Deontic action logic, atomic boolean algebras and fault-tolerance

We introduce a deontic action logic and its axiomatization. This logic has some useful properties (soundness, completeness, compactness and decidability), extending the properties usually associated with such logics. Though the propositional version of the logic is quite expressive, we augment it with temporal operators, and we outline an axiomatic system for this more expressive framework. An important characteristic of this deontic action logic is that we use boolean combinators on actions, and, because of finiteness restrictions, the generated boolean algebra is atomic, which is a crucial point in proving the completeness of the axiomatic system. As our main goal is to use this logic for reasoning about fault-tolerant systems, we provide a complete example of a simple application, with an attempt at formalization of some concepts usually associated with fault-tolerance.     

Deontic logic and possible worlds semantics: A historical sketch

This paper describes and compares the first step in modern semantic theory for deontic logic which appeared in works of Stig Kanger, Jaakko Hintikka, Richard Montague and Saul Kripke in late 50s and early 60s. Moreover, some further developments as well as systematizations are also noted.     

Paradoxes of moral reparation: Deontic foci vs. circumstances

Conclusion The distinction between deontic focus and deontic circumstance is obvious and essential to the understanding of our reasonings about obligations, permissions, rights, and wrongs. Here we have dealt with the basics. These basics must be developed into a full deontic logic. Fortunately, such a comprehensive deontic logic that includes identity, quantification over individuals, and quantification over properties has already been proposed, and applied to the interpretation of legal texts. It should be an excellent basis for Feldman's intriguing and promising idea of world utilitarianism.     

Moral conflict and the logic of rights

The paper proposes a revised logic of rights in order to accommodate moral conflict. There are often said to be two rival philosophical accounts of rights with respect to moral conflict. Specificationists about rights insist that rights cannot conflict, since they reflect overall deontic conclusions. Generalists instead argue that rights reflect pro tanto constraints on behaviour. After offering an overview of the debate between generalists and specificationists with respect to rights, I outline the challenge of developing a logic of rights-reasoning that is compatible with generalism. I then proceed to offer a new logical framework, which utilizes a simple non-monotonic logic of practical reasoning. Both generalist and specificationist interpretations of the logic are explored. The revised logic shows that traditional characterizations of the debate between specificationists and generalists obscure other relevant philosophical positions.

     

On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning

Three experiments are reported that investigate the weighting attached to logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Substantial belief biases were observed despite controls for possible conversions of the premises. Equally substantial effects of logic were observed despite controls for two possible response biases. A consistent interaction between belief and logic was also recorded; belief bias was more marked on invalid than on valid syllogisms. In all experiments, verbal protocols were recorded and analyzed. These protocols are interpreted in some cases as providing rationalizations for prejudiced decisions and, in other cases, as reflecting a genuine process of premise to conclusion reasoning. In the latter cases, belief bias was minimal but still present. Similarly, even subjects who focus primarily on the conclusion are influenced to an extent by the logic. Thus a conflict between logic and belief is observed throughout, but at several levels of extent.     

Cost containment: Issues of moral conflict and justice for physicians

In response to rapidly rising health care costs in the United States, federal and state governments and private industry are instituting numerous and diverse cost-containment plans. As devices for coping with a scarcity of resources, such plans present serious challenges to physicians' traditional single-minded devotion to patient welfare. Those which contain costs by directly limiting medical options or by controlling physicians' daily clinical decisions can threaten the quality of medical care by allowing economic authorities to make essentially medical judgments. In contrast, other plans coax compliance by arranging incentives, e.g., offering financial rewards for successful cost containment. While they allow for clinical freedom, these plans create conflicts between physicians' fiduciary obligations to their patients and the competing interests of the payers. Such conflicts arise as physicians try to work within governmental or corporate cost containment policies, and also as they attempt to “streamline” clinical efficiency. Throughout, issues of justice emerge as physicians seek to reconcile their own patients' claims upon limited common resources with others' equally legitimate claims.     

Children in clinical research: a conflict of moral values

This paper examines the culture, the dynamics and the financial underpinnings that determine how medical research is being conducted on children in the United States. Children have increasingly become the subject of experiments that offer them no potential direct benefit but expose them to risks of harm and pain. A wide range of such experiments will be examined, including a lethal heartburn drug test, the experimental insertion of a pacemaker, an invasive insulin infusion experiment, and a fenfluramine "violence prediction" experiment. Emphasis, however, is given to psychoactive drug tests because of the inherent ethical and diagnostic problems involved in the absence of any objective, verifiable diagnostic tool. Effort is made to provide readers comprehensive reference sources to evidence-based reports about the serious risks these drugs pose for adults and children so that the reader may judge whether the benefits (if any) outweigh the risks for children.     

Adolescents' emotion attributions and expectations of behavior in situations involving moral conflict

This study examined the idea that expectations of behavior in hypothetical situations involving potential moral transgressions are related to emotion attributions relating to both moral and cost-benefit considerations. We asked younger (14 years 5 months) and older (16 years 1 month) female and male adolescents (a) to make predictions about the probability that an adolescent placed in a hypothetical situation where a payoff could be obtained by acting in a nonmoral way would choose to do so and (b) to evaluate adolescents' attributions of moral (guilt) and cost-benefit-related emotions (satisfaction and fear) to the nonmoral action. Two different situations were examined; one looked at the possibility of stealing money from a lost wallet, and the other examined a situation where a contract with another peer could be broken for personal reasons. Results showed that expectations that the nonmoral action would be taken were positively related to the degree of satisfaction and negatively related to the degree of guilt and fear. However, the pattern of relations between emotion attributions and behavioral expectations differed between the two situations. Female and male adolescents had different levels of emotion attributions and behavioral expectations, but the relation between the two was similar for both. Finally, developmental comparisons indicated that older adolescents put more weight on guilt and were more internally consistent in the way that emotions were integrated into behavioral expectations.     

Contrary-to-Duty Paradoxes and Counterfactual Deontic Logic

Philosophia - In this paper, I will discuss some examples of the so-called contrary-to-duty (obligation) paradox, a well-known puzzle in deontic logic. A contrary-to-duty obligation is an...