共查询到20条相似文献，搜索用时 15 毫秒
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This study examines the effects of two different types of good and bad experiences on risk‐taking preferences: fortune and luck. We define fortune as a relatively stable positive or negative context within which choices are made and luck as a more unpredictable series of better or worse outcomes. With the use of a lottery‐based paradigm, fortune was operationalized as a preponderance of all‐gain or all‐loss two‐outcome option pairs within a larger set of mixed‐outcome control lotteries. Luck was operationalized as the experienced frequency of better versus worse outcomes when playing the lotteries. We predicted that fortune and luck would lead to opposite risk‐taking tendencies within control lotteries. An assimilation effect of fortune was predicted, with risk‐averse preferences for control lotteries when surrounded by good fortune and risk‐seeking preferences when surrounded by bad fortune. In contrast, we expected that high rates of success with good luck would lead to risk‐seeking preferences, whereas low rates of success with bad luck would yield risk‐averse preferences. Our predictions for fortune were confirmed; however, there was no evidence of any effect on risk taking based on experiencing good versus bad luck. Moreover, we observed a striking disconnect between impressions of the experience and risk‐taking behavior. Both identification and attributions of luck and fortune were highly correlated with the number of gain outcomes that participants experienced but were uncorrelated with risk taking. We review these surprising findings considering several prominent theories of risk‐taking behavior, particularly drawing attention to the differential roles of predecisional and postdecisional information in choice. 相似文献
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Marcia L. Spetch 《决策行为杂志》2014,27(2):146-156
Whether buying stocks or playing the slots, people making real‐world risky decisions often rely on their experiences with the risks and rewards. These decisions, however, do not occur in isolation but are embedded in a rich context of other decisions, outcomes, and experiences. In this paper, we systematically evaluate how the local context of other rewarding outcomes alters risk preferences. Through a series of four experiments on decisions from experience, we provide evidence for an extreme‐outcome rule, whereby people overweight the most extreme outcomes (highest and lowest) in a given context. As a result, people should be more risk seeking for gains than losses, even with equally likely outcomes. Across the experiments, the decision context was varied so that the same outcomes served as the high extreme, low extreme, or neither. As predicted, people were more risk seeking for relative gains, but only when the risky option potentially led to the high‐extreme outcome. Similarly, people were more risk averse for relative losses, but only when the risky option potentially led to the low‐extreme outcome. We conclude that in risky decisions from experience, the biggest wins and the biggest losses seem to matter more than they should. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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In this paper, we explore the relationships between psychometric and behavioral measures of maximization in decisions from experience (DfE). In two experiments, we measured choice behavior in two experimental paradigms of DfE and self‐reported maximizing tendencies using three prominent scales of maximization. In the repeated consequentialist choice paradigm, participants made repeated choices between two unlabeled options and received consequential feedback on each trial. In the sampling paradigm, participants freely sampled from two options and received feedback on their sampling before making a single consequential choice. Individuals exhibited different degrees of maximizing behavior in both paradigms and across different payoff distributions, but none of the maximizing scales predicted this behavior. These results indicate that maximization scales address constructs that are different from the maximization behavior observed in DfE, and that these measures will need to be improved to reflect behavioral aspects of choice and search from experience. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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In this paper, we merge research related to experiential learning, temporal perception, and the value of time and money by examining decisions where the timing of action (response) determines the outcome received. We predicted that time‐saving preferences and impatience would decrease maximization (i.e., taking action when it returned the largest reward), and that the constraints of temporal perception would compound their effects. Across three studies, participants undershot on average (i.e., responded earlier than the period of time during which a response would return the maximal reward) showed a preference for shorter‐delay options and often did not find the maximal reward. In addition, participants' reliance on temporal perception increased undershooting, increased preferences for shorter‐delay options, and reduced maximization. Nevertheless, participants who found the maximal reward continued to maximize at a high rate rather than opting for shorter delays and smaller rewards. Thus, while most participants appeared to have a preference for saving time, most behaved as reward maximizers rather than temporal discounters. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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We present two experiments that explore the reinforcing value of lottery tickets. Participants are faced with a repeated choice task between a safe alternative and a risky prospect that provides a chance to win a lottery ticket to be played at the end of the study. Study 1 considers situations in which the risky option leads to a slightly higher expected value than the safe alternative. It shows that the risk‐taking rate increases with the probability to win the lottery ticket, but it is below 50% even when this probability is high. Study 2 shows limited sensitivity to the expected value of the risky prospect. The results can be explained with the assumption that participants rely on small samples of past experiences, and that their reaction to lottery tickets reflects large variability. The relationship between the current results and previous research on the synergetic effect of distinct reinforcements and the “pat on the back paradox” is discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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This paper examines the role of computer‐based decision aids in reducing cognitive effort and therefore influencing strategy selection. It extends and complements the work reported in the behavioral decision theory literature on the role of effort and accuracy in choice tasks. The central proposition of the research is that if a decision aid makes a strategy that should lead to a more accurate outcome at least as easy to employ as a simpler, but less accurate, heuristic, then the use of a decision aid should induce that more accurate strategy and as a consequence improve decision quality. Otherwise, a decision aid may only influence decision‐making efficiency. This occurs because decision makers use a decision aid in such a way as to minimize their overall level of effort expenditure. Results from a laboratory experiment support this proposition. When a more accurate normative strategy is made less effortful to use, it is used. This result is consistent with the findings of our prior studies, but more clearly demonstrates that decision aids can induce the use of normatively oriented strategies. The key to inducing these strategies is to make the normative strategy easier to execute than competing alternative strategies. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Recently, there has been increased interest in decisions‐from‐experience (where decision makers learn from observing the outcomes of previous choices), which provide valuable insights into the learning and preference construction processes underlying many daily decisions. Several process models have been developed to capture these processes, and while such models often fit the data well, many assume that the decision maker is a vigilant observer, processing each outcome. In two studies, we provide a critical test of this assumption using eye tracking to record directed visual attention when participants choose repeatedly among two options, each time being shown the outcome for their chosen option and for the foregone option. Consistently, we find that the vigilance assumption is not supported, with decision makers often not attending to outcome information. Moreover, (in)attention to outcomes is predictable, with vigilance decreasing as more choices are made, and being greater for obtained than for foregone outcomes, and when options deliver only gains as opposed to losses or a mixture of gains and losses. Furthermore, we find that this variation in attentional allocation plays a central role in the apparent indecisiveness (inconsistency) in choice, with increased attention to foregone outcomes predicting switches to that option on the next choice. Together, these findings highlight the value of eye tracking in investigations of decisions‐from‐experience, providing novel insight into the cognitive processes underlying them. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Previous research has documented a tendency for people to make more risk‐seeking decisions for others than for themselves in relationship scenarios. Two experiments investigated whether this self–other difference is moderated by participants' self‐esteem and anxiety levels. In Experiment 1, lower self‐esteem and higher anxiety levels were associated with more risk‐averse choices for personal decisions but not for decisions for others. Therefore, participants with lower self‐esteem/higher anxiety showed greater self–other differences in comparison to participants with higher self‐esteem/lower anxiety levels. Experiment 2 demonstrated that this effect was largely mediated by participants' expectations of success and feelings about potential negative outcomes. These results are discussed in the context of “threats to the self,” with a central role played by anxiety and self‐esteem threats in personal decision making but not in decision making for others. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Ji Lu Junhao Pan Qiang Zhang Laurette Dubé Edward H. Ip 《Multivariate behavioral research》2013,48(6):584-599
With intensively collected longitudinal data, recent advances in the experience-sampling method (ESM) benefit social science empirical research, but also pose important methodological challenges. As traditional statistical models are not generally well equipped to analyze a system of variables that contain feedback loops, this paper proposes the utility of an extended hidden Markov model to model reciprocal the relationship between momentary emotion and eating behavior. This paper revisited an ESM data set (Lu, Huet, &; Dube, 2011) that observed 160 participants' food consumption and momentary emotions 6 times per day in 10 days. Focusing on the analyses on feedback loop between mood and meal-healthiness decision, the proposed reciprocal Markov model (RMM) can accommodate both hidden (“general” emotional states: positive vs. negative state) and observed states (meal: healthier, same or less healthy than usual) without presuming independence between observations and smooth trajectories of mood or behavior changes. The results of RMM analyses illustrated the reciprocal chains of meal consumption and mood as well as the effect of contextual factors that moderate the interrelationship between eating and emotion. A simulation experiment that generated data consistent with the empirical study further demonstrated that the procedure is promising in terms of recovering the parameters. 相似文献