Vantage point in traumatic memory

Abstract— Persons with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) spontaneously recalled the traumatic event that led to their condition from either a field or an observer vantage point. In the former case, participants recollected the event as if they were seeing it again through their own eyes; in the latter case, the event was recalled from the perspective of a detached spectator. Analysis of the two types of recollections revealed marked differences in their contents. Whereas field memories afforded richer accounts of the affective reactions, somatic sensations, and psychological states that participants experienced during the focal trauma, observer memories contained more information about participants' physical appearance and actions and the spatial layout of the traumatic scene. Observer trauma memories were also experienced as less emotional and anxiety provoking than field trauma memories. The discussion focuses on the clinical implications of these findings and prospects for future research on traumatic memory.     

Me Too!: Social modelling influences on early autobiographical memories

To investigate the malleability of early memories, 200 participants were asked to describe their earliest memories. Before doing so, approximately half were exposed to confederates who described very early memories such as their first steps or a second birthday party, while others were asked only to think about their earliest memories for two minutes before beginning writing. Participants who were exposed to confederate very early memories produced memories that were nearly a year younger on average than the memories reported by controls (2.99 years vs. 3.96 years). Additionally, when participants in the memory discussion condition were asked about an early event that a confederate had recounted they were more confident than controls that they could recall the event in their own lives. These results indicate that autobiographical memories for early events are quite susceptible to social influence and that simply hearing the very early memories of others can alter autobiographical memory. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The coherence of memories for trauma: Evidence from posttraumatic stress disorder

Participants with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and participants with a trauma but without PTSD wrote narratives of their trauma and, for comparison, of the most-important and the happiest events that occurred within a year of their trauma. They then rated these three events on coherence. Based on participants’ self-ratings and on naïve-observer scorings of the participants’ narratives, memories of traumas were not more incoherent than the comparison memories in participants in general or in participants with PTSD. This study comprehensively assesses narrative coherence using a full two (PTSD or not) by two (traumatic event or not) design. The results are counter to most prevalent theoretical views of memory for trauma.     

Creating false memories for events that occurred before versus after the offset of childhood amnesia

We examined whether false images and memories for childhood events are more likely when the event supposedly took place during the period of childhood amnesia. Over three interviews, participants recalled six events: five true and one false. Some participants were told that the false event happened when they were 2 years old (Age 2 group), while others were told that it happened when they were 10 years old (Age 10 group). We compared participants’ reports of the false event to their reports of a true event from the same age. Consistent with prior research on childhood amnesia, participants in the Age 10 group were more likely than participants in the Age 2 group to remember their true event and they reported more information about it. Participants in the Age 2 group, on the other hand, were more likely to develop false images and memories than participants in the Age 10 group. Furthermore, once a false image or memory developed, there were no age-related differences in the amount of information participants reported about the false event. We conclude that childhood amnesia increases our susceptibility to false suggestion, thus our results have implications for court cases where early memories are at issue.     

Creating false memories for events that occurred before versus after the offset of childhood amnesia

We examined whether false images and memories for childhood events are more likely when the event supposedly took place during the period of childhood amnesia. Over three interviews, participants recalled six events: five true and one false. Some participants were told that the false event happened when they were 2 years old (Age 2 group), while others were told that it happened when they were 10 years old (Age 10 group). We compared participants' reports of the false event to their reports of a true event from the same age. Consistent with prior research on childhood amnesia, participants in the Age 10 group were more likely than participants in the Age 2 group to remember their true event and they reported more information about it. Participants in the Age 2 group, on the other hand, were more likely to develop false images and memories than participants in the Age 10 group. Furthermore, once a false image or memory developed, there were no age-related differences in the amount of information participants reported about the false event. We conclude that childhood amnesia increases our susceptibility to false suggestion, thus our results have implications for court cases where early memories are at issue.     

WHAT INFLUENCES BELIEVING CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE DISCLOSURES? THE ROLES OF DEPICTED MEMORY PERSISTENCE, PARTICIPANT GENDER, TRAUMA HISTORY, AND SEXISM

This vignette study investigated factors that influence believing child sexual abuse disclosures. College student participants ( N = 318) in a university human subject pool completed measures about their own trauma history and responded to questions about sexist attitudes. Participants then read vignettes in which an adult disclosed a history of child sexual abuse, rated disclosures for accuracy and believability, and judged the level of abusiveness. Continuous memories were believed more than recovered memories. Men believed abuse reports less than did women, and people who had not experienced trauma were less likely to believe trauma reports. Gender and personal history interacted such that trauma history did not impact women's judgments but did impact men's judgments. Men with a trauma history responded similarly to women with or without a trauma history. High sexism predicted lower judgments of an event being abusive. Hostile sexism was negatively correlated with believing abuse disclosures. Results are considered in light of myths about child sexual abuse.     

Vivid memories of distant trauma: Examining the characteristics of trauma memories and the relationship with the centrality of event and posttraumatic stress 26 years after trauma

In the present study, we investigated the phenomenological characteristics of distant trauma memories and the relationship between the vividness of trauma memories, the centrality of event and symptoms of posttraumatic stress in two groups with different types of trauma exposure, namely survivors and bereaved, from the fire on the passenger ferry, Scandinavian Star, 26 years earlier. More than two decades after the fire, the traumatic event was represented as a vivid, emotional recollection for many of the victims. For both the survivors and the bereaved, a higher degree of vividness of trauma memories and centrality of the event were associated with higher levels of posttraumatic stress. The present findings show that even very distant trauma memories can be represented as vivid recollections. Furthermore, the findings suggest that both vividness of trauma memories and event centrality may contribute to explain how posttraumatic stress reactions can remain present over a very long time.     

Do Cognitive Interview Instructions Contribute to False Beliefs and Memories?

To examine whether exposing people to false events using instructions taken from the cognitive interview creates false beliefs and false memories, we conducted an experiment where participants took part in two sessions. First, they rated how confident they were that they had experienced certain childhood events and their memories of those events; they also rated how plausible they thought the events were. Second, 2 weeks later, participants were exposed to two of three false target events: one high, one moderate, and one low plausibility. For the first event, participants were instructed to either report everything or mentally reinstate the event context. For the second event, participants received both instructions. The third event was the control event about which participants received no instructions. Finally, participants rated their confidence and memories the second time. The results showed that the cognitive interview instructions had little to no effect on the development of false beliefs and false memories. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“You and your best friend Suzy put Slime in Ms. Smollett’s desk”: Producing false memories with self-relevant details

Rates of false memory reports vary markedly in the published literature. In an effort to explain these differences, the present study investigated the effects of including different types of details in a false narrative upon subsequent false memory formation. Participants were assigned to one of four conditions in which the inclusion of self-relevant and/or specific details in a false event (putting a toy in a teacher's desk) was manipulated. Participants engaged in a standard memory recovery procedure over three interviews, involving recall for three true and one false event Upon completion, 68.2% of participants in self-relevant groups were judged as having created memories or images about the false event, as compared with 36.4% in non-self-relevant groups. Subjective ratings of memory intensity were higher for self-relevant groups, and self-relevant participants were less likely to correctly guess the false event. These findings indicate that including self-relevant details in suggested childhood events increases the likelihood that such events will be accepted as false memories.     

Visual imagery in autobiographical memory: The role of repeated retrieval in shifting perspective

Recent memories are generally recalled from a first-person perspective whereas older memories are often recalled from a third-person perspective. We investigated how repeated retrieval affects the availability of visual information, and whether it could explain the observed shift in perspective with time. In Experiment 1, participants performed mini-events and nominated memories of recent autobiographical events in response to cue words. Next, they described their memory for each event and rated its phenomenological characteristics. Over the following three weeks, they repeatedly retrieved half of the mini-event and cue-word memories. No instructions were given about how to retrieve the memories. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to adopt either a first- or third-person perspective during retrieval. One month later, participants retrieved all of the memories and again provided phenomenology ratings. When first-person visual details from the event were repeatedly retrieved, this information was retained better and the shift in perspective was slowed.     

Mental time travel after trauma: the specificity and temporal distribution of autobiographical memories and future-directed thoughts

The present study investigated the relationship between trauma exposure and specificity and temporal distribution of autobiographical memories and future-directed thoughts. A group of sexual assault victims were compared with women without previous trauma exposure in relation to specificity of autobiographical memories, as measured by the Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT) and specificity of future-directed thoughts as measured by the Future Cueing Task (FCT). The temporal distribution of future-directed thoughts and autobiographical memories was studied by asking the participants to estimate when each memory reported on the AMT had occurred and when each future event reported on the FCT would occur. The results showed no difference between the trauma group and the controls on specificity of autobiographical memories and future-directed thoughts. In line with a review of Moore and Zoellner (2007), PTSD symptoms as measured by the Impact of Event Scale (IES) correlated negatively with specificity. Furthermore, we observed no difference in temporal distribution of future-directed thoughts or autobiographical memories between trauma exposed participants and controls.     

Mental time travel after trauma: The specificity and temporal distribution of autobiographical memories and future-directed thoughts

The present study investigated the relationship between trauma exposure and specificity and temporal distribution of autobiographical memories and future-directed thoughts. A group of sexual assault victims were compared with women without previous trauma exposure in relation to specificity of autobiographical memories, as measured by the Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT) and specificity of future-directed thoughts as measured by the Future Cueing Task (FCT). The temporal distribution of future-directed thoughts and autobiographical memories was studied by asking the participants to estimate when each memory reported on the AMT had occurred and when each future event reported on the FCT would occur. The results showed no difference between the trauma group and the controls on specificity of autobiographical memories and future-directed thoughts. In line with a review of Moore and Zoellner (2007), PTSD symptoms as measured by the Impact of Event Scale (IES) correlated negatively with specificity. Furthermore, we observed no difference in temporal distribution of future-directed thoughts or autobiographical memories between trauma exposed participants and controls.     

Eliciting and comparing false and recovered memories: an experimental approach

We describe an experimental paradigm designed to elicit both recovered and false memories in the laboratory. All participants saw, on a video screen, three critical categorized lists of words mixed in randomly with eighteen filler categorized lists. Those in the blocking condition then had several paper‐and‐pencil tasks that involved only the 18 non‐critical filler lists. An uncued recall test was then given, asking participants to recall all the lists they originally saw on the video screen. Finally, there was a cued recall test that provided category cues for the three critical lists. Substantial memory blocking of critical lists on the uncued test and recovery on the cued recall test was observed in all three experiments. In Experiments 2 and 3, many false and recovered memories were elicited on the cued recall test by including cues for the three critical (forgotten) lists, plus cues for three lists that had never been presented. False memories were distinguishable from truly recovered memories in cued recall by ‘know’ versus ‘remember’ judgements, and by confidence ratings; accurately recovered memories were associated with higher confidence. False and recovered memories could not be discriminated based on recall latency. The results repeatedly show powerful effects of memory blocking and recovery. We also show that recovered and false memories can be elicited within a single experimental procedure, and there may be unique characteristics of each. Although we urge caution in generalizing to false and recovered memories of trauma, we suggest that variations of our comparative memory paradigm may be useful for learning about such phenomena. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Priming voluntary autobiographical memories: Implications for the organisation of autobiographical memory and voluntary recall processes

The goal of this study was to show that voluntary autobiographical memories could be primed by the prior activation of autobiographical memories. Three experiments demonstrated voluntary memory priming with three different approaches. In Experiment 1 primed participants were asked to recall memories from their elementary school years. In a subsequent memory task primed participants were asked to recall memories from any time period, and they produced significantly more memories from their elementary school years than unprimed participants. In Experiment 2 primed participants were asked to recall what they were doing when they had heard various news events occurring between 1998 and 2005. Subsequently these participants produced significantly more memories from this time period than unprimed participants. In Experiment 3 primed participants were asked to recall memories from their teenage years. Subsequently these participants were able to recall more memories from ages 13–15 than unprimed participants, where both had only 1 second to produce a memory. We argue that the results support the notion that episodic memories can activate one another and that some of them are organised according to lifetime periods. We further argue that the results have implications for the reminiscence bump and voluntary recall of the past.     

Emotional content of true and false memories

Many people believe that emotional memories (including those that arise in therapy) are particularly likely to represent true events because of their emotional content. But is emotional content a reliable indicator of memory accuracy? The current research assessed the emotional content of participants’ pre-existing (true) and manipulated (false) memories for childhood events. False memories for one of three emotional childhood events were planted using a suggestive manipulation and then compared, along several subjective dimensions, with other participants’ true memories. On most emotional dimensions (e.g., how emotional was this event for you?), true and false memories were indistinguishable. On a few measures (e.g., intensity of feelings at the time of the event), true memories were more emotional than false memories in the aggregate, yet true and false memories were equally likely to be rated as uniformly emotional. These results suggest that even substantial emotional content may not reliably indicate memory accuracy.     

Trauma memories on trial: is cross-examination a safeguard against distorted analogue traumatic memories?

Trauma memories can feel more disorganised than more mundane memories. That may be problematic in legal contexts. Here we examined: (a) whether that disorganised feeling makes people more susceptible to suggestive questioning during direct examination; and (b) whether cross-examination is the safeguard it is purported to be: that is, we examined whether cross-examination can uncover and correct distorted trauma memories. We showed participants a film depicting a graphic car accident. For some participants, the film unfolded in a temporally disorganised way. We then interviewed participants immediately after the film regarding what they had seen: this ‘direct examination’ included free recall, cued recall and yes/no questions, some of which were misleading. Then, 48 hours later, a second interviewer cross-examined participants. Contrary to our predictions, neither manipulation of the film's temporal organisation, nor participants’ self-reported feelings of event disorganisation significantly affected their accuracy of the film during direct or cross-examination nor their recognition memory of the film. Instead, we found that regardless of whether participants’ memories were distorted by the direct examination, the suggestive nature of the cross-examination introduced sufficient doubt that participants were willing to change their answers. We conclude that traumatic memories are vulnerable to suggestive questioning and, unfortunately, cross-examination is not the legal system's fail-safe corrective influence.     

Also No Support for the Youth Bias: Reply to Koppel and Berntsen

In this reply, I discuss three reasons why the results of Koppel and Berntsen's original study and my study do not offer support for the youth bias. First, participants in Koppel and Berntsen's original study could have used their own memories of public events to indicate how old a typical person would most likely be when the most important public event during that person's life would occur. Second, the absence of the age effect in the second experiment seemed to be caused by the lack of power, making it unlikely that the expectations about the timing of important public events are shared by younger and older participants. Third, participants in my study expected that more events would occur in the period in which a prototypical person would be between 0 and 10 years old than in the period in which the person would be between 11 and 30 years old. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A holistic account of the own-race effect in face recognition: evidence from a cross-cultural study

A robust finding in the cross-cultural research is that people's memories for faces of their own race are superior to their memories for other-race faces. However, the mechanisms underlying the own-race effect have not been well defined. In this study, a holistic explanation was examined in which Caucasian and Asian participants were asked to recognize features of Caucasian and Asian faces presented in isolation and in the whole face. The main finding was that Caucasian participants recognized own-race faces more holistically than Asian faces whereas Asian participants demonstrated holistic recognition for both own-race and other-race faces. The differences in holistic recognition between Caucasian and Asian participants mirrored differences in their relative experience with own-race and other-race faces. These results suggest that the own-race effect may arise from the holistic recognition of faces from a highly familiar racial group.