Fracturing Over Creation Care? Shifting Environmental Beliefs Among Evangelicals, 1984–2010

While evangelicals have been popularly portrayed as caring primarily about social issues including abortion and homosexuality, there have been more reports in recent years of evangelical leaders, congregations, and institutions shifting focus to environmental issues. Are evangelicals shifting attention to and becoming more progressive in their views on the environment? Moreover, are evangelicals fracturing over the issue of environmentalism, as some have suggested? Using content analysis of three evangelical periodicals (Christianity Today, Sojourners, and World) from 1984 to 2010, I find not only that attention to environmental issues has increased over time, but also that the discussion has grown increasingly polarized and politicized. This change represents a potentially important break with the Republican Party and the Christian Right, as moderate evangelicals have moved to the left on environmental issues. Even among highly religious, self‐identified evangelical political elites, there is more diversity in views and political leanings than is commonly assumed. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of a lack of alignment between evangelical elites, traditional Christian Right leaders, and the Republican Party.     

Generational Conversion? The Role of Religiosity in the Politics of Evangelicals

The political environment for evangelical Protestants has changed substantially since the Christian Right reached its apex, as a more issue and ideologically diffuse political environment has emerged. The present study tests two different theoretical perspectives on whether these contextual changes may have altered Millennial evangelicals’ political perspectives vis‐à‐vis those of previous generations of evangelicals. On the one hand, theoretical perspectives related to differential political socialization processes across generations would lead to expectations of generational change among evangelicals. On the other hand, theoretical perspectives related to social identity theory would suggest far less change across generations. Using Pew's 2007 U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, we test these expectations by comparing the relationships between religiosity and political attitudes across three generations of evangelicals. Ordered probit and logistic regression models estimate the impact of religiosity on various political attitudes. These models reveal that Millennial evangelical religiosity continues to be strongly related to Republican Party identification and opposition toward abortion, which is largely consistent with the social identity perspective. Generational change is most evident in a variety of nonsocial issues in which religiosity is associated with less conservatism among Millennials. Additional analysis using the 2012 Religion and Politics Survey with a smaller sample of Millennial evangelicals confirms these results.     

The Liberalization of Young Evangelicals: A Research Note

Media outlets and observers of American religion suggest that young evangelicals are retreating from the ranks of the “Christian right” and are embracing more liberal positions on controversial social issues. We test this hypothesis using the Baylor Religion Survey. We examine two separate measures of evangelical identity as well as a wide variety of political identifications and attitudes. Our study indicates that young evangelicals (1) are significantly more likely than older evangelicals to think that more should be done to protect the environment; (2) hold views similar to older evangelicals regarding abortion, same‐sex marriage, stem cell research, marijuana use, government welfare spending, spending on the nation's health, and the war in Iraq; and (3) remain significantly more conservative than nonevangelicals on these same social issues. We find no strong evidence to support the notion that young evangelicals are retreating from traditional positions or increasingly adopting more liberal positions on hot‐button or controversial social issues.     

Compassionate Conservatives? Evangelicals,Economic Conservatism,and National Identity

In the United States, white evangelicals are more economically conservative than other Americans. It is commonly assumed that white evangelicals oppose redistributive social policies because of their individualistic theology. Yet Canadian evangelicals are just as supportive of redistributive social policy as other Canadians, even though they share the same tools of conservative Protestant theology. To solve this puzzle, I use multi‐sited ethnography to compare how two evangelical congregations in the United States and Canada talked about poverty and the role of government. In both countries, evangelicals made sense of their religious responsibilities to “the poor” by reference to national identity. Evangelicals used their theological tools differently in the United States and Canada because different visions of national solidarity served as cultural anchors for religious discourse about poverty. To understand the political and civic effects of religion, scholars need to consider the varied ways that religious groups imagine national community within religious practice.     

Pentecostal Affiliation

Although Pentecostal Protestants are often included under the broad term “evangelical Protestant,” research suggests that Pentecostals are distinct from other evangelical Protestants in their religious and secular beliefs and activities. In this research note, we demonstrate the practicality and effectiveness of a religious classification that accounts for differences between affiliates of Pentecostal denominations and affiliates of other Protestant denominations. Analysis of nationally representative survey data shows that affiliates of evangelical Protestant and Pentecostal Protestant denominations differ in their levels of education, religious beliefs, attitudes on social issues, and political ideology. These differences are largely congruent with theoretical expectations of differences among Protestant subgroups. The classification of Pentecostal denominations presented in this research note is an important tool for researchers, which can be applied to a wide range of social scientific inquiries.     

The Social Context of Organized Nonbelief: County‐Level Predictors of Nonbeliever Organizations in the United States

Many recent social scientific studies have noted that the percentage of Americans with no religious affiliation is on the rise, but few have examined the nonbeliever organizations that some of these “nones” might join. This study uses an original data set, the first attempt at documenting the population of local nonbeliever organizations in the United States, to explore where these groups are more likely to flourish. Though one might assume that less religious counties, as measured by the percentage of those with no stated religious affiliation, would be more likely to contain nonbeliever organizations, this article provides evidence that they emerge more frequently and in greater numbers in counties with proportionally more evangelical Protestants. The percentage of evangelicals among a county's population is strongly associated with both the existence (dichotomously coded) and the number of nonbeliever organizations, even when controlling for a range of demographic and institutional factors.     

The Young and the Restless? The Liberalization of Young Evangelicals

This study examines popular and scholarly perceptions that young American evangelicals are becoming more liberal than older evangelicals. Young evangelicals are more likely to have more liberal attitudes on same‐sex marriage, premarital sex, cohabitating, and pornography, but not abortion. This analysis is situated within the theoretical context of emerging adulthood, and considers higher education, delayed marriage, and shifts in moral authority as potential mediating factors accounting for age differences. A new method for operationalizing evangelical as a religious identity is suggested and three different classification schemes are examined: religious tradition, self‐identified evangelicals, and theologically conservative Protestants. The data come from the 2006 Panel Study of American Religion and Ethnicity.     

Denominational Differences in Support for Race-Based Policies Among White, Black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans

This study builds upon past studies of denominational culture and racial attitudes by positioning evangelicals as the basis of comparison when assessing denominational differences in American racial attitudes. The study also attempts to extend the theoretical contribution of religious culture and racial attitudes by assessing support for race-based policies among black, white, Hispanic, and Asian-American evangelical and nonevangelical Protestants. In short, arguments about a distinctive individualistic religious culture among evangelicals may be useful in explaining why white evangelicals maintain lower levels of support for policies aimed at reducing racial inequality than do mainline and secular whites. However, it is of less relevance in explaining the race-based policy attitudes of white evangelicals relative to white Catholics and among nonwhites as a whole.     

Belonging Without Belonging: Utilizing Evangelical Self-Identification to Analyze Political Attitudes and Preferences

Research typically defines evangelical belonging as affiliation with an evangelical denomination, but this approach excludes many self-identified evangelicals, even though previous studies of religious groups find that self-identification is a powerful predictor of political preferences. Using data from the National Survey of Religion and Politics, we investigate the usefulness of self-identification for classifying evangelicals. The effects of three types of evangelical belonging (religious tradition-only, self-identification-only, and a combination of religious tradition and self-identification) on respondents' political attitudes, party identification, and vote choice suggest that religious tradition is a good predictor of political attitudes while self-identification is a good predictor of party identification. We conclude that self-identification and tradition are both important to understanding evangelicalism and politics in America.     

The Politics of the Willow Creek Association Pastors

The Willow Creek Association (WCA), a loose association of some 8,000 churches with a common interest in evangelizing using the "seeker" model pioneered by the Willow Creek Community Church, is a good example of a postmodern religious association. A survey of clergy whose churches belong to WCA reveals the membership of the WCA to be diverse, with a large membership from mainline and evangelical denominations. However, the clergy are orthodox in theology, conservative in social theology and on political issues, and generally Republican in partisanship. These pastors are also very active in politics and their churches are deeply involved in the provision of social services. Differences among WCA pastors, especially between the mainline and evangelical Protestants, suggest that the WCA will not evolve into a denomination in the near future. However, the communalities among these clergy reveal the potential of postmodern associations to serve as a forum for cross-denominational coalition building on key issues.     

Evangelical Civil War on the College Campus,White Evangelical Right Framing Resistance to Racial Justice in 2020s America

This paper examines a civil war brewing among evangelicals on the college campus over racial justice—calls for greater racial equality, equity, and inclusion—in the era of Black Lives Matter (BLM). It examines how the white evangelical right are framing their resistance to racial justice and redrawing the color line in the contemporary college evangelical landscape not with distant “social justice warriors” in broader secular society, but with those right inside their evangelical community who, at varying levels, are coming out in support for racial justice in 2020s America. To do this, I first examine the varied campus evangelicals that support racial justice and how they express and frame their support as proper religious practice. I then explicate how the white evangelical right utilize a strategy of colorblind-othering to fight against these co-evangelicals that support racial justice. Data for the study come from the Landscape Study of Chaplaincy and Campus Ministry (2019–22).     

Social Support and the Religious Dimensions of Close Ties

Despite the influence of social support on physical and mental health, few studies have examined why some close ties are more supportive than others. Though religion provides a rich context for social interaction and a meaningful social identity, it has received little attention in the social support literature. A growing literature on religion and health offers insight into how religion affects social support processes. Using dyadic network data derived from the nationally representative 2006 Portraits of American Life Study, I examine how the religious dimensions of close, nonhousehold ties relate to provision of social support. Results from logistic regression analyses indicate that (controlling for a range of other social tie characteristics) same‐faith ties are significantly more likely to be sources of help “in times of need,” while religious discussion is a strong predictor of receiving both help and advice. The effect of religious homophily is strongest for evangelical Protestants and African‐American Protestants. My findings underscore the need for social support researchers to consider the role of religion in shaping support processes in close relationships.     

Who's Right About the Right? Comparing Competing Explanations of the Link Between White Evangelicals and Conservative Politics in the United States

Five competing explanations for why white evangelicals hold right‐of‐center political attitudes are examined using data from the 2000–2004 National Election Studies. Dependent variables include attitudes about abortion, homosexuality, immigration, national defense, and social spending. The five competing explanations accounting for conservative positions are: religiosity, moral standards traditionalism, gender and family ideology, class culture, and cultural geography. Moral standards traditionalism attenuated the evangelical effect on attitudes about abortion, homosexuality, and social spending. Religiosity and male‐dominant gender ideology attenuated the effect on abortion and homosexuality only. In a second set of models, which include members of all major religious groups, these three variables, together with low levels of education, were significantly associated with conservative attitudes. Moral standards traditionalism demonstrated the most consistent, and generally the strongest, effects across dependent variables.     

The Politics of Religious Nones

Americans with no religious affiliation (aka religious “Nones”) are not a politically homogeneous community. Just as there are political differences between groups of Christians, there are political differences between groups of religious Nones. I use nationally representative survey data to examine the political activities and perspectives of atheists, agnostics, and those who are “nothing in particular.” Results show that Americans who report that their religion is nothing in particular are relatively uninterested in politics and unlikely to be politically active; atheists are relatively liberal and likely to experience political conflict and follow political news; and agnostics are particularly likely to vote and feel politically isolated from their families. In many ways, the “softer” secularism of those who are nothing in particular is politically more similar to religious affiliates than the “harder” secularism of agnostics and especially atheists. These results have important implications for the future of American politics as Nones now have the potential to rival evangelical Protestants as a politically relevant constituency.     

Religiosity and Swedish Opinion on the European Union

This article examines whether religiosity affects Swedish opinion on the European Union (EU) using survey data from 1998 conducted by the SOM Institute, Göteborg University. The findings support the notion that religiosity affects Swedish EU opinion. Members of the free churches (nonconformist Protestants) tend to oppose Swedish EU membership, whereas no such tendency is visible among active members of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Sweden (the traditional state church). Members of immigrant churches and adherents to non-Christian religions tend to support Swedish EU membership. The difference between the Church of Sweden and the free churches is explained by the uneven distribution of evangelical values. Support for Swedish EU membership is on the same low level among evangelicals and equally high among mainline Protestants in both religious orientations. Controlling for demographic factors does not change the conclusions.     

The death and resurrection of the American religious marketplace

This article expands upon existing academic literature examining both the decline and fragmentation of the American Christian Right. Specifically, it explores the impact of a fragmented evangelical body from a religious market perspective. It asserts that recent declines in evangelical church membership are largely due to the over-generality of its message, which in and of itself is a by-product of the broadcast age. Predictably, this over-generality has failed to cater to the diverse theological and spiritual needs of American churchgoers. However, with the rapid proliferation of Internet technologies, new religious frontiers are being explored and, as a result, many Christians are going elsewhere to tend to their spiritual needs. This process further reinforces the fragmentation of the evangelical body. This article similarly considers how with the growth of new and divergent religious movements, such as creation care and the emerging church, new religious leaders are finding their voice and preaching a message that diverges significantly from the old evangelical vanguard. While some might be tempted to view these developments in purely theological terms, the cultural fragmentation of the American evangelical community is not just a religious issue. A vibrant religious marketplace threatens the religious monopoly of the Christian Right, and by extension, the articulation of social conservatism and Republican politics. As new religious movements grow, so too do new conceptualisations and understandings of what it means to be a Christian and to hold Christian values. In facilitating the breakdown of the religious monologue of the Christian Right, the Internet is unsettling long-established political coalitions and giving rise to new political realities. To support these claims, this article relies on the combination of previous academic works, the reporting of recent religious and political developments, as well as personal interviews. The aim of this article is to provide a rich textual account of the state of evangelical Christianity as it is lived and experienced in a new media saturated environment.     

Specifying the Impact of Conservative Protestantism on Educational Attainment

Recent studies have demonstrated that conservative Protestantism negatively affects educational advancement. However, these studies have treated conservative Protestantism as a monolithic religious bloc that uniformly constrains achieving higher education. Disaggregating conservative Protestantism into fundamentalists, Pentecostals, and evangelicals reveals that the relationship between conservative Protestantism and educational attainment is more complex than recently shown. Findings from a nationally representative sample of Americans show that fundamentalists and Pentecostals are generally less likely to be college educated relative to other religious groups and nonreligious affiliates. The findings also show that not only are evangelicals more likely to be college educated than fundamentalists and Pentecostals, but with the exception of Jews, they are as likely or more likely than other religious groups and nonreligious affiliates to be college educated. This article suggests that different cultural traditions explain the variation in educational attainment among conservative Protestants .     

Is the Market Moral? Protestant Assessments of Market Society

Is the market moral? Do different Protestant traditions have competing views of “market society”? Despite the increasing diffusion of market logics in American society, scholars of religion have little empirical data on these questions. Employing discourse analysis of market-related topics in two prominent Christian periodicals over a twenty-year period, this paper compares evangelical and mainline Protestant evaluations of markets. We find that neither group views markets as redeeming, self-regulating, or value neutral, and both groups argue that markets require constraints. Evangelicals prioritize moral constraints on markets, while mainline Protestants prioritize governmental and democratic constraints. The degree of difference between the groups varies considerably by topic, however, depending on the degree of potential state intervention. We close by discussing our findings in light of recent debates over the relationship between religious conservatism and economic conservatism. We find that economic conservatism among evangelicals is driven at least as much by a commitment to collective voluntarism as by atomized individualism or free market ideology.     

Measuring Evangelicalism: Consequences of Different Operationalization Strategies

Several investigations of American evangelicalism have been conducted in recent decades, yet they conceptualize evangelicalism in different ways. It is not surprising, therefore, that different profiles of the evangelical movement and its adherents emerge from these studies. This research reviews major studies on the subject undertaken since 1976, when evangelicals first attracted national attention. Using data collected in a single data set—the 1998 General Social Survey—we show how measurement strategies employed in different studies yield drastically different pictures of evangelicalism. Conservative measures indicate that only one in 20 Americans is evangelical while one in two is evangelical according to a combination of more expansive measures. The demographic, cultural, and religious characteristics of evangelicals, as well as theories about them, hinge upon how the population is defined.     

Narrating and Navigating Authorities: Evangelical and Mainline Protestant Interpretations of the Bible and Science

Research on the way Protestants interpret the Bible in relationship to science has tended to focus on biblical literalists; less research, however, has examined the heterogeneity of how nonliteralists interpret the Bible. Utilizing data from semi‐structured interviews with 77 evangelical and mainline Protestants who attend high‐SES congregations, we find that members of both groups draw on similar interpretation strategies in discussing the Bible and evolution. Both eschew literal interpretations of the Bible, demarcate boundaries between the Bible and science, and subsume evolution under broader theological beliefs. Mainline Protestants and evangelicals differ in the way they interpret miracles, with mainline Protestants revealing more openness to scientific and social interpretations of the Bible's miracles, while evangelicals emphasize God's authority over nature. Findings show that different strategies are evoked depending on the issue discussed, revealing implications for a deeper understanding of the way different traditions provide resources for interpreting the Bible and its relationship to scientific issues. Finally, findings contribute to a more robust knowledge of boundary work between the Bible and science as institutional and epistemic authorities.