A re‐examination of melioration and rational choice

We examined how people allocate choices between two alternatives when the payoff from each alternative varied as a function of the allocation of recent choices. On any one trial alternative A had a higher immediate payoff than alternative B, but across all trials B had a higher overall payoff than A. Rational choice theory requires that participants allocate all their responses to the alternative with the greatest overall payoff irrespective of which has the higher immediate payoff. Melioration, in contrast, proposes that participants are motivated to choose the alternative with the higher immediate payoff, irrespective of the consequences for future returns. We report four experiments in which we varied the nature of the payoffs. Participants exhibited self‐control consistent with rational choice theory when payoffs varied in magnitude, but exhibited impulsiveness consistent with melioration when the payoffs varied in probability. Finally, we show that impulsivity when payoffs varied in probability can be overcome following un‐reinforced practice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Distinctive Preferences Toward Risk in the Substantive Domain of Sociality*

As with standard models of rationality, theorists generally treat prospect theory's demonstration of risk aversion in gains but risk tolerance in losses as domain‐general. Yet evolutionary psychology suggests that natural selection has designed a domain specific cognitive architecture—with systems specialized for some substantive domains but not others. Here we address risky choices through that lens asking whether humans' risk responses dispose them to enter social relationships even when doing so is counter to normative rationality and regardless of whether the “enter” versus “not enter” choice is framed as between gains and losses. Laboratory findings in five sites across three countries provide a positive answer to both possibilities. Participants could enter or not enter inherently risky social relationships. They were more willing to enter such relationships than rational choice models would predict and were equally so willing regardless of whether equivalent alternatives were framed as gains and as losses. With the “social context” extracted in otherwise identical games, participants' risk responses were consistent with prospect theory. The present findings suggest the possibility of adaptations designed to facilitate sociality—despite its risks and how those risks are framed.     

A META‐ANALYTIC EXAMINATION OF THE INSTRUCTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPUTER‐BASED SIMULATION GAMES

Interactive cognitive complexity theory suggests that simulation games are more effective than other instructional methods because they simultaneously engage trainees’ affective and cognitive processes ( Tennyson & Jorczak, 2008 ). Meta‐analytic techniques were used to examine the instructional effectiveness of computer‐based simulation games relative to a comparison group (k= 65, N= 6,476). Consistent with theory, posttraining self‐efficacy was 20% higher, declarative knowledge was 11% higher, procedural knowledge was 14% higher, and retention was 9% higher for trainees taught with simulation games, relative to a comparison group. However, the results provide strong evidence of publication bias in simulation games research. Characteristics of simulation games and the instructional context also moderated the effectiveness of simulation games. Trainees learned more, relative to a comparison group, when simulation games conveyed course material actively rather than passively, trainees could access the simulation game as many times as desired, and the simulation game was a supplement to other instructional methods rather than stand‐alone instruction. However, trainees learned less from simulation games than comparison instructional methods when the instruction the comparison group received as a substitute for the simulation game actively engaged them in the learning experience.     

Drug addiction. Is it a disease or is it based on choice? A review of Gene Heyman's Addiction: A disorder of choice.

In Addiction: A disorder of choice, Gene Heyman surveys a broad array of evidence—historical, anthropological, survey, clinical, and laboratory‐based to build an argument about the role of basic choice processes in the phenomena that comprise drug addiction. He makes a compelling, multifaceted argument that conceptualizing drug addiction as a chronic disease (like schizophrenia or diabetes) is both misleading and erroneous. In developing his argument, he points out that the best survey data available indicate that most drug addicts quit their addiction, a fact inconsistent with a chronic‐disease model. He illustrates how basic, normal choice processes can lead to addiction, arguing that people do not choose to be addicts, but that normal choice dynamics can lead them to that condition. He points to a variety of factors that keep most from becoming addicted, with a focus on the role of choice governed by choice‐by‐choice contingencies versus choice governed by the outcome of sequences of choices, a difference in an under‐described activity called framing. His view is consistent with the most effective treatments currently available, and provides a basis for continued basic research on choice as well as research on treatment and prevention.     

Personality accounts for stable preferences and expectations across a range of simple games

Behaviour on even simple experimental games shows considerable individual differences, but previous attempts to link these preferences to stable personality traits have had mixed results. Here we address three limitations of earlier studies, namely: (1) uncertainties concerning the reliability of preferences; (2) use of personality instruments with limited cross-study comparability; and (3) confounds where more than one psychological motive can lead to a particular choice. Sixty-seven participants completed 12 distinct real-money games twice over a two-week interval along with 6 measures concerning their expectations about other players’ choices. Personality was measured using the full NEO-PI-R. Choices were highly stable across time (r = .84). Moreover, choices on the 12 games and 6 expectations reflected a single underlying dimension of “prosocial orientation”, measuring concern for the payoffs received by other players. Scores on the prosocial orientation dimension were related to personality, with openness, (low) neuroticism, and (low) extraversion retained as significant predictors.     

Evaluating the reliance on past choices in adaptive learning models

Adaptive learning models are used to predict behavior in repeated choice tasks. Predictions can be based on previous payoffs or previous choices of the player. The current paper proposes a new method for evaluating the degree of reliance on past choices, called equal payoff series extraction (EPSE). Under this method a simulated player has the same exact choices as the player but receives equal constant payoffs from all of the alternatives. Success in predicting the next choice ahead for this simulated player therefore relies strictly on mimicry of previous choices of the actual player. This allows determining the marginal fit of predictions that are not based on the actual task payoffs. To evaluate the reliance on past choices under different models, an experiment was conducted in which 48 participants completed a three-alternative choice task in four task conditions. Two different learning rules were evaluated: an interference rule and a decay rule. The results showed that while the predictions of the decay rule relied more on past choices, only the reliance on past payoffs was associated with improved parameter generality. Moreover, we show that the Equal Payoff Series can be used as a criterion for optimizing parameters resulting in better parameter generalizability.     

Integrating Cognitive Process and Descriptive Models of Attitudes and Preferences

Discrete choice experiments—selecting the best and/or worst from a set of options—are increasingly used to provide more efficient and valid measurement of attitudes or preferences than conventional methods such as Likert scales. Discrete choice data have traditionally been analyzed with random utility models that have good measurement properties but provide limited insight into cognitive processes. We extend a well‐established cognitive model, which has successfully explained both choices and response times for simple decision tasks, to complex, multi‐attribute discrete choice data. The fits, and parameters, of the extended model for two sets of choice data (involving patient preferences for dermatology appointments, and consumer attitudes toward mobile phones) agree with those of standard choice models. The extended model also accounts for choice and response time data in a perceptual judgment task designed in a manner analogous to best–worst discrete choice experiments. We conclude that several research fields might benefit from discrete choice experiments, and that the particular accumulator‐based models of decision making used in response time research can also provide process‐level instantiations for random utility models.     

Emotion,Decision, and Risk: Betting on Gambles versus Betting on People

We examined the effects of two emotions, fear and anger, on risk‐taking behavior in two types of tasks: Those in which uncertainty is generated by a randomizing device (“lottery risk”) and those in which it is generated by the uncertain behavior of another person (“person‐based risk”). Participants first completed a writing task to induce fear or anger. They then made choices either between lotteries (Experiment 1) or between actions in risky two‐person decisions (Experiments 2 and 3). The experiments involved substantial real‐money payoffs. Replicating earlier studies (which used hypothetical rewards), Experiment 1 showed that fearful participants were more risk‐averse than angry participants in lottery‐risk tasks. However—the key result of this study—fearful participants were substantially less risk‐averse than angry participants in a two‐person task involving person‐based risk (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 offered options and payoffs identical to those of Experiment 2 but with lottery‐type risk. Risk‐taking returned to the pattern of Experiment 1. The impact of incidental emotions on risk‐taking appears to be contingent on the class of uncertainty involved. For lottery risk, fear increased the frequency of risk‐averse choices and anger reduced it. The reverse pattern was found when uncertainty in the decision was person‐based. Further, the effect was specifically on differences in willingness to take risks rather than on differences in judgments of how much risk was present. The impact of different emotions on risk‐taking or risk‐avoiding behavior is thus contingent on the type, as well as the degree, of uncertainty the decision maker faces. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Behavioural Consistency Within the Prisoner's Dilemma Game: The Role of Personality and Situation

Mixed‐motive games represent situations that confront people with a conflict between cooperative and non‐cooperative alternatives. Despite this common basis, recent research has shown that the consistency of people's choices across different mixed‐motive games is rather low. The present research examined behavioural consistency within the same mixed‐motive game, by presenting participants with a series of one‐shot Prisoner's Dilemma Games. Across this set of games, payoffs were manipulated in order to intensify or weaken the conflict between self and the other party while maintaining the game's underlying structure. Our findings indicate that significant differences in choice behaviour are observed as a function of both situational (i.e. manipulations of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game's payoff structure) and personality differences (i.e. individual differences in personality and motivational traits). Moreover, our included situational variables and personality features did not interact with each other and were about equally impactful in shaping cooperation. Crucially, however, despite the significant behavioural differences across game variants, considerable consistency in choices was found as well, which suggests that the game's motivational basis reliably impacts choice behaviour in spite of situational and personality variations. We discuss implications for theorizing on mixed‐motive situations and elaborate on the question how cooperation can be promoted. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Eyes on the Prize? Evidence of Diminishing Attention to Experienced and Foregone Outcomes in Repeated Experiential Choice

Recently, there has been increased interest in decisions‐from‐experience (where decision makers learn from observing the outcomes of previous choices), which provide valuable insights into the learning and preference construction processes underlying many daily decisions. Several process models have been developed to capture these processes, and while such models often fit the data well, many assume that the decision maker is a vigilant observer, processing each outcome. In two studies, we provide a critical test of this assumption using eye tracking to record directed visual attention when participants choose repeatedly among two options, each time being shown the outcome for their chosen option and for the foregone option. Consistently, we find that the vigilance assumption is not supported, with decision makers often not attending to outcome information. Moreover, (in)attention to outcomes is predictable, with vigilance decreasing as more choices are made, and being greater for obtained than for foregone outcomes, and when options deliver only gains as opposed to losses or a mixture of gains and losses. Furthermore, we find that this variation in attentional allocation plays a central role in the apparent indecisiveness (inconsistency) in choice, with increased attention to foregone outcomes predicting switches to that option on the next choice. Together, these findings highlight the value of eye tracking in investigations of decisions‐from‐experience, providing novel insight into the cognitive processes underlying them. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Instance‐based Learning: A General Model of Repeated Binary Choice

A common practice in cognitive modeling is to develop new models specific to each particular task. We question this approach and draw on an existing theory, instance‐based learning theory (IBLT), to explain learning behavior in three different choice tasks. The same instance‐based learning model generalizes accurately to choices in a repeated binary choice task, in a probability learning task, and in a repeated binary choice task within a changing environment. We assert that, although the three tasks are different, the source of learning is equivalent and therefore, the cognitive process elicited should be captured by one single model. This evidence supports previous findings that instance‐based learning is a robust learning process that is triggered in a wide range of tasks from the simple repeated choice tasks to the most dynamic decision making tasks. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Equilibrium Selection,Similarity Judgments,and the “Nothing to Gain/Nothing to Lose” Effect

Rubinstein and Leland have both demonstrated that many observed violations of expected and discounted utility can be explained if people employ similarity judgments to make choices. In this paper, I show that this decision process also explains which equilibria will be selected in single‐shot games with multiple equilibria and implies that play in games will be associated with anomalies in risky choice. Data supporting these predictions are presented. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intertemporal Similarity: Discounting as a Last Resort

Standard models of intertemporal choice assume that individuals discount future payoffs by integrating reward amounts and time delays to generate a discounted value. Alternative models propose that, rather than integrate across them, individuals compare within attributes (amounts and delays) to determine if differences in one attribute outweigh differences in another attribute. For instance, the similarity model 1) compares the two reward amounts to determine whether they are similar, 2) compares the similarity of the two time delays, and then 3) makes a decision based on these similarity judgments. Here, I tested discounting models against attribute‐based models that use similarity judgments to make choices. I collected intertemporal choices and similarity judgments for the reward amounts and time delays from participants in three experiments. All experiments tested the ability of discounting and similarity models to predict intertemporal choices. Model generalization analyses showed that the best predicting models started with similarity judgments and then, if similarity failed to make a prediction, resorted to discounting models. Similarity judgments also matched intertemporal choice data demonstrating both the magnitude and sign effects, thereby accounting for behavioral data that contradict many discounting models. These results highlight the possibility that attribute‐based models such as the similarity models provide alternatives to discounting that may offer insights into the process of making intertemporal choices. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cognitive consequences of playing brain-training games in immersive virtual reality

The goal of the present study was to examine the effects of playing an immersive virtual reality game that included a collection of gamified cognitive tasks, Cerevrum, on specific components of cognition, including perceptual attention, mental rotation, working memory, visualization, visual field of view, and visual processing speed. Participants completed a pretest of cognitive assessments, played one of the two mini-games within Cerevrum (Stardust or Heroes) for 1.5 hr over three 30-min sessions and then completed a posttest of cognitive assessments and a questionnaire about interest and engagement during the game. An inactive control group completed only the pretest and posttest. Results showed no significant differences among the Heroes group, Stardust group, and control group on the posttest scores, even when controlled for pretest scores. These findings do not support the claim that playing brain-training games for a short period results in transfer of cognitive training to nongame venues.     

Action Dynamics in Intertemporal Choice Reveal Different Facets of Decision Process

Two experiments were conducted to examine decision process in intertemporal choice with spatial and temporal action dynamic measures generated from cursor movement. The effects of the context valence (gain and loss) and magnitude of the payoffs (small and large) were investigated. Other factors examined were differences between decisions made at versus away from the indifference point and response variability dependent on what was selected (delayed versus non‐delayed/less‐delayed payoff). Using principal components analysis, decision process is described with three orthogonal components. General decision difficulty is encompassed by two components: (1) Conflict, depicted by Idle time and deviations from a direct choice path, and (2) decision uncertainty or Wavering, described by left‐right directional flips. A general Locomotion factor was also present. In Experiment 1, Conflict was best at capturing the gain/loss and magnitude context effects. Greater Conflict was observed in the loss context and the small magnitude condition. When choices were closer to the indifference point, Wavering was most salient. In Experiment 2, when selecting larger, delayed payoffs, both Conflict and Wavering increased suggesting that controlling the temptation of selecting the sooner, smaller reward entails effort. By analyzing trajectories, the study advances knowledge of the construct validity of different action dynamic measures and supports the distinction of decision uncertainty and decision conflict. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cooperation in Mixed‐Motive Games: The Role of Individual Differences in Selfish and Social Orientation

In mixed‐motive games, people must choose between acting upon selfish interests and concerns for others. Yet, the consistency of people's behaviour across these various games is still unclear. If the same conflict between self and others is at the core of all mixed‐motive situations, three hypotheses can be stated: (1) behaviours in different mixed‐motive games should be substantially related; (2) all these games should substantially appeal to dispositional variables that probe in the psychological conflict between self and others; and (3) these dispositional variables should explain the shared variance among various games. These hypotheses were tested among undergraduate students (N = 219) who played seven different single‐shot mixed‐motive games and one sequential game. Social Value Orientation and the ideological attitudes Social Dominance Orientation and Right‐Wing Authoritarianism were included as dispositions. Our findings, however, showed evidence that did not fully substantiate our hypotheses, which calls into question the general idea that all mixed‐motive games render the conflict between selfish interests and concern for others salient. In the discussion, we focus on implications for research on mixed‐motive situations and elaborate on the role of ideology in this domain. Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Two good reasons to say ‘change!’ – ensemble representations as well as item representations impact standard measures of VWM capacity

Visual working memory (VWM) is a central bottleneck in human information processing. Its capacity is most often measured in terms of how many individual‐item representations VWM can hold (k). In the standard task employed to estimate k, an array of highly discriminable colour patches is maintained and, after a short retention interval, compared to a test display (change detection). Recent research has shown that with more complex, structured displays, change‐detection performance is, in addition to individual‐item representations, supported by ensemble representations formed as a result of spatial subgroupings. Here, by asking participants to additionally localize the change, we reveal indication for an influence of ensemble representations even in the very simple, unstructured displays of the colour‐patch change‐detection task. Critically, pure‐item models from which standard formulae of k are derived do not consider ensemble representations and, therefore, potentially overestimate k. To gauge this overestimation, we develop an item‐plus‐ensemble model of change detection and change localization. Estimates of k from this new model are about 1 item (~30%) lower than the estimates from traditional pure‐item models, even if derived from the same data sets.     

Weighing Outcomes by Time or Against Time? Evaluation Rules in Intertemporal Choice

Models of intertemporal choice draw on three evaluation rules, which we compare in the restricted domain of choices between smaller sooner and larger later monetary outcomes. The hyperbolic discounting model proposes an alternative‐based rule, in which options are evaluated separately. The interval discounting model proposes a hybrid rule, in which the outcomes are evaluated separately, but the delays to those outcomes are evaluated in comparison with one another. The tradeoff model proposes an attribute‐based rule, in which both outcomes and delays are evaluated in comparison with one another: People consider both the intervals between the outcomes and the compensations received or paid over those intervals. We compare highly general parametric functional forms of these models by means of a Bayesian analysis, a method of analysis not previously used in intertemporal choice. We find that the hyperbolic discounting model is outperformed by the interval discounting model, which, in turn, is outperformed by the tradeoff model. Our cognitive modeling is among the first to offer quantitative evidence against the conventional view that people make intertemporal choices by discounting the value of future outcomes, and in favor of the view that they directly compare options along the time and outcome attributes.     

Choice‐making,Expectations, and Treatment Positivity: How and When Choosing Shapes Aversive Experiences

Every day we use products and treatments with unknown but expected effects, such as using medication to manage pain. In many cases, we have a choice over which products or treatments to use; however, in other cases, people choose for us or choices are unavailable. Does choosing (versus not choosing) have implications for how a product or treatment is experienced? The current experiments examined the role of choice‐making in facilitating so‐called expectation assimilation effects—or situations in which a person's experiences (e.g., discomfort and pain) are evaluated in a manner consistent with their expectations. In Experiment 1, participants were initially exposed to a baseline set of aversive stimuli (i.e., sounds). Next, some participants were given expectations for two “treatments” (i.e., changes in screen display) that could ostensibly reduce discomfort. Critically, participants were either given a choice or not about which of the two treatments they preferred. Participants in a control condition were not provided with treatment expectations. Results revealed that discomfort experiences assimilated to expectations only when participants were provided with choice. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and provided evidence against the idea that demand characteristics and choice‐making unrelated to the core task (i.e., choices without associated expectations) could account for the results. Further, Experiment 2 showed that choosing reduced discomfort because of increased positivity about the treatment. Results are discussed in the context of extant research on choice‐making and expectation effects. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Personality accounts for stable preferences and expectations across a range of simple games

Behaviour on even simple experimental games shows considerable individual differences, but previous attempts to link these preferences to stable personality traits have had mixed results. Here we address three limitations of earlier studies, namely: (1) uncertainties concerning the reliability of preferences; (2) use of personality instruments with limited cross-study comparability; and (3) confounds where more than one psychological motive can lead to a particular choice. Sixty-seven participants completed 12 distinct real-money games twice over a two-week interval along with 6 measures concerning their expectations about other players’ choices. Personality was measured using the full NEO-PI-R. Choices were highly stable across time (r = .84). Moreover, choices on the 12 games and 6 expectations reflected a single underlying dimension of “prosocial orientation”, measuring concern for the payoffs received by other players. Scores on the prosocial orientation dimension were related to personality, with openness, (low) neuroticism, and (low) extraversion retained as significant predictors.