Focused memory search in fact retrieval

Several studies of fact retrieval have shown that the more facts a person learns about a concept, the longer it takes him or her to retrieve any of these facts. This result has been interpreted to mean that retrieval of a fact about a concept involves a search of all facts stored in memory with that concept. In the present study, it is suggested that retrieval involves not an unfocused search of all facts stored with a concept, but rather a focused memory search that examines relevant stored facts and ignores irrelevant information. This argument is supported by three experiments in which subjects first learned simple facts (e.g., “The banker likes horses”) and then made speeded true-false decisions for test probes le.g., “The banker likes elephants”). Specifically, results suggest that facts stored with a concept may be organized into subsets. For example, a person’s knowledge about Richard Nixon might be organized into subsets concerning Nixon’s resignation, his trips to China, his family, and so on. The data further suggest that a person attempting to retrieve a fact about a concept (e.g., the name of Nixon’s wife) may simply decide which subset is most likely to contain the desired fact (e.g., the subset concerning Nixon’s family) and search that subset. If the sought-for fact is found in this subset, the search process terminates. If, however, the desired information is not located, other subsets of facts may be searched before the retrieval attempt is given up. The notion that memory search focuses on relevant stored facts and ignores irrelevant information may help to explain why experts (i.e., people who know a large number of facts about a topic) do not experience great difficulty in retrieving facts in their areas of expertise.     

The representation and integration in memory of spatial and nonspatial information

A series of experiments investigated whether people could integrate nonspatial information about an object with their knowledge of the object's location in space. In Experiments 1 and 3, subjects learned the locations of cities on a fictitious road map; in Experiments 2, 4, and 5, subjects were already familiar with the locations of buildings on a campus. The subjects then learned facts about the cities on the maps or the buildings on the campus. The question of interest was whether or not these nonspatial facts would be integrated in memory with the spatial knowledge. After learning the facts, subjects were given a location-judgment test in which they had to decide whether an object was in one region of the space or another. Knowledge integration was assessed by comparing levels of performance in two conditions: (a) when a city or a building name was primed by a fact about a neighboring city or building, and (b) when a city or a building name was primed by a fact about a distant city or building. Results showed that responses in Condition a were faster or more accurate, or both faster and more accurate, than responses in Condition b. These results indicate that the spatial and nonspatial information were encoded in a common memory representation.     

Strategy use in question-answering: Memory strength and task constraints on fan effects

The time taken to recognize a studied fact increases as a function of the number of other previously studied facts sharing concepts with the test fact. The phenomenon, known as the “fan effect,” has been shown to disappear and sometimes even reverse itself when the set of facts are thematically related. The shift from interference toward facilitation occurs only when subjects can use a plausibility-like strategy. In this experiment, subjects learned variously sized sets of rehted facts about fictitious people. Subjects were asked to make either recognition judgments (“Did you study this fact?”) or consistency judgments (“Is this fact consistent with what you studied7”). Subjects made these judgments both the day the material was acquired and 2 days later. The research reported here supports the hypothesis that, with delay, there is a shift in tendency toward more use of the plausibility strategy, away from the careful strategy of searching for an exact match that produces the fan effect. The plausibility strategy produced either a speedup with greater fan or an increase in error rates when the strategy was inappropriate. Plausibility effects were larger at a delay, in both reaction time and error patterns, regardless of whether subjects were asked to make consistency judgments or recognition judgments. Also as predicted, response times became faster as the tendency to adopt the plausibility strategy without first trying direct retrieval increased.     

知识整合的时间进程：ERP研究

本研究借助ERP技术,采用分离句子范式,考察了被试通过整合主干事实生成新知识的时间进程。结果发现：（1）知识整合事实相对于传递性推理事实和新颖事实诱发了更小的N400,与众所周知事实没有显著差异,表明通过整合生成的新信息已经快速纳入了语义知识库;（2）对比两次呈现,延迟性整合事实在第二次呈现的350ms之后波幅显著下降,与众所周知事实没有显著差异,表明知识经验影响了整合的时间进程,相较两个新信息之间的即时整合,新旧信息之间的延迟整合需要更多的时间。     

A partial resolution of the paradox of interference: The role of integrating knowledge

It has been noted that models of memory that posit retrieval interference imply that the more one knows about a topic, the harder it is to retrieve any one of these facts. Smith, Adams, and Schorr (Cognitive Psychology, 1978, 10, 438–464) regard this to be a paradox and postulate that people use world knowledge to integrate various facts about a concept and thereby avoid interference. Exploring this issue further in two experiments we discovered that integration of facts alleviates interference only when a person can perform his memory task by simply making a consistency judgment and can avoid the need to retrieve a specific fact. When foils force subjects to retrieve the specific assertion, the interference occurs among integrated facts as among unrelated facts. It appears that, when possible, subjects will judge whether they have seen a fact simply by judging if it is related to (consistent with) a theme they have studied. In other words, people judge themes rather than facts. Consistent with this interpretation, we found interference among themes; that is, the more themes were associated with a concept, the greater the interference.     

Psychologie en première et en troisième personne : de la « psychologie concrète » à la psychologie clinique

This article presents some basic concepts proposed by G. Politzer, articulated around the concept of “tragic life”, in the literary sense of the composition of a complex of events, actions and people, unity and meaning can only be realized in “first person”. In this context, defining the perimeter of legitimacy of clinical psychology, a “fact” specifically psychological necessarily corresponds to an act which takes existence and feel like segment of a human drama, as an effective act of the singular individual. Critics resulting analyzes relate to the abstract and formal perspective of scientific psychology, which considers classes of facts rather than facts, designing them as entities in themselves, the external I they are demonstrations. The explanatory model which necessarily carries out field of concrete psychology since its causalists schemes have lost sight of the act “first person”. And psychologists would not have noticed that “I remove the psychological facts is destroying them.” (G. Politzer). The person, in his psychic dimension, can only be understood from the person, which makes it possible to specify the field of clinical psychology, and more generally, of any clinical approach.     

Individuation and reference in memory: Proper names and definite descriptions

A theory is presented which assumes that individuals are represented by unique nodes in memory. To test the theory, simple facts were predicated of an individual person. Some facts referred to him by proper name, and other facts by his profession. In a before condition, subjects learned that the profession and name referred to the same individual before learning the facts, while in an after condition, they learned the identity after learning the facts. Subsequent to learning the facts and identities, subjects verified sentences based on what they had learned. Verification latencies indicated that in the before condition, one memory node was created to represent the individual, but two nodes were set up in the after condition. Assymmetries between proper names and professions indicate that the two types of referring expressions are treated differently in long-term memory.     

Memory retrieval and suppression: the inhibition of situation models

When people retrieve newly learned facts on a recognition test, they are often increasingly slowed by the number of other newly learned facts that have a concept in common with the probed fact. This is called the fan effect. Assuming that people are using situation models of the learned information, the author considers whether the inhibition of competing representations is one of the processes involved in the fan effect. Evidence was found for negative priming of related but irrelevant situation models, thus supporting the idea that the inhibition of highly related memory traces is used in long-term memory retrieval. As such, this is a form of retrieval-based inhibition.     

Mood and memory: Mood-congruity effects in absence of mood

Themood-congruity effect refers to facilitated processing of information when the affective valence of this information is congruent with the subject’s mood. In this paper we argue that mood may be a sufficient but not a necessary condition to produce the mood-congruity effect of selective learning. Two experiments are presented in which subjects learned lists of words with neutral, positive, and negative affective valences. In the learning task the subjects were instructed to behave as if they were depressed or happy. The mood-congruity effect was indeed obtained. The effect was stronger with subjects who “predicted” the relationship between mood and affective word valence than with subjects who were unaware of this relationship. The results are not simply attributed to task demands, but are interpreted in terms of a model of cognitive processes and people’s knowledge about mood states.     

Recognition and retrieval of proper names: Age differences in the fan effect

Abstract

A spreading activation model was applied, to explain. some aspects of retrieval failure for proper names. The fact that retrieval failures occur more frequently for well-known names than for unfamiliar names, and the increased incidence of name blocking in the elderly, are both interpreted in terms of the fan effect. Fanning is created when multiple far are known about a single person and results in slower and more error-prone retrieval, but the fan effect can be counteracted if the facts form an integrated set. Three groups of subjects—young, middle-aged, and elderly—learned sets of name-attribute statements in three conditions. In the no-fan condition, each name was uniquely paired with a single attribute; in the fan condition, each name was linked with three different attributes; in the crossed-fan condition, different names shared some of the same attributes. Verification RTs and cued recall responses showed that all subjects found the crossed-fan condition most difficult, but, when name-attribute links were not crossed, young and middle-aged subjects were able to counteract the fan effect by integrating the facts into a unified representation. Elderly subjects were less able to integrate effectively and were more susceptible to the fan effect.     

Young children’s talk about learning events

In order to understand children’s conception of knowledge acquisition better, everyday uses of the terms “learn” and “teach” were examined. Longitudinal data obtained from CHILDES (MacWhinney & Snow, 1990) included 329 target term uses and related references by children (N=5, aged 2;4–7;3) and 431 by adults talking with them. Each reference was coded for mention of what was learned, when, how, and where learning occurred, who learned, and who taught/told, among other topics. Children and adults referred most frequently to what was learned and who learned/taught, and less frequently to when, how, and where learning occurred, a pattern that did not change as children aged. Consistent with earlier experimental reports, children talked mostly about their own learning, rarely mentioning sources of knowledge besides other people (e.g., teachers). Behavior learning was mentioned more than fact learning. Implications for characterizations of children’s developing conceptions of knowledge acquisition, for past and future experimental research, and for education were discussed.     

学前儿童对“知道”和“会”的认知

72名3至5岁儿童接受了陈述性知识和程序性知识的学习任务,探查他们在获得新知识前后对自己是否“知道”和 “会”的认知和知识获取方式的认知 。结果显示,有部分学前儿童在不知道或不会的情况下报告自己“知道”或“会”,对自己的判断倾向于作出肯定回答;在学习新知识之后,学前儿童对自己是否“知道”的认识要比是否“会”的认知准确;儿童对陈述性知识的获取方式的认识好于程序性知识,3岁儿童对知识获取方式的认识存在困难。     

Judging a book by its cover: Interpretative effects of content on problem-solving transfer

We examine how cover stories of isomorphic problems affect transfer. Existing models posit that people retain content in problem representations and that similarities and differences between the “undeleted” cover stories might interfere with recognition of structural similarities.We propose that cover stories can affect transfer in another way—by inducing semantic knowledge that modifies problem structures. Two experiments examined how people represent and solve permutation problems dealing with random assignment of elements from one set to elements from another set. Although the problems were structurally isomorphic, cover stories involving different pairs of element sets led subjects to abstract different “interpreted structures.” Problems involving objects and people (e.g., prizes and students) led subjects to abstract an asymmetric structure (“get”) and problems involving similar sets of people (e.g., doctors and doctors) led subjects to abstract a symmetric structure (“pair”). Transfer was mediated by similarities and differences between the interpreted structures of the learned and the novel problems.     

Values and Science: An Argument for Why They Cannot Be Separated

A distinction between facts and values is often assumed when people in the modern West talk about science. The biologist Stephen Gould, for example, famously argued that religion covers questions of meaning and moral value, but science deals with empirical facts. This paper challenges the traditional fact/value distinction by questioning the presuppositions about science upon which it depends. It begins by describing the origins of the fact/value distinction in the Scientific Revolution and then gives three reasons for the inseparability of facts and values in scientific inquiry, drawing upon themes from the “practice turn” in recent scholarship on the sciences.     

The dilution effect: Nondiagnostic information weakens the implications of diagnostic information

In a series of studies, subjects were asked to make predictions about target individuals. Some subjects were given information about the target which pretest subjects had judged to be “diagnostic”—that is, had judged to be usefully predictive of the outcome. Other subjects were given a mix of information judged to be diagnostic and information judged to be “nondiagnostic” by pretest subjects—that is, judged to be of little value for predicting the outcome. Subjects given mixed information made much less extreme predictions than did subjects given only diagnostic information. It was argued that this “dilution effect” occurs because people make predictions by making simple similarity judgments. That is, they compare the information they have about the target with their conception of outcome categories. The presence of individuating but nondiagnostic information about the target reduces the similarity between the target and those outcomes that are suggested by the diagnostic information. One of the major implications is that stereotypes and other “social knowledge structures” may be applied primarily to abstract, undifferentiated individuals and groups and may be largely set aside when judgments are made about concrete, individuated people.     

Testing enhances both encoding and retrieval for both tested and untested items

In forward testing effects, taking a test enhances memory for subsequently studied material. These effects have been observed for previously studied and tested items, a potentially item-specific testing effect, and newly studied untested items, a purely generalized testing effect. We directly compared item-specific and generalized forward testing effects using procedures to separate testing benefits due to encoding versus retrieval. Participants studied two lists of Swahili–English word pairs, with the second study list containing “new” pairs intermixed with the previously studied “old” pairs. Participants completed a review phase in which they took a cued-recall test on only the “old” pairs or restudied them. In Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2, the review phase was given either before or after the second study list. Testing benefited memory to the same degree for both “new” and “old” pairs, suggesting that there were no pair-specific benefits of testing. The larger benefit from testing when review was given before rather than after the second study list suggests that the memory enhancement was due to both testing-enhanced encoding and testing-enhanced retrieval. To better equate generalized testing effects for “new” and “old” pairs, Experiment 3 intermixed them in the review phase. A statistically significant pair-specific testing effect for “old” items was now observed. Overall, these results show that forward testing effects are due to both testing-enhanced encoding and retrieval effects and that direct, pair-specific forward testing benefits are considerably smaller than indirect, generalized forward testing benefits.     

What emotional reactions can tell us about the nature of others: An appraisal perspective on person perception

The present research aimed to assess how people use knowledge about the emotional reactions of others to make inferences about their character. Specifically, we postulate that people can reconstruct or “reverse engineer” the appraisals underlying an emotional reaction and use this appraisal information to draw person perception inferences. As predicted, a person who reacted with anger to blame was perceived as more aggressive, and self-confident, but also as less warm and gentle than a person who reacted with sadness (Study 1). A person who reacted with a smile (Study 1) or remained neutral (Study 2) was perceived as self-confident but also as unemotional. These perceptions were mediated by perceived appraisals.     

Learning on a response continuum: Comparison of a linear change and a functional learning model

Two reinforcement schedules were used to compare the predictive validity of a linear change model with a functional learning model. In one schedule, termed “convergent,” the linear change model predicts convergence to the optimum response, while in the other, termed “divergent,” this model predicts that a subject's response will not converge. The functional learning model predicts convergence in both cases. Another factor that was varied was presence or absence of random error or “noise” in the relationship between response and outcome. In the “noiseless” condition, in which no noise is added, a subject could discover the optimum response by chance, so that some subjects could appear to have converged fortuitously. In the “noisy” conditions such chance apparent convergence could not occur.The results did not unequivocally favor either model. While the linear change model's prediction of nonconvergence in the divergent conditions (particularly the “noisy” divergent condition) was not sustained, there was a clear difference in speed of convergence, counter to the prediction inferred from the functional learning model. Evidence that at least some subjects were utilizing a functional learning strategy was adduced from the fact that subjects were able to “map out” the relation between response and outcome quite accurately in a follow-up task. Almost all subjects in the “noisy” conditions had evidently “learned” a strong linear relation, with slope closely matching the veridical one.The data were consistent with a hybrid model assuming a “hierarchy of cognitive strategies” in which more complex strategies (e.g., functional learning) are utilized only when the simpler ones (e.g., a linear change strategy) fail to solve the problem.