Computation without Representation

The received view is that computational states are individuated at least in part by their semantic properties. I offer an alternative, according to which computational states are individuated by their functional properties. Functional properties are specified by a mechanistic explanation without appealing to any semantic properties. The primary purpose of this paper is to formulate the alternative view of computational individuation, point out that it supports a robust notion of computational explanation, and defend it on the grounds of how computational states are individuated within computability theory and computer science. A secondary purpose is to show that existing arguments for the semantic view are defective.     

Anger arousal,deindividuation, and aggression

We tested the notion that angered persons' aggression would be increased through a process of excitation transfer when they are deindividuated, but that individuated subjects would be most aggressive in circumstances under which they could use the information that they had ingested an arousing drug as a pretext for their aggression. Sixty-two male undergraduates participated under either deindividuated or individuated conditions, ingested either 350 mg of caffeine or a placebo, were informed that they had either taken a stimulant or a nonarousing drug, and were all angered by a confederate. According to prediction, when deindividuated and aroused by caffeine the amount of noxious stimulation subjects delivered to the provocateur was greater if they believed that the drug they had taken was nonarousing than if they thought it was a stimulant; in contrast, individuated subjects' aggression was greater when aroused subjects believed the drug was a stimulant. The results are discussed in terms of excitation transfer and the effect of aggression inhibition on the use of information about one's arousal.     

Quidditism without quiddities

Structuralism and quidditism are competing views of the metaphysics of property individuation: structuralists claim that properties are individuated by their nomological roles; quidditists claim that they are individuated by something else. This paper (1) refutes what many see as the best reason to accept structuralism over quidditism and (2) offers a methodological argument in favor of a quidditism. The standard charge against quidditism is that it commits us to something ontologically otiose: intrinsic aspects of properties, so-called ??quiddities??. Here I grant that quiddities are ontologically otiose, but deny that quidditism requires them. According to a view I call ??austere quidditism??, properties are individuated by bare numerical identity. I argue that, as far as ontological parsimony is concerned, austere quidditism and structuralism are on a par. But is austere quidditism a coherent alternative to structuralism? To see that it is, we must get clear on what exactly we mean by ??property individuation??. What we discover is that structuralism is a counterpart theory for properties, and that austere quidditism is simply the rejection of counterpart theory. I conclude with a methodological argument to the effect that counterpart theory for properties ought to be rejected. This paper begins by situating the debate between structuralists and quidditists within the context of a debate over the epistemic limits of fundamental science. At the center of this debate is David Lewis??s posthumously published ??Ramseyan Humility?? (2008). In the appendix I explain the precise role of austere quidditism in Lewis??s argument.     

ILLOCUTION,SILENCING AND THE ACT OF REFUSAL

Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby argue that there may be a free‐speech argument against pornography, if pornographic speech has the power to illocutionarily silence women: women's locution ‘No!’ that aims to refuse unwanted sex may misfire because pornography creates communicative conditions where the locution does not count as a refusal. Central to this is the view that women's speech lacks uptake, which is necessary for illocutionary acts like that of refusal. Alexander Bird has critiqued this view by arguing that uptake is not necessary for the illocutionary act of refusal. The Hornsby‐Langton view, then, is philosophically indefensible. Here I defend the philosophical cogency of the Hornsby‐Langton approach.     

When infants talk,infants listen: pre‐babbling infants prefer listening to speech with infant vocal properties

To learn to produce speech, infants must effectively monitor and assess their own speech output. Yet very little is known about how infants perceive speech produced by an infant, which has higher voice pitch and formant frequencies compared to adult or child speech. Here, we tested whether pre‐babbling infants (at 4–6 months) prefer listening to vowel sounds with infant vocal properties over vowel sounds with adult vocal properties. A listening preference favoring infant vowels may derive from their higher voice pitch, which has been shown to attract infant attention in infant‐directed speech (IDS). In addition, infants' nascent articulatory abilities may induce a bias favoring infant speech given that 4‐ to 6‐month‐olds are beginning to produce vowel sounds. We created infant and adult /i/ (‘ee’) vowels using a production‐based synthesizer that simulates the act of speaking in talkers at different ages and then tested infants across four experiments using a sequential preferential listening task. The findings provide the first evidence that infants preferentially attend to vowel sounds with infant voice pitch and/or formants over vowel sounds with no infant‐like vocal properties, supporting the view that infants' production abilities influence how they process infant speech. The findings with respect to voice pitch also reveal parallels between IDS and infant speech, raising new questions about the role of this speech register in infant development. Research exploring the underpinnings and impact of this perceptual bias can expand our understanding of infant language development.     

Art Media and the Sense Modalities: Tactile Pictures

It is widely assumed that the art media can be individuated with reference to the sense modalities. Different art media are perceived by means of different sense modalities, and this tells us what properties of each medium are aesthetically relevant. The case of pictures appears to fit this principle well, for pictures are deemed purely and paradigmatically visual representations. However, recent psychological studies show that congenitally and early blind people have the ability to interpret and make raised-line drawings through touch. This shows that pictures are not essentially visual representations. The view that pictures are essentially visual follows from influential views of the nature of depiction and of the nature of vision that are mistaken. By rooting out the mistake, we learn something about pictures, something about vision, and something about the doctrine that art media are individuated by the sense modalities.     

Voluntary stuttering suppresses true stuttering: a window on the speech perception-production link

In accord with a proposed innate link between speech perception and production (e.g., motor theory), this study provides compelling evidence for the inhibition of stuttering events in people who stutter prior to the initiation of the intended speech act, via both the perception and the production of speech gestures. Stuttering frequency during reading was reduced in 10 adults who stutter by approximately 40% in three of four experimental conditions: (1) following passive audiovisual presentation (i.e., viewing and hearing) of another person producing pseudostuttering (stutter-like syllabic repetitions) and following active shadowing of both (2) pseudostuttered and (3) fluent speech. Stuttering was not inhibited during reading following passive audiovisual presentation of fluent speech. Syllabic repetitions can inhibit stuttering both when produced and when perceived, and we suggest that these elementary stuttering forms may serve as compensatory speech gestures for releasing involuntary stuttering blocks by engaging mirror neuronal systems that are predisposed for fluent gestural imitation.     

Les gestes en autoconfrontation croisée : enjeux et pratiques

This article aims to show how the relationship between gestures and speech can help understand mechanisms of activity's development. In situation of self-confrontation work analysis between two workers, we study more precisely the repetition of a sweep gesture made by one of the two professionals and repeated by the other one. We argue that this type of repetition highlights development of activities mechanisms. From two extracts from a cross self-confrontation, we analyze the coordination between speech and gestures. We finally show that mismatches between gestures and speech make possible to understand development of activity of these professionals in this particular context. As a conclusion, the hypothesis that this development may be one of the origins of the transformation of action in ordinary work situations is advanced.     

Conditional advice and inducements: are readers sensitive to implicit speech acts during comprehension?

Conditionals can implicitly convey a range of speech acts including promises, tips, threats and warnings. These are traditionally divided into the broader categories of advice (tips and warnings) and inducements (promises and threats). One consequence of this distinction is that speech acts from within the same category should be harder to differentiate than those from different categories. We examined this in two self-paced reading experiments. Experiment 1 revealed a rapid processing penalty when inducements (promises) and advice (tips) were anaphorically referenced using a mismatching speech act. In Experiment 2 a delayed penalty was observed when a speech act (promise or threat) was referenced by a mismatching speech act from the same category of inducements. This suggests that speech acts from the same category are harder to discriminate than those from different categories. Our findings not only support a semantic distinction between speech act categories, but also reveal pragmatic differences within categories.     

Straight talk: conceptions of sincerity in speech

What is it for a speech act to be sincere? The most common answer amongst philosophers is that a speech act is sincere if and only if the speaker is in the state of mind that the speech act functions to express. However, a number of philosophers have advanced counterexamples purporting to demonstrate that having the expressed state of mind is neither necessary nor sufficient for speaking sincerely. One may nevertheless doubt whether these considerations refute the orthodox conception. Instead, it may be argued, they expose other ways of elucidating sincerity in speech. “Sincerity in speech” is ambivalent between a number of different conceptions. Against this background this paper presents two alternative conceptions, viz., Sincerity as Spontaneity and Sincerity as Presenting Oneself as one takes Oneself to be and develops a third conception which we may call Sincerity as a Communicative Virtue. This conception emphasizes the speaker’s intention in communicating her attitudes and the need to be properly justified in saying what one does.     

On fineness of grain

A central job for propositions is to be the objects of the attitudes. Propositions are the things we doubt, believe and suppose. Some philosophers have thought that propositions are sets of possible worlds. But many have become convinced that such an account individuates propositions too coarsely. This raises the question of how finely propositions should be individuated. An account of how finely propositions should be individuated on which they are individuated very finely is sketched. Objections to the effect that the account individuates propositions too finely are raised and responses to the objections are provided. It is also shown that theories that try to individuate propositions less finely have serious problems.     

Conversation,speech acts,and memory

Speakers frequently have specific intentions that they want others to recognize (Grice, 1957). These specific intentions can be viewed as speech acts (Searle, 1969), and I argue that they play a role in long-term memory for conversation utterances. Five experiments were conducted to examine this idea. Participants in all experiments read scenarios ending with either a target utterance that performed a specific speech act (brag, beg, etc.) or a carefully matched control. Participants were more likely to falsely recall and recognize speech act verbs after having read the speech act version than after having read the control version, and the speech act verbs served as better recall cues for the speech act utterances than for the controls. Experiment 5 documented individual differences in the encoding of speech act verbs. The results suggest that people recognize and retain the actions that people perform with their utterances and that this is one of the organizing principles of conversation memory.     

Irrelevant speech effects and sequence learning

The irrelevant speech effect is the finding that performance on serial recall tasks is impaired by the presence of irrelevant background speech. According to the object-oriented episodic record (O-OER) model, this impairment is due to a conflict of order information from two different sources: the seriation of the irrelevant speech and the rehearsal of the order of the to-be-remembered items. We tested the model's prediction that irrelevant speech should impair performance on other tasks that involve seriation. Experiments 1 and 2 verified that both an irrelevant speech effect and a changing state effect would obtain in a between-subjects design in which a standard serial recall measure was used, allowing employment of a between-subjects design in subsequent experiments. Experiment 3 showed that performance on a sequence-learning task was impaired by the presence of irrelevant speech, and Experiment 4 verified that performance is worse when the irrelevant speech changes more (the changing state effect). These findings support the prediction made by the O-OER model that one essential component to the irrelevant speech effect is serial order information.     

Meaning and mind: Wittgenstein's relevance for the ‘Does Language Shape Thought?’ debate

This paper explores the relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology for the two major contemporary approaches to the relation between language and cognition. As Pinker describes it, on the ‘Standard Social Science Model’ language is ‘an insidious shaper of thought’. According to Pinker's own widely-shared alternative view, ‘Language is the magnificent faculty that we use to get thoughts from one head to another’. I investigate Wittgenstein's powerful challenges to the hypothesis that language is a device for communicating independently constituted (or individuated) thoughts. I argue that Wittgenstein offers instead a subtle version of the thesis that language determines thought.     

The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents

In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of thinking, considering recent claims that phenomenal character individuates thought contents. We present one prominent way for defenders of phenomenal intentionality to develop that view and then examine ‘sensory inner speech views’, which provide an alternative way of accounting for thought‐content determinacy. We argue that such views fare well with inner speech thinking but have problems accounting for unsymbolized thinking. Within this dialectic, we present an account of the nature of unsymbolized thinking that accords with and can be seen as a continuation of the activity of inner speech, while offering a way of explaining thought‐content determinacy in terms of linguistic structures and representations.     

Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support

We show that the contemporary debate surrounding the question “What is the norm of assertion?” presupposes what we call the quantitative view, i.e. the view that this question is best answered by determining how much epistemic support is required to warrant assertion. We consider what Jennifer Lackey (2010) has called cases of isolated second-hand knowledge and show—beyond what Lackey has suggested herself—that these cases are best understood as ones where a certain type of understanding, rather than knowledge, constitutes the required epistemic credential to warrant assertion. If we are right that understanding (and not just knowledge) is the epistemic norm for a restricted class of assertions, then this straightforwardly undercuts not only the widely supposed quantitative view, but also a more general presupposition concerning the universalisability of some norm governing assertion—the presumption (almost entirely unchallenged since Williamson’s 1996 paper) that any epistemic norm that governs some assertions should govern assertions—as a class of speech act—uniformly.     

The Pornography/Civil Rights Ordinance v. The BOG: And the Winner Is…?

The Supreme Court dismissed the Pornography/Civil Rights Ordinance as an unconstitutional restriction of speech. The Court's dismissal itself violates the free speech of the proposers of the Ordinance. It is not possible for both pornographers to perform the speech act of making pornography and feminists to perform the speech act of proposing the Ordinance. I show that the speech act of proposing the Ordinance takes First Amendment precedence over the speech act of making pornography.     

Comprehending illocutionary force

According to speech act theory (Searle, 1969), utterances have both a propositional content and an illocutionary force (the speech act performed with the utterance). Four experiments were conducted to examine whether utterance comprehension involves speech act recognition. Participants in all experiments first read remarks that could be characterized by a particular speech act (e.g., beg). A recognition probe reaction time procedure was used in Experiments 1 and 2; participants indicated whether a probe word had literally appeared in the last remark that they had read. Participants were significantly slower at making this judgment (and made significantly more errors) when the probe represented the speech act performed with the prior remark than when it did not. A lexical decision task was used in Experiments 3 and 4, and participants were significantly faster at verifying target words representing the speech act performed with a remark, relative to control words. Overall, the results suggest that speech act recognition may be an important component of the comprehension of conversational remarks.