说谎者悖论的一个新解决方案的纲要(英文)

首先,本文在第二节中提出了谎者悖论所包含的一些问题,比如加强的说谎者悖论,Curry悖论,Yablo悖论,偶然的说谎者悖论,以及塔尔斯基的真不可定义性定理。其次,在第三节简单介绍了塔尔斯基的分层理论,并且指出了他方案的一个最大不足之处就是把一个真谓词分成了很多个个真谓词,这和我们的直观很不符合。之后在第四节介绍了我的一个解悖方案,并讨论了它的一些性质,比如可靠性,完全性,以及我的方案和塔尔斯基方案的区别。第五节说明了第二节中提到的一些问题在我的这个方案下如何处理。     

The survival of the survival lottery

ABSTRACT In his paper 'The Survival Lottery'John Harris suggested that there could be situations where the rational thing to do would be to kill a healthy person and harvest his organs for transplantation, thereby saving several lives at the cost of one. Anne Maclean claims that such a proposal, far from being rational, does not qualify as a moral proposal at all since what it suggests is 'plain murder'. I argue that she is correct to claim that the proposal is not uniquely rational and that doctors could quite rationally reject it, but that she overreaches herself when she holds it not to be a moral proposal at all.     

Weakly Intuitionistic Quantum Logic

In this article von Neumann’s proposal that in quantum mechanics projections can be seen as propositions is followed. However, the quantum logic derived by Birkhoff and von Neumann is rejected due to the failure of the law of distributivity. The options for constructing a distributive logic while adhering to von Neumann’s proposal are investigated. This is done by rejecting the converse of the proposal, namely, that propositions can always be seen as projections. The result is a weakly Heyting algebra for describing the language of quantum mechanics.     

Consistent Treatment of Variables and Causation Poses a Challenge for Behavioral Research Methods: A Commentary on Nesselroade and Molenaar (2016)

Nesselroade and Molenaar presented the ideographic filter as a proposal for analyzing lawful regularities in behavioral research. The proposal highlights an inconsistency that poses a challenge for behavioral research more generally. One can distinguish a broadly Humean approach from a broadly non-Humean approach as they relate to variables and to causation. Nesselroade and Molenaar rejected a Humean approach to latent variables that characterizes them as nothing more than summaries of their manifest indicators. By contrast, they tacitly accepted a Humean approach to causes characterized as nothing more than summaries of their manifest causal effects. A non-Humean treatment of variables coupled with a Humean treatment of causation creates a theoretical tension within their proposal. For example, one can interpret the same model elements as simultaneously representing both variables and causes. Future refinement of the ideographic filter proposal to address this tension could follow any of a number of strategies.     

An ecological pedagogy of embeddedness: Theological education for human flourishing

This paper sets forth a proposal for an ecological pedagogy of embeddedness informed by place-based, challenge-based, and competency-based methodologies. While some theological institutions have begun implementing principles from competency-based models, theological educators have not adequately explored the resources within place-based and challenge-based systems. This paper will contribute to the literature on theological education in three distinct ways: first, this proposal will perform the oft-overlooked task of bringing these three pedagogical models into conversation with one another; second, this proposal will aim the outcomes and effects of the three pedagogical models toward the flourishing of the communities in which institutions are embedded; and third, this proposal will break new ground in its application of these three pedagogical systems to the context of a theological seminary.     

Countering Fallacious Moves

Van Eemeren and Houtlosser view fallacies as “derailments of strategic maneuvering” that go against a norm for critical reasonableness. What is to happen if such a derailment is perceived to have taken place? Krabbe (2003) and Jacobs (2000) have discussed the possibilities for continuing the argumentative exchange in a constructive way. Starting from their proposals, van Eemeren and Houtlosser argue that the party who observes that something has gone wrong should maneuver in such a way that at the same time the derailment is recognized and a “re-railment” takes place that brings the discussion back on track. This means that then a meta-dialogue or sub-discussion develops in which the alleged fallacy is responded to and readjusted appropriately. Although this solution has something in common with both Krabbe’s proposal and Jacobs’ proposal, it differs from Krabbe’s proposal because it does not result in just retracting or maintaining the alleged fallacy and it differs from Jacobs’ proposal because it does not allow for making a move that has the appearance of a counter-fallacy.     

Dispositional Essentialism and the Possibility of a Law-Abiding Miracle

An objection to dispositional essentialism has been that it yields an implausible semantics for counterfactuals if determinism happens to be true. I claim that an adequate remedy to this objection would be to endorse the metaphysical possibility of 'law-abiding miracles', i.e., uncaused spontaneous events. This proposal entails that determinism de jure is meta-physically impossible; I argue that this is not a serious disadvantage. I discuss consequences of the proposal for the logical form of laws, and consider a possible objection to the proposal on epistemic grounds.     

Do DSM-5 personality disorder proposals meet criteria for clinical utility?

The Work Group for the DSM-5 personality disorders has submitted their proposal to the professional community. In this paper, we consider the proposal in light of its ability to meet criteria for clinical utility as proposed by First and colleagues (2004). While the Work Group's proposal has addressed some of these concerns, we conclude that there remain several unanswered problems with how the proposal will improve the clinical utility of personality disorders section of the DSM-5. Though these concerns can be addressed to some extent in the field trials, it is incumbent upon the Work Group and clinical researchers to attend carefully to these issues so that shortcomings of previous diagnostic manuals are not repeated in the future.     

Decade of the Mind

In the Fall of 2007, ten neuroscientists published a proposal for an interdisciplinary research initiative, the Decade of the Mind, that would focus on four "broad but intertwined areas": mental health, research on high-level cognitive functions, education, and computational applications (such as intelligent machines). I review the basic ideas behind the proposal and discuss the four proposed areas of research. I argue that for research on higher cognitive functions and in particular, for research and practice in education, the Decade of the Mind is a welcome initiative that may change our lives for the better. Therefore, the proposal, which is scientifically interdisciplinary in nature, has to be politically international.     

Toward an integrative,pluralistic psychology: On the hermeneutico-dialogical conditions of the possibility for overcoming fragmentation

While casting the long-standing problem of fragmentation in a new light, the recent resurgence of interest in pluralism also poses fresh challenges regarding how this pluralism is to be harnessed in the service of integration. In response, the present paper seeks to vindicate the merits of, and to elaborate on the possibilities inherent in, the hermeneutico-dialogical proposal proffered by Yanchar, Slife and associates over a decade ago, but whose potential has remained underexplored in the intervening period. More specifically, the aim is to gain a renewed hearing for this proposal by foregrounding its distinctive possibilities as a means of harnessing pluralism in the interests of overcoming fragmentation. To this end, following a brief review of the status of the problem, I revisit the merits of integrative pluralism as a response to fragmentation as a prelude to elaborating on how the hermeneutico-dialogical proposal can facilitate this. Thereafter, I focus on elucidating the conditions of the possibility for engaging in the requisite sort of dialogical interaction, and expanding on its epistemological, methodological, and ontological underpinnings. The paper concludes with a brief defense of the practical viability of this proposal in response to anticipated charges of utopianism.     

Monotonicity and Reasoning with Exceptions

A proposal by Ferguson [2003, Argumentation 17, 335–346] for a fully monotonic argument form allowing for the expression of defeasible generalizations is critically examined and rejected as a general solution. It is argued that (i) his proposal reaches less than the default-logician’s solution allows, e.g., the monotonously derived conclusion is one-sided and itself not defeasible. (ii) when applied to a suitable example, his proposal derives the wrong conclusion. Unsuccessful remedies are discussed.     

Going As Far As We Can Go: The Jesus Proposal For Stretching Genes and Cultures

The Christian perspective on morality is examined under the rubric of "being like Jesus" and the "Jesus proposal for morality." The Peace People of Northern Ireland are examples of this proposal. Among the features of Christian moral thinking that are emphasized are: Jesus' concern for the future, the transformation that the future requires, human nature interpreted in terms of how it can undergo transformation, and self-giving love as the core of this transformation. Attention is given to the ways in which Jesus both radicalized and relativized the moral conventions of his day. Dialogue with sociobology comes into play when Jesus is viewed as a proposal for cultural evolution and a kind of biocultural mutation. Gerd Theissen's scholarship on Jesus' moral perspectives is given special attention.     

Naturalism and Conceptual Norms

The normative dimensions of concept possession pose a serious problem for naturalistic approaches to the mental. Taking Christopher Peacocke's recent proposal for a naturalistic accommodation of conceptual normativity as a stalking-horse, I argue that no proposal formulated in terms of law-like generalizations about the judgements which a concept possessor must find primitively compelling or self-evident can capture the crucial distinction between failing to possess a concept and misapplying a concept which one does actually possess.     

The phenomenology of empathy: a Steinian emotional account

This paper presents a phenomenological account of empathy inspired by the proposal put forward by Edith Stein in her book On the Problem of Empathy, published originally 1917. By way of explicating Stein’s views, the paper aims to present a characterization of empathy that is in some aspects similar to, but yet essentially different from contemporary simulationist theories of empathy. An attempt is made to show that Stein’s proposal articulates the essential ingredients and steps involved in empathy and that her proposal can be made even more comprehensive and elucidating by stressing the emotional aspect of the empathy process. Empathy, according to such a phenomenological proposal, is to be understood as a perceptual-imaginative feeling towards and with the other person’s experiences made possible by affective bodily schemas and being enhanced by a personal concern for her. To experience empathy does not necessarily or only mean to experience the same type of feeling as the target does; it means feeling alongside the feeling of the target in imagining and explicating a rich understanding of the experiences of the very person one is facing.     

Book Reviews

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to identify what I take to be the main conceptual problem in Lewis’ semantics for counterfactuals when the Limit Assumption (LA) is not satisfied, what I call the Discrimination Problem (DP), and to present and discuss a modification of Lewis’ semantics that aims at solving DP. First, I outline Lewis’ semantics, highlighting the aspects that will be relevant for our discussion. Second, I present DP and discuss it with a heuristic example. Third, I present the new proposal and comment some formal consequences and the objections they give rise to. Fourth, I present an allegedly equivalent version of the proposal and discuss the difference between counterfactuals and strict conditionals. Finally, I defend that the two proposals are different and argue for the first one as the best way of capturing two intuitions that seem in conflict when the LA is not satisfied. I conclude with a dilemma: either the proposal here defended works or LA is inescapable. Thus, if the proposal doesn’t work, the paper must then be considered as an indirect defense of the Limit Assumption.     

"后基因时代"的哲学反思

结构基因组学与功能基因组学的划分,割裂了"结构与功能"的辩证关系,实践上容易造成结构基因组学大功告成的误解."后基因时代"的提法,在科研思维方式上还容易误导人们追新逐热,急功近利.这种提法也是医药企业追逐商业利润的产物.     

The Reduction of Causal Processes

The principle that causes always render their effects more likely is fundamental to the enterprise of reducing facts of causation to facts about (objective) chances. This reductionist enterprise faces famous difficulties in accommodating common-sense intuitions about causal processes, if it insists on cashing out causal processes in terms of streams of events in which every event that belongs to the stream is a cause of the adjoining event downstream of it. I shall propose modifications to this way of cashing out causal processes, still well within the reductionist faith. These modifications will allow the reductionist to handle processes successfully, on the assumption that the reductionist proposal is itself otherwise satisfactory. I shall then argue that the reductionist enterprise lies squarely behind the Theory of Relativity, and so has all the confirmatory weight of Relativity behind it. However this is not all good news for reductionists. For throughout I shall simply assume that the reductionist proposal, to the effect that causes are just chance-raisers, is correct. AndI shall sidestep problems with that proposal as such. And so I shall show that, if in the end we find the reductionist proposal unsatisfactory, it cannot be on grounds of its treatment of causal processes as such. Thus, while I shall argue that causal processes pose no extra trouble for redutionists, I shall be making a case that all the action between reductionists and their opponents should be focused upon the proposal to reduce the two-term causal relation itself to relations amongst probabilities.     

Compound Nominals,Context, and Compositionality

There are good reasons to think natural languages are compositional. But compound nominals (CNs) are largely productive constructions that have proven highly recalcitrant to compositional semantic analysis. I evaluate existing proposals to treat CNs compositionally and argue that they are unsuccessful. I then articulate an alternative proposal according to which CNs contain covert indexicals. Features of the context allow a variety of relations to be expressed using CNs, but this variety is not expressed in the lexicon or the semantic rules of the language. This proposal accounts for the diversity of contents CNs can be used to express while preserving compositionality. Finally, I defend this proposal against some recent anti-contextualist arguments.     

Retraction and Revocation in Agent Deliberation Dialogs

We present a generic denotational semantic framework for protocols for dialogs between rational and autonomous agents over action which allows for retraction and revocation of proposals for action. The semantic framework views participants in a deliberation dialog as jointly and incrementally manipulating the contents of shared spaces of action-intention tokens. The framework extends prior work by decoupling the identity of an agent who first articulates a proposal for action from the identity of any agent then empowered to retract or revoke the proposal, thereby permitting proposals, entreaties, commands, promises, etc., to be distinguished semantically.