Cognition and Self-Control: Cognitive Control of Painful Sensory Input

Eighty Ss were first tested for base-level response to a pain-producing stimulus and then were re-tested on the same pain stimulus after receiving 1 of 8 experimental treatments. The 8 treatments were arranged in a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design: presence or absence of hypnotic induction procedure; presence or absence of instructions for anesthesia; and presence or absence of demands for honest reports. Neither the hypnotic-induction procedure nor the demands for honesty affected the Ss'reports of the degree of pain experienced. The anesthesia instructions--"think of the hand as numb and insensitive as if it were a piece of rubber..."--produced an equal degree of pain reduction in hypnotic and non-hypnotic Ss and in Ss who were and those who were not exposed to demands for honesty. The results indicate that (a) Ss' reports of pain are less affected by demands for honesty and are more closely related to their actual experiences than has been previously assumed and (b) instructions which direct Ss to exercise cognitive control over painful sensory input are effective (with or without 'hypnosis') in reducing the experience of pain.     

The role of compliance in hypnotic and nonhypnotic analgesia

We modified the standard procedure for administering finger pressure pain in order to assess the extent to which subjects biased their reports of pain reduction when exposed to compliance-inducing instructions. Experiment 1 used only highly hypnotizable subjects and found that compliance-induced reductions in reported pain were about half as large as the reported reductions produced by hypnotic analgesia suggestions. Experiment 2 used low as well as high hypnotizables and administered hypnotic or nonhypnotic analgesia instructions and compliance instructions to the same subjects on separate pain trials. Reported pain reductions produced by hypnotic and nonhypnotic analgesia suggestions and those produced by compliance instructions were substantially and significantly correlated. Furthermore, hypnotizability correlated with compliance-induced reported pain reductions as highly as it correlated with the reported reductions produced by hypnotic analgesia suggestions. Among high hypnotizables (but not low hypnotizables) compliant responding was predicted by social desirability. The findings of both studies indicate that compliance strongly influences the reports of hypnotic and nonhypnotic analgesia proffered by high hypnotizables. The role of compliance in the pain reductions reported by low hypnotizables is less clear-cut.     

Effects of instructional set on attributions of nonvolition during hypnotic and nonhypnotic analgesia

Fifty highly hypnotizable subjects were assigned to four treatment groups or a no-treatment control group and then underwent two pain stimulation trials. Half the treated subjects were administered hypnotic analgesia, half waking analgesia. Within hypnotic and nonhypnotic treatments, half the subjects were given actively worded analgesia instructions, half passively worded instructions. Subjects in the four treated groups reported equivalent pain reduction and equivalent use of coping imagery, although hypnotic subjects rated themselves as more deeply hypnotized than did nonhypnotic subjects. Both hypnotic and nonhypnotic subjects given passive instructions rated their pain reduction as occurring involuntarily, whereas those given active instructions reported that their pain was reduced through their active use of coping strategies. These findings support sociocognitive formulations of hypnotic responding that view ratings of involuntariness as reflecting contextually guided interpretations of behavior.     

Channels and order of report in dichotic memory*

Experiments were conducted in which Ss received to-be-remembered sequences of two, three, or four simultaneous pairs of digits. Both digits of each pair were recorded by the same male speaker and both were presented binaurally, thus eliminating cues of spatial location and voice by which Ss could “channel” their reports. Even in the absence of these stimulus channels, Ss reported the digits sequentially. High bias ratings in the first experiment suggested the possibility that sequential reports were induced by uncontrolled stimulus characteristics (e.g., temporal synchrony, intensity, and pitch). Pulse-coded speech stimuli, which provided greater control over nonlinguistic stimulus features, were used in the terminal experiment. Bias ratings were reduced, but the majority of Ss continued to report sequentially. These results suggest that the presence of stimulus channels is not a necessary condition for the occurrence of sequential reporting.     

First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality

In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood as demands of one’s “first-personal standpoint.” Southwood argues that this view can “explain the normativity or reason-giving force” of rationality by showing that they “are the kinds of thing that are, by their very nature, normative.” We argue that the proposal fails on three counts: First, we explain why demands of one’s first-personal standpoint cannot be both reason-giving and resemble requirements of rationality. Second, the proposal runs headlong into the now familiar “bootstrapping” objection that helped illuminate the need to vindicate the normativity of rationality in the first place. Lastly, even if Southwood is right—the demands of rationality just are the demands or our first-personal standpoints—the explanation as to why our standpoints generate reasons will entail that we sometimes have no reason at all to be rational.     

Privation theories of pain

Most modern writers accept that a privation theory of evil should explicitly account for the evil of pain. But pains are quintessentially real. The evil of pain does not seem to lie in an absence of good. Though many directly take on the challenges this raises, the metaphysics and axiology of their answers is often obscure. In this paper I try to straighten things out. By clarifying and categorizing the possible types of privation views, I explore the ways in which privationists about evil are—or should or could be—privationists about pain’s evil.     

Hypnotic blindness and the relevance of cognitive style

Real, hypnotized and simulating, unhypnotized subjects were instructed to use either a constructive or a concentrative cognitive style when attempting to respond to a suggestion for hypnotic blindness; also, some subjects were administered the suggestion without any instructions about cognitive style. More reals who received the constructive rather than the concentrative instructions reported complete blindness; a similar number of simulators who received the different instructions reported complete blindness. Moreover, reals who received the constructive instruction reported a more rapidly developed belief in their blindness. The findings are discussed in terms of the relevance of cognitive style to subjects' reports of hypnotic blindness, and the possibility is considered that both reports of and belief in hypnotic blindness are determined in part by cognitive style.     

Co-occurrence of sequential and practice effects in the Simon task: Evidence for two independent mechanisms affecting response selection

The Simon effect refers to the observation that responses to a relevant stimulus dimension are faster and more accurate when the stimulus and response spatially correspond than when they do not, even though stimulus position is irrelevant. Recent findings have suggested that the Simon effect can be strongly modulated by prior practice with a spatially incompatible mapping and by correspondence sequence. Although practice is thought to influence conditional stimulus —response (S-R) processing, leaving response priming through the unconditional route unaffected, sequential effects are thought to represent trial-by-trial adaptations that selectively involve unconditional S —R processing. In the present study, we tested this assumption by assessing the effects of correspondence sequence both when the Simon task alone was performed and when it was preceded by a spatial compatibility task with either incompatible (Experiments 1-2) or compatible (Experiment 2) instructions. The observation that practice and correspondence sequence co-occur and exert additive effects strongly demonstrates that the two factors affect different processing routes.     

Criminal sentence recommendations in a simulated rape trial: Examining juror prejudice in Canada

This experiment examined the moderating influence of judicial instructions on prejudicial sentencing recornmendations in a simulated videotaped rape trial. Subjects were 243 Canadian university students who were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions and asked to assume the role of juror. In the rape trial, the race of the defendant and victim were varied (either White or Black) and in half of the conditions the judge's instructions to the jury were excluded. Results indicated a 2 (defendant race) × 2 (victim race) × 2 (judicial instructions) interaction with interracial rape generating longer sentence recommendations in the presence of judicial instructions and intra-racial rape eliciting longer sentence allotment in the absence of judicial instructions. Results are contrasted with reports on juror decision-making in the U.S.     

Common and distinctive features in stimulus similarity: A modified version of the contrast model

Featural representations of similarity data assume that people represent stimuli in terms of a set of discrete properties. In this article, we consider the differences in featural representations that arise from making four different assumptions about how similarity is measured. Three of these similarity models— the common features model, the distinctive features model, and Tversky’s seminal contrast model—have been considered previously. The other model is new and modifies the contrast model by assuming that each individual feature only ever acts as a common or distinctive feature. Each of the four models is tested on previously examined similarity data, relating to kinship terms, and on a new data set, relating to faces. In fitting the models, we have used the geometric complexity criterion to balance the competing demands of data-fit and model complexity. The results show that both common and distinctive features are important for stimulus representation, and we argue that the modified contrast model combines these two components in a more effective and interpretable way than Tversky’s original formulation.     

Preferences for Life-Prolonging Medical Treatments and Deference to the Will of God

We defined and measured a dimension of religiosity frequently invoked in end-of-life (EOL) research—deference to God’s Will (GW)—and examined its relationship to preferences for life-prolonging treatments. In a 35-min telephone interview, 304 older men and women (60 +) were administered the 5-item GW scale, sociodemographic questions, three attitude items regarding length of life, and measures of two health indices, depression, and life-prolonging treatment preferences. The GW scale demonstrated internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .94) and predictive and discriminant validity. Higher scores indicative of greater deference to GW were associated with stronger life-prolonging treatment preferences in poor-prognosis scenarios. Implications for the role of religiosity in medical decision-making are discussed.     

Phenomenological immanence,normativity, and semantic externalism

This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail at referring. The standard representationalist view—which thinks of the problem in first-person terms—is contrasted with Brandom’s pragmatic inferentialist approach, which adopts a third-person stance. The rest of the paper defends a phenomenological version of the representationalist position (seeking to preserve its first-person stance) but offers a conception of representation that does not identify it with an entity ‘in the head.’ The standard view of Husserl as a Cartesian internalist is undermined by rejecting its fundamental assumption—that Husserl’s concept of the ‘noema’ is a mental entity—and by defending a concept of ‘phenomenological immanence’ that has a normative, rather than a psychological, structure. Finally, it is argued that phenomenological immanence cannot be identified with ‘consciousness’ in Husserl’s sense, though consciousness is a necessary condition for it.     

Can Facilitation Imagery Alter the Effects of Semantic Priming?

This study examined if task motivational imagery suggestions could facilitate a semantic priming effect, relative to general relaxation suggestions and no specific suggestions; and if the participants’ hypnotizablity moderated the effects of the three types of instructions. Participants (n = 127) were assigned randomly in groups to one of the three instructional conditions (imagery, relaxation, or control) and two versions of a stimulus list for counterbalancing. A 3-way analysis of variance suggested that the semantic priming effect was found to be stronger for stimulus list version 2 than for version 1. A stronger semantic priming effect was found for the high, relative to the low and medium, hypnotizable groups. When medium hypnotizable participants were excluded, an instructional group X hypnotizability group interaction was found for list 1 suggesting that while the low hypnotizable participants benefited more from the relaxation suggestion, the high hypnotizables benefited more from the imagery instruction. The results suggest that imagery instructions may moderate automatic processes for highly hypnotizable individuals.     

Mediating interpersonal expectancies via vocal cues: Differential speech intensity as a means of social influence

Differential vocal emphasis in the tape-recorded instruction reading for a standard person perception task was manipulated by mechanically raising or lowering the volume of the key words describing the success or failure response alternatives on the rating scale. In a series of three experiments, Ss exposed to success emphasis in the instructions rated the stimulus persons as more successful than did Ss exposed to failure emphasis. This trend was reversed for Ss who listened twice to the instructions. None of the Ss reported awareness of the influence attempt.     

Intellectual Honesty

Engaging a listener’s trust imposes moral demands upon a presenter in respect of truthtelling and completeness. An agent lies by an utterance that satisfies what are herein defined as signal and mendacity conditions; an agent deceives when, in satisfaction of those conditions, the agent’s utterances contribute to a false belief or thwart a true one. I advert to how we may fool ourselves in observation and in the perception of our originality. Communication with others depends upon a convention or practice of presumed nonuniversal truthfulness. In support of an asserted duty of nondeceptiveness, I offer a reconciliation of pertinent Kantian passages, a sketch of arguments within utilitarianism, contractarianism, and other views, and an account arguing for application of that duty to assertions, implicatures, omissions, equivocation, prevarication, and sophistry insofar as they affect listeners’ doxastic states. For scholarship, this duty is exceptionless. I describe the kernel of intellectual honesty as a virtuous disposition such that when presented with an incentive to deceive, the agent will not deceive. Intellectual honesty delivers candor when it counts. I contrast this with complementary virtues and the surpassing virtue of ingenuousness. An account is given of the connection between intellectual honesty and an influential physical model of integrity.     

“Things that went well — No serious injuries or deaths”: Ethical reasoning in a normal engineering design process

We argue that considering only a few ‘big’ ethical decisions in any engineering design process — both in education and practice — only reinforces the mistaken idea of engineering design as a series of independent sub-problems. Using data collected in engineering design organisations over a seven year period, we show how an ethical component to engineering decisions is much more pervasive. We distinguish three types of ethical justification for engineering decisions: (1) consequential, (2) deontological or non-consequential, and (3) virtue-based. We find that although there is some evidence for engineering designers as ‘classic’ consequentialists, a more egocentric consequentialism would appear more fitting. We also explain how the idea of a ‘folk ethics’ — a justification in the second category that consciously weighs one thing with another — fits with the idea of the engineering design process as social negotiation rather than as technological progress.     

Transformation of flow in rehabilitation: The role of advanced communication technologies

Authentic rehabilitation requires the active participation of patients and their involvement with opportunities for action and development. Within this framework, in this article we outline the possibility of using two emerging computing and communication technologies—ambient intelligence (AmI) and virtual reality (VR)—for a new breed of rehabilitative and clinical applications based on a strategy defined astransformation of flow. Transformation of flow is a person’s ability to exploit an optimal (flow) experience to identify and use new and unexpected psychological resources as sources of involvement. We identify the feeling ofpresence—the feeling of being in a world that exists outside oneself—as the theoretical link between the technology and rehabilitation. AmI and VR are used to trigger broad empowerment processes induced by a strong sense of presence, leading to greater agency and control over one’s actions and environment.     

Creativity in Context: The Ecology of Creativity Evaluations and Practices in an Artistic Craft

The present article reports a study on the use of a multiple feedback methodology for creativity evaluation in the case of Romanian Easter eggs. Four groups of evaluators —i.e. ethnographers, priests, art teachers and folk artists—all members of professional communities relevant for this particular folk art participated in the study. They almost unanimously appreciated ‘traditional’ wax decorated eggs as highly creative for their designs, aesthetics and the hard work and talent they require but opinions diverged when commenting on the creativity of other types of Easter eggs. At a more general level, two broad evaluation patters were found, corresponding to whether respondents participate or not in decoration practices. Identifying these patterns comes to reinforce the idea that creativity evaluations, as well as creative activity, are rooted in the social and cultural contexts of the participants and these contexts share important similarities but also marked differences.     

Ten reasons why ANOVA theory and research fail to explain attribution processes: 2. Methodological problems

In this, the second of two companion papers, five major methodological problems of questionnaire research into Kelley’s ANOVA model are identified: the formulation of instructions; the choice of stimulus events; the manipulation of information variables; the choice of attribution measures; and the application of process-probing methods. It is argued that the absence of any sophisticated process propositions in Kelley’s theory, in conjunction with the five methodological problems, has led to a poverty of acceptable evidence about how people process unfolding sequences of behaviour (episodes). In conclusion, some of the process-probing methodologies of cognitive science are considered as a remedy to the naive models and methods of attribution researchers.