One Self per Customer? From Disunified Agency to Disunified Self

The notion of an agent and the notion of a self are connected, for agency is one role played by the self. Millgram argues for a disunity thesis of agency on the basis of extreme incommensurability across some major life events. We propose a similar negative thesis about the self, that it is composed of relatively independent threads reflecting the different roles and different mind‐sets of the person's life. Our understanding of those threads is based on theories of the narrative construction of the self. Our disunity thesis is that there need be no overarching narrative that unifies those narrative threads. To explain how the threads hang together to produce coherent action, we make these positive claims: (1) control normally switches smoothly and unconsciously between threads as circumstances require, (2) within one thread there is likely to be acknowledgment of other threads, (3) some situations require a temporary blending of threads, and (4) some plans and policies reach across different threads and contribute to some coordination among them. Our account of a self provides an account of agency that has merits in comparison to Millgram's. Our narrative approach allows explanations of actions beyond rational deliberation.     

Stern on “Self”

ABSTRACT

Self is a notion of common-sense psychology that several schools of psychoanalysis have built into their theories. Stern explores and expands its meaning, tracing its development back to birth and even earlier, and outlining how the psychological development of the preverbal infant contributes to its evolution. In the process, Stern discusses two perspectives on preverbal infant psychology—that of the observational empiricist developmental psychologist, and that of the reconstructing psychoanalytic clinician working from the subjective experience of adult patients, and what each might contribute to the other. His thinking suggests the importance of nonverbal models of infant (and, eventually, adult) subjective experience.     

Belief and Self‐consciousness

Abstract

This paper is about what is distinctive about first‐person beliefs. I discuss several sets of puzzling cases of first‐person belief. The first focus on the relation between belief and action, while the second focus on the relation of belief to subjectivity. I argue that in the absence of an explanation of the dispositional difference, individuating such beliefs more finely than truth conditions merely marks the difference. I argue that the puzzles reveal a difference in the ways that I am disposed to revise my beliefs about myself. This point develops the insight that Anscombe and others had that those of an agent’s beliefs about himself that manifest that special self‐consciousness are not based on observation, testimony or inference. The puzzles show that this kind of self‐consciousness involves, not a special kind of belief or even a special kind of self‐reference, but a special kind of belief revision policy.     

Self and Talent—Treatment Considerations

The clinical pursuit of patients' experiences of talent, in their current life and in their developmental years, has broadened the clinical field considerably and provided more lanes and latitude in the “royal road to the unconscious.” Interest in patients' talents has been experienced as an invitation to bring in their created works, not just as a display of aesthetic interest but, much more importantly, as another pathway through which the analyst can access an understanding of the deepest and most meaningful levels of selfexperience. This article explores some of the meanings of talent for the self and suggests that there is a developmental line for the maturation of one's relationship to one's talent. I provide discussion that illustrates the coextensiveness of the inner experience of talent with the selfobject surround throughout growth and maturation. Finally, I provide illustrations of how talent can be experienced and how exploration of experiences of talent can play a quintessential role in psychoanalytic treatment.     

Self-Construal and Cooperation: Is the Interdependent Self More Cooperative Than the Independent Self?

The present study examined whether a temporary activation of independent or interdependent self-construals by priming has an influence on cooperation in social dilemmas. It was expected that individuals primed with independence would be primarily concerned with their own outcomes, whereas individuals primed with interdependence would also be concerned with the outcomes of their interaction partner. The former should therefore exhibit lower levels of cooperation. Additionally, the influence of social value orientation on cooperation was measured. Participants played 32 rounds of a give-some dilemma with an alleged interaction partner. As predicted, participants primed with independence exhibited lower levels of cooperation than participants primed with interdependence. Results are discussed in terms of their significance for research on self-construals and social dilemmas.     

Entitlement to Self‐Knowledge and Brute Error

Abstract

I discuss Burge’s argument that our entitlement to self‐knowledge consists in the constitutive relation between the second‐order review of thoughts and the thoughts reviewed, and defend it against Peacocke’s criticism. I then argue that though our entitlement to self‐knowledge is neutral to different environments, as Burge claims, the consideration of Burge’s own notion of brute error shows that Burge’s effort to reconcile externalism and self‐knowledge is not successful.     

Self–other contingencies: Enacting social perception

Can we see the expressiveness of other people's gestures, hear the intentions in their voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot because intentions and emotions for them are hidden away inside and we do not have direct access to them. Enactive theories still have no idea because they have so far mainly focused on perception of our physical world. We surmise, however, that the latter hold promise since, in trying to understand cognition, enactive theory focuses on the embodied engagements of a cognizer with his world. In this paper, we attempt an answer for the question What is social perception in an enactive account? In enaction, perception is conceived as a skill, crucially involving action (perception is action and action is perception), an ability to work successfully within the set of regularities, or contingencies that characterize a given domain. If this is the case, then social perception should be a social skill. Having thus transformed the question of what social perception is into that of what social skill is, we examine the concept of social contingencies and the manner in which social skills structure—both constrain and empower—social interaction. Some of the implications of our account for how social and physical perception differ, the role of embodiment in social interaction and the distinction between our approach and other social contingency theories are also addressed.     

Self–other decision making and loss aversion

In eight studies, we tested the prediction that making choices for others involves less loss aversion than making choices for the self. We found that loss aversion is significantly lessened among people choosing for others in scenarios describing riskless choice (Study 1), gambling (Studies 2 and 3), and social aspects of life, such as likeably and status (Studies 4a–e). Moreover, we found this pattern in relatively realistic conditions where people are rewarded for making desirable (i.e., profitable) choices for others (Study 2), when the other for whom a choice is made is physically present (Study 3), and when real money is at stake (Studies 2 and 3). Finally, we found loss aversion is moderated when factors associated with self–other differences in decision making are taken into account, such as decision makers’ construal level (Study 4a), regulatory focus (Study 4b), degree of information seeking (Study 4c), omission bias (Study 4d), and power (Study 4e).     

Self and others in “private language”

The aim of this paper is to restore the interdependent or complementary relationship between self and others against the universalistic one (as I call it) that Kant, for example, once insisted on, by reexamining the concept of so-called private language. I shall consider some views in speech act theory and pragmatics, since there has often been discussion about such a private occurrence as the speaker's sincerity. For example, Jürgen Habermas situates it in the speaker's internal nature as will be seen later. In my opinion, alter ego is an ego because we can empathize (einfühlen) with it, and yet it is alter ego because it has some private experiences which we cannot perfectly comprehend.     

Self‐Consciousness,Normativity and Abysmal Freedom

This article critically examines Christine Korsgaard's claim in her Tanner Lectures to find in self‐consciousness itself the norms that would answer our need for practical reasons, insofar as that need is constituted through our capacity for reflection. It shows that the way in which Korsgaard sees “the need for a reason” as arising out of self‐consciousness implies a dilemma: on the one hand, we want as the ultimate source of our reasons an authority of which we cannot coherently demand legitimation in turn; on the other, our freedom demands that nothing count for us as a reason except insofar as it is in turn endorsed in reflection. Relying on resources drawn from the tradition of reflection, this paper argues that Korsgaard's attempt to resolve this tension is unsuccessful and appeals, in response to this failure, to faith in the authority of our reasons in the absence of foundational justification of them.     

Integrating Self and System: An Empty Intersection?

Synthesizing individual and family therapies can founder if the underlying epistemological assumptions concerning “what is self” are not taken into account. Most individual therapies assume self “really” exists as a relatively stable internal entity, the repository of residues of experience where traits, memories, et cetera are organized via internal schemas. Such a view tends to treat self as a thing, and implies that psychological problems are the result of internal deficits or conflicts; this can lead to difficulties in therapy. In contrast, ecosystemic views employ constructivist and contextualist approaches that are more fluid. However, by basing autopoetic self-organization in language, ecosystemic epistemology still separates subject from object. Adopting a perspective in which self has no fixed, distinguishing characteristics can resolve many difficulties and create a dimensionless point where self and system, individual and family, therapist and client can meet without hindrance.     

Association Between Proactive Personality and Academic Self–Efficacy

Research about organizations has consistently revealed that proactive personality is a relatively stable disposition and a significant antecedent of self-efficacy, which generates employees’ proactive behavior and thus benefits individuals and firms. Consequently, the present study aimed to examine whether the relationship between proactive personality, a general temperamental tendency, and specific self-efficacy that is focused on certain activities or tasks might emerge across contexts in an education setting with a directional effect. From a sample of 123 students, we employed a longitudinal approach using two waves of surveys to examine the directional relations between students’ proactive personalities and their academic self–efficacy in education. The results showed that students’ proactive personalities at Time 1 predicted change in their academic self–efficacy at Time 2, suggesting a top–down relationship. On the contrary students’ academic self–efficacy at Time 1 could not predict their proactive personalities at Time 2. In short, the directional effect of proactive personality on self–efficacy across contexts was captured in this study. Implications and limitations were discussed.     

Is the Interdependent Self More Sensitive to Question Context Than the Independent Self? Self-Construal and the Observation of Conversational Norms

Question answering requires close attention to the common ground to determine what the questioner wants to know. Because attentiveness to others is more likely to be a self-defining goal when the self is thought of as interdependent with others rather than independent of others, we predicted that self-construal influences attentiveness to the common ground. In Experiment 1, participants' temporary self-construal was manipulated through a priming technique. As predicted, interdependence-primed participants were more likely than independence-primed participants to take the recipient's knowledge into account and avoided providing redundant information in a self-administered questionnaire. Drawing on chronic differences in self-construal, Experiment 2 replicated these findings with participants from independent (Germany) and interdependent (China) cultures. Throughout, participants' differential attentiveness to the common ground resulted in differential question order effects, raising important methodological issues for cross-cultural research.     

‘Developing’ the Self in the Knowledge Economy

The term ‘knowledge economy’, like the term ‘globalisation’, has become a catchword in political and educational debate over the last decade or so, especially in debates upon educational policy where the role of education in preparing young people to take their part in the Knowledge Economy is often seen as paramount over other traditional schooling activities. It is said in such debates that the production of knowledge, information and skills, will become more valuable than traditional primary and secondary production. A lot is said about the knowledge required in the Knowledge Economy, and about how institutions, businesses, activities and human beings are to be ordered or structured in accordance with views of knowledge and new Management theories. But little is said of the young people expected to take their part in the knowledge economy. Do they have a choice? Is lying on a surfboard excluded from their life options? How will they be developed, trained or educated to take their part? Will they be committed to developing their selves in accordance with the model of the IT Knowledge Entrepreneur (hereinafter TIKE) presented as a model for education by policy makers in the Knowledge Economy? This article will argue against this latter notion of the development of the self, arguing that because knowledge is prioritised over ethics, there is both an inadequate notion of the self and the educational development of the self and, because of its implicit view only of ethics, an inadequate ethical and moral view of education [246 words].     

The Ecological Self: Metaphor and Developmental Experience?

The term ecological self, used within the fields of deep ecology and ecopsychology, is considered here from the viewpoint of developmental research and theory, within the context of contemporary relational psychoanalysis. Both developmental theory and more specifically our concept of health are explored with the inclusion of relatedness to the nonhuman world and an emphasis on embodiment and interactive experience. Illustrations and examples are drawn from research, clinical work with adults and the literature of natural history.     

Sexual Consent and Lying About One’s Self

Despite the acknowledgement of the moral significance of consent there is still much work to be done in determining which specific sexual encounters count as unproblematically consensual. This paper focuses on the impact of deception. It takes up the specific case of deception about one’s self. It may seem obvious that one ought not to lie to a sexual partner about who one is, but determining which features of oneself are most relevant, as well as the lies which it follows would be impermissible to tell, is complicated. It is argued here that deception about one’s morally valenced character traits, those we think of as virtues and vices, are particularly problematic. This is true regardless of whether knowing the truth about those traits would have made a difference to one’s partner’s consent. Attention is then drawn to a range of types of lies that one ought not to tell.     

The Simulated Self – Fiction Reading and Narrative Identity

Philosophia - How do participating in a work of fiction and imagining a fictional world intertwine with the reader’s life? I develop an account that explores the relation between fiction...