Fool-proof proofs of God?

Summary Two claims have been explored, the first, that fool-proof proofs of the sort that there could be if there were a God like the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are not to be expected, on good religious grounds (a claim I found wanting); and second, that there cannot be philosophical proofs of God which work beyond reasonable doubt.The argument that there cannot be philosophical proofs beyond a reasonable doubt is supported by an examination of some of the fundamental issues in the traditional discussions of proofs for God's existence, and by claims about the relativity of methodological rules to world-views which, I maintain, the traditional discussions indicate. I do not claim to have proved that relativity, only to have illustrated the claim that it is there.It is my further opinion, but I do not claim really to have proved it, that the failure of religious excuses for the lack of public demon strations constitutes a good reason for concluding that there is no God of the sort described as the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; hence that if there is a God, it must be the God of the philosophers. However I admit that there might be sufficient hidden reasons which would offer persuasive excuses for the God of the ordinary believer.Lastly, I have made some comments about what I think is the more valuable way to view the proofs for God. Such an interpretation does justice to the otherwise baffling and continual philosophical disagreements better than rival theories. It is time we take these disagreements with utmost seriousness, and one can hardly do that while treating basic metaphysical arguments as fool-proof proofs.Readers of the literature on proofs will recognize many of the historical and current discussions on which comment is being made. To provide sources for all the comments would be not only cumbersome but impossible because they are found in so many different places and are not the property of any one in particular.     

Affective Reactions to the Thought of “God”: Moderating Effects of Image of God

Recent understanding of subjective well-being suggests that it consists of global judgments of life satisfaction, hedonic experiences, and beliefs about facets of one’s life. Traditionally, life satisfaction judgments have been the outcome of interest in studies examining the relationship between religiosity and well-being. Two studies were conducted to look at the interactive effects of personal religious beliefs, namely God images, and environmental stimuli, particularly priming the thought of “God.” The first study examines hedonic experiences, which is one of the information sources when constructing a well-being judgment. A second study attempts to replicate the findings with life satisfaction ratings. Results of the first study showed that one’s image of God as a controlling or non-controlling entity moderated the affective response to being primed to think about God. In particular, those who had a high controlling image of God had a negative affective reaction to the God prime. Results of the second study replicated the pattern of results using life satisfaction ratings as the dependent variable.     

Can Models of God Compete?

Though the very task of modeling God implies that the reality of God is to some degree unknowable, there are a variety of positions one may take concerning the degree to which one has epistemic access to God. If our models of God are too influenced by subjectivity, it makes no sense to test them against each other in rational competition. In this essay, I define four possible positions that may underlie the task of God-modeling: mysteriosophy, theopoetics, critical realism, and fallibilism. Of these four, I propose that fallibilism is the most appropriate method for constructing models of God. Fallibilism simultaneously assumes that our models are able to refer to a divine reality, and yet always with a tentative stance, as absolute confirmation or universal consensus concerning them will almost certainly never be obtained. Models of God can engage in rational competition, but a final decision will probably be delayed indefinitely. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

Proving the non‐existence of God

Using Rawls's theory as illustration, I argue that any conception of justice which includes a commitment to equality of opportunity eventually must collide with a commitment to the family. I then contend that the link between justice and equality of opportunity cannot be severed by showing that one powerful attempt to do so founders. Borrowing from Martin Buber, I try to show that the perspective required by justice is different from and opposed to that required for intimate relations. Moreover, I argue that the institution of the family provides the soil without which human intimacy withers. Finally, I try to suggest that the need for human. I‐You encounters is a response to aspects of the human condition quite different from those which give rise to institutions of justice and the state.     

Who Believes in a Male God? Ideological Beliefs and Gendered Conceptualizations of God

Recent studies have explored whether certain conceptualizations of God are associated with various attitudes and beliefs. In the current study, we examined the relationship between gendered God concepts and the belief that God is involved in one’s life and religious-related rigid ideologies (i.e., religious fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism [RWA]). Across two studies, one conducted with religious students at a Jesuit university and the other with a national sample, we found that individuals who believed God to be male were more likely to believe that God had more control and involvement in their life, had higher levels of religious fundamentalism and higher levels of RWA-Aggression (Study 1 and 2), RWA–Submission (Study 1 and 2), and RWA–Conventionalism (Study 2) than individuals with other gendered or nongendered conceptualizations of God. Implications of the broader impact that gendered God concepts have on social and political domains are explored. Last, limitations and future research directions are discussed.     

“God may NOT be a Personexcl;”: A Case of Cultural Construction of God Representations

This article raises the fundamental questions of God representations: What is the origin and nature of God representations in the context of culture? The subsequent questions that flow from this major question include: What are the psychoanalytic notions of culture and cultural experience? And what is the relationship between the self and God representation? Given the emphasis placed upon the nature of “individual” representational experience in psychoanalytic literature, this article presents a challenge to psychoanalytic object-relations theory by explicating the case of the Korean cultural construction of God representations. The author argues that to understand one’s images of God one needs to consider the relationship between the mental images one has constructed prior to one’s acquisition of language and cultural constructs that are collectively represented and symbolically embodied through the use of language.     

Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement?

This essay considers whether reformed epistemology is compatible with the claim that knowledge is a cognitive achievement. It is argued that knowledge of God is not only compatible with a more general achievement claim, but is also compatible with a much stronger achievement claim – namely, the strong achievement thesis where achievements are characterized by the overcoming of some obstacle. With respect to reformed epistemology, then, it is argued that the obstacle that is overcome is an environment that is not conducive to belief in God given the cognitive consequence of sin. This essay suggests two ways in which the agent is involved in the process of overcoming this obstacle.     

Concerning the Preservation of God’s Omnipotence

Numerous examples have been offered that purportedly show that God cannot be omnipotent. I argue that a common response to such examples (i.e., that failure to do the impossible does not indicate a lack of power) does not preserve God’s omnipotence in the face of some of these examples. I consider another possible strategy for preserving God’s omnipotence in the face of these examples and find it wanting.

Can One Be Cognitively Conscious of God?

How do humans ‘register’ God: attain knowledge or revelation of God? Analysis is familiar in terms of explanatory hypothesis, necessity, authority and commitment. However individuals speak also of ‘experience’ or ‘consciousness’ of God/Christ/grace – received widely, not just by an esoteric few. But may we properly hold that people can be cognitively aware of God? Undoubtedly such speech has problematic aspects. Not only do psychosis, self-deception, gullibility recur. Commentators are liable to enlist what may be termed the A-conceptual Lucidity picture, which critically fails. Various positions urged by thinkers rule out by definition the very possibility of cognitive awareness of God. Some analysts assert: a person’s experiencing x is constituted throughout by the person’s use of concepts in toto reached previously and independently. But, why adopt any a priori dismissiveness? We should favour a portrayal of people’s epistemic situation respecting God called the Consciousness Portrayal. Phrases therein include: ‘God’s gracious, guiding activity’; ‘a person’s access to God’; ‘attentive consciousness/conceptualization/knowledge of God’; ‘diverse levels or modes of consciousness’; ‘God’s guidance in a person’s creatively picking out concepts’; and ‘“cognition” which, as regards meaning, is not just a function of calculative reasoning’. Alertness to usage in non-religious contexts aids our finding the religious phrasing intelligible. The Portrayal is approachable from an internal and external angle. Opponents’ challenges to the Portrayal invoke some broad epistemological theses, often pronounced intrinsic to ‘rationality’. But we fittingly espouse certain contrasting epistemological views. And these prove to fortify the Consciousness Portrayal.     

Good God?!? Lamentations as a Model for Mourning the Loss of the Good God

This article will address the devastating psychological and social effects due to the loss of one's primary love-object, namely God in the case of faith communities and religious individuals. By using Melanie Klein's Object Relations Theory (Klein in Envy and gratitude and other works 1946/1963. The Free Press, New York, 1975a) as a way to enter the text of Lamentations, I will articulate an alternative reading that can serve as a model for Pastors and Educators to use when walking with individuals and communities through unspeakable losses. I will argue that Lamentations may be used as a tool for naming confounding depression and anxiety that stems from a damaged introjected object (one's personal God). This tool may provide individuals and communities a framework for placing anger and contempt upon God in order to re-assimilate this loved yet hated object, eventually leading toward healing and restoration of the self.     

A Comparison of Christians’ Concepts of Jesus Christ and God

In the god concept literature, little research has been conducted on how people think about and relate specifically to Jesus Christ. This study addresses the extent to which Christians distinguish between Jesus and God in terms of their concepts of Jesus and God, the pathways they use to connect with Jesus and God, and the benefits they seek and receive from Jesus and God. The study also tests whether participants’ concepts of Jesus have unique predictive power for psychological, social, and spiritual criterion variables after controlling for their concepts of God. The sample includes 165 college students and 107 church attendees who self-identified as Christians. Results indicate that although most participants view Jesus and God as being similar to each other, they perceive Jesus to be warmer but less transcendent and stern than God. Including participants’ concepts of Jesus in hierarchical multiple regressions accounted for significant additional variance after controlling for their concepts of God in predicting participants’ negative affect, social justice attitudes, spiritual emotions, and Christian orthodoxy. Participants generally used various pathways more to connect with God than with Jesus, and they reported seeking and receiving many benefits more from God than from Jesus. These results suggest that future research on god concepts among Christians ought to include separate measures of Jesus concepts and God concepts.     

God knows (but does God believe?)

The standard view in epistemology is that propositional knowledge entails belief. Positive arguments are seldom given for this entailment thesis, however; instead, its truth is typically assumed. Against the entailment thesis, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (Noûs, forthcoming) report that a non-trivial percentage of people think that there can be propositional knowledge without belief. In this paper, we add further fuel to the fire, presenting the results of four new studies. Based on our results, we argue that the entailment thesis does not deserve the default status that it is typically granted. We conclude by considering the alternative account of knowledge that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel propose to explain their results, arguing that it does not explain ours. In its place we offer a different explanation of both sets of findings—the conviction account, according to which belief, but not knowledge, requires mental assent.     

Pascal’s Wager and the Nature of God

This paper argues that Pascal’s formulation of his famous wager argument licenses an inference about God's nature that ultimately vitiates the claim that wagering for God is in one’s rational self-interest. Specifically, it is argued that if we accept Pascal’s premises, then we can infer that the god for whom Pascal encourages us to wager is irrational. But if God is irrational, then the prudentially rational course of action is to refrain from wagering for him.     

‘The Process Concept of God and Pacifism’

In this article I argue for the superiority of the neoclassical (or process) concept of God to the classical concept of God as static, especially as the former relates to the moral superiority of pacifism to just war theory. However, the two main proponents of neoclassical or process theism—Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne—failed to see the full ramifications of their improved concept of God in that they tended to stop short of pacifism by maintaining an uneasy alliance with the violence often associated with classical theism.     

撒母耳Samuel向神求来的asked of God神听见了God has heard

撒母耳是歌辖的后代,以利加拿之子(撒上1:20;代上6:27),作以色列的先知、祭司和士师四十年. 以利加拿住在拉玛,有哈拿和毗尼拿两个妻子,哈拿因为没有生育,心中十分愁苦,当她到示罗献祭时,在神的殿中痛哭,祈祷耶和华,许愿说:"万军之耶和华啊,你若垂顾婢女的苦情……赐给我一个儿子,我必使他终身归与耶和华."神顾念哈拿,她就生了一个儿子,给他起名叫撒母耳,说:"这是我从耶和华那里求来的."孩子断了奶之后,哈拿就把孩子带至示罗,先在神前献祭,再把孩子领到祭司以利面前说:这孩子是我向神求来的.所以我将这孩子归与耶和华,使他终身服事神.哈拿就回去了(撒上1:1-28).撒母耳则被留在以利面前学习事奉耶和华.他渐渐长大,神和人都越发喜爱他.有一天夜里,撒母耳已经睡着了,耶和华两次呼唤他,他都以为是以利,第三次才回答说:"请说,仆人敬听."神对撒母耳说:"我在以色列中必行一件事,叫听见的人都必耳鸣.我指着以利家所说的话,到了时候,我必始终应验在以利身上."次日撒母耳就把神说的一切话都告诉了以利,并没有隐瞒.撒母耳长大了,因为耶和华与他同在,将自己的话默示撒母耳,撒母耳就把这话传递以色列地,他所说的话一句都不落空,使得全以色列的人都知道耶和华立撒母耳为先知(撒上3:1-21).