Self-analysis: a fool for a patient?

In this paper I first reviewed the scanty publications on the subject of self-analysis. Although it was recommended by Freud as early as 1910 for every analyst, self-analysis turns out to have many pitfalls and to be quite a complicated and controversial procedure. There is no agreement on the proper technique of self-analysis in the literature, nor is there any discussion of the determinants of the particular choice of technique of self-analysis that is employed, nor even of the reasons why some analysts do not engage in it at all. Using clinical data gathered from written material of many years of self-analysis following the termination of a successful training psychoanalysis, I have attempted to elucidate some of the problems posed by this procedure. These problems are in some ways similar to formal psychoanalysis, but are in some ways contingent on the fact that it is basically a different technique. It is a solitary occupation and therefore suffers from the dangers of disintegration into autism, narcissism, and obsessional rumination. There is no living presence of an analyst to serve either as a transference figure or to make interpretations and stimulate the production of material. The identification with the analyst's analyzing function is far from simple in self-analysis because of the complex nature of the various internalizations of the analyst that take place over years of a formal training analysis. Thus, Ticho (1967) is correct when she claimed that self-analysis is a skill that the analysand has to acquire by himself or herself. An important phase of the beginning of self-analysis involves the working through of the separation from the psychoanalyst and the re-evaluation of the analyst and the analytic process. This results in a heightened sense of independence and autonomy, increased cohesion of the self, and maturation--which is manifested by greater autonomous ego functioning, a more mature sense of identity, and continued transformations of narcissism which highly valuable goals, on the basis of the data I have presented, can be approached through the process of self-analysis. Above all this stands the most important goal of self-analysis, the understanding of one's countertransference reactions. This is especially important in the treatment of seriously disturbed patients who become disruptive, and thus get labeled borderline, often as a response to unconscious countertransference manifestations from the analyst which are then experienced in the self-object transference as failures in empathy.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Is analytical psychology a religion? Jung's search for a substitute for lost faith

Analytical psychology does not aim at curing neurotic symptoms, but at bringing about a change in the patient's attitude to him or her self, and therefore to life in general. This new attitude can be described as religious, but it has nothing to do with creeds or conventional forms of worship. Analytical psychology is not a religon, but can be described as a prolegomenon to religion or religion in statu nascendi.     

Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?

Here is a surprisingly neglected question in contemporary epistemology: what is it for an agent to believe that p in response to a normative reason for them to believe that p? On one style of answer, believing for the normative reason that q factors into believing that p in the light of the apparent reason that q, where one can be in that kind of state even if q is false, in conjunction with further independent conditions such as q’s being a normative reason to believe that p. The primary objective of this paper is to demonstrate that that style of answer cannot be right, because we must conceive of believing for a normative reason as constitutively involving a kind of rationality-involving relation that can be instantiated at all only if there is a known fact on the scene, which the agent treats as a normative reason. A secondary objective, achieved along the way, is to demonstrate that in their Prime Time (for the Basing Relation) Errol Lord and Kurt Sylvan do not succeed in undermining the factoring picture in general, only a simple-minded version of it.

     

Credence for conclusions: a brief for Jeffrey’s rule

Synthese - Some arguments are good; others are not. How can we tell the difference? This article advances three proposals as a partial answer to this question. The proposals are keyed to arguments...     

Is there a place for Feminists in a Christian Church?

Based on a dialogue held on 16 May 1986 in London at Westminster Cathedral Hall, and organised by Catholic Women's Network and Women in Theology. Dr Daphne Hampson presents her own position at length, Dr Rosemary Ruether responds to it at length, and a discussion between the two of them follows.     

Why a family perspective for pain?

Although it is well established that families have a strong influence on individuals' beliefs and behaviors related to health and illness, relatively little attention has been devoted to the family's role in the development, maintenance, and treatment of pain or to the impact of chronic pain in one family member upon other family members. A major source of information about pain and how to respond to pain symptoms is learned within the family setting. This article reviews ways in which pain conceptualizations are developed in the family and highlights the need to more carefully study health as well as dysfunctional family reactions to chronic pain. A case example is presented that details the far reaching consequences that chronic pain can have on family life. It is concluded that more careful research, particularly in terms of the operationalization of theoretical constructs and the reliable assessment of these constructs, is needed before any definitive statements can be made about the importance and characteristics of pain-family transactions.     

What Makes for a Merry Christmas?

Despite the importance of Christmas within many cultures, researchhas not examined the types of experiences and activities that are associated withholiday well-being. Thus, we asked 117 individuals, ranging in age from 18 to 80,to answer questions about their satisfaction, stress, and emotional state during theChristmas season, as well as questions about their experiences, use of money, andconsumption behaviors. More happiness was reported when family and religiousexperiences were especially salient, and lower well-being occurred when spendingmoney and receiving gifts predominated. Engaging in environmentally consciousconsumption practices also predicted a happier holiday, as did being older and male.In sum, the materialistic aspects of modern Christmas celebrations may underminewell-being, while family and spiritual activities may help people to feel more satisfied.     

Is there a memory for sentences?

A critical discussion of the model of sentence memory which enjoyed greatest popularity in the psycholinguistic research of the sixties, namely the model based on the deep-structure-plus-tag hypothesis of sentence memory, is presented together with the results of an experiment on prompted recall for sentences with various intervals after presentation and with two types of instructions. This experiment contributed to show that immediate memory for sentences can be affected by appropriate instructions, and that after a short time after presentation only the main semantic information of the sentences is recalled. An alternative model is presented, based on the notion of storage of the meaningful elements of the sentences in a rather abstract form, and of recall as a reconstructive process to produce new sentences. The results of two new experiments on sentence memory, the first a free and prompted recall experiment with children, the second a recognition memory study with adolescents, are then presented and discussed in relation to the model.     

Dialectic – a universal for consciousness?

Dialectic is a word of many meanings but used here in the classical sense of the apposition of thesis and antithesis leading to synthesis. The first, counterfactual phase is expressible symbolically by the symmetric difference $, “one or the other, but not both”. The second, synthesis phase is taken here to correspond to the complement ∼$, consisting of commonality and context within the universe of discourse. After a brief discussion of parallels between “events” in quantum theory and the dialectical pair ($, ∼$), it is argued that the latter is more fundamental for brain and mind. Consciousness is “carved at the joints” as comprising basic awareness (=not-unconscious), self-awareness, perception and cognition factored by attention, and emotion. The dialectical pair ($, ∼$) is then referred to Working Memory and Long-Term Memory, categories both mathematical and psychological, knowledge and learning, negotiation and dialogue, problem solving, affect and emotion, and brain structure and function. Coupling previous work by the author for the ($, ∼$) model with the present analysis, it is concluded that the dialectical pair provides a universal for consciousness parallel to its known universal property for the most general sorts of equivalences in mathematics.     

A Christian for the Christians, a Muslim for the Muslims? Reflections on a Protestant View of Pastoral Care for all Religions

Whereas in the first half of the 20th century, proclamationwas the focal point of pastoral care in Germany, the 1970s witnessedan embracing of the American pastoral care movement. From thenon, pastoral care was increasingly understood as accompanyingpatients whilst adopting the spiritual dimension. Nowadays,Christian chaplains are encountering an increasing number ofpatients from different religious communities. Various modelshave been proposed to help Protestant chaplains find an authenticform of pastoral care suitable for all religions. Until a clearposition is assumed with regard to Christianity's demands ofabsolutism, however, none of these approaches can be satisfactory.     

Ramifications of a population model forκ as a coefficient of reliability

Coefficient is generally defined in terms of procedures of computation rather than in terms of a population. Here a population definition is proposed. On this basis, the interpretation of as a measure of diagnostic reliability in characterizing an individual, and the effect of reliability, as measured by, on estimation bias, precision, and test power are examined. Factors influencing the magnitude of are identified. Strategies to improve reliability are proposed, including that of combining multiple unreliable diagnoses.This investigation was supported in part by the National Institute of Mental Health Specialized Research Center Grant # MH-30854.     

Body-extension versus body-incorporation: Is there a need for a body-model?

This paper investigates the role of a pre-existing body-model that is an enabling constraint for the incorporation of objects into the body. This body-model is also a basis for the distinction between body extensions (e.g., in the case of tool-use) and incorporation (e.g., in the case of successful prosthesis use). It is argued that, in the case of incorporation, changes in the sense of body-ownership involve a reorganization of the body-model, whereas extension of the body with tools does not involve changes in the sense of body-ownership.     

Validating a “spurning scale” for teachers

Based on a model on helpers’ reactions to rejection of their help, a spurning scale for teachers was constructed, comprising items that examine teachers’ perception of spurning of their help/advice by students and colleagues. Three avenues were taken to assess the validity of the scale: The relationships of the spurning scores with burnout scores; the relationships of spurning scores with job (dis)satisfaction and with job turnover; and relationships of spurning scores with job stresses from different sources. In-service teachers enrolled in a teacher training program were invited to fill out a questionnaire that contained these variables. Results suggest that the spurning scale is valid.     

Is inclusion a valid control for ostracism?

Considerable knowledge about ostracism’s impact comes from research using Cyberball, an online ball-tossing game. In Cyberball, the inclusion condition is the control condition, to which ostracism is compared. The assumption is that Cyberball-inclusion is not affirming and represents an expected level of inclusion. However, without a no-inclusion control condition, it is unclear whether inclusion elevates need satisfaction, whether ostracism depresses need satisfaction, or both. We introduce Cybertree—a control condition designed to provide a similar experience to Cyberball without inclusion. Individuals playing Cybertree did not differ from included individuals in terms of feeling ostracized, level of need satisfaction, and mood. Both Cyberball inclusion and Cybertree differed significantly from ostracized individuals. We conclude that Cyberball inclusion is a reasonable control group for Cyberball ostracism but discuss research questions that may benefit from the use of Cybertree.     

Mythic perspectives for a world in distress∗

In a series of books and articles published over the past two decades, the authors have developed a five‐stage system for identifying and modifying the mythic structures that guide individual development. In this essay, they draw upon the integral relationship between personal and collective myths in applying this five‐stage model to contemporary social issues. They focus, in particular, on the mythic conflicts that underlie the tensions between progress and sustainability and between individualism and community. Based on the contradictory designs inherent in a prevailing myth and in an emerging myth, the authors present a dialectical model that is formulated to lead to a new myth that incorporates the most functional elements of old and emergent forces, while transcending their limitations. The essay closes with a discussion of social actions that may embed a new myth within a culture, along with the conditions that are required to effectively reinforce and maintain it.     

Is exposure a necessary condition for fear-reduction?

In most of the effective techniques for reducing fear, exposure to the fear-provoking stimulus is a prominent feature. It is argued that in many circumstances, engaged exposure to the fear stimuli is a sufficient condition for fear-reduction, but there is no good reason for supposing that such exposure is a necessary condition for fear-reduction. Seven examples of fear-reduction apparently taking place in the absence of exposure are used to illustrate the argument. Some theoretical and practical consequences of the argument are introduced.