MacIntyre on Tradition,Rationality, and Relativism

MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism relies crucially on a distinctive moral particularism, for which morality and rationality are fundamentally tradition-constituted. In light of this, some have detected in his work a moral relativism, radically in tension with his endorsement of a Thomist universalism. I dispute this reading, arguing instead that MacIntyre is a consistent universalist who pays due attention to the moral-epistemic importance of traditions. Analysing his teleological understanding of rational enquiry, I argue that this approach shows how it is possible, dialectically, to reconcile the particularity of our starting-points with the assertion of universal truths. What MacIntyre offers, I contend, is a moral universalism that avoids the pitfalls of its liberal counterpart, and invites an important meta-theoretical shift with respect to the scope for toleration and social critique and toleration in contemporary pluralist society.     

Getting the Story Straight: Kierkegaard,MacIntyre and Some Problems with Narrative

As part of the widespread turn to narrative in contemporary philosophy, several commentators have recently attempted to sign Kierkegaard up for the narrative cause, most notably in John Davenport and Anthony Rudd's recent collection Kierkegaard After MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative and Virtue. I argue that the aesthetic and ethical existence‐spheres in Either/Or cannot adequately be distinguished in terms of the MacIntyre‐inspired notion of ‘narrative unity’. Judge William's argument for the ethical life contains far more in the way of substantive normative content than can be encapsulated by the idea of ‘narrative unity’, and the related idea that narratives confer intelligibility will not enable us to distinguish Kierkegaardian aesthetes from Kierkegaardian ethicists. ‘MacIntyrean Kierkegaardians’ also take insufficient notice of further problems with MacIntyre's talk of ‘narrative unity’, such as his failure to distinguish between literary narratives and the ‘enacted dramatic narratives’ of which he claims our lives consist; the lack of clarity in the idea of a ‘whole life’; and the threat of self‐deception. Finally, against the connections that have been drawn between Kierkegaardian choice and Harry Frankfurt's work on volitional identification, I show something of the dangers involved in putting too much stress on unity and wholeheartedness.     

信仰与理性的冲突与谐和——对克尔凯郭尔信仰观之合理性的一种辩护

在理性与信仰的关系问题上,认为克尔凯郭尔主张基督教信仰只关系到主观而与客观无关,其"真理是主体性"、"信仰是荒谬的"等命题是对理性之摒弃的看法是偏狭的。克氏在信仰上对主观真理的强调和对客观真理的质疑建立在承认人的罪性以及因之而人的理性遭到了破坏这一前提上,这一点并不与理性本身相冲突,而毋宁说是人的理性层次的问题;另一方面,在克氏,基督教信仰的主观性就其自身而论也必须以理性客观性为前提,因无正确的客观性作保证就没有克氏要求的那种主观性,其眼中的信仰的主观真理也就不复存在了。     

After MacIntyre

In his influential book After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre identifies Kierkegaard's view of ethics with that of Kant. Both Kant and Kierkegaard, according to MacIntyre, accept the modern paradigm of moral activity for which freedom of the will is the ultimate basis. Ronald M. Green, in Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt, accepts and deepens this alignment between the two thinkers. Green argues that Kierkegaard deliberately obscured his debt to Kant by a systematic “misattribution” of his ideas to other thinkers, and to classical philosophy in particular. This essay argues that MacIntyre and Green are mistaken in identifying Kierkegaard with the Kantian tradition of moral autonomy and that they overlook his debt to the classical conception of virtue. In casting Kierkegaard in the role of the quintessential exponent of a modern conception of freedom, they have perhaps overlooked one of the greatest critics of moral autonomy who has ever lived.     

Pellegrino,MacIntyre, and the internal morality of clinical medicine

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - There has been significant debate about whether the moral norms of medical practice arise from some feature or set of features internal to the discipline of...     

论信、信念、信仰、宗教信仰的特征及意义

“信”植根于人性之中并且是人之生存、思考和行动的基础。研究信、信念、信仰、宗教信仰的含义、特点及其相互关系具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。信仰作为一种具有超越性的人生终极价值,在很大程度上是和宗教观念联系在一起的。宗教信仰具有个体性、选择性、神圣性等特征。信仰(包括宗教信仰)对人生的重大影响主要表现在:为人生提供终极的基础;为人们提供价值体系中的“应当的应当”;对道德进行聚合和圣化;给人生带来无限的希望;使人生获得真正的自由。     

麦金太尔论社会关系、共同利益与个人利益

我们从出生到死亡都处在一种接受与给予的关系中 ,我们从谁那里接受和给予谁往往是不对称的。这是我们参与到这个网络中不得不懂得的。在这个接受与给予的关系中 ,有我们的共同利益和我们个人的利益。同时 ,处在这样一种关系中 ,也需要我们遵守相应的德性规则。     

Faith,Fact, and Behaviorism

David Hume argued that ought cannot be derived from is. That is, no set of facts, no amount of scientific knowledge, is by itself sufficient to urge us to action. Yet generations of well-meaning scientists (more and more as secular influences grow in the West) seem to have forgotten Hume''s words of wisdom. All motivated action depends ultimately on beliefs that cannot be proved by the methods of science, that is, on faith.     

A Constructivist Pedagogue's Personal Narrative of Integrating Faith with Learning: Epistemological and Pedagogical Challenges

This article offers a personal narrative about integrating the Christian faith into the process of teaching and learning. The author begins by describing his understanding of pedagogy that framed his beliefs about teaching in higher-education environments. Understanding the author's beliefs provides a context for his experiences in integrating faith with learning. Specifically, the author offers three tensions of faith integration and describes how pedagogy helped him overcome these tensions.