Recognition trust

Philosophical Studies - Trust is critical for social life, and yet it is alarmingly fragile. It is easily damaged and difficult to repair. Philosophers studying trust have often noted that basic...     

Humble trust

I challenge the common view that trust is characteristically risky compared to distrust by drawing attention to the moral and epistemic risks of distrust. Distrust that is based in real fear yet fails to target ill will, lack of integrity, or incompetence, serves to marginalize and exclude individuals who have done nothing that would justify their marginalization or exclusion. I begin with a characterization of the suite of behaviors characteristic of trust and distrust. I then survey the epistemic and moral hazards of distrust, in particular, distrust’s propensity to bias interpretation, to perpetuate itself, to confirm itself, to dishonor, and to insult. Taking seriously these moral and epistemic hazards requires taking affirmative measures to respond to them. I elaborate one such response: “humble trust”. The practice of humble trust issues from skepticism about the warrant of one’s own felt attitudes of trust and distrust, curiosity about who might be unexpectedly responsive to trust and in which contexts, and commitment to abjure and to avoid distrust of the trustworthy. Humble trust enables individuals to trust that they will be trusted.

     

Believing on trust

The aim of the paper is to propose a way in which believing on trust can ground doxastic justification and knowledge. My focus will be the notion of trust that plays the role depicted by such cases as concerned Hardwig (J Philos 82:335–49, 1985; J Philos 88:693–708, 1991) in his early papers, papers that are often referenced in recent debates in social epistemology. My primary aim is not exegetical, but since it sometimes not so clear what Hardwig’s claims are, I offer some remarks of interpretation that might be of interest. The main purpose of the paper, however, is this: following various cues in Hardwig’s writing, I specify certain epistemic properties of agents in social systems, such that, roughly speaking, for agents to know (or be justified in believing) what the ‘system knows’, social relations of epistemic trust between agents in the system are necessary. I will suggest that we can view this social form of epistemic trust as non-inferential dispositions to believe what some individual or other source of information asserts or transmits. When this disposition is discriminating and defeater-sensitive, it can ground knowledge and justification. Or, more cautiously, we should be sympathetic to this view if we are inclined to accept the core insight of process reliabilism. Finally, I will offer some remarks about how epistemic trust and epistemic reasons may relate on this picture.     

Toward the differentiation of trust in supervisor and trust in organization

Trust in supervisor and trust in organization are argued to be distinct but related constructs, each with its own set of antecedents and outcomes. Empirical field results supported the proposition. Although trust in supervisor and trust in organization were positively and significantly correlated, trust in supervisor was more strongly associated with proximal variables (ability, benevolence, and integrity of supervisor), whereas trust in organization was more strongly correlated with global variables (perceived organizational support and justice). This conclusion held despite the inclusion of proximal variables in the regression on trust in organization and the inclusion of global variables in the regression on trust in supervisor. In addition to the differential antecedents of trust in supervisor and trust in organization, the outcomes for both variables were different. Trust in supervisor was related to increased innovative behavior and satisfaction with supervisor, and trust in organization was related to higher organizational commitment and lower intention to leave. Therefore, the authors provide clear preliminary data on the distinctiveness of trust in supervisor and trust in organization. One implication of this set of results is that organizations should adopt a more holistic approach in building trust, which can be achieved by focusing on the various constituents of the organization and the various levels (e.g., the supervisor level and the organizational level).     

Illusory trust: Kanizsa shapes incidentally increase trust and willingness to invest

Previous research has shown that the completion of basic perceptual processes is intrinsically pleasant. In the absence of diagnostic and objective cues to trustworthiness, nondiagnostic factors such as positive affect can incidentally lead to reported and behavioral trust. On the basis of these two premises, it was tested whether positive affect from the completion of perceptual processes has implications for the formation of trust in first-time business-consumer interactions. We tested this hypothesis in four experiments, using the famous Kanizsa illusion as an exemplary perceptual process that has been shown to trigger positive affect. We found that participants trusted companies who featured a Kanizsa shape as their logo more than companies with closely matched logos that did not allow for the completion of a basic perceptual process. This was evident on self-reported (Experiment 1) as well as behavioral (Experiments 2–4) measures of trust. This effect even persisted under incentivized conditions (Experiment 4) and was partially mediated by the intrinsic pleasantness of perception (Experiment 3). These findings for the first time demonstrate that positive affect is not the only consequence of perception, but rather has further trickle-down consequences for social judgments and economic decision making. Perceptual illusions seem to elicit illusory trust. Therefore, these novel findings bear important implications not only for both logo design and marketing but also for consumer decision making.     

A healthy dose of trust: The relationship between interpersonal trust and health

The positive effects of trust are manifold. Recent research has shown that trust levels may even influence physical health. The current work explores this issue and aims to shed light on the mechanisms underlying the relationship between trust and health in a 5‐wave longitudinal data set. Results showed that trust was positively related to physical health: Participants report fewer health problems when they trust their partner more, replicating earlier findings. More importantly, symptoms of anxiety and depression mediate the effect of trust on self‐reported health. Finally, results of residual lagged analyses show that earlier levels of trust predict later symptoms of anxiety and depression symptoms, in turn predicting changes in physical health symptoms over time.     

Attorney-client trust among convicted criminal defendants: preliminary examination of the attorney-client trust scale

The current study describes the development of the Attorney-Client Trust Scale (ACTS), a measure designed to assess a client's trust in his or her attorney. A sample of 307 male inmates completed the ACTS and provided information about their most recent case and attorney. Low ACTS scores were associated with having a court-appointed attorney, going to trial, and receiving a lengthy prison sentence. High ACTS scores were related to satisfaction with sentences and attorneys. In addition, findings suggest that perceptions about attorneys' interpersonal skills were as important as perceptions about legal skills in forming opinions about overall lawyering ability. It is recommended that attorneys employ a well rounded assortment of interpersonal skills to foster their clients' trust and to make better use of the limited amount of time they have to spend with clients.     

Rational Mentoring

Psychologists and other mental health professionals often serve as mentors to graduate students, interns and junior professionals. Mentor relationships are often long-term and emotionally complex and ideally involve provision of both career and psychosocial functions which prepare proteges for careers in the profession. Although experienced and accomplished, mentors often fall prey to a range of irrational thinking which may compromise their effectiveness in the mentor role. In this article we briefly define mentoring, describe the practices of effective mentors, highlight the irrational beliefs that most often prove troubling to mentors and outline several strategies for effectively coping with these beliefs. We hypothesize that routine and overt disputation of mentor-related irrational beliefs will enhance both the effect and enjoyment of mentoring.     

Promises as invitations to trust

Philosophical Studies - It is now popular to think that promissory obligation is grounded in an invitation to trust. I object that there are important differences between invitations and promises;...     

The assessment of trust orientation

The development of the Trust Inventory, a 40-item measure of trust in generalized others (Generalized Trust) and romantic partners (Partner Trust) is described. A third conceptualization of trust in friends and family members (Network Trust) is also discussed College students (N = 1,229) participated in five stages of test construction and validation. Results indicated that the Trust Inventory scales are reliable, both internally and temporally, and that the Partner Trust and Generalized Trust Scales demonstrate both concurrent and construct validity. The resulting inventory is unique in its capacity to assess these types of trust simultaneously. Evidence supporting the discriminant validity of the Network Trust was mixed, whereas factor analytic treatments of Trust Inventory items supported the distinctiveness of Network Trust as compared to Partner and Generalized Trust, the Network Trust Scale correlated to roughly the same degree as the other two scales with several variables of differential theoretical relevance. Thus, little evidence supporting the incremental validity of Network Trust was observed Discussion focuses on the evidence suggesting the validity of interpretations of Generalized and Partner Trust and considers the issue of additional research regarding Network Trust.     

The practical rationality of trust

Most action can be explained in Humean or teleological terms; that is, in most cases, one can explain why someone acted by reference to that person’s beliefs and desires. However, trusting and being trustworthy are actions that do not permit such explanation. The action of trusting someone to do something is a matter of expecting someone to act for certain reasons, and acting trustworthily is one of acting for these reasons. It is better to say that people act out of trust, rather than for some end. Thus, teleological considerations do not suffice to trust. This is the negative claim of the paper. Its positive proposal is an account of the practical rationality of trust. The key idea is that in trusting one takes on commitments, not merely to act in certain way, but also to premise one’s practical reasoning on a trust-based view of the interaction situation.     

The moral obligations of trust

Moral obligation, Darwall argues, is irreducibly second personal. So too, McMyler argues, is the reason for belief supplied by testimony and which supports trust. In this paper, I follow Darwall in arguing that the testimony is not second personal ‘all the way down’. However, I go on to argue, this shows that trust is not fully second personal, which in turn shows that moral obligation is equally not second personal ‘all the way down’.