose pellets. A further test revealed that this training resulted in enhanced generalization between these two cues. It was argued that this effect is mediated by the conditioned aversive properties of the common associate of the two auditory cues.     

Wall,Gate and Self-Other Dynamics: A Confucian Ethics of Separation and Interconnection

This paper starts with the social and moral implications of wall in history and in the contemporary world, to usher in the early Confucian discourse on wall and gate. The Confucian discourse implies that walls—either actual, virtual or symbolic—are there to defend and/or to separate, while gates enable the managed access to and opening-up the self-imposed insularity or moderate the self-centred exclusiveness that walls imply. By way of reinterpretation and reconstruction, we will extract from a variety of Confucian discussions the ethical awareness that however strongly built, walls must be associated with gates, and that the wall and the gate are therefore locked in mutuality to make possible the reality of interconnectedness between the inside and the outside and between the self and the other. It will be argued that by using ethical virtues as tools to moderate separation and exclusiveness, Confucian discourses highlight the dynamics of the self-other relationship, and establishes an ethics that may well be still applicable to contemporary situations and can be drawn upon to help dissolve the tension between the values of populist self-centrism and those of globalist interconnectedness.     

The Generalization Problem and the Identity Solution

For some time now, Jaegwon Kim has argued that irreducible mental properties face the threat of causal inefficacy. The primary weapon he deploys to sustain this charge is the supervenience/exclusion argument. This argument, in a nutshell, states that any mental property that irreducibly supervenes on a physical property is excluded from causal efficacy because the underlying physical property takes care of all of the causal work itself. Originally intended for mental properties alone, it did not take long for his critics to suggest the argument generalizes across all of the special science properties as well. Kim responds in two different ways to the generalization problem. The first response, which I call the higher-level solution, is ably dismissed by numerous critics. The second response, which I call the identity solution, has not faced comparable scrutiny. In this paper I argue that the identity solution faces numerous problems of its own.