羞恶之心辨析——耻感、羞感和罪感

以羞感文化与罪感文化的区别来推定重视"面子"的中国道德观缺乏自律,其实是不恰当的。因为中国道德观赖以为基础的"羞恶之心"其实是耻感,而耻感是羞感和罪感的双重迭加。以儒学为旨,可知耻感即是羞恶之心,它出于恻隐之心,并可明确其萌发历程为:由不忍→将他者投射到自我心象→意识到对他者负有伦理责任。由于耻感非羞感,故以西方思想论羞感来理解羞恶之心,也就难以说明羞恶之心是道德本体,以及为仁与义的结合。最后,透过王船山的释义可以发现,耻感的扩充历程,即是孟子所言的"养气"。     

Vicarious shame

We examined an account of vicarious shame that explains how people can experience a self-conscious emotion for the behaviour of another person. Two divergent processes have been put forward to explain how another's behaviour links to the self. The group-based emotion account explains vicarious shame in terms of an in-group member threatening one's social identity by behaving shamefully. The empathy account explains vicarious shame in terms of empathic perspective taking; people imagine themselves in another's shameful behaviour. In three studies using autobiographical recall and experimental inductions, we revealed that both processes can explain why vicarious shame arises in different situations, what variation can be observed in the experience of vicarious shame, and how all vicarious shame can be related to a threat to the self. Results are integrated in a functional account of shame.     

Hidden shame

Shame dynamics, after decades of neglect, reappeared in psychoanalytic thinking with increasing prevalence in the last thirty years. Shame that is hidden is an aspect of complex clinical phenomenology that is particularly likely to be missed and hidden further by partial psychoanalytic explanations that drive shame more and more from view. Shame is often hidden theoretically by formulations limiting conflict to conflict between drives or impulses and something opposing them. By contrast, the incompatible idea model propounded by Freud in Studies on Hysteria emphasizes awareness incompatible with the dictates of conscience, and hence is broader in scope and closer to actual experience. Although shame and guilt arise developmentally earlier than does a true sense of morality, these emotions and their unconscious variants become entwined with the individual's sense of morality as development proceeds. The dynamics of shame and guilt are considerably more complex than their phenomenology as overt emotions. Shame emphasizes weakness, vulnerability, and the likelihood of rejection--so much so that its acknowledgment often generates more shame. Guilt, however, since it is action- and power-oriented, often obscures shame and so defends against it.     

The shame of existing: An extreme form of shame

This paper presents ‘the shame of existing’ as a form of shame that is deeper and more extensive than those customarily encountered. ‘The shame of existing’ is defined as shame about existing as we are and especially at the fact that we are. It is accompanied by merciless and total rejection of the subject's self and by feelings of extreme worthlessness and inferiority coupled with the all‐pervasive conviction that it would be better not to exist. On the basis of clinical material, consideration is given to the specific transference and countertransference aspects of analyses in which the shame of existing constitutes an important part of the patient's pathology. Disturbance of handling and holding by the primary objects right from birth is suggested as the earliest developmental basis of the shame of existing. This disturbance is attributed to hate and rejection of the infant by the primary objects and to the infant's not being touched emotionally and physically and not having its right to exist acknowledged. The paper begins with an introduction to shame as an affect and as a concept in psychoanalytic theory.     

Vicarious shame

We examined an account of vicarious shame that explains how people can experience a self-conscious emotion for the behaviour of another person. Two divergent processes have been put forward to explain how another's behaviour links to the self. The group-based emotion account explains vicarious shame in terms of an in-group member threatening one's social identity by behaving shamefully. The empathy account explains vicarious shame in terms of empathic perspective taking; people imagine themselves in another's shameful behaviour. In three studies using autobiographical recall and experimental inductions, we revealed that both processes can explain why vicarious shame arises in different situations, what variation can be observed in the experience of vicarious shame, and how all vicarious shame can be related to a threat to the self. Results are integrated in a functional account of shame.     

Primary shame,mortal wound and tragic circularity: Some new reflections on shame and shame conflicts

Invited to contribute some thoughts on recent developments in psychoanalytic thinking about shame, the author starts off with Aristotle's prescient analysis of shame and then focuses on accumulating experiences in the psychoanalytic treatment of patients with severe neuroses, in particular the close relationship of severe traumatization and chronic states of shame, and how this is reflected in shelfdestructive repetitions. Reminiscent of what we know from tragedy and the tragic dimension of human existence, this repetition compulsion shows a built‐in circularity. These circular dynamics have at their core struggles with deep woundedness that can variably be conceived of as primary pain, primary shame and primary anxiety. Consequently, throughout the experiences with these patients goes the absoluteness both of their conscience and of their ideal, what we know as the “archaic superego:”     

Shame,shame

The word shame, as discussed in the literature, is too general and vague. It should thus be restricted to problems caused by (1) faulty toilet training; (2) the consistent use of humiliation as a form of discipline; and (3) public humiliation. Therapists need to be both active in identifying shame, and in intervening therapeutically since patients tend to hide it. Group therapy along with individual therapy is especially helpful in reversing effects of public humiliation.     

Cosmopolitan anger and shame

ABSTRACT

Sentimental cosmopolitans argue that cultivating empathy for distant others is necessary in order to motivate action to address global injustices. This paper accepts the basic premises of the sentimental cosmopolitan project but argues that it ought to be extended to include cultivating other cosmopolitan emotions, particularly anger and shame. There is a tendency to think of anger and shame as unworthy, or as base motives to be overcome; but I argue that, in fact, they constitute an important resource for motivating action to address global injustices. The argument proceeds in three parts. Section 1 outlines sentimental cosmopolitanism and explicates the relationship between empathy, and anger and shame. Section 2 examines the link between anger and shame and responsibility, arguing that anger and shame are well-suited to capturing notions of responsibility for injustice, something lacking in an empathy-based account of sentimental cosmopolitanism. Section 3 provides two further arguments in favour of anger and shame: (i) anger represents a powerful source of energy for political action, and (ii) shame can motivate cosmopolitan action where empathy is absent.     

Working with shame in psychoanalytic treatment

Shame is a central human affect, reflecting feelings of defect, inferiority, and failure of the self. It is, therefore, a proper focus for psychoanalytic treatment. Beginning with Freud's seminal attention to narcissism and the ego ideal, the possibility for studying shame and its relation to the ego ideal (i.e. the loving function of the superego) was inherent in psychoanalytic theory, but Freud's pursuit of intrapsychic conflict and the punitive superego postponed further elaboration of shame. Interest in the relation of the ego ideal to the superego (Hartmann, 1950; Reich, 1954), and in the ideal self (Sandler et al., 1963; Schafer, 1960, 1967) opened the way to further study of shame. Kohut's contributions, with their focus on narcissism and self-pathology, have given a language and perspective on self-deficits allowing elaboration of shame's place in psychoanalytic treatment. In this paper, I have focused on the treatment of shame in two patients. I suggest that shame lies at the very center of the narcissistic patient's pathology, with primary internal shaming (directed at the self's failures and inadequacies) permeating all aspects of the treatment. For the neurotic patient, shame is more circumscribed, reflecting partial failures of the self; it tends to be reactive, relating to passive withdrawal from internal conflict and castration fears, and is intermixed with oedipal manifestations. I have described clinical sequences that demonstrate my approach to working with shame in each of these patients. In both cases, the task is to recognize, acknowledge, accept, and investigate the patient's shame. Only after such empathic investigation can underlying conflictual and genetic derivatives be productively pursued. This sequence is often intuitively followed in analysis, but in this paper I have attempted to articulate more systematically shame's role in psychoanalytic treatment.     

Reclaiming the feeling of shame

The author resorts to Bleger's conception of regression to ambiguity in order to achieve an understanding of patients who have suffered from extreme situations such as torture, disappearance, concentration camp. The regression to ambiguity that helped these patients to survive and that elicits extreme feelings of shame must be gradually diminished so that older intact ego components as well as the original feelings of shame can be reclaimed.     

Differentiating shame from guilt

How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b) shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c) shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d) shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we defend specific interpretations of each of these answers and argue that they are related to four different dimensions of the emotions. This not only allows us to overcome the conclusion that the above criteria are either unrelated or conflicting with one another, it also allows us to tell apart what is constitutive from what is typical of them.     

The shame of failure: examining the link between fear of failure and shame

The present research was designed to examine hypotheses derived from the proposition that shame is the core of fear of failure. Study 1 was conducted in a naturalistic setting and demonstrated that individuals high in fear of failure reported greater shame upon a perceived failure experience than those low in fear of failure. These findings were obtained controlling for other negative emotions. Study 2 was conducted in a controlled laboratory setting and demonstrated that high fear of failure individuals reported greater shame, overgeneralization, and closeness to their mother (controlling for baseline levels of these variables) than those low in fear of failure. Those high in fear of failure also reported that they would be less likely to tell their mother and father about their failure experience and would be more likely to tell their mother and father about their success experience. The implications of these findings for acquiring a deeper understanding of fear of failure are discussed.     

Aspects of nonperverse scopophilia within an analysis

This essay is intended to contribute to the increasing importance ascribed to scopophilia in modern psychoanalytic literature. The exceptional position of scopophilia is twofold: by virtue of its subdivisions, voyeurism and exhibitionism, it constitutes one of the two pairs of component drives recognized by Freund; and it informs one of the two major perceptual avenues that comprise communication in the analytic setting. A case is presented which shows how the psychic life of a female patient was dominated by a nonperverse scopophilia in a remarkable variety of ways, ranging from hyper-investment to inhibition and phobic curtailment. The case is equally noteworthy for the way in which these various phenomena were reenacted in the transference and in the particular visual character of the analytic scene; thus the patient's optical focal symbiosis and ophidiophobia are related to what I call the analyst's "retro presence."     

On differentiating embarrassment from shame

Four experiments were conducted to demonstrate that embarrassment and shame are distinct emotions that result from violations of different types of internalized standards. Embarrassment results from violating one's particular persona; shame results from violating a shared, objective ideal. Subjects vividly imagined themselves in situations and indicated their emotional reactions. In Experiment I, we demonstrate that people differentiate between embarrassment and shame systematically (F(1,27) = 74.4, p < 0.001). In Experiments 2 and 3, we demonstrate that embarrassment results from violating a persona (n = 34, p < 0.001; n = 23, p < 0.001), and shame results from violating an objective ideal (n = 34, p < 0.001; n = 23, p < 0.001). In Experiment 4, we demonstrate that it is the type of standard that is violated (n = 30, p < 0.001), not whether or not the violation was intentional, that determines whether one experiences embarrassment or shame. We argue that both shame and embarrassment play an important role in maintaining personal identity.     

The heteronomous moral value of shame

Recent work in moral theory has argued against according shame any moral value in virtue of its supposed heteronomy. Authors who have defended shame's moral value have generally argued that shame is, in fact, autonomous. In the present article, I draw on the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Stanley Cavell and Adam Smith to develop an argument for shame's moral worth based on its heteronomy. I then contrast my defence with work that holds shame's moral value to be based on its autonomy. I argue that that view goes wrong by construing shame on the model of private experience. This psychology is unconvincing in its own right and can underwrite moral failings.     

Manifesting shame in a Philippine migrant village

In this article, I examine how internal migrants in a Philippine village negotiate shame. Specifically, I analyse how shame is embodied and performed by internal migrants in “Little Italy”, a village in the Philippines populated by overseas Filipino workers (OFW), who largely work in Italy, and their families who remain resident in the village. Little Italy's internal migrants are other Philippine nationals who have moved to the village for employment opportunities within OFW households. These intersecting flows of international and internal migration render Little Italy a ‘migrant village’. I interrogate internal migrants' shame in two ways: first, as underpinning the subservience that is necessary for negotiating their nominal membership of the village; and second, in contesting and reframing Filipino stereotypes in relation to local social standing and place-based meanings of paid domestic work. I argue that as much as shame has been viewed as an element of social cohesion in the Philippines, its analysis is also a critical tool for troubling current understandings of social positions in migrant spaces such as Little Italy. My findings contribute to scholarship on migration and emotion by, first, demonstrating how emotion in general, and shame in particular, flows between international and internal migrations; and second, by underscoring the role of emotion in creating new dimensions of shame in spaces of migration.