The Historical Development of the Written Discourses on Ubuntu

Abstract

In this article, I demonstrate that the term ‘ubuntu’ has frequently appeared in writing since at least 1846. I also analyse changes in how ubuntu has been defined in written sources in the period 1846 to 2011. The analysis shows that in written sources published prior to 1950, it appears that ubuntu is always defined as a human quality. At different stages during the second half of the 1900s, some authors began to define ubuntu more broadly: definitions included ubuntu as African humanism, a philosophy, an ethic, and as a worldview. Furthermore, my findings indicate that it was during the period from 1993 to 1995 that the Nguni proverb ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ (often translated as ‘a person is a person through other persons’) was used for the first time to describe what ubuntu is. Most authors today refer to the proverb when describing ubuntu, irrespective of whether they consider ubuntu to be a human quality, African humanism, a philosophy, an ethic, or a worldview.     

Inheritance,Originality and the Will: Bergson and Heidegger on Creation

Abstract

In the work of Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger we find different responses to traditional ideas of ‘creation’. Bergson advances a philosophy of creation, wherein ‘creation’ is presented as the production of a ‘radical’ or ‘absolute’ novelty, not only in art, but in all forms of human experience and biological life. Heidegger, in contrast, comes to criticise ideas of ‘creation’ in art as the expression of an alienated ‘humanism’ and ‘subjectivism’ essential to the modern age. This paper illuminates this divergence by showing how Bergson and Heidegger, despite appearances, grapple with the question of art-production – and with the attendant issues of inheritance and originality – in similar ways. It is only in recognising this proximity, I argue, that it is possible to perceive adequately what essentially distinguishes their approaches: Bergson’s conception of creation as a function of the will.     

Discourse,agency and the question of evil

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of evil from an ethical and discourse-analytical perspective, taking Joan Copjec’s commentary on Kant’s notion of ‘radical evil’ and its relation to human freedom as its point of departure. Specifically, Copjec’s argument, that for Kant (and, one may add, for Lacan) the subject is always “in excess of itself”, provides an important foil for, or corrective to what may seem to be the upshot of Foucault’s notion of discourse (its heuristic value notwithstanding). The latter entails that, insofar as the subject is ineluctably discursively constructed, its actions could be understood as being ‘determined’ by the discursive structure of (its) subjectivity. That is, the subject as agent may seem to lack volitional freedom in the sense that it is merely an instrument of a certain discourse by which it is ’spoken‘. However, Kant’s idea of ’radical evil‘, it is further argued, presupposes that the subject is free, in other words, that it always exceeds itself. In Foucault’ s terms, this would mean that the subject of discourse is able to adopt a counter-discursive position - something Foucault sometimes seems to make room for. What Kant calls ‘radical evil’ may be understood as something that occurs in the world through human agency, in the face of the possibility of an alternative course of action; that is, it is chosen - even if we only know this in retrospect through the phenomenon of guilt. i, in contrast, it is understood as being ‘diabolical’ in the sense of being unavoidably and irresistibly part and parcel of human ‘nature’, no one could condemn it in moral terms. This line of thinking is fleshed out, or given concrete significance by means of a discourse-analysis of documents pertaining to the so-called ‘ripper-rapist’ (criminal) case in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, in the mid-1990s.     

WORLDLY AND UNWORLDLY FEELINGS,FABRICATION AND LETTING GO

ABSTRACT

This paper proposes a framework for understanding vedanā and emotion in relation to each other, and both of them in relation to awakening. The vedanā (or feeling tone) that arises in mental experience will be shown to be central to emotion. Western views of emotion will be examined alongside some of the Buddha’s teachings on vedanā. The paper will show mental vedanā, and human emotion in the context of the two psychological orientations of ‘fabrication’ and ‘letting go’, which are then correlated with the Buddha’s notions of ‘worldly’ and ‘unworldly’ feelings. The paper proposes that such contextualisation is useful towards the development of a clear intellectual understanding of the nature of feelings, while (more importantly) it could support practitioners in a process of meditative inquiry and transformation.     

Spinoza on the Conditions that Nominally Define the Human Condition

ABSTRACT

In ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,’ Harry Frankfurt argues that a successful analysis of the concept ‘human’ must reveal something that distinguishes humans from non-humans, as well as indicate something informative about ‘those attributes [of ourselves] which are the subject of our most humane concern.’ In this paper, I present an analysis of Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ as it is employed within his Ethics. I show that Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ satisfies Frankfurt’s desiderata because I show that Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ is, at core, a version of Frankfurt’s own. I argue that Spinoza’s account of human bondage and human freedom indicate that Spinoza sees humans as beings that possess higher-order volitions, and that comments Spinoza makes throughout his corpus shows that he views beings that lack higher order desires to be, in an important sense, non-human. The analysis here sheds light upon the community of entities that Spinoza’s Ethics is written for, as well as upon issues concerning the nature of Spinoza’s Free Man.     

From Pussy Riot’s ‘punk prayer’ to Matilda: Orthodox believers,critique, and religious freedom in Russia

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the configurations of belief, critique, and religious freedom in Russia since the performance of the Russian group Pussy Riot in 2012. The ‘punk prayer’ and its legal and political aftermath are interpreted as an incidence of the contestation of the boundary between the secular and the religious in the Russian legal and social sphere. The authors show that the outcome of this contestation has had a decisive impact on the way in which religion, critique, and the human right of religious freedom have been defined in the present Russian context. In response to Pussy Riot, the Russian legislator turned offending religious feelings into a crime. The article investigates two more recent cases where offended feelings of believers were involved, the opera “Tannhäuser” in Ekaterinburg in 2015 and the movie Matilda in 2017, and analyses how the initial power-conforming configuration that emerged as a reply to the ‘punk prayer’ has revealed a ‘power-disturbing’ potential as conservative Orthodox groups have started to challenge the authority of the State and the Church leadership. The article is based on primary sources from Russian debates surrounding Pussy Riot, Matilda, and “Tannhäuser” and on theoretical literature on the religious–secular boundary and human rights.     

The Virtue of Dialogue,Dialogue as Virtue in Plato's Protagoras

Abstract

This article interprets Plato's Protagoras as a defense, against the claim of the sophists to possess a skill of teaching virtue, of Socrates’ claim in the Apology (38a) that the greatest good for a human being is examining oneself and others every day with regard to virtue. Attention to the often-neglected complex series of prologues as well as the dispute about method at the dialogue's center shows both the erotic and the dialogical character of Socratic virtue. Specifically, human virtue turns out to be a process of becoming as opposed to being good that can be carried out only in constant dialogue with others. In this context, the ‘science of measurement’ Socrates describes on behalf of Protagoras and the other sophists is exposed for what it is: a delusion that continues to exert its power over us today on account of the recurrent human wish to possess a skill or technique that could save us by guaranteeing the goodness and happiness of our lives.     

Arrested Development: On Hegel,Heidegger and Derrida

ABSTRACT

Although both Heidegger and Derrida criticize Hegel as the archetype and historical culmination of the metaphysics of presence, Hegel’s dialectics also serves as a model for their critical destruction or deconstruction of metaphysics. Through an analysis of the notions of ‘arrest’ and ‘halt’ in Derrida and Hegel, this paper will show how both Heidegger and Derrida take up elements of Hegel’s theory of the development of consciousness, which is characterized both by an ‘unhalting forward motion’ but also by delay, interruption and inertia. This paper will develop the strange parallel between Derrida’s notion of l’arrêt and the halting movement of spirit in Hegel. It will show that Hegel’s ‘rhythm of the concept’ is not so distant from the ‘arrhythmia’ Derrida finds in the notion of l’arrêt. It will thus show how time, history and spirit are linked in a self-deconstructive manner in this unstable point of the arrest/halt.     

Post/Human Conditions

Abstract

Perhaps one of the most pressing issues for the twenty-first century will be the impact of new technologies on our experiences and understandings of what it means to be human. For many commentators, this signals the advent of the ‘posthuman condition’, in which digital technologies will have the capacity to reconfigure our conceptions of space and time; cybernetic devices will enhance and augment bodies and minds; and genetic modification will challenge the fixity of ‘human nature’ at the most fundamental level. This article examines some of the most influential discourses—from science, ethics and popular culture—that promise to shape the choices and values determining how such technologies will be used, and to what ends. Closer analysis reveals a multiplicity of visions of ‘posthuman conditions’, however, informed by a diversity of philosophical, ethical, political — and theological—understandings of what it means to be human in an age of technology; and this article proposes the terminology of ‘post/human’ as a critical device designed to alert us to the choices and values inherent in our engagement with our tools and technologies. The article concludes by advancing some themes by which a deeper theological critique of the post/human might be conducted: transcendence, sacramentality and creativity, divine and human.     

Understanding behavioural clusters: Identifying differences between clusters of health behaviours on key constructs

Objective: To uncover the rationale underlying the perceived distinction between clusters of health behaviours by identifying cognitive constructs that differentiate among them, and creating a ‘cognitive profile’ for each behavioural cluster. Thus, different determinants and characteristics of health behaviours (e.g. ‘perceived behavioural control’, ‘impact on health’, ‘effort’, ‘non-health rewards’, ‘habit’) were used to compare health behaviour meta-clusters (physical and psychosocial) and clusters (e.g. nutrition behaviours, substance abuse, medical practices).

Methods: A sample of lay people (N = 1956) judged items representing behavioural clusters delineated in the Health Behaviour Taxonomy on 14 constructs.

Results: Significant differences emerged between the physical and psychosocial meta-clusters, as well as among their sub-clusters. For example, physical behaviours were higher on ‘perceived behavioural control’ and ‘impact on health’ compared to psychosocial behaviours, and nutrition was perceived highest on ‘effort’ and ‘non-health rewards’ compared to the other clusters of the physical meta-cluster.

Conclusion: The findings increase our understanding of the logic underlying lay people’s cognitive schema of health behaviour clusters. ‘Cognitive profiles’ that explain differences between the clusters were identified, which can be used to design health messages and interventions targeting multiple health behaviours.     

Ibn al-cArab on the Three Conditions of Tawba

Although generally translated as ‘repentance’, tawba, like its Hebrew equivalent, teshuvah, simply means ‘turn’ or ‘return’. It is used in the Qur'an to describe actions of both human beings and God. Even though the idea of tawba subsumes the notion of ‘repentance’ (from the Latin paenitere, ‘to be sorry’, ‘to grieve’, or ‘to regret’), its meaning is not limited to that. The tendency within much of Western scholarship on Islam to understand tawba simply as repentance, and mostly human repentance, may well reflect certain presumptions about repentance and its place in religious life, which, one might argue, are absent in Islam. This article explores the understanding of tawba in the thought of Ibn al-^cArab (1165–1240 CE), whose most extensive reflections on it appear in chapters 74 and 75 of his Meccan Revelations. It focuses on the first of these chapters which concentrates primarily on the conditions set by many of the religious authorities as the fundamental components of human tawba. Ibn al-^cArab's response reflects certain central motifs that permeate his literary oeuvre. These motifs and their wider relation to his views on tawba will be highlighted as our discussion of this important Sufi maqām (station) unfolds.     

On Hannah Arendt: The Worldly In-Between of Human Beings and its Ethical Consequences

Abstract

In this paper, I show how a concept of ethics can be derived from Hannah Arendt’s theory of action in The Human Condition, which contains from her call for action. When she looks at the ‘political actor’, as well as at the concept of ‘political situation’, her ethical claim is first of all the need to take initiative, to act. Hence, ‘political situations’ as she defines them are discussed as common responsibilities. But common responsibility is rooted in the in-between of human beings, rather than in individual human nature and is determined by Arendt’s principle of humanity. Therefore, at the centre of an implicit Arendtian ethics stands the world and the in-between of human beings.     

Benefits of belonging: Experimental manipulation of social inclusion to enhance psychological and physiological health parameters

Objective: Acute changes in social belonging are important triggers for alterations in health and well-being, yet research has emphasised the negative effects of ‘exclusion’ at the expense of evaluating the potentially positive effects of ‘inclusion’. This study examined the impact of acute belonging on physiological and psychological outcomes.

Design and main outcome measures: A healthy population (N?=?138) were randomly allocated to ‘included’ or ‘excluded’ conditions. Condition-dependent differences in pre/during-task heart rate and pre/post-task self-reports of negative/positive mood, and social self-esteem, were assessed.

Results: Included participants showed decreased heart rate and negative mood, and increased social self-esteem. No inclusion-related change in positive mood was shown. An increase in heart rate was observed in excluded participants though no changes in negative/positive mood or social self-esteem were shown. Shifts in social self-esteem acted as a mechanism through which inclusion/exclusion impacted upon negative and positive mood alterations. Results remained significant in presence of covariates (sex, global self-esteem, rumination and social anxiety).

Conclusion: Findings suggest that acting to enhance belonging through ‘inclusion’ resulted in adaptive physiological and psychological outcomes. Neutral and potentially protective responses were observed in the immediate aftermath of ‘exclusion’. Self-esteem served as one route through which these effects were transmitted.     

Love,passion, and peak experience: A qualitative study on six continents

Abstract

Qualitative inquiry promotes deeper understanding of human experiences that can be reduced and decontextualized when examined solely via quantitative methods. In this study, we interviewed 150 people in 22 countries on six continents, asking them, ‘What do you love?’, ‘What is a great passion in your life?’, and ‘What has been a peak experience in your life?’. Love, passion, and peak experience share definitional and theoretical overlaps. However, they have not been explored simultaneously across cultures using qualitative methods. We utilized a pragmatic, inductive, thematic methodology, and 11 key themes emerged from the data. Other people and learning and growing were the top two themes for all three constructs, and data patterns suggested more variation within than between continents. We suggest that love, passion, and peak experience may promote self-determination and/or psychological complexity via integration with and differentiation from the environment, and suggest directions for future research.     

Misreadings,Clarifications and Reminders: A Reply to Hutchinson and Read

ABSTRACT

Analytic philosophy is often associated with a physicalistic naturalism that privileges natural-scientific modes of explanation. Nevertheless there has since the 1980s been a heterodox, somewhat subterranean trend within analytic philosophy that seeks to articulate a more expansive, ‘non-reductive‘ conception of nature. This trend can be traced back to P.F. Strawson’s 1985 book Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. However, Strawson has long been ignored in the literature around ‘soft naturalism’ – especially in comparison to John McDowell. One of the reasons for this is that Strawson’s account of soft naturalism is not often viewed as particularly plausible – it has come in for heavy criticism from the likes of Sebastian Gardner (2007) and Robert Stern (2003). In this paper, I argue that Strawson’s soft naturalism ought to be re-assessed: that his critics can be refuted, and that his naturalism remains a compelling alternative to the likes of McDowell’s. I attempt this through a ‘radicalisation’ of the modest Strawson’s position, demonstrating that his naturalism has implicit in it something like Marx’s conception of human ‘species-being’.     

Richard Wagner and the Birth of The Birth of Tragedy 1

Abstract

Nietzsche writes that the ‘real task’ of The Birth of Tragedy is to ‘solve the puzzle of Wagner’s relation to Greek tragedy’. The ‘puzzle’, I suggest, is the intermingling in his art and writings of earlier socialist optimism with later Schopenhauerian pessimism. According to the former the function of the ‘rebirth of Greek tragedy’ in the ‘collective artwork’ is to ‘collect’, and so create, community. According to the second the function of the artwork is to intimate a realm ‘beyond’ this world of pain and death. The audacity of The Birth is that it attempts to show that Wagner can have his cake and eat it: the ‘Dionysian’, musical, element provides a ‘metaphysical comfort’, while the ‘Apollonian’, verbal, element draws a ‘veil of oblivion’ over the metaphysical, thereby allowing the artwork to solidify community. Contrary to the standard Anglophone view, this perspective on The Birth shows that Nietzsche’s intimate association with Wagner during the period of its creation lies at the heart of its philosophical content.     

Between Causes and Reasons: Sellars,Hegel (and Lewis) on “Sensation”

ABSTRACT

This paper explores Sellars’ and Hegel’s treatment of ‘sensation’ – a notion that plays a central role in the reflections of both authors but which has garnered little scholarly attention. To disentangle the issues surrounding the notion and elaborate its role, function, and fate in their thought, I begin with a methodological question: what kind of philosophical argument leads Sellars and Hegel to introduce the concept of ‘sensation’ into their systems? Distinguishing between their two argumentative approaches, I maintain that Hegel offers what I broadly label a ‘transcendental’ argument for ‘sensation,’ which he presents in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and in the corresponding Lectures, whereas Sellars introduces the notion of sensation for what I term empirically ‘explanatory’ reasons. Next, I closely analyze Hegel’s and Sellars’ theories of sensation to produce a textually supported and conceptually coherent reading of their views on the notion. To clarify my methodological distinction and its stakes in Hegel’s and Sellars’ I will reference Lewis’ notion of the given.     

Intermingling and confusion

Abstract

An understanding of Descartes’ concept of ‘confusion’ is important both for making sense of his epistemological enterprise and for grasping his doctrine of the union of mind and body. An analysis of Descartes’ notion of confusion is offered which is grounded in the (more or less controversial) theses that confused thoughts are thoughts, that confusion is confusion by a thinker of one thought with another, and that confusion both can and should be avoided or ‘undone’. This analysis takes its rise from his contrast between ‘confused’ and ‘distinct’ : it exhibits confusion as a failure to distinguish between meanings of systematically ambiguous expressions. This failure is sometimes due to ‘bad intellectual habits’ which in his view ought to be broken, sometimes to ‘nature’ (where the confusion is in general beneficial to our welfare). Paradigmatically these are expressions which refer ambiguously to substances (i.e. mind and body) which are ‘really distinct’. Moreover, his ‘disambiguations’ indicate a central but neglected aspect of his aim in philosophizing: he can be seen as engaged in a moral project of ‘philosophical therapy’.