No evidence of risk-taking or impulsive behaviour in a person with episodic amnesia: Implications for the role of the hippocampus in future-regarding decision-making

Does advantageous decision-making require one to explicitly remember the outcome of a series of past decisions or to imagine future personal consequences of one's choices? Findings that amnesic people with hippocampal damage cannot form a clear preference for advantageous decks over many learning trials on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) have been taken to suggest that complex decision-making on the IGT depends on declarative (episodic) memory and hippocampal integrity. Alternatively, impaired IGT performance in amnesic individuals could be secondary to risk-taking and/or impulsive behaviour resulting from impaired episodic future thinking (i.e. prospection) known to accompany amnesia. We tested this possibility in the amnesic individual K.C. using the IGT and the Toronto Gambling Task (TGT), a novel task that dissociates impulsivity from risk-taking without placing demands on declarative memory. K.C. did not develop a preference for advantageous over disadvantageous decks on the IGT and, instead, showed a slight preference for short-term gains and an inability to acquire a more adaptive appreciation of longer-term losses. He also did not display impulsive or risk-taking behaviour on the TGT, despite a profound inability to imagine personal future experiences. These findings suggest that impaired decision-making on the IGT in amnesia is unlikely to reflect a predilection to act in the moment or failure to take future consequences into account. Instead, some forms of future-regarding decision-making may be dissociable, with performance on tasks relying on declarative learning or on episodic-constructive processes more likely to be impaired.     

Working memory involvement in emotion-based processes underlying choosing advantageously

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is widely used to assess decision making under conditions of uncertainty in clinical as well as in nonclinical populations. However, there is still debate as to whether normal performance at this task relies on implicit, emotion-based processes that are independent of working memory. To clarify the role of working memory on normal performance on the IGT, participants performed the task under low or high working memory load. We used a modified version of the original task, in which the position of the four decks was randomized between trials. Results showed that only participants performing under low memory load significantly chose more advantageously halfway through the task. In addition, when comparing the number of cards chosen from the two decks with frequent losses, one advantageous and one disadvantageous, only participants performing under low memory load chose more cards from the advantageous deck. The present findings indicate that the processes underlying optimal advantageous performance on the IGT rely on working memory functions.     

The uncertainty appraisal enhances the prominent deck B effect in the Iowa gambling task

The Iowa gambling task (Bechara et al., Cognition 50:7–15, 1994) is designed to simulate a decision making problem under ambiguity, in which the degree of reliance on emotional cues arising from previous experiences contributes to perform advantageously. Recent studies based on the appraisal tendency framework demonstrated that emotional certainty (associated with intuitive strategies) leads to a more advantageous decision pattern, whereas emotional uncertainty (associated with deliberative strategies) impairs the performance in the IGT (Bagneux et al., Motivation and Emotion 37(4):818–827, 2013; Bollon and Bagneux, Cognition and Emotion 27(2):376–384, 2013). Due to the problems in the IGT (Dunn et al., Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 30:239–271, 2006; Steingroever et al., Psychological Assessment 25(1):180–193, 2013), however, it is an open question to what extent the disadvantageous IGT performance in the uncertainty conditions was based on risky decision making. Addressing the main criticisms on the IGT, the primary aim of the present study is to provide a further explanation for the underlying source of the IGT impairment led by uncertainty appraisals. In line with previous research, we found that participants in the certainty-associated emotion condition (disgust) outperformed those in uncertainty-associated conditions (fear, sadness) in the gambling game. Detailed four-deck format analyses on decision patterns and knowledge levels provided supporting evidence for our main hypothesis that the weak IGT scores in the uncertainty conditions can be summarized as a failure to anticipate the badness and the goodness of the most difficult decks, and a dominant preference for a risky option with high immediate gains and infrequent losses.     

Stress and Risky Decision Making: Cognitive Reflection,Emotional Learning or Both.

Stressful situations hinder judgement. Effects of stress induced by anticipated public speaking on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) were examined. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) was used to examine the relationship between reflective thinking and IGT performance. The stress manipulation increased blood pressure and was associated with poorer IGT and CRT performance. Stressed participants were slower to avoid the disadvantageous decks. Moreover, CRT scores correlated with optimal deck selections indicating the importance of reflective thinking for good performance on the IGT. These correlations were observed in relatively early trials, which challenges the view that analytic thinking is not important when card contingencies are being learned. Data revealed that IGT performance in healthy individuals is not always optimal; stress levels impair performance. A mediation analysis was consistent with the proposal that the stress manipulation reduced IGT performance by impeding reflective thinking. Thus, reflective processing is an important explanation of IGT performance in healthy populations. It was concluded that more reflective participants appear to learn from the outcomes of their decisions even when stressed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of decision-phase time constraints on emotion-based learning in the Iowa Gambling Task

Research employing the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has frequently shown that learning is impaired in various clinical populations. However, precisely what constitutes "unimpaired" control group learning remains unclear. In order to understand some of the possible factors underlying variability in control group IGT performance, the present study sought to manipulate features of the task to intentionally disrupt learning. Specifically, the present study investigated the effects of time constraints on emotion-based learning during automated administration of the IGT. For two groups of participants, a time-constraint of either 2-s or 4-s was implemented during the critical decision making period, while a control group received no time constraint. We also evaluated participants' subjective experience after every block of 20 trials. Results demonstrated that the 2-s group differed significantly from the control group. Subjective experience measures revealed rapid development of awareness of the advantageous and disadvantageous decks among all three groups. Overall, our findings demonstrate, for the first time, the effects of decision-phase time constraints on emotion-based learning and indicate that the IGT reward/punishment schedules are to some extent cognitively penetrable.     

Comparison of deck- and trial-based approaches to advantageous decision making on the Iowa Gambling Task

We compared the original deck-based model of advantageous decision making assessed with the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) with a trial-based approach across behavioral and physiological outcomes in 33 younger adults (15 men, 18 women; 22.2 ± 3.7 years of age). One administration of the IGT with simultaneous measurement of skin conductance responses (SCRs) was performed and the two methods applied: (a) the original approach of subtracting disadvantageous picks of Decks A and B from advantageous picks of Decks C and D and (b) a trial-based approach focused on the financial outcome for each deck leading up to the trial in question. When directly compared, the deck-based approach resulted in a more advantageous behavioral profile than did the trial-based approach. Analysis of SCR data revealed no significant differences between methods for physiological measurements of SCR fluctuations or anticipatory responses to disadvantageous picks. Post hoc investigation of the trial-based method revealed Deck B contributed to both advantageous and disadvantageous decision making for the majority of participants. When divided by blocks of 20, the number of advantageous to disadvantageous choices reversed as the task progressed despite the total number of picks from Deck B remaining high. SCR fluctuations for Deck B, although not significantly different from the other decks, did show a sharp decline after the first block of 20 and remained below levels for Decks C and D toward the end of the task, suggesting that participants may have gained knowledge of the frequency of loss for this deck.     

Personality characteristics and state mood influence individual deck selections on the Iowa Gambling Task

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is commonly used to assess risky decision making in clinical and non-clinical populations, and negative mood and various personality characteristics have been shown to affect the number of advantageous and disadvantageous selections on this task. Recent research has suggested that IGT data should be analyzed at the individual deck level due to differences in frequency and magnitude of losses, and the present study examined how personality characteristics and state mood may affect deck level selections on this task. Participants were 91 undergraduate students (38 male) who completed measures of impulsivity and sensation seeking, behavioral activation and inhibition, state mood, and the computerized IGT. Results indicated that negative mood, drive, impulsivity, and sensation seeking were all positively correlated with Deck B selections, but negatively correlated with Deck D selections. No differences emerged in correlations between Decks A and B or Decks A and D. Results indicate that mood and personality characteristics differentially relate to selections from the individual decks on the IGT. Results have implications for the assessment of decision making, as personality and fluctuations in state-dependent mood could mimic pathological risk-taking if analysis is conducted on the combined decks.     

Age-related variance in decisions under ambiguity is explained by changes in reasoning,executive functions,and decision-making under risk

Previous literature has explained older individuals’ disadvantageous decision-making under ambiguity in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) by reduced emotional warning signals preceding decisions. We argue that age-related reductions in IGT performance may also be explained by reductions in certain cognitive abilities (reasoning, executive functions). In 210 participants (18–86 years), we found that the age-related variance on IGT performance occurred only in the last 60 trials. The effect was mediated by cognitive abilities and their relation with decision-making performance under risk with explicit rules (Game of Dice Task). Thus, reductions in cognitive functions in older age may be associated with both a reduced ability to gain explicit insight into the rules of the ambiguous decision situation and with failure to choose the less risky options consequently after the rules have been understood explicitly. Previous literature may have underestimated the relevance of cognitive functions for age-related decline in decision-making performance under ambiguity.     

Propensity for risk taking and trait impulsivity in the Iowa Gambling Task

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is sensitive to decision making impairments in several clinical groups with frontal impairment. However the complexity of the IGT, particularly in terms of its learning requirements, makes it difficult to know whether disadvantageous (risky) selections in this task reflect deliberate risk taking or a failure to recognise risk. To determine whether propensity for risk taking contributes to IGT performance, we correlated IGT selections with a measure of propensity for risk taking from the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), taking into account potential moderating effects of IGT learning requirements, and trait impulsivity, which is associated with learning difficulties. We found that IGT and BART performance were related, but only in the later stages of the IGT, and only in participants with low trait impulsivity. This finding suggests that IGT performance may reflect different underlying processes in individuals with low and high trait impulsivity. In individuals with low trait impulsivity, it appears that risky selections in the IGT reflect in part, propensity for risk seeking, but only after the development of explicit knowledge of IGT risks after a period of learning.     

Implicit emotional biases in decision making: the case of the Iowa Gambling Task

Many authors have endorsed the hypothesis that previous emotional experiences may exert a covert influence on behavior, but some findings and replications of the original studies challenged this view. We investigated this topic by carrying out an experiment with the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), where a dissociation procedure was adopted to successfully isolate possible implicit components. After a typical interaction with the IGT, participants performed a "blind" card selection phase without receiving any feedback. Half of them were instructed to continue choosing as they did before, the other half was told that good card decks turned bad, and vice versa, so that explicit knowledge was necessary to overcome the previously learned deck-outcome associations. The results confirmed the existence of early acquired implicit biases, confirming that previously experienced emotional events may covertly affect subsequent behavior.     

Emotion-based learning and central executive resources: an investigation of intuition and the Iowa Gambling Task

The role of emotion in complex decision-making can be assessed on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), a widely used neuropsychological measure that may tap a different aspect of executive function than that assessed by conventional measures. Most notably, the 'feeling' about which decks are good or bad, often described in relation to IGT performance, seems reminiscent of decision-making based on intuition-linked to a long history of research in decision-making contrasting the 'intuition' versus 'reasoning' styles of problem solving. To test the claim that the performance on the IGT relies more on emotion-based learning than conventional executive resources for normal performance, a group of participants completed the IGT simultaneously with one of two secondary-tasks, one of which (random number generation) is known to load executive resources. A third group performed the IGT with no secondary-task. If performance on the IGT requires the properties associated with intuitive operations, then participants should either show no disruption when completing a secondary-task, or at least show no selective disruption on a secondary-task that loads for executive function. The rate of learning in the three groups was not significantly different. This suggests that the sorts of cognitive resources loaded by traditional executive tasks such as random number generation do not overlap, in the cognitive architecture, with the emotion-based learning skills that are required for Iowa Gambling Task performance. The findings of the present study are also consistent with a previous claim of the Iowa group that emotion-based learning and working memory resources are doubly dissociable.     

Decision-making,cognitive functions,impulsivity, and media multitasking expectancies in high versus low media multitaskers

In several studies, individuals who reported to frequently multitask with different media displayed reduced cognitive performance, for example in fluid intelligence and executive functioning. These cognitive functions are relevant for making advantageous decisions under both objective risk (requiring reflection and strategical planning) and ambiguous risk (requiring learning from feedback). Thus, compared to low media multitaskers (LMMs), high media multitaskers (HMMs) may perform worse in both types of decision situations. The current study investigated HMMs and LMMs in a laboratory setting with the Game of Dice Task (GDT; objective risk), the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; ambiguous risk), various tests quantifying cognitive functions (logical reasoning, working memory, information processing, general executive functions), and self-report measures of impulsivity, media multitasking expectancies, and problematic Internet use. From 182 participants, 25 HMMs and 19 LMMs were identified using the Media Multitasking Index. Results show that HMMs compared to LMMs performed weaker on the IGT but not on the GDT. Furthermore, HMMs had slightly decreased performance in tests of logical reasoning and working memory capacity. HMMs tended to increased information processing speed but this difference was not significant. Furthermore, HMMs have more positive expectancies regarding media multitasking and reported higher tendencies toward problematic Internet use. HMMs and LMMs did not differ significantly with respect to impulsivity and executive functions. The results give a first hint that HMMs may have difficulties in decision-making under ambiguous but not under objective risk. HMMs may be more prone to errors in tasks that require feedback processing. However, HMMs appear not to be impaired in aspects of long-term strategic decision-making.

     

Regulatory fit effects in a choice task

This article examines the interface between motivation and choice. In category learning, a regulatory fit has been shown to increase exploration of alternative response strategies even when exploration is suboptimal. In the present study, promotion- and prevention-focused subjects performed a choice task that required them to choose from one of two decks of cards on each trial. They either gained or lost points with each draw. In Experiment 1, optimal performance required an exploratory response pattern that entailed sampling from a deck that initially appeared disadvantageous but ultimately became advantageous. In Experiment 2, optimal performance required an exploitative response pattern. A softmax action selection model that includes an exploitation parameter was applied to each subject’s data from both experiments and revealed greater exploration of alternative strategies for people with a regulatory fit. This response strategy was optimal in Experiment 1 and led to superior performance, but was suboptimal in Experiment 2 and led to inferior performance.     

风险取向类型与爱荷华赌博任务成绩的影响

神经科学领域的研究者们设计了测量情感决策的经典爱荷华赌博任务并提出了体细胞标记假说来解释其研究结果,但迄今为止这一假说还没有得到一致认可。许多研究提出了可能影响爱荷华赌博任务成绩的其他因素。本研究试图在前人研究的基础上采用实验法探讨风险取向类型这一人格因素是否影响正常个体的爱荷华赌博任务成绩。实验结果显示,不同风险取向类型的个体在爱荷华赌博任务中的成绩和表现截然不同。典型风险趋向型个体在爱荷华赌博任务中的表现类似于某些神经系统患者,倾向于更多地选择不利纸牌,其任务成绩显著差于典型风险回避型个体。这一研究结果表明：风险取向类型是影响正常个体爱荷华赌博任务成绩的重要因素之一。     

Risky decision making and cognitive flexibility among online sports bettors in Nigeria

Online sports betting is a popular recreational activity in Nigeria. Like other forms of gambling, risk of pathological progression exists for gamblers who continue betting despite severe financial and psychosocial consequences. In the present study, we examined whether this population of gamblers shows deficits in decision making and cognitive flexibility that have been documented in Western gambling populations. Thirty-six online sports bettors and 42 non-gambling participants completed a version of the Iowa gambling task (IGT) and an established set-shifting task for the assessment of cognitive flexibility. The two groups did not differ significantly in the selection of disadvantageous decks on the IGT. In contrast, sports bettors committed significantly more errors on the set-shifting task than non-gambling control participants. As this performance deficit was not specific to trials requiring a set shift, it most likely resulted from gambling-related changes in general cognitive or motivational abilities that are required to successfully complete challenging mental tasks. While our results illustrate that findings from Western populations cannot automatically be generalised to other contexts, it should be noted that we focused on only one particular type of gambling and included mostly participants with mild gambling-related problems.     

Intelligence,but not emotional intelligence,predicts Iowa Gambling Task performance

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is a famous and frequently-used neuropsychological task that is thought to reflect real-world decision-making. There has been some debate, however, about the degree to which the IGT involves cold (cognitive) versus hot (emotional) processing. The present study incorporated 68 healthy individuals and used measures of cognitive intelligence (IQ) and emotional intelligence (EIQ) to predict IGT performance. Higher IQ scores significantly predicted better IGT performance, whereas no EIQ–IGT relationship was observed. The implications of this research on clinical and experimental use of the IGT are outlined.     

Affective bias in complex decision making: Modulating sensitivity to aversive feedback

The present study investigated the conflict between well-developed attitudes and incentive rewards using the Iowa Gambling Task. In particular, the incorporation of emotional labels allowed us to model the role of affective biases and their impact on complex decision making over time. Two experiments manipulated the class of deck label (emotional pictures and racial faces) using both congruent and incongruent association to the deck incentives. Both experiments demonstrated that an incongruent association can lead to striking and persistent decision making biases. Thus, a common theme was a general inability to tolerate conflict between rewards and goal-irrelevant labels. Notably, Experiment 2 demonstrated that this ‘incongruency’ effect appeared to result from positive labels interfering with aversive experiences from bad decks. More generally, sensitivity to accumulating losses from punishing decks was primarily associated with successful performance on these Gambling Task variants. These results suggest emotional biases are readily harmful in complex decision making, and that flexibility in the extent to which we permit emotional influences to guide our decisions is crucial.     

Episodic chasing in pathological gamblers using the Iowa gambling task

"Chasing ones losses" is a key symptom among pathological gamblers (PGs). This study focuses on quantitative differences in episodic chasing (i.e., sequences of disadvantageous decisions within a single gambling session) between PGs and non-pathological gamblers (NPGs). We compared 61 PGs and 39 NPGs on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and the Zuckerman Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS). The PGs showed significantly more chasing and had significantly poorer decision-making strategies than NPGs, particularly among males (F = 4.52, p < 0.05). Random players were significantly less sensation seeking than advantageous and disadvantageous (i.e., chasing) players, but there was no interaction with group or gender. The results suggest that quantifiable within-session gambling behavior holds important implications for detecting underlying vulnerabilities to gambling pathology.     

The role of urgency and its underlying psychological mechanisms in problematic behaviours

The urgency facet of impulsivity, that is, the tendency to act rashly in response to intense emotional contexts [Cyders, M. A., & Smith, G. T. (2008). Emotion-based dispositions to rash action: positive and negative urgency. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 807-828], has been related to a wide range of maladaptive behaviours. The present study further investigates the role of urgency in problematic behaviours by considering distinct psychological mechanisms that may underlie this component of impulsivity. With this aim, 95 volunteer participants were screened with self-reported questionnaires assessing urgency and three problematic behaviours (compulsive buying, excessive mobile phone use, excessive Internet use). They performed two laboratory tasks: a stop-signal task designed to assess the capacity to inhibit prepotent responses in response to both neutral and emotional stimuli; and the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) measuring the ability to take into account the future consequences of an action. A poor ability to inhibit prepotent responses in the emotional condition of the stop-signal task was found to predict more disadvantageous choices in the IGT, which ultimately results in higher urgency and more problematic behaviours. These findings shed new light on the construct of urgency, its related psychological mechanisms, and its role in problematic behaviours.     

Paradoxical effects of education on the Iowa Gambling Task

Suitable normative information on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is not currently available, though it is clear that there is great individual variability in performance on this assessment tool. Given that the task is presumed to measure the emotion-based learning systems that are thought to form the biological basis of 'intuition,' there is some reason to think that education (especially tertiary education) might explicitly de-emphasise the role of emotion-based learning in decision-making. This suggests the paradoxical finding that better-educated participants should show poorer performance on the IGT. We recruited 30 participants (all female, all aged 18-25) to participate in a 'real money' version of the IGT. There was no significant difference in performance in blocks 1-3 of the task (trials 1-60). However, there was a substantial effect of education on the final two blocks (trials 61-100), such that the less-well-educated participants produced twice as much of an improvement over baseline as did their university-educated colleagues. A range of possible explanations for this remarkable finding are discussed. The most likely appears to be that tertiary education specifically discourages the use of emotion-based learning systems in decision-making. These findings bear on the extent to which education has a role to play in our reliance on cognition and emotion in decision-making, including the likely role of education in the generation and maintenance of false beliefs.