Open Questions and the Manifest Image

The essay argues that, on their usual metalinguistic reconstructions, the open question argument and Frege's puzzle are variants of the same argument. Each are arguments to a conclusion about a difference in meaning; each deploy compositionality as a premise; and each deploy a premise linking epistemic features of sentences with their meaning (which, given certain meaning‐platonist assumptions, can be interpreted as a universal instantiation of Leibniz's law). Given these parallels, each is sound just in case the other is. They are, in fact, unsound. The essay first argues that reformulations of these arguments directly in terms of Leibniz's law are unsound and then that subarguments of the metalinguistic versions are unsound for structurally similar reasons. Finally, given how the theory/observation distinction is deployed in linguistic practice, the meaning‐platonist assumptions are shown to be optional. Shouldn't philosophers be permitted to rise above faith in grammar? All due respect for governesses–but hasn't the time come for philosophy to renounce the faith of governesses? FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Beyond Good and Evil, 1886     

On thought experiments as a priori science

Against Norton's claim that all thought experiments can be reduced to explicit arguments, I defend Brown's position that certain thought experiments yield a priori knowledge. They do this, I argue, not by allowing us to perceive “Platonic universals” (Brown), even though they may contain non‐propositional components that are epistemically indispensable, but by helping to identify certain tacit presuppositions or “natural interpretations” (Feyerabend's term) that lead to a contradiction when the phenomenon is described in terms of them, and by suggesting a new natural interpretation in terms of which the phenomenon can be redescribed free of contradiction.     

Skepticism about Practical Reason: Transcendental Arguments and Their Limits

Transcendental arguments offer a particularlypowerful strategy for combating skepticism. Such arguments, after all, attempt to show thata particular skepticism is not simply mistakenbut inconsistent or self-refuting. Whilethus tempting to philosophers struggling withskepticism of various sorts, the boldconclusions of these arguments have longrendered them suspicious in the eyes of many. In fact, in a famous paper from 1968 BarryStroud develops what is often taken to be adecisive case against transcendental argumentsin general. Recent work in the area of practical reason,however, suggests that such arguments stillhave their defenders. Theorists such as JamesDreier and Christine Korsgaard have reliedexplicitly on transcendental arguments tojustify certain principles of practical reason. Can such arguments overcome Stroud's objection? In what follows, I argue that they can. However effective Stroud's general criticismmay be in other areas, it does not apply in therealm of practical reason. Nevertheless, thereare strict limits on how far transcendentalarguments can take us. In particular, despiteKorsgaard's efforts, they cannot succeed inestablishing a rational foundation formorality.     

The Russian Cusanus: S. L. Frank and the Russian reception of Nicholas of Cusa

During the intense philosophical and theological renaissance of the Russian Silver Age, the German Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) received a unique appraisal in the work of Semyon Liudwigovich Frank (1877–1950), hailed by some as ‘the greatest Russian philosopher’. This paper will show that five of Frank's central philosophical arguments can be traced directly to Cusa's writings. Once these key arguments are taken together with Frank's own comments about Cusa, it can be concluded that Frank saw himself as Cusa's modern successor, presenting his ideas in a different intellectual context. In this sense, we can speak of Frank as the ‘Russian Cusanus’. The arguments in question include Cusa's docta ignorantia, our knowledge of being, the recognition of absolute being as ‘non-other’, the identity of possibility and actuality in the absolute, and finally the coincidentia oppositorum.     

Argument,Inference, and Persuasion

This paper distinguishes between two types of persuasive force arguments can have in terms of two different connections between arguments and inferences. First, borrowing from Pinto (in Argument, inference, and dialectic, Kluwer Academic Pub, Dordrecht, 2001), an arguer's invitation to inference directly persuades an addressee if the addressee performs an inference that the arguer invites. This raises the question of how invited inferences are determined by an invitation to inference. Second, borrowing from Sorenson (J Philos 88:245–266, 1991), an arguer's invitation to inference indirectly persuades an addressee if the addressee performs an inference guided by the argument even though it is uninvited. This raises the question of how an invitation to inference can guide inferences that the arguer does not use the argument to invite. Focusing on belief-inducing inference, the primary aims here are (i) to clarify what is necessary for an addressee's belief-inducing inference to be invited by an argument used as an instrument of persuasion; and (ii) to highlight the capacity of arguments to guide such inferences. The paper moves beyond Pinto's (2001) discussion by using Boghossian's (Philos Stud 169:1–18, 2014) Taking Condition in service of (i) and (ii) in way that illustrates how epistemically bad arguments can rationally persuade addressees of their conclusions.

     

Justice and Social Conflict

This article analyzes possible effects of ideas of justice, perceptions of injustice, and the use of justice arguments on the emergence, course, and resolution of social conflicts. Four functions of justice are identified: (1) ideas of justice and perceptions of injustice can elicit or evoke social conflicts; (2) justice arguments and rhetorics can be used to support one's own position in a dispute; (3) the basic value and the principles and rules of justice can restrict social conflicts and help to generate ways of conflict resolution; (4) the labelling of conflict resolutions as just can increase the acceptance of the resolution. The analysis is illustrated by making reference to a recent case of international conflict and diplomatic controversy.     

IRREDUCIBLE SUBJECTIVITY AND INTERACTIONISM: A CRITIQUE1

The authors offer a critique of the privileging of subjectivity in psychoanalysis characteristic of what Hanly has called interactionism, with specific reference to the work of Renik. First, Renik's argument for the irreducible subjectivity of the analyst is explored and critiqued from a philosophical perspective. The need for and plausibility of a subtler notion of objectivity that takes into account the limitations of human subjectivity and that analysts can meaningfully pursue is defended. Second, Renik's ‘re‐visioning’ of psychoanalysis, which follows from his notion of irreducible subjectivity, is explored and critiqued. Renik's view of enactments is contrasted with a ‘totalistic’ perspective of countertransference that allows for important, finer conceptual distinctions. Renik's conceptualisation of countertransference enactments is characterised as a ‘special case’ of countertransference as a vice. Next, Renik's view of transference is critiqued for privileging the adaptive dimensions of transference, and for potentially sidelining archaic dimensions. Finally, Renik's conclusions and ‘revisioning’ of psychoanalysis are shown to follow from his modifying or jettisoning certain features of the analytic situation and process. These features and their implications are elaborated on. The conclusion outlines the extent to which the arguments presented can be extended to other advocates of interactionism.     

Synonymy and the epistemology of linguistics

In Word and Object, Quine argues from the observation that ‘there is no justification for collating linguistic meanings, unless in terms of men's dispositions to respond overtly to socially observable stimulations’ to the conclusion that ‘the enterprise of translation is found to be involved in a certain systematic indeterminacy’. In this paper, I propose to show (1) that Quine's thesis, when properly understood, reveals in the situation of translation no peculiar indeterminacy but merely the ordinary indeterminacy present in any case of empirical investigation; (2) that it is plausible that, because the subject of inquiry is language, we are in a better position with respect to such empirical indeterminacies than we are in other areas of investigation; (3) that, in any case, Quine's arguments are impotent, for they are either contradictory or incoherent; and (4) that Quine is led to his radical conclusions because he confuses a trivial and unexciting indeterminacy, which does obtain, with the striking indeterminacy for which he argues, which does not obtain.     

Universal Plotkinism: A Review Of Henry Plotkin’s Darwin Machines And The Nature of Knowledge

Plotkin's Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge (1993) is a major contribution to the field of evolutionary epistemology and universal Darwinism. Evolutionary epistemology is the idea that evolution is a knowledge‐gaining process. Universal Darwinism holds that processes of variation and selection can be observed at different levels from the primary level of biological evolution (where genes code for phenotypes) through to individual learning and culture (where the units of variation and selection are not so clear cut). Although antithetical to behaviorism, large parts of Plotkin's thesis can be recast in nonmentalistic terms and exploited by behavior analysts. In particular, Plotkin's arguments for a strong commonality of process between biological evolution and individual learning offer directions for progress on questions that have long interested behavior analysts, such as: Why do some organisms learn? How did learning evolve? What is the relation between behavior and evolution? Although the paths of connection between evolution and individual behavior that Plotkin sketches are not yet fully clear of confusion, his is undoubtedly a very stimulating direction to explore.     

Pollock on token physicalism,agent materialism and strong artificial intelligence

An examination of John Pollock's theory of artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind raises difficulties for his mechanist concept of person. Token physicalism, agent materialism, and strong artificial intelligence are so related that if the first two propositions are not well‐established, then there is no justification for believing that an artificial consciousness can be designed and built. Pollock's arguments are shown to be inconclusive in upholding a functionalist theory of persons as supervenient but purely physical entities. In part this is the result of Pollock's thin definition of the concept of supervenience, according to which any complex supervenes on its proper parts. The limitations of this account are apparent when contrasted with richer conceptions of supervenience, such as Joseph Margolis’. But on Margolis’ theory, the mind and its expressions supervene on or rise above their material embodiments in the sense that they cannot be fully explained in physical terms, which contradicts Pollock's token physicalism and agent materialism. The consequence for Pollock's project to explain the mind as mechanical, and to manufacture artificial persons, is that these systems can at best aspire to impressive innovations in weak artificial intelligence, but realistically cannot aspire to strong or mentalistic artificial intelligence.     

‘Everyone’, consequences,and generalization arguments

This paper addresses issues raised by recent discussion in normative ethics which concern relations between properties of individual actions and of certain groups of actions. First, an ambiguity common to ‘everyone can’ and ‘everyone ought’ is examined. Next, a similar ambiguity in talk about consequences is studied; here several procedures for identifying and evaluating consequences are compared. Then a notation that untangles the ambiguities is presented. Next, this notation is employed in an analysis of Marcus Singer's deduction of his generalization argument. Finally, there is a study of the question as to whether or not conflicts are possible between Singer's generalization argument and the dictates of consequences of individual actions. The findings are that such conflicts are or are not possible depending upon how a certain restriction on generalization arguments is interpreted, and that in either case the proponent of generalization arguments is faced with problems.     

Evaluation of changes in mother-infant brief psychotherapy: A single case study

Representation-oriented brief psychotherapy with mother-infant dyads is used to examine correspondences between maternal behaviors and maternal representations of her infant. A single case study is presented to illustrate how one can objectify interactional variables that may correspond behaviorally to underlying maternal mental representations. This paper presents the results of a collaboration that focuses on the process of enacting fantasy via the domain of behavior. Attention is drawn to interacted themes that are enacted versions of representational themes. Enacted themes are pathogenic in behavioral terms for the infant. Five themes are identified in the case material. Changes in the mother's representations affect both the mother-infant relationship and the infant's functioning.     

Legal and Ethical implications of HIV and Duty to Warn For Counselors: Does Tarasoff Apply?

The Tarasoff decision has been used as a benchmark in the professional literature for arguments on a counselor's duty to warn individuals who are sexually intimate with a client diagnosed as having HIV infection. Implications of the current application of Tarasoff principles to those cases are considered and conclusions are drawn that question such an application. The counseling profession's ethical standards related to these issues and the professional literature are reviewed with regard to current legislative and case law. Potential alternate courses of action that would be indicated by a broad application of Tarasoff are presented.     

The Irrationality of Choosing Egoism—A Reply to Eshelman

Despite the vast literature on Rawls's work, few have discussed his arguments for the value of democracy. When his arguments have been discussed, they have received staunch criticism. Some critics have charged that Rawls's arguments are not deeply democratic. Others have gone further, claiming that Rawls's arguments denigrate democracy. These criticisms are unsurprising, since Rawls's arguments, as arguments that the principle of equal basic liberty needs to include democratic liberties, are incomplete. In contrast to his trenchant remarks about core civil liberties, Rawls does not say much about the inclusion of political liberties of a democratic sort – such as the right to vote – among the basic liberties.

In this paper, I complete some of Rawls's arguments and show that he has grounds for including political liberties, particularly those of a democratic nature, in the principle of equal basic liberty. In doing so, I make some beginning steps toward illustrating the genuinely democratic nature of Rawls's arguments. Rawls believes that a few different arguments can be given for democratic institutions and that these arguments work together to support the value of democracy. In this paper, I focus on Rawls's arguments relating to self-respect. I focus on this set of arguments because they are among the strongest of Rawls's arguments for equal political liberty and its fair value.     

Argument Structure,Argument Content,and Cognitive Change in Children's Peer Interaction

In this experimental study, the author examined whether children's conversations play a role in the processes of influence between peers. Children, aged 8 to 10 years, who were at different levels of moral development participated. The conversations of 120 children were coded and analyzed in terms of argument structure and content. Results indicated that the differences in structure between boys' and girls' arguments are stylistic and do not influence conversation outcomes. The children's use of the structural features of conversations suggested that when a more advanced position is adopted, the arguments themselves appear to inspire cognitive change. However, when a less advanced position is adopted, the children who influence their peers invoke a particular and insistent conversational style. Results are discussed in terms of transmission and constructivist accounts of the role of social interaction in cognitive development.     

J. Skelly wright and refusal of treatment

This article is a critical analysis of Judge J. Skelly Wright's “Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College.” Wright's paper concerns the refusal of a Mrs. Jones to allow a blood transfusion needed to save her life and Wright's decision, based on a number of social, medical, legal, religious, and psychological facts, to permit the transfusion. The presentation is a close paraphrase of Wright's own case write-up. Critical expositions of five arguments explicitly advanced by Wright for his decision to allow a transfusion are given, as are attempts to track down other justifying reasons he may have had for his decision.