From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary

Conciliationists about peer disagreement hold that when one disagrees with an epistemic peer about some proposition p, one should significantly change one's view about p. Many arguments for conciliationism appeal to a principle Christensen [2011] dubs Independence. Independence says that evaluations of the beliefs of those with whom one disagrees should not be made on the basis of one's initial reasoning about p. In this paper, I show that this principle is false. I also show that two weaker principles that vindicate conciliationism are either false, unmotivated, or both.     

Theory of mind and epistemological development: the relation between children's second-order false-belief understanding and their ability to reason about evidence

The study investigates the hypothesis that children's ability to attribute second-order beliefs facilitates their understanding of evidence, as seen in the ability to distinguish between causes and reasons. Seventy-four children 5–7 yr old were given belief and evidence tests. The belief tests assessed their ability to represent and reason from second-order false-beliefs, and the evidence tests assessed their ability to distinguish between the cause of a situation and a person's reason for believing it. The relation between performance on the two tests was determined, taking into account general language and non-verbal reasoning abilities. Results show that performance on the belief test and on the evidence part of the evidence test improved significantly over the age range, and that a significant proportion of variance in the evidence test scores is accounted for by second-order false-belief understanding, over and above that accounted for by general language and non-verbal abilities. The argument is made that second-order false-belief understanding is fundamental to children's epistemological development, underlying not just their understanding of evidence, but also their understanding of inference and truth.     

Facts and meaning: An examination of their role in psychological research from a phenomenological perspective

It is argued that mainstream psychological research has prioritized observable facts over meaning. The theoretical foundation in psychology, according to mainstream psychology, is such that meaningful experience is considered to be less primordial than natural scientific constructions about the world. The methodological procedure of mainstream psychology entails a prioritization of facts over meaning. However, in this article it is argued that subjective meaning is already in play in psychological discussions of "facts".
An epistemological examination of the notions of "facts" and "meaning" from a phenomenological perspective leads to a prioritization of meaning over facts. Implications of such an analysis for psychological research are discussed. One implication is that psychological research must give up its aim to establish causa! laws. A phenomenological approach to studies of meaning is presented.     

Artificial explanations: the epistemological interpretation of explanation in AI

In this paper I critically examine the notion of explanation used in artificial intelligence in general, and in the theory of belief revision in particular. I focus on two of the best known accounts in the literature: Pagnucco’s abductive expansion functions and Gärdenfors’ counterfactual analysis. I argue that both accounts are at odds with the way in which this notion has historically been understood in philosophy. They are also at odds with the explanatory strategies used in actual scientific practice. At the end of the paper I outline a set of desiderata for an epistemologically motivated, scientifically informed belief revision model for explanation.     

From human to artificial cognition and back: New perspectives on cognitively inspired AI systems

We overview the main historical and technological elements characterising the rise, the fall and the recent renaissance of the cognitive approaches to Artificial Intelligence and provide some insights and suggestions about the future directions and challenges that, in our opinion, this discipline needs to face in the next years.     

New Roles for Rhetoric: From Academic Critique to Civic Affirmation

The classical conception of rhetoric as the method of reasoned political judgment survived into the Renaissance but was reduced to academic critiques of style and "empty" public rhetoric with the rise of modern science and its representationalist theories of language. Recently, however, rhetoric, textuality, and the "linguistic turn" generally, have become central metaphors in the human sciences. This renewed rhetorical perspective not only fosters a critique of positive philosophy and of scientism in public discourse, it also offers affirmative methods by which persons can construct their civic lives.     

从批判到重构:女性主义心理学的历史发展

女性主义心理学产生于20世纪60、70年代的女性主义运动,经历了从对主流心理学的批判到重构心理学认识论与方法论的历史发展轨迹。20世纪60、70年代,女性主义心理学着重于对主流心理学中的男性中心主义偏见的揭露与批判;从80年代起,女性主义心理学将重点转向对心理学学科基础假设的挑战,试图重构心理学的认识论与方法论。     

Psychology from Islamic Perspective: Contributions of Early Muslim Scholars and Challenges to Contemporary Muslim Psychologists

Early Muslims wrote extensively about human nature and called it Ilm-al Nafsiat or self-knowledge. In many cases, their works seem to be the original ideas for many modern day psychological theories and practices. What is interesting however is that a lot of what the early scholars wrote was blended with Islamic philosophy and religious ideas. This paper covers major contributions of prominent early Muslim scholars to psychology and outlines the challenges faced by today's Muslims in adapting to the Western theories. It also offers a few recommendations on the indigenization of psychology for Muslim societies interested in seeking the Islamic perspective on human behaviors.     

Psychology of Religion: What One Needs to Know

This essay is an introduction to systematic nonsectarian psychology of religion—its nature and scope, and its history. Among major issues, the study of motivation for being religious and stages of religious development are discussed, as well as counseling and psychotherapy. I summarize current trends.     

From the Terrible Loneliness to the Wonderful Agreement of Human Beings

What would be the “terrible loneliness” and what would be the “wonderful agreement” in the present paper? The “terrible loneliness” is the only reality that a person perceives and/or thinks during the now going on. For the person, an enormous quantity of occurrences is in the present moment absent. A very small quantity of occurrences is present. The person is the only being in having this. And, this is only during a little moment. The person never thinks about his loneliness in this moment. On the contrary, he thinks he is plenty of people and full of occurrences. But, if he were thinking about reality, he would live in a terrible loneliness. How does he escape himself from this loneliness? He thinks that the probable occurrences are real occurrences. He may be right in a plenty of times. Going through what I call opening hypotheses—basic hypotheses and non-basic but important hypotheses—and going through what I call simply hypotheses he is able to sanction a wonderful agreement of human beings about the known parts of the Universe. However, they are hypotheses, not absolute realities.     

史事宗易学研究方法析论

夫援史证《易》本为易家释《易》普遍之现象,然自赵宋三李一杨(李光、李杞、李中正、杨万里)开宗奠基后,历宋元明三朝而踵继者众,至有清一朝,更以超迈往古之姿,创猗欤盛哉之势,将史事易学推至极盛。由于此派易学著作甚多,易家援引史事形貌多样,不仅丰富史事易学之内容,亦充实义理易学之内涵,并建构出此派易学独特之体系,值得吾人深入研究。海内外曾从事相关研究者虽不乏其人,惟此派易学研究方法仍有讨论之空间,愿将个人研究之拙见,提供未来研究者之参考,冀收后出转精之效。其内容包括史事易学之定义、史事易家之典型、史事易学发展史略、援史证《易》研究之重点(如援史动机、援史类型、援史与卦爻比附之切当性、援史之史观、以说理为本以援史为末),以及史事易学研究之发展性等等,希望透过文献资料之搜集与分析,进而从易学与易学史之角度推论,俾有助于史事宗易学研究方法之建立,与史事易学研究深度广度之推扩。     

The observing subject and psychophysiological research: An epistemological discourse

Realizing that scientific knowledge was not based on a simple disclosure of reality, but was rather invented and developed in accordance with our own conceptions and prejudices, it should no longer be possible to consider matters as if they existed independently of us out there.Taking as examples the notions of memory and information we try to elucidate the relevance this perspective has with respect to neuro- and psychophysiological research.     

On experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy: a reply to Sorell

In this paper, we reply to Tom Sorell’s criticism of our engagement with the history of philosophy in our book, The Theory and Practice of Experimental Philosophy. We explain why our uses of the history of philosophy are not undermined by Sorell’s criticism and why our position is not threatened by the dilemma Sorell advances. We argue that Sorell has mischaracterized the dialectical context of our discussion of the history of philosophy and that he has mistakenly treated our use of the history of philosophy as univocal, when in fact we called on the history of philosophy in several different ways in our text.     

Westernalization in the Mirror: On the Cultural Reception of Western Psychology

Miki Takasuna’s paper on “Proliferation of Western Methodological Thought in Psychology in Japan: Ways of Objectification” offers many significant clues for reconsidering the history and unity of psychology. Its treatment of the reception of psychology in Japan hints at the relevance of the models of the subject for psychology—including the allegedly “official” psychology. The aim of this paper is to suggest such reconsideration, on the basis of a distinction between psychology-importing and psychology-exporting countries, and provide a reflection on the cultural problems of assimilation by the latter of a discipline advanced by the former. This perspective leads us to acknowledge the existence of a variety of psychological programs corresponding to the transformation and modernization of different social realities. Also, an indication is offered of several possible levels of analysis of such programs, which are seen to be related with the emergence of psychology as the science of modernity.

Revising Method in Psychological Studies of Religious Matters: From Repeating to Remembering and Working-Through

Fundamental criticisms of research in psychology of religion are recurrently leveled by scholars—including psychologists of religion themselves: the character, intention, and validity of many studies are suspect; approaches are parochial; findings are often insubstantial. These valid critiques betray a neglected root cause: a problem of method. This essay examines method and method change, considers why inadequate methods persist as well as how operative methods are corrected. It identifies tacit problematic commitments and outlines contours of a revised method.     

Harry Harlow: From the Other Side of the Desk

On the basis of her personal reminiscences the author provides a picture of Harry Harlow’s personality. Harlow emerges as an unassuming and witty person. Dr. Frank C.P. van der Horst (fhorst@fsw.leidenuniv.nl) of Leiden University stands as the person to address correspondence to.

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From Rogers to Clinebell: Exploring the History of Pastoral Psychology

This essay explores the recent history of pastoral psychology by examining the transition from Carl Rogers’s client-centered therapy as a dominating force to the emergence of Howard Clinebell’s growth counseling. The theory and application of each approach is explored, including an analysis of how the cultural milieu of World War II and the shift to neofreudian thought influenced both Rogers and Clinebell. Finally, this essay demonstrates how Clinebell modified Rogers’s client-centered therapy by combining confrontation with unconditional positive regard.     

The plight and promise of contemporary psychoanalysis in the light of its social history

This paper addresses the many changes which have beset psychoanalysis and the psychoanalytic community since the widespread, general acceptance of both by the educated, middle-class public in the 1950s. It attempts to explain these changes, at least in part, by reflecting upon them in the light of the history of the psychoanalytic movement and upon the rise of dynamic psychology as well. Many in the psychoanalytic community think that their work is being ignored, devalued, and even attacked by an increasing number of influential persons and organizations. Critics claim that, epistemologically, psychoanalysis is scientifically invalid; therapeutically, it is ineffective; economically, it is too costly and takes too long; and theoretically, it is pluralized to the point of fragmentation. This is the plight of psychoanalysis. This paper argues that many of the major problems which once beset Freud and his colleagues, and which beset the psychoanalytic community today, are best understood in terms of two sociological processes, legitimation and institutionalization. Legitimation is the socio-cultural process whereby a new idea (e.g., Freud's theories, Jung's theories) contests the established web of ideas which give coherence and meaning to social and personal identity. Institutionalization refers to the way legitimated ideas replace once-contested views of reality. The single most decisive factor generating the plight of contemporary psychoanalysis is the ‘decision’ (1) to socially locate (institutionalize) psychoanalysis in institutes, rather than in clinics or universities, and (2) to represent psychoanalysis to the public (legitimation) as a medical science. In order to illustrate and advance these claims, I first define and distinguish sociologically the institute, the clinic and the university. Second, I describe the origins and development of the ‘decision’, made by Freud and his followers, to locate or institutionalize psychoanalysis in institutes. Third, I compare and contrast this early pattern of legitimation and institutionalization with that of the present-day psychoanalytic movement in England (relatively benign institutionalization) and in the United States (relatively destructive institutionalization). Throughout this discussion I draw upon the new literature on the history of psychoanalysis, past and present. As for the ‘promise’ for psychoanalysis, it can materialize insofar as psychoanalysis establishes contact with the clinic and the university (re-legitimation) and insofar as that contact becomes so self-evident that it is taken for granted (i.e., it is re-institutionalized).