Plato’s Ion: Difficulties and Contradictions

Philosophia - This article treats Plato’s Ion as a test-case. It is widely accepted in literature about Plato that he was a consistent and systematic thinker, whose dialogues express his...     

Plato’s Cave

Abstract

Current interpretations of Plato’s cave are obviously incorrect because they do not explain how what we hear does not come from what we see. I argue that Plato is saying that the colors we receive from our faculty of vision do not cause the sounds that we receive from our faculty of hearing. I also show how we do not see ourselves or one other, how the shadows on the wall of the cave are images of that which casts them and therefore have less reality than them, and how the cave illustrates the divided line’s concern for the relationship between Forms and visible reality. The paper is structured around the two great riddles of the divided line: how Forms can be more real than everyday objects, and how one can know the unhypothesized beginning with complete certainty. I further argue that the puppets that cast shadows stand for the immanent Forms of the Phaedo and also for the moving Forms of the Timaeus. That of which these puppets are themselves images would thus stand for the Forms as they are in themselves of the Phaedo or the indestructible Forms of the Timaeus.     

Knowledge and Power in Plato’s Political Thought

Abstract

Plato justifies the concentration and exercise of power for persons endowed with expertise in political governance. This article argues that this justification takes two distinctly different sets of arguments. The first is what I shall call his ‘ideal political philosophy’ described primarily in the Republic as rule by philosopher‐kings wielding absolute authority over their subjects. Their authority stems solely from their comprehension of justice, from which they make political judgements on behalf of their city‐state. I call the second set of arguments Plato’s ‘practical political philosophy’ underlying his later thought, where absolute rule by philosopher‐kings is undermined by the impure character of all political knowledge. Whereas the complete comprehension of justice sanctions the absolute political power of those with this expertise, partial knowledge of justice disallows for such a large investment of power. Plato’s practical political philosophy argues for a mixed theory of governance fusing the institutions of monarchy with democracy in the best practical city‐state. Thus, Plato comes to realize the insurmountable difficulties of his ideal political thought, preferring a more practical political philosophy instead.     

Goodman’s “New Riddle”

First, a brief historical trace of the developments in confirmation theory leading up to Goodman’s infamous “grue” paradox is presented. Then, Goodman’s argument is analyzed from both Hempelian and Bayesian perspectives. A guiding analogy is drawn between certain arguments against classical deductive logic, and Goodman’s “grue” argument against classical inductive logic. The upshot of this analogy is that the “New Riddle” is not as vexing as many commentators have claimed (especially, from a Bayesian inductive-logical point of view). Specifically, the analogy reveals an intimate connection between Goodman’s problem, and the “problem of old evidence”. Several other novel aspects of Goodman’s argument are also discussed (mainly, from a Bayesian perspective).     

Meaning and Cognition in Plato’s Cratylus and Theaetetus

For Plato, the crucial function of human cognition is to grasp truths. Explaining how we are able to do this is fundamental to understanding our cognitive powers. Plato addresses this topic from several different angles. In the Cratylus and Theaetetus, he attempts to identify the elemental cognitions that are the foundations of language and knowledge. He considers several candidates for this role, most notably, perception and simple meaning-bearing concepts. In the first section, we will look at Plato??s worries about semantic instability and its epistemic consequences. The central role of basic cognitions in Plato??s account of knowledge in the Theaetetus will be explored in the second section. In the final section, the relevance of Plato??s conception of cognition to modern discussions in the philosophy of language and epistemology will be noted.     

Is Plato’s Timaeus Panentheistic?

Hartshorne and Reese thought that in the Timaeus Plato wasn’t quite a panentheist—though he would have been if he’d been consistent. More recently, Cooper has argued that while Plato’s World Soul may have inspired panentheists, Plato’s text does not itself describe a form of panenetheism. In this paper, I will reconsider this question not only by examining closely the Timaeus but by thinking about which features of current characterizations of panentheism are historically accidental and how the core of the doctrine might most fruitfully be understood. I’ll argue that there is a polytheistic view that deserves to be called panentheistic and that Plato’s Timaeus describes such a view.     

The syllable’s role in word naming

In a series of experiments, the masked priming paradigm with very brief prime exposures was used to investigate the role of the syllable in the production of English. Experiment 1 (word naming task) showed a syllable priming effect for English words with clear initial syllable boundaries (such as BALCONY), but no effect with ambisyllabic words targets (such as BALANCE, where the /l/ belongs to both the first and the second syllables). Experiment 2 failed to show such syllable priming effects in the lexical decision task. Experiment 3 demonstrated that for words with clear initial syllable boundaries, naming latencies were faster only when primes formed the first syllable of the target, in comparison with a neutral condition. Experiment 4 showed that the two possible initial syllables of ambisyllabic words facilitated word naming to the same extent, in comparison with the neutral condition. Finally, Experiment 5 demonstrated that the syllable priming effect obtained for CV words with clear initial syllable boundaries (such as DIVORCE) was not due to increased phonological and/or orthographic overlap. These results, showing that the syllable constitutes a unit of speech production in English, are discussed in relation to the model of phonological and phonetic encoding proposed by Levelt and Wheeldon (1994).     

Aristotle’s harmony with Plato on separable and immortal soul

The possibility of a harmony between the psychological doctrine of Aristotle and that of Plato marks a significant issue within the context of the debate surrounding Aristotle’s putative opposition to or harmony with Plato’s philosophy. The standard interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of the soul being purely hylomorphic leaves no room for harmonisation with Plato, nor does a functionalist interpretation that reduces Aristotle’s psychological doctrine to physicalist terms. However, these interpretations have serious drawbacks, both in terms of ad-hoc explanations formulated in the developmentalist mode, and the misconstruing of some of the fundamental features of Aristotle’s psychological doctrine. A dualist interpretation that accepts Aristotle’s doctrine of some part of the soul being properly incorporeal, separable and immortal overcomes these drawbacks and, significantly, opens the door for Platonic harmonisation. Furthermore, it can be shown that the kind of immortality in question is also in line with the Platonic stance, due to a deep similarity between the conceptions of metaphysical and moral personhood held by Plato and his student. However, this Aristotelian dualism is not Platonic dualism simpliciter. Rather, it is best understood in terms of the division of labour between Aristotle and Plato suggested by the Neoplatonic commentators generally, and Simplicius in particular. I argue that though questions surrounding these issues and particularly the issue of reincarnation remain, an account of Aristotle’s psychological doctrine as dualist and in harmony with Plato’s view of the soul can be shown to be stronger than both standard hylomorphic and functionalist accounts, both exegetically and philosophically.     

The Notion of Pseudo-Argument in Perelman’s Thought

According to Perelman (Rhétoriques, Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles, 1989: 80), a pseudo-argument is an argument that is supposed to be convincing from a given audience viewpoint, while it is not from another audience viewpoint. Such a claim raises the traditional problem of the boundaries between the well known “convince versus persuade” dichotomy. This paper aims at investigating it from a contemporary rhetorical and argumentative perspective which will take into account the fictional dimension of persuasion. In this perspective, it will be claimed that the notion of an “as if” argument better fits to some rhetorical phenomena.

The Role of Masculinity in Children’s Bullying

The aim of the present study was to explore the association between gender role, in terms of self-attribution of masculine and feminine characteristics, and children's involvement in bullying problems during the elementary-school years. A total of 113, six- to ten-year-old children completed self-report measures of bullying and victimization and a masculinity–femininity scale. Their teachers provided ratings of pupils’ reactive and proactive aggressive behavior. Data from a hierarchical regression on bullying scores showed that, irrespective of sex, masculine traits predicted active bullying behavior. Moreover, bullying was also related to victimization and to teacher's evaluation of reactive aggression. Our findings suggest the need for longitudinal and cross-cultural studies in this line of research.     

Psychoanalytic Interpretation as Pharmakon: Applying Derrida’s “Plato’s Pharmacy” to Psychoanalysis

This paper presents a metaphorical heuristic to expand psychoanalysts’ views on the nature and method of interpretation from an intersubjective perspective. It uses one of Jacques Derrida’s findings in his essay “Plato’s Pharmacy,” a critique of Plato’s Phaedrus, as a model of psychoanalytic interaction. A parallel is drawn between psychoanalytic interpretation and the pharmakon—an ancient Greek term for ‘drug’ that means both remedy and poison. From this comparison, the inescapable dependence of personal meaning on contextual factors, specifically the context of the clinical intersubjective field, is shown. As a result, when an interpretation is offered, the analyst cannot truly know if the patient will receive it as remedy or poison. By keeping the context-dependent nature of personal meaning in awareness through the use of the pharmakon metaphor, analysts increase their abilities of interpretive understanding. In further discussion, the classical psychoanalytic concept of ‘negative therapeutic reaction’ is presented as an example of a decontextualized and reified psychoanalytic construct that becomes superfluous when interpretations are viewed through an intersubjective lens as pharmakon. Without the burden of expectation for being the authoritative imparter of reality and truth, the analyst may now attend to the patient in a way that is more fluid and reciprocal, where the relational field becomes what is primarily interpreted. Further, practical clinical implications of the concept of pharmakon suggest that since the analytic interpretation is subjective in every respect, effective clinical practice cannot be reduced to rigid protocols of technique.     

The primacy question in Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology

This paper takes up the question as to what has primacy within Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology as a way to provide insight into the relation between empirical science and transcendental philosophy within his account of embodiment. Contending that this primacy necessarily pertains to methodology, I show how Kurt Goldstein’s conception of biology provided Merleau-Ponty with a scientific model for approaching human existence holistically in which primacy pertains to the transcendental practice of productive imagination that generates the eidetic organismic Gestalt in terms of which sense is made of empirical facts. Considering the analogous role played by imagination in Merleau-Ponty’s account of perceptual synthesis in the form of what he called projection, I argue that his account of embodiment is, parallel to Goldstein, grounded methodologically on the projection of an organismic Gestalt, and that as a form of operative-intentional praxis projection is the site of primacy in his phenomenology overall. In terms of the relation between natural science and transcendental philosophy in Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment, while the theoretical dimension of the latter—the eidetic apriority of the organismic Gestalt—is coupled dialectically with empirical facts on an epistemically coeval basis, these are jointly subordinated to the normative commitments implied by the imaginative projection of that Gestalt. The primacy of the latter is transcendental but in a distinctly practical sense, such that any substantive discrepancy between natural science and Merleau-Pontian phenomenology reflects metaphilosophical, not theoretical, disagreement.     

The racial subtext in Canada’s immigration discourse

The articulation of race has become subtle and elusive in democratic societies because racism conflicts with principles of equality and non-discrimination. This article examines Canada’s immigration discourse and argues that a racial subtext can be discerned from the discourse by examining its vocabulary, syntax, structure, and implied rationale. The study shows that codified concepts and an implied logic are used to convey racial massages that appear not to be “race”-based. The discourse is further facilitated by opinion polls and academic studies that reify the notion of “race” and legitimize its everyday use as a harmless concept. It is the discourse itself, and not implied differences of “race”, that fragments Canada. The study recommends abandoning the use of racial subtext in academic research and immigration policy development.