In search of clarity: self-esteem and domains of confidence and confusion

To date, research suggests that self-concept clarity is a monolithic construct: Some people have clearly defined self-concepts in all domains, whereas others do not. The authors argued that self-concept clarity is instead multifaceted and varies across trait domains. The authors predicted that social commodities (SCs; e.g., looks, popularity, social skills) would show less self-concept clarity than would communal qualities (CQs; e.g., kindness, warmth, honesty), due to domain differences in observability, ambiguity, and controllability. Results replicated past findings that self-esteem predicts self-concept clarity but also demonstrated that participants' SC self-views were less clear than their CQ self-views. Moreover, people showed greater clarity about traits that were lower in observability and higher in ambiguity and controllability. These findings suggest that everyone, regardless of self-esteem, has self-concept domains of relative confidence and confusion.     

Perceiving low self‐esteem in close others impedes capitalization and undermines the relationship

Disclosing positive experiences to others (i.e., “capitalization”) is associated with personal and interpersonal benefits (Gable & Reis, 2010). Unfortunately, people who perceive low self‐esteem (LSE) in close others are reluctant to capitalize, holding back from those they expect will be unsupportive (MacGregor & Holmes, 2011). In Study 1, we extend previous findings by demonstrating the importance of the type of experience disclosed; participants capitalized less positively with an (ostensibly) LSE friend when disclosing an accomplishment, not a positive experience attributed to happenstance. In Study 2, we demonstrate the external validity of the phenomenon by examining real discussions between romantic partners. Participants capitalized less positively with their LSE partner, behavior associated with lower relationship satisfaction 6 weeks later (particularly for women).     

Do people with low self-esteem really want to feel better? Self-esteem differences in motivation to repair negative moods.

This research examined the hypothesis that people with low self-esteem (LSE) are less motivated than people with high self-esteem (HSE) to repair their negative moods. In Study 1, participants completed diaries in response to either a success or a failure in their everyday lives. Participants described what they intended to do next and the reasons behind those plans. After failure, fewer LSE than HSE participants expressed a goal to improve their mood. A follow-up investigation (Study 2) suggested that this difference was not due to a self-esteem difference in knowledge of mood repair strategies. In Study 3, after undergoing a negative mood induction, fewer LSE than HSE participants chose to watch a comedy video, even though both groups believed the comedy video would make them happy. Studies 4 and 5 explored possible reasons why LSE people are less motivated than HSE people to repair their negative moods.     

Contingencies of self-worth, academic failure, and goal pursuit

Two studies examine the effects of failure on explicit and implicit self-esteem, affect, and self-presentation goals as a function of people's trait self-esteem and academic contingency of self-worth. Study 1 shows that participants with low self-esteem (LSE) who receive failure feedback experience lower state self-esteem, less positive affect, and less desire to be perceived as competent the more they base self-worth on academics. In contrast, participants with high self-esteem (HSE) who strongly base self-worth on academics show a slight boost in state self-esteem and desire to be perceived as competent following failure. Study 2 shows that following failure, academically contingent LSE participants downplay the importance of appearing competent to others and associate themselves with failure on an implicit level. Taken together, these findings suggest that academically contingent HSE people show resilience following failure, whereas academically contingent LSE people experience negative outcomes and disengage from the pursuit of competence self-presentation goals.     

Short horizons and tempting situations: Lack of continuity to our future selves leads to unethical decision making and behavior

People who feel continuity with their future selves are more likely to behave in ethically responsible ways as compared to people who lack continuity with their future selves. We find that individual differences in perceived similarity to one’s future self predicts tolerance of unethical business decisions (Studies 1a and 1b), and that the consideration of future consequences mediates the extent to which people regard inappropriate negotiation strategies as unethical (Study 2). We reveal that low future self-continuity predicts unethical behavior in the form of lies, false promises, and cheating (Studies 3 and 4), and that these relationships hold when controlling for general personality dimensions and trait levels of self-control (Study 4). Finally, we establish a causal relationship between future self-continuity and ethical judgments by showing that when people are prompted to focus on their future self (as opposed to the future), they express more disapproval of unethical behavior (Study 5).     

Self-esteem and perceptions of conveyed impressions: is negative affectivity associated with greater realism?

Two studies examined the notion that negative affectivity (Watson & Clark, 1984) is associated with more accurate perceptions of conveyed impressions in social interactions. In Study 1 (n = 160), low self-esteem (LSE) and high self-esteem (HSE) subjects were paired with either an LSE or an HSE partner. After a 15-min interaction, they rated themselves, their partners, and how they believed their partners would rate them on 20 adjectives related to social competence. Study 2 (n = 40) was identical except that each interaction was observed by 2 observers who rated each participant, and participants also rated how they believed an observer would rate them. LSE subjects exhibited greater accuracy only with respect to the elevation component of observers' ratings; HSE subjects overestimated the positivity of observers' evaluations, whereas LSE subjects were relatively accurate. However, LSE subjects exhibited less overall accuracy with respect to their partners' ratings. We argue that when these results are considered with earlier research, there is no support for the notion of depressive realism in assessing conveyed impressions.     

Self‐Concept Clarity and the Management of Social Conflict

ABSTRACT: In 4 studies we examined the relationship between self‐concept clarity and conflict management. Individuals with higher self‐concept clarity were overall more active and showed more cooperative problem‐solving behavior than people with low self‐concept clarity. There were no relationships with contending or yielding. The positive relationship with cooperative behavior was mediated by less rumination (Study 2) and moderated by conflict intensity (Study 3). Specifically, it applied to relatively mild conflicts (Study 3). Finally, Study 4 extended these findings to the group level: Dyad members with higher self‐concept clarity engaged in problem solving, whereas dyad members with lower self‐concept clarity did not. We conclude that higher self‐concept clarity associates with proactive problem solving in social conflict.     

Reaction in action: intergroup contrast in automatic behavior

Whereas previous research has shown automatic behavior conforming to outgroup stereotypes, the authors demonstrate automatic behavioral contrast away from a stereotype/trait associated with an outgroup (Study 1 and 2) and point to the importance of an "us-them" intergroup comparison in this process. In Study 1, participants colored pictures more messily when neatness was associated with an outgroup rather than the ingroup. In Study 2, using a different behavior, participants primed with busy business people reacted faster than controls (assimilation) but became slower when their student ingroup identity was activated (contrast). Subliminally priming an "us-them" intergroup comparison set undermined the accessibility of outgroup stereotypic words (Study 3), especially for those higher in prejudice (Study 4). This suggests that people automatically distance themselves from outgroup attributes when intergroup antagonism is cued or chronic. Implications for the role of self and comparison processes in automatic behavior are discussed.     

Self-esteem and persistence in the face of failure

In 2 studies, the authors examined self-esteem, persistence, and rumination in the face of failure. Study 1 manipulated degree of failure and availability of goal alternatives. When an alternative was available, high self-esteem (HSE) participants persisted more than low self-esteem (LSE) participants after a single failure, but less after repeated failure. When no alternative was available, no self-esteem differences in persistence emerged. LSE participants ruminated more than HSE participants. Study 2 examined persistence and rumination for 10 personal goals across an academic year. HSE participants were better calibrated (higher within-subject correlations between perceived progress and persistence across goals), had higher overall levels of persistence, higher grade point averages, and lower levels of rumination than LSE participants. Although traditional views that emphasize the tenacious persistence of HSE individuals need revision, HSE people appear more effective in self-regulating goal-directed behavior.     

The spyglass self: a model of vicarious self-perception

Self-perception theory posits that people sometimes infer their own attributes by observing their freely chosen actions. The authors hypothesized that in addition, people sometimes infer their own attributes by observing the freely chosen actions of others with whom they feel a sense of merged identity--almost as if they had observed themselves performing the acts. Before observing an actor's behavior, participants were led to feel a sense of merged identity with the actor through perspective-taking instructions (Study 1) or through feedback indicating that their brainwave patterns overlapped substantially with those of the actor (Studies 2-4). As predicted, participants incorporated attributes relevant to an actor's behavior into their own self-concepts, but only when they were led to feel a sense of merged identity with the actor and only when the actor's behavior seemed freely chosen. These changes in relevant self-perceptions led participants to change their own behaviors accordingly. Implications of these vicarious self-perception processes for conformity, perspective-taking, and the long-term development of the self-concept are discussed.     

Striving for the moral self: the effects of recalling past moral actions on future moral behavior

People's desires to see themselves as moral actors can contribute to their striving for and achievement of a sense of self-completeness. The authors use self-completion theory to predict (and show) that recalling one's own (im)moral behavior leads to compensatory rather than consistent moral action as a way of completing the moral self. In three studies, people who recalled their immoral behavior reported greater participation in moral activities (Study 1), reported stronger prosocial intentions (Study 2), and showed less cheating (Study 3) than people who recalled their moral behavior. These compensatory effects were related to the moral magnitude of the recalled event, but they did not emerge when people recalled their own positive or negative nonmoral behavior (Study 2) or others' (im)moral behavior (Study 3). Thus, the authors extend self-completion theory to the moral domain and use it to integrate the research on moral cleansing (remunerative moral strivings) and moral licensing (relaxed moral strivings).     

A test of whether attributions provide for self-enhancement or self-defense

It is well known that people often make attributions in a way that is favorable to their self-concepts (see R. L. Collins, 1996, for a review). However, it is less clear whether the primary effect is to enhance self-esteem or to defend against the possible loss of self-esteem. The authors performed an experiment to test these possibilities against each other. In a completely between-participants design, participants recalled either a positive behavior or a negative behavior that was performed by themselves or others. They then judged the positivity or negativity of the behavior and made trait attributions about the actor (i.e., himself, herself, or others). The results indicated that although judgments and trait attributions for positive behaviors were similar for the self and for others, judgments and trait attributions for negative behaviors were less negative for the self than they were for others. The authors interpreted these and other findings as supporting a defensive strategy rather than an enhancive strategy.     

State emotional clarity and attention to emotion: a naturalistic examination of their associations with each other,affect, and context

ABSTRACT

Despite emotional clarity and attention to emotion being dynamic in nature, research has largely focused on their trait forms. We examined the association between state and trait forms of these two constructs, and how they are related to affect intensity and two contextual variables: Social context and significant event occurrence. Seventy-nine adults recruited from the community reported eight times a day for a week on the extent to which they were clear about their emotions, attended to their emotions, levels of affect intensity, the number of people with whom they were interacting, and whether a significant event had occurred. State clarity and attention were positively associated, demonstrating a moderate relation similar to that of their trait forms. Trait and state attention, but not trait and state clarity, were significantly positively associated. Positive and negative affect were quadratically associated with clarity and attention, with the highest levels of affect intensity reported at high levels of clarity and attention. Clarity and attention were positively associated with increasing numbers of people with whom people were interacting. Attention and clarity were elevated when significant events occurred – especially during positive events. We discuss the findings in the context of functional adaptation theories of emotion.     

Implicit ambivalence from attitude change: an exploration of the PAST model

Traditional models of attitude change have assumed that when people appear to have changed their attitudes in response to new information, their old attitudes disappear and no longer have any impact. The present research suggests that when attitudes change, the old attitude can remain in memory and influence subsequent behavior. Four experiments are reported in which initial attitudes were created and then changed (or not) with new information. In each study, the authors demonstrate that when people undergo attitude change, their old and new attitudes can interact to produce evaluative responses consistent with a state of implicit ambivalence. In Study 1, individuals whose attitudes changed were more neutral on a measure of automatic evaluation. In Study 2, attitude change led people to show less confidence on an implicit but not an explicit measure. In Studies 3 and 4, people whose attitudes changed engaged in greater processing of attitude-relevant information than did individuals whose attitudes were not changed.     

Motivated recruitment of autobiographical memories

We hypothesized that people motivated to believe that they possess a given trait search for autobiographical memories that reflect that trait, so as to justify their desired self-view. We led subjects to believe that either extraversion or introversion was desirable, and obtained convergent evidence from open-ended memory-listing tasks as well as from reaction-time tasks measuring the speed with which memories could be generated that this manipulation enhanced the accessibility of memories reflecting the desired trait. If people rely on their memories to construct desired self-concepts, motivated changes in self-concepts should be constrained by the content of available memories. Our final study demonstrates such constraints.     

“… And How About Now?”: Effects of Item Redundancy on Contextualized Self‐Reports of Personality

A common method of studying cross-situational variation in personality involves asking people to describe their behavior in several different contexts. Although this approach is intuitively appealing, it introduces a great deal of redundancy into the measurement process and may affect the interpretation of contextualized self-reports. Specifically, when participants are asked the same questions repeatedly in a single questionnaire, they may be compelled to focus on how their behavior is different. We tested this hypothesis by experimentally manipulating the number of contexts that were included in a measure of role-related personality. In 2 experiments (Study 1 N=377, Study 2 N=524), we found that multiple-role questionnaires produced greater variation in trait levels across roles, larger differences between general and role-specific ratings, and weaker correlations between general and role-specific ratings than single-role questionnaires. These findings illustrate how the measurement process can have an effect on the variability of responses to contextualized self-reports.     

A multimethod investigation of depressive symptoms,perceived understanding,and relationship quality

This research examines whether people who are experiencing more depressive symptoms perceive their partners as less able to understand their thoughts and feelings. Results showed that depressive symptoms (Studies 1 and 3) and depressive mood (Study 2) were negatively associated with perceived understanding in general (Study 1), in daily life (Study 2), and during a conflict conversation (Study 3). Partners of people who were more depressed actually were less empathically accurate during the conflict conversation in Study 3, although they did not recognize that they were being less understanding. Moreover, perceived understanding helped explain the link between depressive symptoms and relationship quality in all three studies, and these effects held when controlling for self‐reported understanding and perceived partner hostility.     

Problem Clarity as a Moderator between Trait Affect and Self‐Perceived Creativity

Empirical studies on the relationship between affect and creativity often produce conflicting results. This inconsistency has led us to believe that the relationship between affect and creativity may be better understood by looking at potential moderators. Our study looked specifically at trait affect and self‐perceived creativity. Using the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) theory with problem clarity as the potential moderator, we hypothesized that when individuals are faced with problems that lack clarity, trait affect has greater sway over their self‐perceived creativity. Our results provided evidence that problem clarity moderated the relationship between positive trait affect and self‐perceived creativity; the positive relationship between positive trait affect and self‐perceived creativity is stronger when problem clarity is low and weaker when problem clarity is high. No moderating effect was found in the relationship between negative trait affect and self‐perceived creativity.     

Female first,leader second? Gender bias in the encoding of leadership behavior

In the current paper we investigate whether gender affects the encoding of leadership behavior. In three studies we found evidence that perceivers had difficulty encoding leadership behaviors into their underlying prototypical leadership traits when the behavior implied an agentic trait and the behavior was enacted by a female. Using a lexical decision making task, in Study 1 we demonstrated that agentic leadership traits were less accessible than communal leadership traits when the leader was female. Additionally, Study 1 also demonstrated that agentic traits were less accessible when the leader was female versus male. In Studies 2a and 2b, we replicated the differences we found for agentic leadership behaviors using perceiver’s self-ratings as the dependent variable. Results are discussed both in terms of their implications for future research on gender bias in leadership and their practical implications for eliminating gender bias against females who aspire to leadership positions.     

Can you forgive? It depends on how happy you are

This paper examined how individual group status and happiness influence forgiveness. In Study 1, happiness was treated as a trait difference: highly happy people, compared with very unhappy people, were found to be more willing to forgive murderers. More important, an interaction effect between happiness and group status on forgiveness was found, that is, highly happy people tended to be more forgiving when either ingroup or outgroup members were killed; unhappy people, however, tended to be less forgiving about murder when ingroup rather than outgroup members were killed. In Study 2, happiness was treated as an emotional state difference: happiness, rather than sadness, was found to bring greater forgiveness. Moreover, consistent with the interaction effect displayed in Study 1, happy participants tended to forgive more when ingroup or outgroup members were hurt; sad participants tended to forgive less when ingroup members rather than outgroup members were hurt. Implications for connections between happiness, group membership, and forgiveness are discussed.