Why we still need a mark of the cognitive

What makes a process a cognitive process? I’m not just asking for a list of cognitive processes, but for what makes an item on that list a cognitive process. Why should it be on the list? This is a question that has been ignored far too long in the domain of research calling itself cognitive science. It is time to give an answer and that is what I propose in this paper. I contrast my answer with others that have been given and defend the need against some claims in the literature that a mark of the cognitive is not needed.     

A Shamanic Journey under the Wildebeest Skin

Journeys taken in both the outer world as well as the inner world can become experiences of initiation. These adventures speak to us, and when we later decipher their meaning, they give our life purpose, value, and direction. By focusing on the compelling images and symbols that appear repeatedly over one's lifetime, the thread of one's myth can be revealed.

Inspired by an animal scar that appeared on my body, I traveled to Africa and embarked on two safaris. I returned home to process the meaning of my African pilgrimages by way of an inner safari wherein I reflected on the images and insights that came to me during and after these two outer journeys. In this article I include the dynamics of my totem animal (the wildebeest, a herd animal), and what was born out of my dialogues with them in active imaginations when I lay under a wildebeest skin. I came to realize that what I was participating in was a shamanic initiation process. My soul and “bush soul” seemed to have merged together and were lodged in the wildebeest as a symbol for their existence in my life. The integration of animal symbolism, dreams, and active imaginations can lead to an unanticipated renewal. Reflecting psychologically on my travels, I became increasingly aware that these inner and outer peregrinations were essential ingredients in my individuation process. This whole venture evolved into a shamanic endeavor and resulted in a psychological and spiritual rebirth.     

Embodied female experience through the lens of imagination

Abstract: In 1971, I made a film entitled Self Portrait of a Nude Model Turned Cinematographer in which I explore the objectifying ‘male’ gaze on my body in contrast to the subjective lived experience of my body. The film was a radical challenge to the gaze that objectifies woman – and thus imprisons her – which had hitherto dominated narrative cinema. Since the objectification of women has largely excluded us from the privileged phallogocentric discourses, in this paper I hope to bring into the psychoanalytic dialogue a woman's lived experience. I will approach this by exploring how remembering this film has become a personally transformative experience as I look back on it through the lens of postmodern and feminist discourses that have emerged since it was made. In addition, I will explore how this process of imaginatively looking back on an artistic creation to generate new discourses in the present is similar to the transformative process of analysis. Lastly, I will present a clinical example, where my embodied countertransference response to a patient's subjection to the objectifying male gaze opens space for a new discourse about her body to emerge.     

A Note from the Editor

In this article I detail the conceptual trajectory of a classroom of 2nd- and 3rd-grade students as they reinvent topographical lines to represent height in a map within the constraints of an overhead perspective. In my analysis I pay special attention to the role of social interaction—and in particular the role of the teacher—in the process of knowledge production. First, I demonstrate how the invention of representational forms by individuals occur as part of a larger social process of creating cultural conventions and negotiating a taken-as-shared understanding of these new tools. Second, I show how gesture, as a part of the larger semiotic ecology for meaning making around representations, contributes to creation of understanding. Third, I make some preliminary proposals regarding the process of transforming personal inventions into cultural conventions. The analyses are intended to contribute to our field's growing understanding of young children's activity when inventing representations (i.e., metarepresentational competence), the mechanisms for learning within instructional activities based on the iterative refinement of these representations (i.e., progressive symbolization), and a rejection of the dichotomy between an individual's cognition and her participation within a cultural community.     

Trauma, forgiveness and the witnessing dance: making public spaces intimate

In this paper I explore the concept of forgiveness as a response to gross human rights violations. I present a conceptual examination of the effects of massive trauma in relation to what I refer to as the 'unfinished business' of trauma. Using a psychoanalytic framework, I consider the process of 'bearing witness' about trauma and examine how this process opens up the possibility of reciprocal expressions of empathy between victim and perpetrator. I then argue that, in this context of trauma testimony and witnessing, empathy is essential for the development of remorse on the part of perpetrators, and of forgiveness on the part of victims. Using a case study from South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) I clarify the relationship between empathy and forgiveness, and show how the restorative model of the TRC can open up an ethical space and create the possibility of transformation for victims, perpetrators and bystanders. In my conclusion I suggest that forgiveness in politics is the only action that holds promise for the repair of brokenness in post-conflict societies, particularly if, as in South Africa, victims have to live together with perpetrators and beneficiaries in the same country.     

An interpersonal perspective on the personality assessment process

Many aspects of therapeutic approaches to the personality assessment process derived from or are consistent with Sullivan's interpersonal approach to clinical practice, but the link between such approaches and contemporary interpersonal theory remains underdeveloped. In this article, I argue that contemporary interpersonal theory provides a valuable framework within which to conceptualize the personality assessment process. Specifically, I argue that interpersonal models can parsimoniously represent client behavior and can facilitate discussions of assessment data with assessees. Further, I show that hypotheses on the therapeutic mechanisms of personality assessment can be reframed in contemporary interpersonal metatheory so that they can be compared and tested directly.     

Good lives and the rehabilitation of offenders: Promises and problems

In this paper, I argue that every rehabilitation program presupposes conceptions of possible good lives for offenders and, associated with this, an understanding of the necessary internal and external conditions for living such lives. I first clarify the notion of good lives and outline its necessary features. Second, I establish the conclusion that all offender programs presuppose a conception of good lives. In order to make the argument a little more concrete, I demonstrate how a state-of-the-art treatment program for sex offenders and research on the process of offender change presuppose such a conception and expose the problems evident in the way they engage with this dimension of rehabilitation. Third, I argue that it is necessary for individuals working to rehabilitate offenders to explicitly construct conceptions of good lives for different offenders and to use these conceptions to shape the behavior change process.     

When the Frame Doesn't Fit the Picture

I reconsider the function and construction of the psychoanalytic frame from an intersubjective, relational perspective. The analytic frame is meant to create and stand for, both practically and symbolically, a therapeutic structure with clear and safe boundaries in which the process of therapy unfolds. From my perspective, the establishment of the frame is, at the same time, an integral part of the process itself and reflects conscious and unconscious aspects of both patient and analyst. I explore this paradox and its implications for both practice and theory. In theorizing the functions of the frame, I draw on Goffman's frame theory, Bateson's anthropological and ethological studies, Ferenzci's perspective on the elasticity of technique, and a number of contemporary relational theorists. Several clinical vignettes are presented as illustrative of a new perspective on the analytic frame as cocreated and contextual, reflecting the variability of the psychoanalytic situation and the uniqueness of each dyad.     

The Analyst's Uses of Theory and the Theory the Analyst Uses: Reply to Commentary

Where Slochower focuses her discussion on the analyst's multiform uses of theory, I focus my response on how the theory we each use informs a quite different way of understanding what is at issue for my patient in the apparent disengagement that marks her quest for help. More broadly, I consider how the theoretical perspective Slochower brings to her rendering of my clinical understanding and position makes for a reading that diverges significantly from my own view of what transpired in the treatment process I present.     

An Interpersonal Perspective on the Personality Assessment Process

Many aspects of therapeutic approaches to the personality assessment process derived from or are consistent with Sullivan's interpersonal approach to clinical practice, but the link between such approaches and contemporary interpersonal theory remains underdeveloped. In this article, I argue that contemporary interpersonal theory provides a valuable framework within which to conceptualize the personality assessment process. Specifically, I argue that interpersonal models can parsimoniously represent client behavior and can facilitate discussions of assessment data with assessees. Further, I show that hypotheses on the therapeutic mechanisms of personality assessment can be reframed in contemporary interpersonal metatheory so that they can be compared and tested directly.     

William James and the Religious Character of the Sick Soul

The scholarly attention lavished on William James’ case study in the “Sick Soul” lecture in The Varieties of Religious Experience of a man disturbed by the vision of an epileptic patient has generally not approached this case as a religious experience. To deepen our understanding of religious experience, I show that this case study can be understood as religious using elements of the theory of religion expounded throughout James’ text. I argue that it can be understood as a stage in the process of conversion James lays out. The omission of a subsequent stage highlights James’ reasons for rejecting healthy-mindedness as a philosophically adequate perspective and illustrates his claim that the strivings of the conscious mind can stunt the conversion process. Drawing on other philosophical, psychological, and literary texts, I argue that the content of the vision James describes points to solitude as a source of religious disquiet.     

Delving into psychoanalytic texts: the notion of the reading third

In this article I introduce the notion of the reading third, which evolves during the reading process. The idea came to my mind while studying Wolfgang Iser’s theory of the reading process, and already knowing about Thomas Ogden’s concept of the analytic third: What is experienced, shaped and understood while reading a text? The notion of the reading third is based on psychoanalytic theory and method like just Ogden’s concept, and on the aesthetic response theory of Iser. Elaborating the reading third, I combine two modes of reading: one understanding and interpreting, and one floating and experiencing mode. To these modes I add two different understandings of truth. The first mode is connected to a traditional, objective and visible truth. The latter mode relies on Wilfred Bion’s concept of O, a special kind of evasive, ephemeral truth. The reading third takes and loses form as one reads, accentuating reading as a highly creative activity, where each reading elicits different understandings, experiences and truths. I give examples of such a way of reading psychoanalytic texts like those of Bion and a work of fiction, Henry James’ short novel The Turn of the Screw.     

Psychoanalysis and the Body–Mind Problem

In this paper I have tried to clarify some of the differences between on the one hand ordinary doubts and uncertainties that are part and parcel of the psychoanalytic process, and on the other hand the sort of doubt that Socrates called 'aporia', that is, philosophical and conceptual. I have described one point at which philosophical doubt may creep into psychoanalytic thinking on body/mind issues. I presented a psychoanalytical model of the mind, based largely on Bion and Anzieu, in which mind is seen to be emergent from a body–mind nexus, to which we may, under pressure, regress. I elaborated this by reference to an example of my own somatisation, and to Anzieu's theory of a skin ego. Finally I made some comparisons between philosophical solutions to anxieties arising both in the mind/body area and in general epistemology, and psychoanalytic approaches to similar anxieties in life.     

The Right Brain Implicit Self Lies at the Core of Psychoanalysis

In this contribution I expand my continuing work on the centrality of right brain structures and unconscious processes from the neuropsychoanalytic perspective of regulation theory, an overarching model of the development, psychopathogenesis, and treatment of the implicit self. In an introduction I highlight the essential role of not only implicit cognition but implicit affect, communication, and regulation in current relational psychoanalytic models. I then briefly discuss recent developmental and neurobiological studies of implicit processes in early development and psychopathogenesis. In the bulk of this work I explore the essential role of implicit affective processes in psychotherapeutic change processes. I focus particularly on the expression of right brain unconscious mechanisms in affect-laden enactments, and on the therapist's moment-to-moment navigation through these heightened affective moments by not left brain explicit secondary process cognition but right brain implicit primary process affectively driven clinical intuition. Direct access to these right brain implicit processes by both patient and therapist is central to effective treatment.     

The Paradox of Holding and Recognizing and the Local Moving Along of the Therapeutic Process

In an attempt to provide a first incomplete answer to the question raised by the editors as to “what cures traumatized patients,” I join my voice to that of the many authors who associate therapeutic action with the process of affect regulation that develops within the analytic dyad. I believe that we are yet to find effective ways of describing the therapeutic process so that the fundamental elements can be reflected upon and studied by therapists. This is especially important when we are working with severely traumatized patients. One of the challenges we are facing today has to do with the way in which therapists communicate such experiences to each other. In our reflections, it all depends on the level at which we situate ourselves, if the therapist places himself/herself at the local level of the interactive process he/she needs to learn to stand in the uncertainty of the security and change paradox relying on the intersubjective process itself. With traumatized patients the challenge in psychotherapy almost always involves the ‘treatment that hurts’ paradox.     

Reply to “Expanding the Frame” by Anthony Bass and to Commentaries

In this reply I offer a short answer to the question about the theme “What do we learn from experience?” I can say that certainly the power of that particular experience with that patient made me more sensitive and careful toward similar moments with other patients. I then offer some comment on the contributions in this issue of the journal. I emphasize the interweaving of structure and process and the process of building meaning as an intersubjective achievement. I also intervene on the theme “how to transmit psychoanalytic wisdom.”     

Process Reliabilism,Virtue Reliabilism,and the Value of Knowledge

The value problem for knowledge is the problem of explaining why knowledge is cognitively more valuable than mere true belief. If an account of the nature of knowledge is unable to solve the value problem for knowledge, this provides a pro tanto reason to reject that account. Recent literature argues that process reliabilism is unable to solve the value problem because it succumbs to an objection known as the swamping objection. Virtue reliabilism (i.e., agent reliabilism), on the other hand, is able to solve the value problem because it can avoid the swamping objection. I argue that virtue reliabilism escapes the swamping objection only by employing what I call an entailment strategy. Furthermore, since an entailment strategy is open to the process reliabilist (in two different forms), I argue that the process reliabilist is also able to escape the swamping objection and thereby solve the value problem for knowledge.     

Mediation process and the acquisition of language

Summary Two experiments were conducted with chaining paradigm in which three lists were differentiated in semantic organization. In Experiment I, chaining (A-B, B-C, A-C), pseudo-chaining (A-B, B'-C, A-C) and non-chaining (A-B, D-C, A-C) conditions produced no difference in the performance on the A-C list in Stage III and A-B recall in Stage IV was the same for all conditions, corresponding to the same performance on the A-B list in Stage I. The findings were confirmed by Experiment II in which two types of mediators (preposition versus contentive) were used in chaining paradigm. No evidence of mediated facilitation was found. The results were discussed with regard to whether mediation process could provide an adequate explanatory device of language acquisition process.The study was supported by a grant from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. I am very grateful to Prof. Dr. W. Metzger for his useful suggestions.     

Figuration of the Real as an Intersubjective Process

In this paper, I make use of the term figuration, which relates to the process of giving shape to unconscious contents in the form of meaningful presentations. My interest is in how traumatic experience succeeds or fails to become psychically figured and thereby susceptible to elaboration and absorption through intersubjective process. I argue that the process of figuration always occurs in an actual or implied intersubjective context and involves, thereby, a central feature of an exchange between subject and Other. These concepts are discussed and applied to a case report of an analytic psychotherapy involving a traumatic dream and its sequellae.