Alice-in-Wonderland terminological usage in,and communicational concerns about,that peculiarly American flight of technological fancy

Alice-in-Wonderland (AW) terminological usage employs basic terms in a systematically misleading and taxonomically anarchic way. The so-called “control” question “test” (CQT) polygraph procedure, which enjoys a controversial but nevertheless scientific status in North America, involves such AW terminological usage. The basic concepts of “test,” “control,” and “quantification” are loosely employed. There is loose talk about the “detection ofdeception,” which generates the paradox that in the CQT it is in the innocent that deception should be detected. Moreover, deception is not really assessed either in the CQT or in the more scientifically-based Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT). Finally, there is loose practice in evaluating the CQT, which should not be primarily assessed in terms of its overall accuracy, but in terms of its specific effects in improving accuracy through the provision of physiological information to the examiner. Such an assessment has not been carried out even in laboratory analogues of polygraphy. The treatment of the CQT exemplifies most psychophysiologists’ reluctance to treat basic definitional issues seriously, and also means that opponents of the CQT are unable to communicate clearly about it with non-psychophysiologist professionals and with the lay community.     

Effects of socialization on the physiological detection of deception

Effects of socialization on the physiological detection of deception using the control question test (CQT) were explored in three mock crime experiments. Subjects were 168 volunteers from criminal, community, and college student populations. Socialization was measured by the Socialization (So) scale of the California Psychological Inventory. All subjects were given a CQT using standard field techniques. The physiological data were blindly evaluated by a semiobjective field scoring technique and previously developed discriminant function. There were no effects of socialization on the accuracy of classification by the semiobjective field scoring or the discriminant function. A modest negative relationship was found between socialization scores and differential reactivity in the CQT as indicated by correlations with the semiobjective (r = −.22) and discriminant scores (r = −.17). It was concluded that socialization is not an important variable for field applications of the CQT.     

Trial by polygraph: Scientific and juridical issues in lie detection

The present article examines two methods of polygraph-assisted lie detection: the Control Question Technique (CQT) and the Guilty Knowledge Technique (GKT). It presents the rationale for both, arguing that only the latter is well grounded in psychological theory. It then surveys the empirical support for claims of the polygraph's ability to detect deception, arguing that such support often comes from studies that are methodologically flawed by contamination of various sorts—especially studies of the CQT. The article then explores the legal implications of introducing polygraph test results, as presently gathered, into the criminal courtroom.     

欺骗识别的准确率：影响因素与提高途径

欺骗是一种常见的社会现象,通过观察他人的行为表现识别欺骗则是人们的一项重要能力。研究表明,人们的欺骗识别能力仅仅略微高于随机水平。本文关注基于行为线索的欺骗识别研究。首先,介绍欺骗识别的准确率;然后,结合Brunswik的透镜模型从欺骗线索的有效性和欺骗线索的利用两方面分析识别准确率的影响因素;并在此基础上探讨了提高识别准确率的途径。最后,对未来可能的研究方向进行展望。     

Self–Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe

In the debate over the nature of self–deception, "intentionalists" argue that self–deception requires an intention to deceive oneself, and "motivationists" argue that a desire, and not an intention, typically plays a crucial causal role in self–deception. Intentionalists have criticized motivationist views for ignoring what is distinctive about self–deception, and for failing to account for cases of "twisted" self–deception. I offer a new motivationist account whose distinctive element is the desire to believe. I argue that this account identifies what is common to cases of both "twisted" and "straight" self–deception, and that it captures what is distinctive about self–deception.     

Sex, lies, and strategic interference: the psychology of deception between the sexes

The desires of one sex can lead to deceptive exploitation by the other sex. Strategic Interference Theory proposes that certain "negative" emotions evolved or have been co-opted by selection, in part, to defend against deception and reduce its negative consequences. In Study 1 (N = 217) Americans reported emotional distress in response to specific forms of deception. Study 2 (N = 200) replicated the results in a German sample. Study 3 (N = 479) assessed Americans' past experiences with deception and conducted additional hypothesis tests using a procedure to control for overall sex differences in upset. Each study supported the hypothesis that emotions track sex-linked forms of strategic interference. Three clusters of sex differences proved robust across studies-emotional upset about resource deception, commitment deception, and sexual deception. We discuss implications for theories of mating and emotion and directions for research based on models of antagonistic coevolution between the sexes.     

Religion's evolutionary landscape: counterintuition, commitment, compassion, communion

Religion is not an evolutionary adaptation per se, but a recurring cultural by-product of the complex evolutionary landscape that sets cognitive, emotional, and material conditions for ordinary human interactions. Religion exploits only ordinary cognitive processes to passionately display costly devotion to counterintuitive worlds governed by supernatural agents. The conceptual foundations of religion are intuitively given by task-specific panhuman cognitive domains, including folkmechanics, folkbiology, and folkpsychology. Core religious beliefs minimally violate ordinary notions about how the world is, with all of its inescapable problems, thus enabling people to imagine minimally impossible supernatural worlds that solve existential problems, including death and deception. Here the focus is on folkpsychology and agency. A key feature of the supernatural agent concepts common to all religions is the triggering of an "Innate Releasing Mechanism," or "agency detector," whose proper (naturally selected) domain encompasses animate objects relevant to hominid survival--such as predators, protectors, and prey--but which actually extends to moving dots on computer screens, voices in wind, and faces on clouds. Folkpsychology also crucially involves metarepresentation, which makes deception possible and threatens any social order. However, these same metacognitive capacities provide the hope and promise of open-ended solutions through representations of counterfactual supernatural worlds that cannot be logically or empirically verified or falsified. Because religious beliefs cannot be deductively or inductively validated, validation occurs only by ritually addressing the very emotions motivating religion. Cross-cultural experimental evidence encourages these claims.     

It's not what you are,it's what you know: experience,beliefs, and the detection of deception in employment interviews

This study investigated the ability of more or less experienced employment interviewers and laypersons to detect deception in employment interviews. Although correct beliefs about indicators of deception led to higher deception detection accuracy, more experienced employment interviewers did not show more accurate beliefs about indicators of deception and did not perform better at detecting deception than less experienced interviewers and laypersons. Furthermore, more experienced interviewers showed a less‐pronounced tendency of judging messages as true irrespective of their actual truthfulness (truth bias) than less experienced interviewers and laypersons. It is suggested that experience in employment interviewing does not automatically lead to higher deception detection abilities in employment interviews, but that correcting people's beliefs about indicators of deception can do so.     

Vulnerability of older adults to deception in prison and nonprison contexts

Media reports frequently depict older adults as victims of deception. The public perceives these stories as particularly salient because older adults are seen as fragile victims taken advantage of because of trusting behaviors. This developmental investigation of deception detection examines older and younger adults interacting in 2 contexts, prison and the "free world," to discover whether older adults are vulnerable to deception. Younger prisoners were found to be lie biased. Older adults were better able to discriminate lies than younger adults, and this effect was localized primarily to older female adults. Findings indicate that discriminability strongly increases from younger to older age for women, whereas men do not show an improvement, as age increases, in making decisions about statement veracity.     

Police officers' beliefs about,and use of,cues to deception

Meta‐analytic findings indicate that people, including police officers, are generally poor at detecting low‐stakes deception. Related to this, investigations of behaviours that people reportedly use to make truth or lie judgements tend to conclude that people rely on incorrect stereotypes. However, consistent findings suggest that police officers are able to detect high‐stakes deception; this implies that, at least in some contexts, police officers utilise reliable cues to deception. The research presented here was an investigation of cues to deception used by police officers (N  = 69), when making veracity decisions about real world, high‐stakes communications. Data were collected on both free report cues, and also prescribed cues that were known (from previous research), to discriminate between liars and truth‐tellers in the communications that the police officers observed. Officers free reported using cues related to verbal content, emotion, body language, eyes, vocal cues, and external cues. Most prescribed cues were self‐reportedly used correctly by large majorities of the officers, suggesting that they may not rely on inaccurate stereotypes. Self‐report use of categories of free report cues, and prescribed cues, was not related to accuracy in detecting deception. As people may not always be aware of the behaviours on which their judgements are based, the relationships between some of the behaviours actually displayed in the communications, and group accuracy in detecting deception in those communications, were also investigated. Group accuracy was related to the presence of subjective, emotion‐related cues in the communications.     

Anticruelty care: commentary

The anticruelty policy is a best-interests test for treatment plans including decisions to forgo life-sustaining therapy for certain incompetent patients. In connection with specific proposed therapy, the policy requires no reference to the patient's unknowable values, subjective experiences, or quality of life. The decision to undertake a treatment plan derives from the caregiver's knowledge of burdens and benefits of that treatment when used in caring for the competent or for those incompetents capable of growth or repair. The caregiver should weigh the potentially cruel effects of treatment against the likelihood of reducing suffering or encumbrance with the treatment. The terms "burden" and "benefit," in fact, are replaced by the terms "cruelty" and "beneficence," as the relevant opposing outcomes that must be weighed. Thus, the anticruelty policy shifts our scrutiny from experiences of the patient that we cannot evaluate to the proposed actions of the competent decision makers and caregivers. Notably, it is a protreatment policy when the goals of medicine are attainable; and it is an anticruelty policy when they are not. The policy does evaluate the world of the patient to the extent that it requires a judgment based upon external appearances about patient pleasure or happiness in living. It presumes to universalize larger societal values about cruelty, beneficence, compassionate concern for the helpless, and certain rights of individuals. And it presumes to universalize on the patient's behalf specific medical values about hopeless injury, timely death, the goals of medicine, and cruelty, which should remain open to societal discussion and revision. The presented definition of hopeless injury does not require brain death, coma, or persistent vegetative state. Specifically, the policy holds that death is timely for a patient with hopeless injury, and that prevention of death for such patients is not a goal of medicine but a cruelty.     

The case of Pinocchio: teachers’ ability to detect deception

In a study with 365 teacher students, 447 teacher trainees, and 123 teachers, the ability to detect students’ deception was tested. Participants judged the credibility of videotaped students who were accused of academic dishonesty (having cheated in a test). Half of these messages were actually true (students had not cheated on the test) and half of them were deceptive (students had cheated on the test). As expected and in line with findings on the influence of expertise on the ability to detect deception from other fields, we found that the overall accuracy rate of teachers was not higher than that of teacher trainees and teacher students. Moreover, we found no effect of teaching experience (years working as a teacher) on overall detection of deception accuracy. Interestingly, teachers were found to have a stronger truth bias and therefore had a lower accuracy in detecting deceptive messages than teacher students and teacher trainees (veracity effect). While teacher characteristics accounted for very little variance, senders’ opportunity to prepare and their gender had strong effects. Detection accuracy was higher for messages where the student had no chance to prepare before being accused of cheating. Overall, independent, or experience, participants hold inaccurate beliefs about deception.     

Stem cell research: a target article collection: Part II--what's in a name: embryos,clones, and stem cells

In 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the "Human Cloning Prohibition Act" and President Bush announced his decision to allow only limited research on existing stem cell lines but not on "embryos." In contrast, the U.K. has explicitly authorized "therapeutic cloning." Much more will be said about bioethical, legal, and social implications, but subtleties of the science and careful definitions of terms have received much less consideration. Legislators and reporters struggle to discuss "cloning," "pluripotency," "stem cells," and "embryos," and whether "adult" are preferable to "embryonic" stem cells as research subjects. They profess to abhor "copying humans" or "killing embryos." Do they know what they are talking about? Do we? This paper explores the historical, philosophical, and scientific contexts that inform this heated discussion.     

Anchoring,Familiarity, and Confidence in the Detection of Deception

Anchoring in judgments is the tendency for the final judgment to be biased toward the initial estimate through insufficient adjustment. In the context of the detection of deception, it has been used to explain phenomena such as negative absolute leakage and the truthfulness bias. We examined the influence of order of judgment type on attitude ratings, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias. Receivers of communications should tend to anchor their judgments on the sender's attitudinal position if asked to make attitude judgments first and on the sender's behavior if asked to make truthfulness judgments first. The results partly support these predictions. Negative absolute leakage, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias were not significantly different for those who made attitude judgments before truthfulness judgments. However, results show that accuracy decreased as the session continued and there was no difference in the confidence with which truth and deception judgments were made, but there was a positive relation between confidence and truthfulness bias.     

Rhyme, rime, and the onset of reading

There is recent evidence that children naturally divide syllables into the opening consonant or consonant cluster (the onset) and the rest of the syllable (the rime). This suggests an explanation for the fact that preschool children are sensitive to rhyme, but often find tasks in which they have to isolate single phonemes extremely difficult. Words which rhyme share a common rime and thus can be categorized on that speech unit. Single phonemes on the other hand may only be part of one of these speech units. This analysis leads to some clear predictions. Young children, even children not yet able to read, should manage to categorize words on the basis of a single phoneme when the phoneme coincides with the word's onset ("cat," "cup") but not when it is only part of the rime ("cat," "pit"). They should find it easier to work out that two monosyllabic words have a common vowel which is not shared by another word when all three words end with the same consonant ("lip," "hop," "tip") but the odd word has a different rime than when the three words all start with the same consonant ("cap," "can," "cot") and thus all share the same onset. The hypothesis also suggests that children should be aware of single phonemes when these coincide with the onset before they learn to read. We tested these predictions in two studies of children aged 5, 6, and 7 years. The results clearly support these predictions.     

Fostering integrity in research: Definitions, current knowledge, and future directions

Over the last 25 years, a small but growing body of research on research behavior has slowly provided a more complete and critical understanding of research practices, particularly in the biomedical and behavioral sciences. The results of this research suggest that some earlier assumptions about irresponsible conduct are not reliable, leading to the conclusion that there is a need to change the way we think about and regulate research behavior. This paper begins with suggestions for more precise definitions of the terms "responsible conduct of research," "research ethics," and "research integrity." It then summarizes the findings presented in some of the more important studies of research behavior, looking first at levels of occurrence and then impact. Based on this summary, the paper concludes with general observations about priorities and recommendations for steps to improve the effectiveness of efforts to respond to misconduct and foster higher standards for integrity in research.     

On-the-Job Experience and Skill at Detecting Deception1

The role of on-the-job experience in fostering skill at detecting deception was examined. A deception-detection test was administered to three samples of more than 100 subjects each: a group of undergraduates with no special experiences at detecting deceit; a group of new recruits to a federal law enforcement training program, who had some limited on-the-job experience at detecting deceit; and a group of advanced federal law enforcement officers, with years of experience working at jobs in which the detection of deception is very important. Although the officer samples were more confident about their judgments of deceptiveness than were the students, they were no more accurate than the students. None of the three groups showed a significant improvement in deception-detection success from the first half to the second half of the test; however, the advanced officers felt increasingly confident about their performance as they progressed through the test. Correlational analyses of the relationship between accuracy and confidence provided further evidence that experience does not improve people's awareness oi the accuracy or inaccuracy of their judgments. The findings from this research are compared to the results of research on other kinds of professional decision-makers (e.g., clinical psychologists), and several theoretical perspectives on the role of experience in decision making are discussed.     

When Accurate Beliefs Lead to Better Lie Detection1

This study tested the hypothesis that people with accurate beliefs about the cues that predict deception are better at detecting deception only when those beliefs are cognitively available and activated. To test the hypothesis, participants viewed video fragments of people who were being either honest or dishonest. A questionnaire assessed participants' beliefs about the cues involved in deception, and activation of participants' belief cues was accomplished by manipulating suspicion. The results provided support for the hypothesis, where participants whose beliefs were activated and had accurate beliefs were better at detecting deception compared to other participants. Gender differences were also found, where lies communicated by women were more accurately detected than were lies communicated by men.     

Foundationalism,Coherentism and Rule-Following Scepticism

Semantic holists view what one's terms mean as function of all of one's beliefs and applications. Holists will thus be coherentists about how one's usage is justified: showing that one's usage of a term is justified involves showing how it coheres with the rest of one's beliefs and applications. Semantic reductionists, on the other hand, will understand such justification in a classically foundationalist fashion. Now Saul Kripke has, on Wittgenstein's behalf, famously argued for a type of scepticism about meaning and the possibility of demonstrating the correctness of one's usage. However, Kripke's argument has bite only if one understands justification in classically foundationalist terms. Consequently, Kripke's arguments, if good, lead not to a type of scepticism about meaning, but rather to the conclusion that one should be a coherentist about the justification of our usage, and thus a holist about semantic facts.