Realism,instrumentalism, and the intentional stance

One of Dennett's principal arguments for an instrumentalistic construal of intentional attributions (e.g., attributions of belief, etc.) is that such attributions are environment relative. I argue that one can and should adopt a realist perspective toward such attributions, but accommodate their environmental relativity by treating intentional properties as relational properties. By doing so one acquires a useful perspective on experimental cognitive psychology; in particular, one can overcome the temptation to treat ecological accounts and information processing accounts as incompatible alternatives and come to see them as mutually supportive. Treating intentional properties as relational may be counter-intuitive, but I provide examples of how other sciences have had to treat what seem to be intrinsic properties as relational.     

Unlikely allies: embodied social cognition and the intentional stance

I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett??s view, human social cognition involves adopting the intentional stance (IS), i.e., assuming that an interpretive target??s behavior is an optimally rational attempt to fulfill some desire relative to her beliefs. Characterized this way, proponents of ESC would reject any alliance with Dennett. However, for Dennett, to attribute mental states from the intentional stance is not to attribute concrete, unobservable mental causes of behavior. Once this is appreciated, the kinship between IS??understood as a model of our quotidian interpretive practices??and ESC is apparent: both assume that quotidian interpretation involves tracking abstract, observable, behavioral patterns, not attributing unobservable, concrete, mental causes, i.e., both assume social cognition is possible without metapsychology. I argue that this affinity constitutes an opportunity: proponents of ESC can use IS as a characterization of the subpersonal basis for social cognition. In the process, I make my interpretation of IS more precise and relate it to current empirical literature in developmental psychology.     

The role of intentional forgetting in employee selection

The authors examined the effects of forbidden information on the employee-selection process. They presented the participants with 4 applicants for the position of cashier-stockperson. One of the applicants (the Target Applicant) provided a mixture of forbidden and job-relevant information; the remaining applicants gave no forbidden information. Some of the participants were told before they reviewed the applicants what types of information were to be considered as forbidden, and they were instructed to disregard any such information in the applications. The remaining participants were not aware of the presence of the forbidden information, nor were they instructed to disregard such information. The participants who were instructed to disregard the forbidden information rated the Target Applicant more favorably than did those who were not aware of its presence. Moreover, those in the disregard condition recalled less of the forbidden information and more of the job-relevant information about the Target Applicant than did those in the no-instruction condition. These data patterns support laboratory-based studies on intentional forgetting.     

Laws,causality and the intentional explanation of action

Whether or not an intentional explanation of action necessarily involves law-like statements is related to another question, namely, is it a causal explanation? The Popper-Hempel Thesis, which answers both questions affirmatively, inevitably faces a dilemma between realistic and universalistic requirements. However, in terms of W.C. Salmon’s concept of causal explanation, intentional explanation can be a causal one even if it does not rely on any laws. Based on this, we are able to refute three characteristic arguments for the claim “reason is not a cause of action,” namely, the “proper logical” argument, the “logical relation” argument, and the “rule-following” argument. This rebuttal suggests that the causal relationship between reason and action can provide a justification for intentional explanations.     

The intentional and the intended

The paper defends the thesis that for S to V intentionally is for S to V as (in the way) S intended to. For the normal agent the relevant sort of intention is an intention that one's intention to V generate an instance of one's V-ing along some (usually dimly-conceived) productive path. Such an account allows us to say some actions are intentional to a greater or lesser extent (a desirable option for certain cases of wayward causal chains), preserves the intuitive link between intention and intentionally, and supports the common sense view that the concept of intending is more basic than those of acting with an intention and of acting intentionally. The remainder of the paper responds to certain apparent counter-examples offered by Audi, Harman, and Bratman. In the course of this, I discuss connections between intending to V and hoping to V, and I argue that one can intend to do what one doesn't expect to do, and that one always intends what one attempts.     

Semantic indeterminacy and the realist stance

Semantic Indeterminacy and Scientific Realism are perhaps the two most ubiquitous and influential doctrines of the Quinean corpus. My concern is to argue against neither in isolation, but against their joint compatibility. Scientific Realism, I argue, when understood as Quine's realistic attitude toward the posits of physical theory, is essentially intentional in character. Thus, Realism requires Intentionality. In Section 1, I provide some necessary exegesis. In Section 2, I attempt to show how this Realism/Intentionality connection arises, surprisingly, within Quine's own mature work to create a tension in his views which he does not himself resolve. In Section 3, I examine the source of the Realism/Intentionality connection more deeply, and respond to possible Quinean objections to my account. In Section 4, I consider the consequences of the connection for various debates in recent analytic philosophy.     

HIV, Cognition and Women

Although the incidence of HIV in the United States is higher among men compared to women, the global proportion of women versus men who are infected has been approximately 50% since the late 1990s. Women have been under-represented in neuropsychological studies of HIV. A small number of studies have reported a significantly higher prevalence of neurocognitive impairment among HIV+ women compared to HIV− controls regardless of symptom status and with or without an AIDS diagnosis. Impairment was most evident on psychomotor tasks. The risk of neuropsychological impairment was increased among HIV+ women not on antiretroviral therapy. Age and depressive symptoms also increase neurocognitive risk. New neurocognitive studies of ovarian steroid hormones, PTSD and other psychiatric conditions are critical for addressing potential female-specific aspects of HIV-Associated Neurocognitive Disorder. Such studies will also address questions regarding involvement of the hippocampus and verbal memory, which may be of particular significance among HIV+ women.

Social Cognition,Accuracy, and Physiology

Existing norms for scientific communication are rooted in anachronistic practices of bygone eras making them needlessly inefficient. We outline a path that moves away from the existing model of scientific communication to improve the efficiency in meeting the purpose of public science—knowledge accumulation. We call for six changes: (a) full embrace of digital communication; (b) open access to all published research; (c) disentangling publication from evaluation; (d) breaking the “one article, one journal” model with a grading system for evaluation and diversified dissemination outlets; (e) publishing peer review; and (f) allowing open, continuous peer review. We address conceptual and practical barriers to change and provide examples showing how the suggested practices are being used already. The critical barriers to change are not technical or financial; they are social. Although scientists guard the status quo, they also have the power to change it.