Prior probabilities and representational momentum

In many previous experiments on representational momentum (in which memory for the final location of a moving target is displaced in the direction of target motion), participants judged whether a probe presented after a target vanished was at the same location where that target vanished or at a different location. The experiments reported here manipulated the actual or expected prior probability a same response to such a probe would be correct. In Experiment 1, a same response was correct on 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, or 90% of the trials, but observers were not instructed regarding these probabilities. In Experiment 2, a same response was correct on 11% of the trials, but different groups of participants were instructed that a same response would be correct on 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, or 90% of the trials. Probabilities of a same response to different probe positions, weighted mean estimates of representational momentum, hit rates and false alarm rates, and d′ and ß are reported. Representational momentum occurred in all conditions but was not influenced by actual or expected prior probability a same response would be correct. The data suggest representational momentum does not result from changes in sensitivity, and a distinction between performance bias and competence bias is introduced.     

Illusory motion and representational momentum

When a moving target vanishes abruptly, participants judge its final position as being ahead of its actual final position, in the direction of motion (representational momentum; Freyd & Finke, 1984). In the present study, we presented illusory motion and examined whether or not forward displacement was affected by the perceived direction and speed of the target. Experiments 1A and 1B showed that an illusory direction of movement of a target was perceived, and Experiment 2 showed that an illusory speed of a moving target was observed. However, neither the direction nor the magnitude of forward displacement was affected by these illusions. Therefore, it was suggested that the mechanism underlying forward displacement (or some extrapolation processing) uses different motion signals than does the perceptual mechanism.     

Psychosexuality and the representational world.

The sensual experiences, fantasies and enactments that occur in the course of normal development are seen as psychic organizers which contribute vitally to the structuralization of the representational world. In the sexual perversions which occur in structurally deficient, developmentally arrested individuals, this function of early psychosexual experiences has been retained and is regressively relied upon in order to restore or sustain the cohesion and stability of crumbling, fragmenting or disintegrating self and object representations. Analytic exploration of the details of perverse fantasies and acts, their origins and functions, reveals the particular ways in which they compensate for specific structural weaknesses in patients' representational worlds. Some clinical illustrations and therapeutic implications of these formulations are briefly presented.     

Husserl and the representational theory of mind

Husserl has finally begun to be recognized as the precursor of current interest in intentionality — the first to have a general theory of the role of mental representations in the philosophy of language and mind. As the first thinker to put directedness of mental representations at the center of his philosophy, he is also beginning to emerge as the father of current research in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence.My thanks to David Woodruff Smith and Frank McGuinness for their invaluable help with the issues addressed in this paper.     

速度知识和表征动量

通过3个实验探索速度知识和表征动量的关系。3个实验均使用2（速度知识：快、慢）×2（运动方向：左、右）的两因素实验设计,采用诱导运动范式,因变量为偏移加权均数。实验1使用汽车和自行车作为刺激材料,发现两者的前移量无差异;实验2使用人奔跑和站立姿势作为刺激材料,发现奔跑的前移量大于站立的前移量;实验3是控制实验,发现实验2的结果不是由水平视角差异造成的。结论：在有效启动速度概念的情况下,速度知识可以影响表征动量,但其影响可能相对微弱。     

Amygdala circuitry in attentional and representational processes

The amygdala has long been implicated in the display of emotional behavior and emotional information processing, especially in the context of aversive events. In this review, we discuss recent evidence that links the amygdala to several aspects of food-motivated associative learning, including functions often characterized as attention, reinforcement and representation. Each of these functions depends on the operation of separate amygdalar subsystems, through their connections with other brain systems. Notably, very different processing systems seem to be mediated by the central nucleus and basolateral amygdala, subregions of the amygdala that differ in their anatomy and in their connectivity. The basolateral amygdala is involved in the acquisition and representation of reinforcement value, apparently through its connections with ventral striatal dopamine systems and with the orbitofrontal cortex. The dentral nucleus, however, contributes heavily to attentional function in conditioning, by way of its influence on basal forebrain cholinergic systems and on the dorsolateral striatum.     

Temporal dynamics of generalization and representational distortion

Individuals generalize differently depending on the extent of their past experiences and what they learn from them. For instance, the peak of generalization can shift from a familiar stimulus to novel ones when the familiar stimulus has been repeatedly discriminated from another, similar stimulus. We examined how the amount of experience students had in discriminating complex sounds impacted their later generalization. As training increased, participants improved at distinguishing sounds, but their tendency to respond to certain novel sounds increased. With additional training, however, this shift dissipated. The results suggest that shifts in generalization may correspond to transitional states of perceptual learning and that learning-related changes in perceptual sensitivities involve more than just incremental increases in feature selectivity.     

Combining the representational and the relational view

Philosophical Studies - This paper tries to meet the three basic constraints in the metaphysics of perception—that, following Schellenberg (Philos Stud 149:19–48, 2010), I call here the...     

The structural theory and the representational world

I have attempted to articulate a means of incorporating representational world concepts firmly within the structural theory, while still maintaining their clarity, a view which I believe can be useful both clinically and theoretically. It can facilitate an analyst's working with complex clinical material that reflects conflicts at multiple developmental levels, without forcing a premature commitment to restrictive conceptualizations which could impede his listening to the full richness of the material. In addition, I have argued that the perpetual resurgences of representational world psychologies may be understood as an indication of the need for the inclusion of those phenomena in our theory in a clear and integrated way. Finally, I have presented some basis for suggesting that the drive-defense and the representational world models represent coordinate aspects of the structural theory, each with its vantage points for highlighting and clarifying certain phenomena, but best used complementarily in our observations of psychopathology at all levels of development. I do not believe this represents a totally new view or departure within psychoanalytic thinking. On the contrary, I have assembled, organized, and attempted to make explicit certain understandings which I believe we often apply naturally through the use of empathy and intuitive gifts. In an analysis which is going well, an analyst operating within a drive-defense framework is almost certainly finding some natural way of dealing with self and object issues, even if he does not formulate them explicitly to himself. To set down and make explicit, however, the functions we may much of the time perform without awareness is worthwhile preparation against times of difficulty in understanding a particular case. At those times we need at our disposal as specific, as inclusive, and as illuminating a theory as we can find to assist us. It is that clinical need which has guided me in these attempts at theoretical clarification.     

The phenomenology of representational awareness

The Eleventh Annual Aron Gurwitsch Memorial Lecture, presented under the sponsorship of the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology in conjunction with the meetings of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy and the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences at Villanova University on 12 October 1990.     

Fantasy,defense, and the representational world

This paper discusses the manipulation of mental representations, particularly in relation to the psychoanalytic concepts of conscious or unconscious fantasy. A distinction is made between the unconscious phenomenal (experiential) aspect of representations and the nonexperiential, quasi-structural aspect. The concept of the representational world is described and elaborated, and its development is seen as a consequence of the infant's interaction with itself and the external world. Processes such as identification and projection can be seen in terms of changes in self and object representations, and the same is true for all the mechanisms of defense. The content of unconscious wishes is transformed, by use of such mechanisms, into representations that are acceptable to consciousness. Major transformations of unconscious representational content occur in the process of creating unconscious (preconscious) fantasy, and further transformations are frequently needed before such (preconscious) fantasies are permitted access to consciousness. The concept of projective identification is considered in the light of the ideas put forward in the paper.     

The relationship between mental rotation and representational momentum

Two experiments explored a possible relationship between mental rotation and representational momentum, a task in which participants were asked to remember an object's position following a sequence of images implying motion. Typically, participants misremember the position as distorted forward along the implied trajectory. If representational momentum relies on mental imagery, the magnitude of memory distortion in a representational momentum task should be positively correlated with the rate of mental rotation. As predicted, faster mental rotation rates and larger memory distortions for object position were observed for rotational axes aligned with the viewers' coordinate system. In addition, participants with slower mental rotation rates produced smaller memory distortions in the implied-event task.     

The representational basis of syllable categories

Two hypotheses concerning the relation between phoneme and syllable categories are contrasted. The phonological hypothesis holds that phoneme categories are perceptually basic, whereas syllable categories are abstract and specify the phonological rules operating on phoneme categories. The integrative routine hypothesis suggests that whereas phoneme categories are basic, syllable categories are not entirely abstract but are represented at least partially on the basis of higher order perceptual information, specifying the dynamics of coarticulating phoneme categories. Three experiments used a primed naming task in which subjects had to name the entire syllable (consonant-vowel and vowel-consonant; Experiment 1), the syllable-initial phoneme category (Experiment 2), or the syllable-final phoneme category (Experiment 3). The results supported the integrative routine hypothesis. S.D. is a postdoctoral fellow of the Belgian Fund for Scientific Research.     

The pointedness effect on representational momentum

An observer's memory for the final position of a moving object is shifted forward in the direction of that object's motion. It is called representational momentum (RM). This study addressed stimulus-specific effects on RM. In Experiment 1, participants showed larger memory shift for an object moving in its typical direction of motion than when it moved in a nontypical direction of motion. In Experiment 2, participants indicated larger memory shift for a pointed pattern moving in the direction of its point than when it moved in the opposite direction. In Experiment 3, we again examined the influences of knowledge about objects' typical motions and the pointedness of objects, because we did not control the shape (pointedness) of objects in Experiment 1. The results showed that only pointedness affected the magnitude of memory shift and that the effect was smaller than the momentum effect.     

The representational framework in perceptual theory

The representational stance in perceptual theory is described and its proper domain of application is examined. A decision rule for invoking representation is proposed but, although the rule is principled, its implementation is problematic. Despite the widespread appeaLof therepresentational stance, detailed working out of the position within perceptual theory is still needed.