Naturalism and the Space of Reasons in Mind and World

Abstract

This paper aims to show that many criticisms of McDowell’s naturalism of second nature are based on what I call ‘the orthodox interpretation’ of McDowell’s naturalism. The orthodox interpretation is, however, a misinterpretation, which results from the fact that the phrase ‘the space of reasons’ is used equivocally by McDowell in Mind and World. Failing to distinguish two senses of ‘the space of reasons’, I argue that the orthodox interpretation renders McDowell’s naturalism inconsistent with McDowell’s Hegelian thesis that the conceptual is unbounded. My interpretation saves McDowell from being inconsistent. However, the upshot of my interpretation is that what is really at work in McDowell’s diagnosis of the dualism between nature and reason is the Hegelian thesis, not the naturalism of second nature.     

Drug Courts and the ‘Responsibility without Blame’ Approach

This article starts from a paradox and aims to solve it. On the one hand, although Drug Courts (DCs) are one of the most interesting penal innovations in recent years, running counter to the dominant retributive approach and the rival approach based on deterrence, they have surprisingly not attracted the attention of philosophers and therefore lack a solid philosophical foundation. On the other hand, although Pickard's ‘responsibility without blame’ approach looks very convincing on paper, its practical applications remain unclear outside the clinical context. I argue that Pickard's approach is the theoretical framework that DCs need and that they are a compelling application of it: DCs do ascribe to participants various forms of responsibility (criminal ‘liability-responsibility’, responsibility of choice, responsibility for progress or failure, responsibility as answerability, tort liability) while striving to keep ‘affective blame’ at bay in order to help them regain their autonomy. However, I argue that some of the limitations of both this approach and DCs become apparent once we consider the ‘outer limits’ of DCs, in other words those who are terminated from DCs and those who refuse to enter DCs in the first place.     

Scepticism About Scepticism or the Very Idea of a Global ‘Vat-Language’

This paper aims to motivate a scepticism about scepticism in contemporary epistemology. I present the sceptic with a dilemma: On one parsing of the BIV (brain-in-a-vat) scenario, the second premise in a closure-based sceptical argument will turn out false, because the scenario is refutable; on another parsing, the scenario collapses into incoherence, because the sceptic cannot even save the appearances. I discuss three different ways of cashing out the BIV scenario: ‘Recent Envatment’ (RE), ‘Lifelong Envatment’ (LE) and ‘Nothing But Envatment’ (NBE). I show that RE scenarios are a kind of ‘local’ sceptical scenario that does not pose a significant threat to the possibility of perceptual knowledge as such. I then go on to consider the more radical (or global) LE and NBE scenarios, which do undermine the possibility of perceptual knowledge of an ‘external’ world by positing that it is conceivable that one has always been envatted and, hence, trapped in a ‘global’ illusion. I start by assuming that we could be in such a scenario (LE or NBE) and then spell out what we would need to presuppose for such scenarios to be capable of being actual. Drawing on some central insights from Wittgenstein’s anti-private language considerations, I show that the truth of a global scepticism would presuppose the possibility of a private ‘vat-language’, a notion that cannot be rendered coherent. But, if so, then neither can the sceptical scenarios that presuppose such a conception.

     

Working psychodynamically and psychosocially with women who have been raped

In this paper, I analyse aspects of the experience of some female University students who have been raped drawing on a Kleinian psychoanalytic perspective and Layton’s concept of ‘normative unconscious processes’. I suggest that Klein’s writing provides a theoretical basis for thinking about the projective and introjective processes that may be at play between perpetrator and ‘victim’. Here, I focus upon Kleinian conceptualisations of castration anxiety, fragmentation, envy, greed and guilt. In terms of ‘normative unconscious processes’, I explore how castration anxiety (in a more symbolic sense of powerlessness), fragmentation, envy, greed and guilt may also operate within social discourses around sexual violence. Specifically, I draw upon Freyd’s concept of DARVO and Payne’s Rape Myth Acceptance Scale which both explain ‘victim blaming’ in terms of the social reversal of the positions of perpetrator and ‘victim’. I illustrate this social process with reference to representations of rape within the mainstream media. My hypothesis is that, although the ‘psychic’ and the ‘social’ are two contrasting positions theoretically, it is possible to draw on both of them to make sense of the experience of working with rape clinically.

The clinical context of this paper is my work as a psychodynamic counsellor at a modern London-based University. I draw on composite case studies of women who have been raped, drawing on both ‘psychic’ and ‘social’ perspectives. I seek to explore how the ‘psychic’ and the ‘social’ can be integrated in different ways depending upon the clinical situation. I suggest that they can be mutually enriching ways of working. Through approaching how the ‘psychic’ and the ‘social’ might interrelate from a clinical viewpoint, I conclude that the idea of ‘working psychosocially’ is of most use when approached as a flexible concept that different clinicians may draw on in different ways with different patients.     

Hume's Dual Criteria for Memory

In his brief treatment of memory, Hume characterizes memory using two kinds of criteria: ideas' phenomenal character and their correspondence to the past experiences from which they derived. These criteria have seemed so perplexing to interpreters, both individually and jointly, that Hume's account of memory is commonly considered one of the weakest parts of his philosophical system. This paper defends Hume's criteria by showing that they achieve two theoretical aims: a scientific classification of ideas and a definition of ‘memory.’ In particular, I argue that Hume's definition of ‘memory’ is cogent in light of Putnamian considerations about definitions.     

Synchronicity and meaning

It is usually thought that synchronicity, characterised as ‘meaningful coincidence’, is therefore understandable in relation to the concept of ‘meaning’. I will explore the largely unhelpful symbiotic relationship between ‘coincidence’ and ‘meaning’ by comparing synchronicity with synchoricity ‐ coincidence in space rather than time. These two concepts are often mixed together and I will attempt to describe a ‘pure’ synchronicity in order to sharpen our sense of how meaning is felt to arise from coincidence. It will then be suggested that the standard concept of synchronicity is mostly psychologically irrelevant and, when adjusted to remove elements which are explained quite naturally by evolutionary theory, we are left with a concept which has implications both for the metaphysical foundations of Analytical Psychology and the individualistic emphasis one commonly finds in the field.     

Natural Kinds of Substance

This paper presents an extension of Putnam's account of how substance terms such as ‘water’ and ‘gold’ function and of how a posteriori necessary truths concerning the underlying microstructures of such kinds may be derived. The paper has three aims. (1) I aim to refute a familiar criticism of Putnam's account: that it presupposes what Salmon calls an ‘irredeemably metaphysical, and philosophically controversial, theory of essentialism’. I show how all of the details of Putnam's account—including those that Salmon believes smuggle in such essentialist commitments—can be squared with a rejection of any such essentialist metaphysics. (2) I aim to reveal why Steward is wrong to suppose that, by helping himself to the claim that ‘H₂O’ is a rigid designator of a substance, Kripke, too, presupposes something controversially ‘metaphysical’. (3) I aim to show how my proposed account also sidesteps a variety of objections raised by Needham and others who argue that Kripke's and Putnam's accounts of how ‘water’ and ‘gold’ function founder upon the sheer microstructural complexity of the phenomena in question.     

Neither ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’ nor ‘Better’ in Terms of ‘Good’

In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms of the other. According to definitions of ‘good’ in terms of ‘better’, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of ‘better’ without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining ‘better’ in terms of ‘good’, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of intrinsic goodness or it breaks down in cases where both of the relata of ‘better’ are bad.     

The Liberty of the Liberty Principle

Res Publica - Mill’s Liberty Principle aims to protect ‘social’ freedom, which is traditionally understood as negative freedom. I argue that Mill’s conception of social...     

A Buddhist Take on Gilbert Ryle’s Theory of Mind

Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949/2002. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press) is generally considered a landmark in the quest to refute Cartesian dualism. The work contains many inspirational ideas and mainly posits behavioral disposition as the referent of mind in order to refute mind–body dualism. In this article, I show that the Buddhist theory of ‘non-self’ is also at odds with the belief that a substantial soul exists distinct from the physical body and further point out similarities between the Buddhist outlook and Ryle’s ideas in three parts. First, I illustrate that Ryle’s ‘category mistake’ has certain points in common with the Buddhist refutation of ‘self’. Within the Buddhist framework, referents such as ‘mind’ and ‘self’ are merely imputed terms. The presumed existence of an independent substance such as a ‘soul’, when considered in isolation from the expedient usage of the term ‘mind’, can therefore also be viewed as a ‘category mistake’. Second, attempting to solve the questions of ‘what mind is’ and ‘how mind operates’ are two entirely different approaches to the study of mind. I argue that it is necessary to focus on ‘knowing-how’ rather than ‘knowing-that’, if we are to gain a more comprehensive understanding of mind and avoid any kind of category mistake such as those that follow from isolating the physical properties of brain or drawing inferences from a mystical soul. Third, I aim to show why investigating mind from the perspective of ‘dispositions’ of behavior is a valid approach. The Buddhist concept of karma-vāsanā elucidates the habitual tendency to act or not act in various situations. Based on this theory, I argue that the workings of the human mind bears strong links to the formation of karma and as such have important axiological implications that cannot be ignored. I conclude by pointing out that Ryle’s insightful ideas could in certain ways be complemented by the Buddhist theory of mind. In my view, his philosophy is not only a mediator between Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology, but could perhaps also be seen as a mediator between traditional Eastern systems of thought and contemporary philosophies of mind.     

Reversibility and chiasm: false equivalents? An alternative approach to understanding difference in Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy

The chiasm is usually considered the key notion for Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy. I argue against a common conclusion, namely that ‘the chiasm’ is equivalent to ‘reversibility’. Even when the two terms are not taken as interchangeable, the precise nature of their relation has not been adequately established. Focusing exclusively on ‘reversibility’ has implications for a range of philosophical issues, including relations between self and other. The danger of substituting one term for the other is that existential relations are construed as inversions, rather than as genuine exchanges. I examine two trajectories that can be discovered in ‘The Intertwining—The Chiasm’. The first is the inclusion of difference within a peculiar, extended sense of ‘reversibility’. The second is the development of a plurality of expressions, among which ‘reversibility’ is necessary but not sufficient. I go on to argue that Merleau-Ponty secures difference within the chiasm by supplementing the notion of reversibility with ‘imminence’, the idea that something has not yet occurred. I also propose that the figure of a threshold illuminates how the chiasm operates as a transition where both joining and differentiation occur.     

‘Allah has spoken to us: we must keep silent.’ In the folds of secrecy,the Holy Book of the Druze

This article explores the cultural dynamics of bond and separateness created around the Book of Wisdom (kitâb ?l-?ikma), the Druze Holy Book. The Text, unrevealable to Druze non-believers or foreigners, is shrouded in a collective pact to ‘keep quiet’. I assert that this alliance aims to protect Druze intimacy rather than highlight their separateness from others. It is rooted in the Druze premise that meaning is both corporeal and feminine, that it pertains to an ineffable interiority. I thereby distance myself from anthropological analyses that consider the so-called Druze secret around the Book as static content solely related to language.     

Against cognitive artifacts: extended cognition and the problem of defining ‘artifact’

In this paper I examine the notion of ‘artifact’ and related notions (namely, ‘cognitive artifact’) in the dominant version of extended cognition theory (ECT) grounded on extended functionalism. Although the term is ubiquitous in the literature, it is far from clear what ECT means by it. How are artifacts conceptualized in ECT? Is ‘artifact’ a meaningful and useful category for ECT? If the answer to the previous question is negative, should we worry? Is it important for ECT to have a coherent theory of artifacts? And what are the demands and constraints that ECT imposes on this theory? I distinguish between two aspects of ECT, one narrow, aligned with extended functionalism (EF); and one broad or pluralistic, in which EF is combined with other theoretical resources in the context of diverse research programs. I begin by determining the problems in conceptualizing artifacts from EF. Then I address the question of why a concept of artifact may be relevant to ECT. Next, I examine the efforts of Richard Heersmink to combine ECT with dominant theories of artifacts in the philosophy of technology (ECT in its broad aspect). I argue that both approaches fail to yield a meaningful notion of artifact, let alone one of ‘cognitive’ artifact. Finally, I argue that narrow ECT places rather strong constraints on a theory of artifacts, since it locates the specificity of ‘artifact’ in material aspects of realization that are, by definition, outside its theoretical purview. I examine, then discard, the possibility that a materialist and objectivist theory of artifacts may be of help. And finally I briefly explore some ways in which a broad, pluralistic ECT may address some of these shortcomings.     

‘Ought Implies Can’: Not So Pragmatic After All

Those who want to deny the ‘ought implies can’ principle often turn to weakened views to explain ‘ought implies can’ phenomena. The two most common versions of such views are (a) that ‘ought’ presupposes ‘can’, and (b) that ‘ought’ conversationally implicates ‘can’. This paper will reject both views, and in doing so, present a case against any pragmatic view of ‘ought implies can’. Unlike much of the literature, I won't rely on counterexamples, but instead will argue that each of these views fails on its own terms. ‘Ought’ and ‘can’ do not obey the negation test for presupposition, and they do not obey the calculability or the cancelability tests for conversational implicature. I diagnose these failures as partly a result of the importance of the contrapositive of ‘ought implies can’. I end with a final argument emphasizing the role the principle plays in moral thinking, and the fact that no pragmatic account can do it justice.     

Catalysts for psychic change: Perspectives from contemporary psychoanalysis

This paper was given as the inaugural ‘Ellen Noonan Counselling Lecture’ on 3 July 2007, at Birkbeck College, University of London, and I have retained some of the spoken style of the original lecture. Since the 1960s, psychoanalytic models of change and growth have in themselves undergone radical changes. The aims of psychoanalytic and psychodynamic work are now less tied to a model of ‘health’ or ‘normality’ and more linked into processes that enable people to keep developing throughout life. The lecture examines some of the new theories of psychic change and growth from the contemporary Independent, Lacanian and post-Kleinian schools of psychoanalysis and, using clinical illustrations, explores the implications of these new theories for psychodynamic practice.     

Analyzing the Muddles of Analysis: (Some of) What Analytic Theologians Can Learn from the History of Analytic Feminism

Analytic theologians have ironically experienced difficulties in precisely defining the meaning of ‘analytic’ with respect to their style of theology. In this article, I turn to the history of a similar research project, analytic feminism, to see how it went about defining ‘analytic’ in relation to the typically non-analytic subject area of feminist studies. I then consider two commonly referred to attempts to define analytic theology, one methodological and the other socio-historical, and discuss shortcomings of each. I close with a new definition of analytic theology that aims to incorporate all the insights in the discussions which precede it.     

The concept of privilege: a critical appraisal

In this essay, I examine the use of the concept of privilege within the critical theoretical discourse on oppression and liberation (with a particular focus on white privilege and antiracism in the USA). In order to fulfill the rhetorical aims of liberation, concepts for privilege must meet what I term the ‘boundary condition’, which demarcates the boundary between a privileged elite and the rest of society, and the ‘ignorance condition’, which establishes that the elite status and the advantages it confers are not publicly recognised or affirmed. I argue that the dominant use of the concept of privilege cannot fulfill these conditions. As a result, while I do not advocate for the complete abandonment of the rhetoric of privilege, I conclude that it obscures as much as it illuminates, and that the critical theoretical discourse on liberation and oppression should be suspicious of its use.