Telling and detecting lies in a high‐stake situation: the case of a convicted murderer

All deception studies published to date have been laboratory studies. In such studies people lied only for the sake of the experiment, consequently the stakes were usually low. Although research has shown that most spontaneous lies told in real life are trivial, such studies tell us little about lies where the stakes are high (such as police/suspect interviews). In Study 1, we discuss the behaviour of an actual suspect while he was interviewed by the police in a murder case. Although the man initially denied knowing and killing the victim, substantial evidence obtained by the police showed that he was lying. On the basis of this evidence, the man confessed to killing the victim and was later convicted for murder. To our knowledge there has been no other study published that has analysed the behaviour of a liar in such a high‐stake realistic setting. The analysis revealed several cues to deception. In Study 2, we exposed 65 police officers to six fragments (three truthful and three deceptive) of the interview with the murderer and asked them to indicate after each fragment whether the man was lying or not. The findings revealed that the participants were better at detecting truths (70% accuracy) than lies (57% accuracy). We also found individual differences among observers, with those holding popular stereotypical views on deceptive behaviour, such as ‘liars look away’ and ‘liars fidget’ performing least effectively as lie catchers. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Telling stories

Patients need to tell their stories. One of our primary tasks as analysts is to help patients tell their stories and own them. The freedom of mind to think, to feel, and to know are dependent on the ongoing capacity for storytelling. The analyst's stance plays a major role in the development of the analysand's storytelling capacities.     

看相算命

“风水“真能带来好运吗?　　风水一说,最早见于晋代郭璞&;lt;葬书&;gt;,旧称“堪舆“.风水“理论“认为,住宅(阳宅)、墓地(阴宅)周围的风向、水流、地势等,关系到住者或葬者一家的祸福.在风水先生看来,造屋、墓葬都要与宇宙之气相协调,聚“吉气“而忌“煞气“、“死气“,否则便不能吉祥平安.其实,生老病死乃自然法则,富贵贫贱依人事而论,与住宅、坟地的地形、地貌、方向、气候并不相干.……     

Lies,lies, and more lies: A plea for propositions

To resolve putative liar paradoxes it is sufficient to attend to the distinction between liar-sentences and the propositions they would express, and to exercise the option of turning would-be deductions of paradox (of contradictions) into reductios of the existence of those propositions. Defending the coherence of particular resolutions along these lines, leads to recognition of the non-extensionality of some liarsentences. In particular, it turns out that exchanges of terms for identicals in the open-sentence — does not expression a true proposition are not invariably truth-preserving because they are not invariably proposition-expression preserving. All of this recommends propositions as fruitful subjects of interesting renewed research.     

The future lies open

Recently retired as Dean of Students and Professor of Psychology at the University of Minnesota, he has held offices in many organizations in the student personnel field. He was president of apga in 1967–1968.     

Telling as Inviting to Trust*

How can I give you a reason to believe what I tell you? I can influence the evidence available to you. Or I can simply invite your trust. These two ways of giving reasons work very differently. When a speaker tells her hearer that p, I argue, she intends that he gain access to a prima facie reason to believe that p that derives not from evidence but from his mere understanding of her act. Unlike mere assertions, acts of telling give reasons directly. They give reasons by inviting the hearer's trust. This yields a novel form of anti‐reductionism in the epistemology of testimony. The status of testimony as a sui generis source of epistemic warrant is entailed by the nature of the act of telling. We can discover the nature of this illocution, and its epistemic role, by examining how it functions in the real world of human relations.     

Tell me sweet little lies: An event-related potentials study on the processing of social lies

In reading tasks, words that convey a false statement elicit an enhanced N400 brainwave response, relative to words that convey a true statement. N400 amplitude reductions are generally linked to the online expectancy of upcoming words in discourse. White lies, contrary to false statements, may not be unexpected in social scenarios. We used the event-related potential (ERP) technique to determine whether there is an impact of social context on sentence processing. We measured ERP responses to target words that either conveyed a social “white” lie or a socially impolite blunt truth, relative to semantic violations. Word expectancy was controlled for by equating the cloze probabilities of white lying and blunt true targets, as measured in previous paper-and-pencil tests. We obtained a classic semantic violation effect (a larger N400 for semantic incongruities relative to sense making statements). White lies, in contrast to false statements, did not enhance the amplitude of the N400 component. Interestingly, blunt true statements yielded both a late frontal positivity and an N400 response in those scenarios particularly biased to white lying. Thus, white lies do not interfere with online semantic processing, and they do not engage further reanalysis processes, which are typically indexed by subsequent late positivity ERP effects. Instead, an N400 and a late frontal positivity obtained in response to blunt true statements indicate that they were treated as unexpected events. In conclusion, unwritten rules of social communicative behavior influence the electrical brain response to locally coherent but socially inappropriate statements.     

True lies: Self-stabilization without self-deception

Self-deception entails apparent conceptual paradoxes and poses the dilemma between two competing needs: the need for stability of the self-concept, on the one hand, and the need to accept reality, on the other. It is argued, first, that conceptual difficulties can be avoided by distinguishing two levels of explanation. Whereas, in a personal language, “the person” deceives him- or her-self, a cognitive (“subpersonal”) approach explains this self-deception by reference to the interplay of cognitive processes of which the person is not aware. Second, the tension between stability and adjustment of the self can be resolved by self-immunization, which maintains the stability of central self-conceptions by adjusting peripheral aspects and their diagnostic value for the central concepts. Processes of self-immunization were investigated in a series of studies operating on both levels of explanation. Implications for psychological explanations of personal phenomena such as self-images and self-insight are discussed.     

Maintaining lies: The multiple-audience problem

In an examination of lying in social context, undergraduates were videotaped while describing teachers. Each student described a teacher truthfully to one peer, described the teacher deceptively to a second peer, and was then required to describe the teacher to both peers as the latter sat side-by-side. Three experiments examined the psychology of this multiple-audience predicament. Results of an initial experiment show that students who are in the predicament appear deceptive. They appear deceptive whether they are lying or telling the truth. A second experiment replicates this finding, and suggests that the students’ apparent deceptiveness is conveyed more strongly by audible than visible cues. In the interpersonal predicament created by multiple audiences, students offer equivocal, disfluent remarks, as a third experiment shows. Discussion centers on the challenge of maintaining lies in the context of multiple relationships.