The function of phenomenal states: is there progress for the "softer problem" of consciousness?

The function of phenomenal states remains a mystery, primarily because of the prevalent, a priori view that these states serve no functional role. This note is a call to arms against this uncorroborated and counterproductive view, which continues to stifle research on the topic. It is proposed that, given what we know and can accomplish with the tools at hand, discovering the function of phenomenal states has become a tractable problem, easier than that of discovering the neural basis of these states--the "hard problem" of consciousness. A simple method that may unveil the function of phenomenal states is presented. It involves contrasting the task demands of conscious and unconscious processes.     

Are “implicit” attitudes unconscious?

A widespread assumption in recent research on attitudes is that self-reported (explicit) evaluations reflect conscious attitudes, whereas indirectly assessed (implicit) evaluations reflect unconscious attitudes. The present article reviews the available evidence regarding unconscious features of indirectly assessed "implicit" attitudes. Distinguishing between three different aspects of attitudes, we conclude that (a) people sometimes lack conscious awareness of the origin of their attitudes, but that lack of source awareness is not a distinguishing feature of indirectly assessed versus self-reported attitudes, (b) there is no evidence that people lack conscious awareness of indirectly assessed attitudes per se, and (c) there is evidence showing that, under some conditions, indirectly assessed (but not self-reported) attitudes influence other psychological processes outside of conscious awareness. Implications for the concept of "implicit attitudes" are discussed.     

Promoting a Brand's Emotion Benefits: The Influence of Emotion Categorization Processes on Consumer Evaluations

Research in psychology has demonstrated that people have a shared knowledge of emotion categories. Building on this research and our understanding of categorization processes, this article proposes a mechanism by which consumers utilize information about a brand's “emotion benefits” in forming attitudes. The results of 2 experimental studies show that (a) consumers’ processing of a brand's emotion benefit information is consistent with categorization processes such that emotion category congruity effects are large in basic—versus subordinate—level conditions, (b) associating a brand with certain emotions can influence brand and ad attitudes without necessarily eliciting emotions during exposure to advertising, (c) emotion category congruity “works” through attitude‐toward‐the‐ad and emotion benefit beliefs in influencing brand attitudes, and (d) subjective product category knowledge moderates the strength of these effects. Taken together, these results explicate the process by which a knowledge‐based consideration of a brand's emotional benefits can influence consumers’ beliefs about the brand and brand attitudes.     

Distinguishing automatic and controlled components of attitudes from direct and indirect measurement methods

Distinct automatic and controlled processes are presumed to influence social evaluation. Most empirical approaches examine automatic processes using indirect methods, and controlled processes using direct methods. We distinguished processes from measurement methods to test whether a process distinction is more useful than a measurement distinction for taxonomies of attitudes. Results from two studies suggest that automatic components of attitudes can be measured directly. Direct measures of automatic attitudes were reports of gut reactions (Study 1) and behavioral performance in a speeded self-report task (Study 2). Confirmatory factor analyses comparing two-factor models revealed better fits when self-reports of gut reactions and speeded self-reports shared a factor with automatic measures versus sharing a factor with controlled self-report measures. Thus, distinguishing attitudes by the processes they are presumed to measure (automatic versus controlled) is more meaningful than distinguishing based on the directness of measurement.     

Suggested reading

The problem of mystical/meditational experience is discussed from the point of view of the neural network theory, considering also the approach to (sub) quantum physics by Bohm and Hiley. It has been argued that the appearance of global uniform neural patterns, i.e. those with coherent activities of constitutive neurons, function as the basis of mystical unity. Various processes occurring as the result of the collective dynamics of a complex neural system are compared and correlated with mystical phenomenology on the one hand, and with quantum processes or neurophysiological effects on the other. Awareness may be a quantum phenomenon, so some speculations about neural‐quantum interactions and analogies are presented. The contact with the symmetric subquantum “sea”, in which the brain is embedded, may provide the background for the most radical experiences. Special attention is devoted to implicit versus explicit mental and transcendental processes, and to their multi‐level parallelism. Evolution towards transcendental consciousness brings an alternative lifestyle for the future.     

Implicit and explicit attitudes respond differently to increasing amounts of counterattitudinal information

This research examined the processes by which explicit and implicit attitudes changed to systematically differing levels of counterattitudinal (CA) information. Explicit attitudes changed quickly in response to relatively small amounts of CA information, reflecting rule‐based reasoning. On the other hand, implicit attitudes changed more slowly in the face of CA information, reflecting the progressive accretion of evaluation‐attitude object pairings. Thus, explicit attitudes were extremely malleable and changed quickly when CA information was presented, however, implicit attitudes revealed a slow, linear change trajectory resulting from the on‐going accrual of information about the attitude object. Implications for the processes underlying implicit and explicit attitudes are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: an integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change

A central theme in recent research on attitudes is the distinction between deliberate, "explicit" attitudes and automatic, "implicit" attitudes. The present article provides an integrative review of the available evidence on implicit and explicit attitude change that is guided by a distinction between associative and propositional processes. Whereas associative processes are characterized by mere activation independent of subjective truth or falsity, propositional reasoning is concerned with the validation of evaluations and beliefs. The proposed associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model makes specific assumptions about the mutual interplay of the 2 processes, implying several mechanisms that lead to symmetric or asymmetric changes in implicit and explicit attitudes. The model integrates a broad range of empirical evidence and implies several new predictions for implicit and explicit attitude change.     

Sexual‐perception processes in acquaintance‐targeted sexual aggression

This study analyzes data from seven published studies to examine whether three performance‐based indices of men's misperception of women's sexual interest (MSI), derived from a self‐report questionnaire, are associated with sexual‐aggression history, rape‐supportive attitudes, sociosexuality, problem drinking, and self‐reported MSI. Almost 2000 undergraduate men judged the justifiability of a man's increasingly unwanted advances toward a woman on the Heterosocial Perception Survey‐Revised. Participants self‐reported any sexual‐aggression history, and some completed questionnaires assessing rape‐supportive attitudes, sociosexuality, problem drinking, and self‐reported MSI. A three‐parameter logistic function was fitted to participants’ justifiability ratings within a non‐linear mixed‐effects framework, which provided precise participant‐specific estimates of three sexual‐perception processes (baseline justifiability, bias, and sensitivity). Sexual‐aggression history and rape‐supportive attitudes predicted: (a) reduced sensitivity to women's affect; (b) more liberal biases, such that the woman's affect had to be more negative before justifiability ratings dropped substantially; and (c) greater baseline justifiability of continued advances after a positive response. Sexual‐aggression history and attitudes correlated more strongly with sensitivity than baseline justifiability; remaining variables showed the opposite pattern. This work underscores the role of sexual‐perception processes in sexual aggression and illustrates the derivation of performance‐based estimates of sexual‐perception processes from questionnaire responses.

     

The representation of multiplication and division facts in memory

Recently, using a training paradigm, Campbell and Agnew (2009) observed cross-operation response time savings with nonidentical elements (e.g., practice 3 + 2, test 5 - 2) for addition and subtraction, showing that a single memory representation underlies addition and subtraction performance. Evidence for cross-operation savings between multiplication and division have been described frequently (e.g., Campbell, Fuchs-Lacelle, & Phenix, 2006) but they have always been attributed to a mediation strategy (reformulating a division problem as a multiplication problem, e.g., Campbell et al., 2006). Campbell and Agnew (2009) therefore concluded that there exists a fundamental difference between addition and subtraction on the one hand and multiplication and division on the other hand. However, our results suggest that retrieval savings between inverse multiplication and division problems can be observed. Even for small problems (solved by direct retrieval) practicing a division problem facilitated the corresponding multiplication problem and vice versa. These findings indicate that shared memory representations underlie multiplication and division retrieval. Hence, memory and learning processes do not seem to differ fundamentally between addition-subtraction and multiplication-division.     

The effect of pre-cueing on spatial attention across perception and action

It is well established that processes of perception and action interact. A key question concerns the role of attention in the interaction between perception-action processes. We tested the hypothesis that spatial attention is shared by perception and action. We created a dual-task paradigm: In one task, spatial information is relevant for perception (spatial-input task) but not for action, and in a second task, spatial information is relevant for action (spatial-output task) but not for perception. We used endogenous pre-cueing, with two between-subjects conditions: In one condition the cue was predictive only for the target location in the spatial-input task; in a second condition the cue was predictive only for the location of the response in the spatial-output task. In both conditions, the cueing equally affected both tasks, regardless of the information conveyed by the cue. This finding directly supports the shared input-output attention hypothesis.     

The spatial intersection of minds

Spatial formats of information are ubiquitous in the cognitive and neural sciences. There are neural uses of space in the topographic maps found throughout cortex. There are metaphorical uses of space in cognitive linguistics, physical uses of space in ecological psychology, and mathematical uses of space in dynamical systems theory. These varied informational uses of space each provide a single contiguous medium through which cognitive processes can be shared across subsystems. As we further develop our understanding of how the human mind processes information in real time, the continuous sharing and cascading of information patterns between brain areas can be extended to a sharing and cascading of information between multiple brains and bodies to produce coordinated behavior. Essentially, the way you and the people around you negotiate your shared space affects the way you think, because space is a fundamental part of how you think. It is via space that the mental processes of one mind can form an intersection with the mental processes of another mind.     

Interaction of vision and movement via a mirror

I have noticed a striking effect that vision can have on movement: when a person makes circular motions with both hands, clockwise with the left hand, counterclockwise with the right hand, while watching the reflection of one hand in a parasagitally placed mirror, if one arm makes a vertical excursion, the other arm tends to make the same vertical excursion, but not typically if the excursing arm is viewed in plain vision. This observation may help in understanding how visual feedback via a mirror may be beneficial for rehabilitation of some patients with movement deficits secondary to certain neurologic conditions, and illustrates that the traditional division of neural processes into sensory input and motor output is somewhat arbitrary.     

Brain-to-brain coupling: a mechanism for creating and sharing a social world

Cognition materializes in an interpersonal space. The emergence of complex behaviors requires the coordination of actions among individuals according to a shared set of rules. Despite the central role of other individuals in shaping one's mind, most cognitive studies focus on processes that occur within a single individual. We call for a shift from a single-brain to a multi-brain frame of reference. We argue that in many cases the neural processes in one brain are coupled to the neural processes in another brain via the transmission of a signal through the environment. Brain-to-brain coupling constrains and shapes the actions of each individual in a social network, leading to complex joint behaviors that could not have emerged in isolation.     

Spatial Behavior of University Undergraduates in Double-Occupany Residence Rooms: An Inventory of Effects

The spatial behavior of 116 male and 190 female pairs of university under-graduates was examined in the context of their self-reported own and shared territories within double-occupany residence rooms. The variables were divided into a number of conceptual categories, R -squared calculated for the contribution of each category to own and shared territory estimates, and finally regressions for the entire set of variables were calculated for each gender on these estimates. The conceptual categories used were: personality; subjects' physical characteristics; distal or past environments; behavior in the room; sports, social, outdoor, and aesthetic behaviors; attitudes toward room and roommate; and physical characteristics of the room. The entire set of variables accounted for 53% of the variance in the own territory and 42% of the variance in public territory for the males, while the figures for the females were 46% and 39% respectively. Generally, the males' reported spatial behaviors were more influenced by "internal" variables, such as personality and attitudes, than were the females' spatial behaviors, which were more influenced by "external" variables, such as the physical characteristics of the room and the social situation.     

Political polarization projection: social projection of partisan attitude extremity and attitudinal processes

What influences perceptions of political polarization? The authors examine the polarization of people's own political attitudes as a source of perceived polarization: Individuals with more extreme partisan attitudes perceive greater polarization than individuals with less extreme partisan attitudes. This "polarization projection" was demonstrated in 3 studies in which people estimated the distribution of others' political attitudes: one study with a nationally representative sample concerning the 2008 presidential election, and 2 studies concerning university students evaluating a policy regarding scarce resource allocation. These studies demonstrate that polarization projection occurs simultaneously with and independently of simple projection, the tendency to assume that others share one's partisan political attitudes. Polarization projection may occur partly because people assume that others engage in similar attitudinal processes as the self, such as extensive thought and emotional arousal. The projection of various attitudinal processes was demonstrated in a study concerning health care reform policies. Further supporting this explanation, polarization projection increased when people introspected about their own attitudinal processes, which increased the accessibility of those processes. Implications for perceptions of partisanship, social judgment, and civic behavior are discussed.     

The Effect of Residence Hall Judicial Pollcies on Attitudes toward Rule-Violating Behaviors1

As part of a longitudinal study of legal socialization (N= 507), a subset of the sample (n= 87) was chosen for an exploratory naturalistic experiment of the effect of manipulated residence hall judicial policies on attitudes toward rule-violating behavior. Freshman students who directly participated in the functioning of their dormitory judicial system (n= 26) expressed attitudes less tolerant of rule-violating behaviors than did freshman students (n= 12) who had no control over how rules were enforced. Students in both of these experimental conditions expressed attitudes less tolerant of rule-violating behavior than did those (n= 49) living in two control dormitories operating under the usual university policies. While noting the problem of confounds inherent in naturalistic designs, the results are interpreted as suggesting that while the imposition of strict rules by an external authority can result in attitudinal compliance, a stronger effect can be achieved by fostering shared values through active student participation in the judicial system. The implications of these findings are interpreted within the context of control theory.     

Intentional attunement: mirror neurons and the neural underpinnings of interpersonal relations

The neural circuits activated in a person carrying out actions, expressing emotions, and experiencing sensations are activated also, automatically via a mirror neuron system, in the observer of those actions, emotions, and sensations. It is proposed that this finding of shared activation suggests a functional mechanism of "embodied simulation" that consists of the automatic, unconscious, and noninferential simulation in the observer of actions, emotions, and sensations carried out and experienced by the observed. It is proposed also that the shared neural activation pattern and the accompanying embodied simulation constitute a fundamental biological basis for understanding another's mind. The implications of this perspective for psychoanalysis are discussed, particularly regarding unconscious communication, projective identification, attunement, empathy, autism, therapeutic action, and transference-countertransference interactions.     

U.S. ethnic minorities' attitudes towards Whites: The role of shared reality theory in intergroup relations

In the current research, we suggest that shared reality, the belief that one perceives the world the same way as another group, can predict attitudes towards that group. We tested shared reality theory in the context of American ethnic minority groups' (i.e., African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinas/os) attitudes towards White Americans. In surveys of two samples recruited from different geographical locations in the USA, we tested predictions derived from different theories of intergroup relations. Using mediational analysis, we defined models to assess the extent to which shared reality theory predicted—directly and indirectly—prejudicial attitudes towards Whites. We tested the model derived from shared reality theory against other theoretical alternatives. Taken together, the results of the research indicated that shared reality predicts attitudes towards White Americans among these three ethnic groups. Thus, shared reality is a relevant, though largely overlooked, factor in intergroup dynamics.     

Changing prejudiced attitudes by thinking about persuasive messages: implications for resistance

This research showed that changing attitudes toward stigmatized groups can result from both the simple processes that require little thinking and the traditional elaborative forms of persuasion that require high thinking processes. Importantly, even when the obtained attitude change was equivalent for situations in which there was high and low message elaboration, the changes produced in high thinking conditions were found to be more resistant to further attacks than equivalent changes produced by less thoughtful mechanisms. Not only were those attitudes more resistant as measured objectively (Study 1) but participants also perceived their attitudes to be subjectively more resistant (Study 2). These studies suggest that examining the processes by which prejudice is changed can be important for understanding the consequences and long‐term implications of treatments and campaigns oriented to changing attitudes toward stigmatized groups.     

The infection of bad company: stigma by association

Stigma by association represents the process through which the companions of stigmatized persons are discredited. Conduits for stigma by association range from the strong and enduring bonds of kinship to the arbitrary occasions of being seen in the company of someone who is stigmatized. A theoretical model is proposed in which both deliberative and spontaneous processes result in the spread of stigma to the companions of stigmatized persons. Support for this model was found across 3 studies that examined how explicit and implicit stigma-relevant attitudes moderate stigma-by-association effects. When social relationships were meaningful (e.g., kinship), both explicit and implicit attitudes moderated the devaluation of stigmatized persons' companions. On the other hand, when social relationships appeared coincidental only implicit attitudes moderated companion devaluation.