Mahatma Gandhi’s Pragmatic Spirituality: Its Relevance to Psychology East and West

M. K. Gandhi is no academic psychologist; but his philosophy and practice of pragmatic spirituality have important implications for psychology in general and Indian psychology in particular. Psychology as taught and practised in India is mostly Western and not Indian psychology. Indian psychology is an emerging system of psychology with its roots in classical Indian thought. According to Gandhi, the person is instinctively brute, but inherently spiritual. Consequently, he/she has on the one hand natural attraction to sensory gratification and indulgence, selfish desires and craving. On the other hand, he or she aspires for self-realization. Human development is a dialectical process where people seek to find a workable synthesis between sensory indulgence and spiritual aspirations, between egotistic selfishness and altruistic urges. Gandhi’s life provides an excellent case study of the ways of spiritual development. The techniques he crafted like satyagraha and the strategies he followed in his public life give us insights into how spirituality can be applied to improve human condition. The applications are not India specific, but universal. Therefore, psychologists from the East as well as from the West can join in exploring Gandhian ideas and techniques of psycho-spiritual development and their relevance to today’s troubled world.     

Remembering Medard Boss

Abstract

The life and work of Medard Boss is reviewed. This overview includes the development of his daseinsanalysis, presenting its roots in psychoanalysis, existential phenomenological psychiatry, Heideggerian philosophy, and Indian thought. Also examined are Boss's contributions to the fields of psychotherapy, philosophy, and human scientific psychology. The latter contributions include Boss's explication of the meanings of three specific kinds of psychological phenomena: sexual disorders, bodily illnesses and injuries, and dreams. The article then concludes with the author's personal reflections on his experiences with daseinsanalysis and Medard Boss.     

Existential perspective in the thought of Carl Jung

It is argued that there is a significant existential perspective in the thought of Carl Jung. Similarities and differences with some of the views of Jean Paul Sartre are explored as a way of developing this perspective and to show how a philosophy of a man might be developed drawing from both sources. Jung is shown to be in disagreement with Sartre in defending an idea of a determinate human nature, describing the self in a developmental way, and in not claiming that human freedom is absolute or unconditioned. Nevertheless, the Jungian concept of individuation is similar to Sartre's ideal of authenticity, in that both focus on the goal of achieving meaningful existence through development of inner resources, creative exercise of freedom, and overcoming self-deception.     

The destiny of freedom: in Heidegger

The essay recapitulates the decisive steps in Heidegger’s development of the problem of human freedom. The interpretation is set in the context of a general matrix for how freedom is treated in the tradition, as both a theoretical ontological problem, and as practical appeal. According to some readers, Heidegger’s thinking is a philosophy of freedom throughout; according to others his “turning” implies abandoning the idea of human freedom as a metaphysical remnant. The essay seeks an intermediate path, by following his explicit attempts to develop an ontology based on the concept of freedom in the earlier writings, showing how this is the central theme in his confrontation and also his final break with German idealism, with Kant and with Schelling in particular, and with the prospects for a system of freedom. However, this break does not terminate his preoccupation with the problem of freedom, which is then transformed into the idea of thinking as a practice of freedom, as a way of reaching into “the free”.

The Turn from Ontology to Ethics: Three Kantian Responses to Three Levinasian Critiques

Abstract

Both Kant and Levinas state that traditional ontology is a type of philosophy that illegitimately forces the structure of human reason onto other beings, thus making the subject the center and origin of all meaning. Kant’s critique of the ontology of his scholastic predecessors is well known. For Levinas, however, it does not suffice. He rejects what we could call an ‘existential ontology’: a self-centered way of living as a whole, of which all philosophical ontology is but a branch. Alternatively, he presents an ethical way of living centered on ‘the Other’. Kant also, however, eventually turns to ethics to uncover a more fundamental domain of meaning. Hence, both thinkers ultimately agree about the primacy of ethics over theory. Despite this concurrence, Levinas nevertheless criticizes all aspects of Kant’s turn towards ethics: his reason for making this turn, the kind of critique that he applies to this domain, and the outcome thereof. These three points reflect Levinas’ more general critique that Kant did not succeed in overcoming ontological discourse. This paper shows how Kant can reply to, and overcome, each of Levinas’ three critiques. In this way, I reveal certain commonalities between these two thinkers that commentators still often overlook.     

关于道德与政治哲学视野中的法律哲学的对话(上)

Joseph Raz has been dedicated to using the philosophies of mind and of action to explain the nature of normativity. By the same token, his research on jurisprudence and the nature of law has been rooted in his use of the context of the philosophy of practical reason to explain the normativity of law, namely,the relation between law and morality. Our understanding of the Razian philosophy of law thus cannot be divorced from his research on moral and political philosophies. Our dialogue with Joseph Raz will h...     

What Is ‘The Meaning of Our Cheerfulness’? Philosophy as a Way of Life in Nietzsche and Montaigne

Robert Pippin has recently raised what he calls ‘the Montaigne problem’ for Nietzsche's philosophy: although Nietzsche advocates a ‘cheerful’ mode of philosophizing for which Montaigne is an exemplar, he signally fails to write with the obvious cheerfulness attained by Montaigne. We explore the moral psychological structure of the cheerfulness Nietzsche values, revealing unexpected complexity in his conception of the attitude. For him, the right kind of cheerfulness is radically non‐naïve; it expresses the overcoming of justified revulsion at calamitous aspects of life through a reflective, higher‐order affirmative attitude. This complex notion of cheerfulness turns out to have roots in Montaigne himself, and it must (according to both philosophers) be thought of as a kind of second nature cultivated through practice, as a kind of second nature. Understanding the meaning of cheerfulness thereby sheds light on the conception of philosophy as a way of life in both Nietzsche and Montaigne.     

Freedom: East and West

This paper explains some of the uses of the word ‘freedom’ in Western as well as in Indian philosophy. Regarding the psychological concept of freedom or free will, this paper focuses on the distinction between fatalism, determinism, types of compatibilism, and libertarianism. Indian philosophers, by and large, are compatibilists, although some minor systems, such as Śākta Āgama, favor a type of libertarianism. From the Indian perspective the form of life of human beings has also been mentioned in the discussion of free will. Regarding metaphysical freedom, I discuss the views of the Bhagavad Gītā and Swami Vivekananda in Sect. III. K.C. Bhattacharyya, a neo-Advaita Vedāntin, has discussed degrees of freedom of the subject at several levels. According to him, spiritual progress lies in the progressive realization of the freedom of the subject. I compare his view with the classical Advaita concept of freedom. I have also addressed the question of whether freedom from suffering can be realized at social and global levels. In this context I have mentioned some of the interpretations of the great saying ‘I am Brahman,’ and how freedom can be realized at the global level by using the Advaita concept of ‘oneness.’     

Leninism and the Enlightenment

Conclusion The outcome of this comparison of the impact of the Englishtenment on two rival philosophical traditions suggests that there are points of contact even on the issues that appear to push Leninism in an opposite direction from liberalism. The lack of communication between these two traditions results in a lack of vigor in developing their philosophies in a way that addresses the accomplishments of rival philosophies. For example, Leninism, which seeks to justify limits on the freedom of speech for those viewed as anti-socialist, would do well to reinforce its position by mastering the reasoning of the liberals who differentiate the rights of the Ku Klux Klan from those of the N.A.A.C.P. And liberalism, which has been concerned with overcoming formal equality to implement real, practical equality of opportunity, is in effect echoing one of Lenin's main concerns about democracy under capitalism.Insofar as Lenin put forward the idea of Marxism as the continuation and sublation of the best accomplishments of human culture, it appears to be a weakness of contemporary Leninism that it fails sufficiently to embrace or confront the body of philosophical thought characterizing the liberal democratic conceptions of the Enlightenment and of contemporary liberalism. Even though this body of thought was known to Lenin and partially appropriated as well as confronted by him, there is a lack of emphasis by Leninists upon the mastering of the arguments advanced by liberalism. The fact that rival, anti-Leninist thought also began from certain ideas of the Enlightenment underscores the importance for Leninism's own self-understanding of studying the evolution of Enlightenment philosophy, its links with twentieth-century liberalism, and the reasons for the rejection of liberal conceptions by Lenin.     

Kant and Hegel on purposive action

This essay discusses Kant and Hegel’s philosophies of action and the place of action within the general structure of their practical philosophy. We begin by briefly noting a few things that both unite and distinguish the two philosophers. In the sections that follow, we consider these and their corollaries in more detail. In so doing, we map their differences against those suggested by more standard readings that treat their accounts of action as less central to their practical philosophy. Section 2 discusses some central Kantian concepts (Freedom, Willkür, Wille, and Moral Law). In Section 3, we take a closer look at the distinction between internal and external action, as found in Kant’s philosophy of morality and legality. In Section 4, we turn to Hegel and his distinctions between abstract right (legality), morality, and ethical life, as well as the location of his account of action within his overall theory of morality. We discuss the distinction between Handlung and Tat, and non-imputable consequences. The overall aims of our essay are to shed light on some puzzles in Kant and Hegel’s conceptions and to examine where their exact disputes lie without taking a stand on which philosophy is ultimately the most satisfactory.     

The enduring significance of Christos Yannaras: some further works in translation

The Greek philosopher and theologian Christos Yannaras is becoming better known in the English-speaking world with the publication of an increasing number of his works in English translation. With the help of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, Yannaras articulates an ontological (as opposed to an ontic) version of Being based on relation. Beings exist not as ontic entities but only with reference to the person. Relation actually constitutes existents. Our fulfilment as human beings lies in our ascending from the mode of nature, which is bound by necessity, to a mode of existence characterised by self-transcending referentiality or love. Two obstacles are considered: the problem of evil and the ‘religionisation’ of Christianity. The fundamental problem of evil is that it renders human life without meaning. There are, however, no rational explanations of evil. The only reply lies beyond language, in faith/trust, self-transcendence and self-offering. A religionised version of Christianity transforms faith into an ideology which holds out salvation as a reward for the individual. The Church – the ecclesial event – is not a collection of individuals seeking their own salvation but a community of people called to struggle together to attain true existence, to pass from the finite mode of nature to that mode which knows no limitations of decay and death. An intellectualist approach to philosophy does not help us to achieve this goal. For philosophy is not simply an exercise in thinking but the struggle to attain existential freedom. Such freedom is transformatory, referential and ek-static.     

Royaumont Revisited

Michael Dummett has claimed that the only way to establish communication between the analytic and Continental schools of philosophy is to go back to their point of divergence in Frege and the early Husserl. In this paper, I try to show that Dummett's claim is false. I examine in detail the discussions at the infamous 1958 Royaumont Colloquium on analytic philosophy. Many – including Dummett – believe that these discussions underscore the futility of attempting to bridge the gap between Continental and analytical philosophies in anything like their current shapes. I argue, however, that a close study of the Royaumont proceedings rather reveals how close some of the analytical speakers were to some of their Continental listeners.     

La Liberté Dans la Perception Chez Husserl et Fichte<Superscript>1</Superscript>

In spite of their opposite methods, Fichte's deductive process and Husserl's reduction cope with the same challenge: they aim to explain how the sensible world is dependent on reflixivity. As perception is generally linked with natural existence, and pure passivity, the deepest significance of transcendental thought in those philosophies consists in equalizing phenomenon and reflexion. In the heart of bodily life, some spiritual theme has to be found. Fichte defines action as the quantification of freedom, and freedom is effectively achieved in the sensible world. Human perception reveals freedom altogether in corporal movements as in the surrounding world (Umwelt). The Fichtean theory of acknowledgment assumes this goal. In the same way, Husserl's reduction explains how significance proceeds from the body (Leib). The Husserlian analysis of kinesthesis and the radical experience of the hand touching the other hand both introduce to the status of pre-reflection. However the complete resolution of the question is given by Fichte: Intelligibility may exist in the sensible world as the metaphysical concept of phenomenon (Erscheinung) in the last Fichtean philosophy expresses the idea of the Absolute pervading the sensible.

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La Liberté Dans la Perception Chez Husserl et Fichte¹

     

Nietzsche on Art and Freedom

There are passages in Nietzsche that can be read as contributions to the free will/determinism debate. When read in that way, they reveal a fairly amateurish metaphysician with little of real substance or novelty to contribute; and if these readings were apt or perspicuous, it seems to me, they would show that Nietzsche's thoughts about freedom were barely worth pausing over. They would simply confirm the impression—amply bolstered from other quarters—that Nietzsche was not at his best when addressing the staple questions of philosophy. But these readings sell Nietzsche short. He had next to no systematic interest in metaphysics, and his concern with the question of freedom was not motivated by metaphysical considerations. Rather—and as with all of Nietzsche's concerns—his motivations were ethical. He was interested, not in the relation of the human will to the causal order of nature, but in the relation between freedom and the good life, between the will and exemplary human living. Read from this perspective, Nietzsche's remarks about freedom actually add up to something. And what they add up to is one aspect of his attempt to understand life after the model of art. Beauty, for Kant, was an image of the moral. ¹ For Nietzsche, by contrast—and the contrast can be hard to spell out—art was an image of the ethical. ² My hope here is to begin to explain why Nietzsche might have thought that the issue of freedom was relevant to that. In sections 1–3, I attempt to show why Nietzsche is not best read as a participant in the standard free will/determinism debate; in sections 4–6, I try to spell out the ethical conception of freedom that he develops instead.     

论海德格尔对康德实践哲学的解读

海德格尔对康德实践哲学的解读是他阐释康德哲学的重要组成部分。本文围绕着道德情感、实践理性、实践自由等问题分析了海德格尔在这一方面的解读内容,并且指出海德格尔的解读是定向于存在论的,属于基础存在论筹划,人的存在问题是关注的核心。他力图发掘康德思想中的存在论-生存论的内涵,这反而丧失了原初的伦理学意义。     

Prolongement du dispositif d’accompagnement sens de la vie et sens du travail : « Développer le sens de sa vie en cultivant ses liens aux autres et aux communautés sociales »

IntroductionAs an extension of the counseling program for adults, dedicated to meaning of life and meaning of work, a complementary session called “Developing the meaning of one's life by cultivating one's links with others and social communities” has been created. It is developed under the impetus in particular of formulated research perspectives in which broadening the focus is encouraged, by no longer focusing solely on individuals but also on social groups, collectives and communities.ObjectiveThe intention is to understand the way through which meaning is developed by way of contact with social interactions and how the development of reflection on social communities makes it possible to enrich the individual in the construction of his identity, his references and of his social integration. This session strives not to reinforce, with the accompaniment to meaning, individualism, excessive self-centeredness, withdrawal into oneself within what is known of the intimate sphere. On the contrary, it strives to promote an awareness of the importance of the link to others, of an openness to otherness which is fundamental in the construction of meaning.ProcedureThe objective of this study is to present the session by considering its processes and its effects in order to provide practicing psychologists and counselors in the field of orientation with an intervention device and operational tools.Concluding discussionThe scientific and practical implications are discussed in the light of the main results collected during the 2019 experimentation of this session with four communities and its application within five counseling programs validating its contributions for the beneficiaries and for the overall device.     

‘Wholeness,Dignity and the Ageing Self’: A Conversation Between Philosophy and Theology

SUMMARY

Winifred Wing Han Lamb: My philosophical interest straddles the areas of education, religion and theology. As a teacher involved in school philosophy programs, I have also been interested in the philosophy of childhood and particularly in the recurring notion of the ‘whole child’ in education. In considering what ‘wholeness’ could mean for children's education, I have also been led to consider what meaning it holds for the self through the ‘changing scenes’ of life, especially in the face of the challenges of ageing.

The notion of ‘wholeness’ holds an intuitive appeal and invites articulation of the deep truths of our faith with respect to persons in all ‘sorts and conditions.’ In section one of this chapter, I attempt that articulation. But this conversation needs to be complementary. Our chapter is the beginning of a dialogue between philosophy and theology in which both affirm the ageing self in the light of the human search for wholeness and dignity.

Heather Thomson: My theological research into humanity as an image of God led me to inquire about the way in which we could speak meaningfully of ageing and dying in terms of imaging God. This challenged how God-likeness was to be understood in relation to glory, honour and power, terms associated with imaging God and exerting dominion. In searching for a theological view of the self that would confer dignity on the ageing, I was led into conversation with various philosophies of the self, some very helpful for my task.

It seems to me that, if ageing people are to be counted as having dignity and worth, and not discounted, then one's theory of the human person was significant. In pondering the issue, it appeared that a conversation between philosophy and theology would be fruitful. Hence, this joint paper. We each speak from our own discipline but find resonance with each other's work. We see this as a first step in a constructive conversation.     

Ordinary life and the tragedy of solidarity

In his texts, Józef Tischner (1930–2000) referred to significant problems characteristic of the end of the communist regime and the first years of the liberal-democratic system in Poland. He tried to understand, among other things, the sources of Polish society’s disappointment with their regained political and economic freedom. This article discusses the late period of Tischner’s life and work, when his philosophy was heavily influenced by the ideas of Charles Taylor. On the one hand, the author analyzes Tischner’s attitude toward the concept of ordinary life, while on the other, Tischner’s understanding of solidarity combined with the concept of the spirit of capitalism. The article shows numerous similarities and significant differences between the way of thinking of both philosophers. The former concern above all the consentaneous assessment of the disappearance of heroism in liberal-democratic societies, while the latter concern the discrepancies in the assessment of the possibility of fully implementing the idea of solidarity in these societies.

     

Heidegger and Foucault: On the Relation Between the Anxiety–Engendering–Truth and Being-Towards-Freedom

In his very last, now famous, interview, Michel Foucault states that his philosophical thought was shaped by his reading of Heidegger, even though he does not specify what aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy inspired him in the first place. However, his last interview is not the only place where Foucault refers to Heidegger as his intellectual guide. In his 1981/1982 lecture course, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault confesses that the way Heidegger conceptualized the relationship between subject and truth was a starting point for him for thinking about the relationship between truth, subject, subjective-transformation, and freedom. Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to reconstruct the Foucault-Heidegger encounter from the perspective of subject-truth relation. I will ask how Heidegger and Foucault conceptualized the relationship between truth, self-transformation, and freedom. And I will claim that for both Foucault and Heidegger, freedom lies in constantly and creatively repeating the traditional possibilities of existence in order to question the reified patterns of interpretation, and in order to reveal the anxiety–engendering–truth that what is regarded as natural and inevitable in human life is historically contingent and transformable.     

‘Philosophy in India’ or ‘Indian Philosophy’: Some Post-Colonial Questions

Mode of philosophizing in post-colonial India is deeply influenced by two centuries of British rule (1757–1947), wherein a popular divide emerged between doing classical Indian philosophy and Western philosophy. However, a closer look reveals that the divide is not exclusive, since there are several criss-cross modes of philosophizing shaped by the forces of colonialism and nationalist consciousness. Contemporary challenges lie in raising new philosophical questions relevant to our time, keeping in view both what has been inherited and what has been imbibed in these centuries-old civilizational journeys. One needs to recognize India’s rich intellectual traditions based on cultural diversity, and at the same time raise fundamental questions that are transcendental in nature, yet historically rooted in our temporal presence. The challenge to articulate the nature of Indian philosophy (as anviksiki or darsana) has remained one of the daunting tasks for scholars of philosophy. Contemporariness of Indian philosophy is another issue to be deliberated. Contemporariness lies not only in raising new questions to classical Indian philosophies, but also in finding newness in old questions. It should further include engaging the classical philosophies with new methodological questions, be it Western philosophical methods or ones internally generated. Contemporariness will include narrating new stories driven by the dynamics of the present, where drive for questioning comes from the authentic philosophical issues of our time.