Response bias in judging deceptive movements

Two not mutually exclusive explanations, perceptual and motor expertise, account for the finding that experts outperform novices in recognizing deceptive actions from bodily (kinematic) cues. The aim of the present study was twofold: First, we sought to examine the impact of motor and perceptual expertise on distinguishing deceptive and non-deceptive actions. Second, we tested the hypothesis that differences in perceptual judgments on deceptive movements vs. non-deceptive movements do not necessarily need to be caused by either perceptual or motor expertise differences, but can also be a result of response bias. Skilled handball players (field players and goalkeepers) and novices had to detect whether a penalty-taker shot or faked a shot at the goal. Signal detection theory (SDT) analysis revealed that skilled handball players outperformed novices in discriminating shots from fakes. No differences in perceptual sensitivity were found between the goalkeepers and the field players. However, SDT analysis showed that goalkeepers were significantly biased to judge movements as deceptive, while neither field players nor novices showed this response bias.     

Shoot or don't shoot? Why police officers are more inclined to shoot when they are anxious

We investigated the effect of anxiety on police officers' shooting decisions. Thirty-six police officers participated and executed a low- and high-anxiety video-based test that required them to shoot or not shoot at rapidly appearing suspects that either had a gun and "shot," or had no gun and "surrendered." Anxiety was manipulated by turning on (high anxiety) or turning off (low anxiety) a so-called "shootback canon" that could fire small plastic bullets at the participants. When performing under anxiety, police officers showed a response bias toward shooting, implying that they accidentally shot more often at suspects that surrendered. Furthermore, shot accuracy was lower under anxiety and officers responded faster when suspects had a gun. Finally, because gaze behavior appeared to be unaffected by anxiety, it is concluded that when they were anxious, officers were more inclined to respond on the basis of threat-related inferences and expectations rather than objective, task-relevant visual information.     

Formation and use of covariation assessments in the real world

In this study we examined covariation assessments made using real‐world information held by individual participants about an important preventive health behaviour: receiving an influenza vaccine (‘flu shot’). Four hundred and seventy‐seven healthy adult participants completed a questionnaire, indicating both their personal experience and vicarious experience (knowledge of other people's experiences) with the flu shot and the flu. Additionally, participants provided a covariation assessment by indicating how effective they thought the flu shot is in preventing the flu. We examined whether the experience information was related to the covariation assessment, and whether it in turn was related to the decision to receive a flu shot. Our results indicated that people use a simple intuitive strategy to combine their personal experience information. For vicarious experience information, we found evidence for use of a normative strategy, as well as simpler intuitive strategies. Consistent with our hypothesis, both types of experience information were associated with the effectiveness judgement, which was subsequently related to the decision to obtain a flu shot. Practical applications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stereotypic ingroup bias as self‐defense against relative deprivation: evidence from a longitudinal study of the German unification process

In a longitudinal questionnaire field study on psychological consequences of German unification, the intergroup situation between East and West Germans was investigated. Data were collected in 1996 and 1998. The sample consisted of 585 East Germans and 387 West Germans who had never lived in the other part of Germany. It was assumed that East Germans' social identity is threatened due to their fraternal deprivation in comparison with West Germans. It was predicted that East Germans would employ ingroup bias as an identity management strategy in order to protect their emotional well‐being against harmful consequences of fraternal deprivation. In line with this prediction, it was found that (a) East Germans feel fraternally deprived compared to West Germans on important quality of life dimensions, (b) they display ingroup bias vis‐à‐vis West Germans, (c) ingroup bias increases with increasing East German identity, (d) ingroup bias is determined longitudinally by relative deprivation, and (e) ingroup bias buffers the effect of relative deprivation on mental health over time. As expected, ingroup bias and the effects of ingroup bias were larger for the dimension of personal integrity than for the dimensions of sympathy and competence. Ingroup bias is interpreted as compensatory self‐enhancement. West Germans feel fraternally privileged compared to East Germans and consider their advantages to be undeserved. Unexpectedly, West Germans display outgroup bias on the stereotype dimensions of integrity. This bias is interpreted as an effort to appease the moral outrage of East Germans and to silence their own guilty conscience due to undeserved advantages. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How well do people recall risk factor test results? Accuracy and bias among cholesterol screening participants.

The authors conducted a community-based cholesterol screening study to examine accuracy of recall for self-relevant health information in long-term autobiographical memory. Adult community residents (N = 496) were recruited to participate in a laboratory-based cholesterol screening and were also provided cholesterol counseling in accordance with national guidelines. Participants were subsequently interviewed 1, 3, or 6 months later to assess their memory for their test results. Participants recalled their exact cholesterol levels inaccurately (38.0% correct) but their cardiovascular risk category comparatively well (88.7% correct). Recall errors showed a systematic bias: Individuals who received the most undesirable test results were most likely to remember their cholesterol scores and cardiovascular risk categories as lower (i.e., healthier) than those actually received. Recall bias was unrelated to age, education, knowledge, self-rated health status, and self-reported efforts to reduce cholesterol. The findings provide evidence that recall of self-relevant health information is susceptible to self-enhancement bias.     

The right side? Under time pressure, approach motivation leads to right-oriented bias

Approach motivation, a focus on achieving positive outcomes, is related to relative left-hemispheric brain activation, which translates to a variety of right-oriented behavioral biases. In two studies, we found that approach-motivated individuals display a right-oriented bias, but only when they are forced to act quickly. In a task in which they had to divide lines into two equal parts, approach-motivated individuals bisected the line at a point farther to the right than avoidance-motivated individuals did, but only when they worked under high time pressure. In our analysis of all Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup penalty shoot-outs, we found that goalkeepers were two times more likely to dive to the right than to the left when their team was behind, a situation that we conjecture induces approach motivation. Because penalty takers shot toward the two sides of the goal equally often, the goalkeepers' right-oriented bias was dysfunctional, allowing more goals to be scored. Directional biases may facilitate group coordination but prove maladaptive in individual settings and interpersonal competition.     

Hindsight bias after receiving self-relevant health risk information: a motivational perspective

The phenomenon of hindsight bias was explored in the context of self-relevant health risk information. Participants in a community screening estimated their cholesterol level (foresight measure) before receiving positive or negative feedback based on their actual cholesterol level. Hindsight estimations were then assessed twice: once immediately after the feedback, and again several weeks later. While the unexpected positive feedback group showed no systematic recall bias, hindsight estimations of individuals receiving unexpectedly negative feedback showed a dynamic change over time. Immediately after the feedback, participants' recollection of their expected cholesterol level were shifted towards their actual cholesterol level (hindsight bias). In contrast, several weeks later, foresight estimations were recalled as less accurate than they had been (reversed hindsight bias). These data might reflect a change of the motivational focus from "hot affect" and fear control, which occur immediately after receiving negative feedback, to danger control, which occurs some time after the feedback, as proposed by the dual process model.     

Hindsight bias after receiving self-relevant health risk information: A motivational perspective

The phenomenon of hindsight bias was explored in the context of self-relevant health risk information. Participants in a community screening estimated their cholesterol level (foresight measure) before receiving positive or negative feedback based on their actual cholesterol level. Hindsight estimations were then assessed twice: once immediately after the feedback, and again several weeks later. While the unexpected positive feedback group showed no systematic recall bias, hindsight estimations of individuals receiving unexpectedly negative feedback showed a dynamic change over time. Immediately after the feedback, participants' recollection of their expected cholesterol level were shifted towards their actual cholesterol level (hindsight bias). In contrast, several weeks later, foresight estimations were recalled as less accurate than they had been (reversed hindsight bias). These data might reflect a change of the motivational focus from "hot affect" and fear control, which occur immediately after receiving negative feedback, to danger control, which occurs some time after the feedback, as proposed by the dual process model.     

An investigation of self-assessment bias in mental health providers

Previous research has consistently found self-assessment bias (an overly positive assessment of personal performance) to be present in a wide variety of work situations. The present investigation extended this area of research with a multi-disciplinary sample of mental health professionals. Respondents were asked to: (a) compare their own overall clinical skills and performance to others in their profession, and (b) indicate the percentage of their clients who improved, remained the same, or deteriorated as a result of treatment with them. Results indicated that 25% of mental health professionals viewed their skill to be at the 90th percentile when compared to their peers, and none viewed themselves as below average. Further, when compared to the published literature, clinicians tended to overestimate their rates of client improvement and underestimate their rates of client deterioration. The implications of this self-assessment bias for improvement of psychotherapy outcomes are discussed.     

"We Don′t Expect It Happened": On Mazursky and Ofir′s (1990) Purported Reversal of the Hindsight Bias

Mazursky and Ofir (1990) recently claimed to have shown a reversal of the hindsight bias. They presented three experiments which supposedly showed that, following unexpected and surprising events, judgments were biased in a direction opposite to that predicted by the hindsight bias. We argue that the Mazursky and Ofir results should not be interpreted as a reversal of the hindsight bias for three reasons: (1) Mazursky and Ofir′s supposed reversal effect is on a rating of the quality of a product, rather than on the sort of likelihood ratings on which the hindsight bias has been demonstrated; (2) their results can readily be interpreted in terms of a contrast effect, especially in the case of their Experiments 1 and 2; and (3) given the use of quality ratings, the supposed reversal effect could have resulted from subjects′ desire to rate one product as superior, in part by rating other similar products as inferior. Discussion focuses on other purported evidence for a reversal of the hindsight effect and on suggestions for future research.     

Stereotypic head twirls, but not pacing, are related to a ‘pessimistic’-like judgment bias among captive tufted capuchins (Cebus apella)

Abnormal stereotypic behaviour is widespread among captive non-human primates and is generally associated with jeopardized well-being. However, attributing the same significance to all of these repetitive, unvarying and apparently functionless behaviours may be misleading, as some behaviours may be better indicators of stress than others. Previous studies have demonstrated that the affective state of the individual can be inferred from its bias in appraising neutral stimuli in its environment. Therefore, in the present study, in order to assess the emotional state of stereotyping individuals, 16 captive tufted capuchins (Cebus apella) were tested on a judgment bias paradigm and their faecal corticoid levels were measured in order to assess the intensity of the emotional state. Capuchins with higher levels of stereotypic head twirls exhibited a negative bias while judging ambiguous stimuli and had higher levels of faecal corticoids compared to subjects with lower levels of head twirls. Levels of stereotypic pacing, however, were not correlated with the monkeys' emotional state. This study is the first to reveal a positive correlation between levels of stereotypic behaviour and a 'pessimistic'-like judgment bias in a non-human primate by employing a recently developed cognitive approach. Combining cognitive tests that evaluate the animals' affective valence (positive or negative) with hormonal measurements that provide information on the strength of the emotional state conduces to a better understanding of the animals' affective state and therefore to their well-being.     

Do clutch players win the game? Testing the validity of the clutch player's reputation in basketball

ObjectivesThe sport psychology literature recognizes the existence of clutch behavior among elite athletes. The present study questions the validity of the clutch reputation in basketball. The performance of clutch players was compared to that of their teammates, using a broad approach that included different performance measures.DesignEight basketball experts ranked NBA players according to their perceived reputation of being clutch shooters. The selection procedure resulted in a sample of 16 clutch players who had successfully made a game-deciding shot, or had made a successful shot in the final few minutes to tie the game, during the 2003–2006 seasons.MethodData were collected from play-by-play reports of 222 tied NBA games during the 2005–2006 season and playoffs. Data were reduced to the final five minutes of the second and fourth quarters in each close/tied game. A MANOVA and several ANOVAs were conducted in order to compare the performance measures of the clutch players and the average of their teammates, in game phases of low and high pressure.ResultsThe reported main effects of clutch versus non-clutch players suggest a superior performance of the clutch players. The results also show that the clutch players improved their performance in the final, most decisive phase of the game, which could be interpreted as evidence for clutch ability. However, the clutch players did not improve their general shooting skills, as might have been expected.ConclusionsTop NBA players, like most other people, do not perform better under pressure situations, at least not while considering their chances of making a shot, but clutch players do influence the end-result of the game in other aspects.     

中国军人心理健康状况的元分析

研究的目的在于深入探讨军人的心理健康状态。通过文献查阅收集了77篇用SCL-90作为测评工具的关于军人心理健康状况的研究,样本量为56164人,根据被试情况把这些研究分为两组,一组为军事应激条件下的军人,另一组为非军事应激条件下的军人,分别对两组研究进行了元分析。研究发现非军事应激条件下军人的心理健康水平与军人常模差不多;军事应激条件下军人的心理健康水平在应激前高于军人常模,应激中低于军人常模,应激后与军人常模差不多。其中城镇驻军的心理健康水平高于高原驻军,高于边防驻军;应激中的心理健康水平低于应激后,低于应激前;地域、人员类别以及应激水平等因素对军人SCL-90得分有显著影响。敏感性分析和发表偏倚显示本研究的稳定性较好,没有发表偏倚。表明中国军人的心理健康状况并非很差;与金华等的地方成人常模和蔡心培的国家军用标准相比,王焕林19662人的军人常模更适合于做军人的比较标准;地域、人员类别以及应激水平等因素对SCL-90得分有显著影响     

Tempo,Rhythm, and Aging in Golf

Older (n = 12) and younger (n = 12) golfers attempted to hit a golf ball into a target net a short distance away. An accelerometer attached to the back of the clubhead measured the applied force. In contrast to the more typical finding of slower perceptual-motor performance by older adults, older golfers reached their peak downswing force earlier in the shot and also exhibited a trend toward a faster overall speed or tempo of the shot. Additionally, older golfers exhibited greater changes in applied force and greater variability. A pattern of divergence among the force-time histories from multiple shots suggested that the overall person-plus-golf-club dynamics were unstable during a part of the shot. Older adults may be slower in controlling this instability. Half of the participants heard a tone whose pitch was proportional to their force. These participants had a slower follow through; however, they did not make significantly more or fewer shots than participants who had not been presented with the tone. Analyses of the temporal covariation among the backswing, downswing, and follow-through favored a chain-like temporal structure over a hierarchical, proportional structure. The pattern of covariation suggests that the tempo and rhythm of the shot are not independent and that changing one's tempo may disrupt rhythm.     

Self‐Favoring Bias for Physical Activity in Middle‐Aged and Older Adults1

A self‐favoring bias for physical activity (PA) was examined in a community‐based sample of middle‐aged and older adults (N= 3,211). Participants' actual level of PA relative to peers was compared with their perceived PA relative to peers. It was estimated that 38% were realistic, 46% self‐favoring, and 16% other‐favoring in their perceptions. Among participants whose actual PA level was similar to peers, increasing age was associated with a self‐favoring bias. Among less and more physically active participants, however, age was not associated with this bias. Better self‐rated health and being male were also associated with a self‐favoring bias. These results suggest that a self‐favoring bias for PA exists in a significant proportion of middle‐aged and older adults, and it is more pronounced with increasing age, among those with better self‐rated health, and among men.     

A test of Bayesian observer models of processing in the Eriksen flanker task

Two Bayesian observer models were recently proposed to account for data from the Eriksen flanker task, in which flanking items interfere with processing of a central target. One model assumes that interference stems from a perceptual bias to process nearby items as if they are compatible, and the other assumes that the interference is due to spatial uncertainty in the visual system (Yu, Dayan, & Cohen, 2009). Both models were shown to produce one aspect of the empirical data, the below-chance dip in accuracy for fast responses to incongruent trials. However, the models had not been fit to the full set of behavioral data from the flanker task, nor had they been contrasted with other models. The present study demonstrates that neither model can account for the behavioral data as well as a comparison spotlight-diffusion model. Both observer models missed key aspects of the data, challenging the validity of their underlying mechanisms. Analysis of a new hybrid model showed that the shortcomings of the observer models stem from their assumptions about visual processing, not the use of a Bayesian decision process.     

Health status, perceptions of risk, and prevention interest for health and nonhealth problems

Healthy and acutely ill college students indicated their risk compared to their peers for 10 health and nonhealth problems. Participants as a whole showed clear evidence of optimistic bias. However, whereas healthy participants showed an equal tendency to be biased optimistically for health and nonhealth problems, ill participants felt significantly more vulnerable to future health relative to nonhealth problems. This was the case even though the future health problems were objectively unrelated to their current illnesses. Perceptions of the preventability of the health and nonhealth problems paralleled the comparative risk judgments. Finally, those who were ill expressed relatively little interest in receiving prevention information. Possible mechanisms and implications are discussed.     

Misremembering colostomies? Former patients give lower utility ratings than do current patients.

Community members often evaluate health conditions more negatively than do the patients who have them. The authors investigated whether experience with a health condition reduces this discrepancy by surveying colostomy patients by mail (n = 195), some of whom (n = 100) had their colostomies reversed and normal bowel function restored. The authors also surveyed a community sample recruited via the Internet (n = 567). They then compared all 3 groups' utility value for life with a colostomy by using the time trade-off utility measure and by examining ratings of current quality of life. Despite having direct experience with the health condition, former colostomy patients provided much lower utility valuations than did current patients. In fact, their valuations were similar to those given by a community sample. Rather than accurately remembering their actual experiences with colostomies, the former patients may have applied a theory of how colostomies had influenced their lives; this is consistent with other research on theory driven recall bias.