首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 812 毫秒
1.
This article proposes a new theoretical framework for the reviewed state‐of‐the‐art research on collective narcissism—the belief that the ingroup’s exceptionality is not sufficiently appreciated by others. Collective narcissism is motivated by the investment of an undermined sense of self‐esteem into the belief in the ingroup’s entitlement to privilege. Collective narcissism lies in the heart of populist rhetoric. The belief in ingroup’s exceptionality compensates the undermined sense of self‐worth, leaving collective narcissists hypervigilant to signs of threat to the ingroup’s position. People endorsing the collective narcissistic belief are prone to biased perceptions of intergroup situations and to conspiratorial thinking. They retaliate to imagined provocations against the ingroup but sometimes overlook real threats. They are prejudiced and hostile. Deficits in emotional regulation, hostile attribution bias, and vindictiveness lie behind the robust link between collective narcissism and intergroup hostility. Interventions that support the regulation of negative emotions, such as experiencing self‐transcendent emotions, decrease the link between collective narcissism and intergroup hostility and offer further insights into the nature of collective narcissism.  相似文献   

2.
The prevalence and resilience of conspiracy beliefs suggest that such beliefs may derive in part from general information-processing mechanisms. Two predictions were tested: conspiracy beliefs would increase as familiarity with the conspiracy increased, and conspiracy beliefs would rest in part on the perception of the alleged conspirators' motive. Participants read condensed versions of four real-life conspiracy theories of varying familiarity, rated their belief in the conspiracies, and explained their ratings. Although belief was not associated with familiarity, participants used different justifications for their beliefs about familiar and unfamiliar conspiracies, relying prominently on motive when the conspiracy was unfamiliar. Preliminary data suggested that participants' beliefs in conspiracies may have been equally strong when they reasoned only in terms of motive as when they reasoned in terms of documented evidence. An additional finding suggested also that beliefs in conspiracies may increase as affiliation with the victim of the alleged conspiracy increases.  相似文献   

3.
This paper reviews current research on intergroup consequences of collective narcissism – an emotional investment in an unrealistic belief in exaggerated greatness of an in‐group. Integrating findings of the psychology of intergroup relations with findings regarding psychological outcomes of individual narcissism, the collective narcissism construct addresses the relationship between ‘in‐group love’ and ‘out‐group hate’. Differentiating between narcissistic and genuine positive group regard uncovers the potential of genuine ‘in‐group’ love to motivate positive out‐group attitudes and intergroup tolerance. Collective narcissism is also shown to be the aspects of positive group attachment that inspires defensive and retaliatory intergroup hostility under perceived threat. Narcissistic idealization of an in‐group is contingent on external validation and underlain by internal doubts. Collective narcissists are never fully satisfied with external acknowledgement of the in‐group and they are sensitive to anything that may undermine the in‐group’s exaggerated image.  相似文献   

4.
Recent work suggests that collective narcissism—an exaggerated, unrealistic belief in an ingroup's greatness that demands constant external validation—is a strong predictor of a variety of political attitudes. In the present study, we use nationally representative panel data from Poland to examine the relationship between national collective narcissism and nationalism, a belief that the national ingroup is superior and should dominate other nations. We first demonstrate that national collective narcissism, nationalism, and mere satisfaction with national ingroup are distinct. In turn, in both cross-sectional and panel analyses, we find that (1) national collective narcissism is positively related to nationalism, whereas satisfaction with the national ingroup is not; and (2) national collective narcissism is a stronger predictor of nationalism than national ingroup satisfaction is in absolute terms. Our analyses thus provide evidence that nationalism may be rooted in narcissistic exaggeration of the greatness of the national ingroup rather than nonnarcissistic national ingroup satisfaction.  相似文献   

5.
ABSTRACT

Gender studies have often been criticized for undermining family and religious values. In this paper, we argue that these criticisms exhibit the characteristics of conspiracy theories. We define gender conspiracy beliefs as convictions that gender studies and gender-equality activists represent an ideology secretly designed to harm traditional values and social arrangements. In two studies conducted among Catholics in Poland (Study 1 N= 1019; Study 2 N= 223), we examined the prevalence of gender conspiracy beliefs and their psychological concomitants. We hypothesized that gender conspiracy beliefs should be associated with a defensive identification with one’s religious group, captured by religious collective narcissism. In both studies, Catholic collective narcissism was demonstrated to be a robust predictor of gender conspiracy beliefs. We additionally demonstrated that Catholic collective narcissism predicted outgroup hostility, and this effect was mediated by gender conspiracy beliefs. We discuss the implications for gender-based prejudice.  相似文献   

6.
A common assumption is that belief in conspiracy theories and supernatural phenomena are grounded in illusory pattern perception. In the present research we systematically tested this assumption. Study 1 revealed that such irrational beliefs are related to perceiving patterns in randomly generated coin toss outcomes. In Study 2, pattern search instructions exerted an indirect effect on irrational beliefs through pattern perception. Study 3 revealed that perceiving patterns in chaotic but not in structured paintings predicted irrational beliefs. In Study 4, we found that agreement with texts supporting paranormal phenomena or conspiracy theories predicted pattern perception. In Study 5, we manipulated belief in a specific conspiracy theory. This manipulation influenced the extent to which people perceive patterns in world events, which in turn predicted unrelated irrational beliefs. We conclude that illusory pattern perception is a central cognitive mechanism accounting for conspiracy theories and supernatural beliefs.  相似文献   

7.
Conspiracy theories offer simple answers to complex problems by providing explanations for uncertain situations. Thus, they should be attractive to individuals who are intolerant of uncertainty and seek cognitive closure. We hypothesized that need for cognitive closure (NFCC) should foster conspiracy beliefs about events that lack clear official explanations, especially when conspiracy theories are temporarily salient. In Experiment 1, NFCC positively predicted the endorsement of a conspiracy theory behind the refugee crisis, especially when conspiratorial explanations were made salient. Experiment 2 showed that when conspiratorial explanations were made salient, NFCC positively predicted beliefs in conspiracies behind a mysterious plane crash. However, the link between NFCC and beliefs in conspiratorial explanations was reversed in the case of a plane crash with an official, non‐conspiratorial, explanation for the accident. In conclusion, people high (vs. low) in NFCC seize on conspiratorial explanations for uncertain events when such explanations are situationally accessible.  相似文献   

8.
Although conspiracy theories are ubiquitous across times and cultures, research has not investigated how cultural dimensions may predict conspiracy beliefs. The present research examined intergroup conspiracy beliefs in United States and Chinese samples at the peak of the trade war. In two studies (one pre-registered; total N = 1,092), we asked US participants to what extent they believed Chinese institutions and companies were conspiring against the United states and Chinese participants to what extent they believed US institutions and companies were conspiring against China. Results revealed that such beliefs were stronger among Chinese than US participants due to higher power distance values and vertical collectivism. In particular, these cultural dimensions were associated with increased psychological involvement in intergroup conflict (as reflected by higher levels of collective narcissism and perceived outgroup threat), which in turn predicted intergroup conspiracy beliefs. Exploratory analyses suggested that particularly power distance values mediate these effects. We conclude that cultural dimensions that promote hierarchy in society are associated with increased intergroup conspiracy beliefs.  相似文献   

9.
In the present contribution, the author investigated the idea that messages communicating inclusion by others lead to stronger conspiracy beliefs about impactful societal events than messages communicating exclusion by others. These effects of belongingness, however, were expected only among people who experience high levels of self‐uncertainty. In Study 1, a manipulation of belongingness predicted belief in conspiracy theories only among people with unstable self‐esteem (an individual difference indicator of self‐uncertainty), while controlling for self‐esteem level. In Study 2, a manipulation of belongingness influenced belief in conspiracy theories only among participants who were experimentally induced to feel uncertain about themselves. It is concluded that among self‐uncertain people, inclusion breeds suspicion about the causes of impactful and harmful societal events.  相似文献   

10.
This study examined the relationship between a series of individual difference measures and belief in political and medical conspiracy theories. Participants (N = 323) rated 20 conspiracy theories (10 medical, 10 political) and completed a set of questionnaires. Belief in political conspiracies was strongly positively correlated with belief in medical conspiracies. Belief in both conspiracy types was correlated with low self‐esteem, low Conscientiousness, more right‐wing political views, younger age, and greater belief in the benefits of Alternative Medicine. It was also correlated with religiousness and gender. Low Emotional Stability and Agreeableness were also correlated with belief in political conspiracies, and higher education level was correlated with belief in medical conspiracies. The findings generally demonstrated support for a monological belief system. Implications and limitations are discussed.  相似文献   

11.
Previous research has obtained mixed findings as to whether feelings of self‐worth are positively or negatively related to right‐wing ideological beliefs and prejudice. We propose to clarify the link between self‐worth and ideology by distinguishing between narcissistic and non‐narcissistic self‐evaluations as well as between different dimensions of ideological attitudes. Four studies, conducted in three different socio‐political contexts: the UK (Study 1, N = 422), the US (Studies 2 and 3, Ns = 471 and 289, respectively), and Poland (Study 4, N = 775), investigated the associations between narcissistic and non‐narcissistic self‐evaluations, social dominance orientation (SDO), right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA), and ethnic prejudice. Confirming our hypotheses, the results consistently showed that after controlling for self‐esteem, narcissistic self‐evaluation was positively associated with SDO (accounting for RWA), yet negatively associated with RWA (accounting for SDO). These associations were similar after controlling for psychopathy and Machiavellianism (Study 3) as well as collective narcissism and Big Five personality characteristics (Study 4). Studies 2–4 additionally demonstrated that narcissistic self‐evaluation was indirectly positively associated with prejudice through higher SDO (free of RWA) but indirectly negatively associated with prejudice through lower RWA (free of SDO). Implications for understanding the role of self‐evaluation in right‐wing ideological attitudes and prejudice are discussed. Copyright © 2017 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology  相似文献   

12.
Conspiracy theories concern milestone events, mobilizing various explanations. However, there is still emerging research on how conspiracy beliefs mobilize normative and nonnormative collective action, as well as political engagement and what the emotional underpinnings of such effects are. We conducted two experimental studies (Study 1, N = 301 and Study 2, N = 328) on exploring the relationship between exposure to conspiracy theories and normative, nonnormative collective action and political engagement, moderated by primed victimhood and mediated by fear/anxiety and anger emotional indices. Results in Study 1 showed that exposure to conspiracy theories decreases normative collective action, but increases nonnormative collective action, negative emotions of anger and fear/anxiety and political engagement. In Study 2 we confirmed findings of Study 1, but these effects were moderated by primed victimhood. Study 2 also showed that anger index, but not fear/anxiety index, significantly mediated the moderating interaction effect between exposure to conspiracy theories and primed victimhood on the (non)normative collective action and political engagement. Results are discussed in light of the broader impact of circulation of conspiracy theories and their effective tackle amidst societal traumas.  相似文献   

13.
We investigated the effects of ingroup and outgroup sources of respect, defined as positive social evaluations of self, on group members' emotional reactions and collective self‐esteem. We used both natural group memberships (Studies 1 and 2) and laboratory groups (Study 3). We expected that the positive effects of respect derived from an ingroup would not hold when derived from an outgroup source. In Study 1 (N = 294) respect was manipulated as deriving either from ingroup or outgroup. Although respect produced a positive emotional reaction irrespective of source, collective self‐esteem was only enhanced by an ingroup source. In Study 2 (N = 248), we investigated the concurrent effects of ingroup respect and outgroup respect. As in Study 1, ingroup and outgroup respect both produced positive emotional reactions, but collective self‐esteem was only affected by ingroup respect. Additionally, outgroup respect intensified the shame people experienced due to lack of ingroup respect. In Study 3 (N = 66), participants were immersed in experimental groups and ingroup and outgroup respect were manipulated orthogonally. Interactive effects of the two sources of respect indicated that high outgroup respect could not compensate for low ingroup respect, and if anything had an adverse effect. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

14.
We hypothesised that belief in conspiracy theories would be predicted by the general tendency to attribute agency and intentionality where it is unlikely to exist. We further hypothesised that this tendency would explain the relationship between education level and belief in conspiracy theories, where lower levels of education have been found to be associated with higher conspiracy belief. In Study 1 (N = 202) participants were more likely to agree with a range of conspiracy theories if they also tended to attribute intentionality and agency to inanimate objects. As predicted, this relationship accounted for the link between education level and belief in conspiracy theories. We replicated this finding in Study 2 (N = 330), whilst taking into account beliefs in paranormal phenomena. These results suggest that education may undermine the reasoning processes and assumptions that are reflected in conspiracy belief.  相似文献   

15.
We advance a new account of why people endorse conspiracy theories, arguing that individuals use the social-cognitive tool of projection when making social judgements about others. In two studies, we found that individuals were more likely to endorse conspiracy theories if they thought they would be willing, personally, to participate in the alleged conspiracies. Study 1 established an association between conspiracy beliefs and personal willingness to conspire, which fully mediated a relationship between Machiavellianism and conspiracy beliefs. In Study 2, participants primed with their own morality were less inclined than controls to endorse conspiracy theories - a finding fully mediated by personal willingness to conspire. These results suggest that some people think 'they conspired' because they think 'I would conspire'.  相似文献   

16.
Collective action is typically studied in social protest contexts and predicted by different motivations (i.e., ingroup identification and efficacy beliefs, and outgroup‐directed anger). Assuming that voting to some extent reflects a form of collective action, we tested whether these three different motivations predicted voting in Dutch, Israeli, and Italian national election contexts. Based on previous meta‐analyses on voting and collective action, we hypothesized that identification with and efficacy beliefs regarding this party would motivate voting across the different elections (i.e., context‐independent effects). As for anger, we predicted more context‐dependent effects, depending on whether the anger is targeting the previous government or at the political system at large. Results were largely in line with predictions, showing the relatively context‐independent motivational power of party identification and efficacy beliefs, and clearly context‐dependent effects for anger. Specifically, we found little support for a similar motivational power of anger targeting previous government policies, but anger targeting politics in general demotivated Dutch and Israeli participants to vote (interpreted as an expression of political cynicism), while curiously motivating Italian participants to vote (interpreted as a desire for system change from “old” to “new” politics). We discuss these findings in the context of voting in national elections, and recommend further integration of the voting and social protest literatures.  相似文献   

17.
Many people in the major Western economies (e.g., United States, UK, and Germany) subscribe to free market ideology (FMI), which claims that institutional oversight of the market is unnecessary for public reaction can force corporations to regulate their own behavior. The question then becomes how people's belief in FMI affects their reactions to corporate transgressions. Given its ingroup‐centered values, we hypothesized that FMI beliefs would bias reactions to corporate transgressions. We report results of a pilot study showing that FMI beliefs are predicted by selfishness, tradition, conformity, and lack of universalism. We then report three experiments, which showed that stronger FMI beliefs predict weaker demands to redress corporate injustices committed by ingroup (but not outgroup) corporations (Studies 1–3), especially when victims of corporate wrongdoings belong to an outgroup (rather than the ingroup; Study 3). The findings inform our conceptual understanding of FMI and give insights about its implications for market justice.  相似文献   

18.
Despite evidence of widespread belief in conspiracy theories, there remains a dearth of research on the individual difference correlates of conspiracist ideation. In two studies, we sought to overcome this limitation by examining correlations between conspiracist ideation and a range of individual psychological factors. In Study 1, 817 Britons indicated their agreement with conspiracist ideation concerning the July 7, 2005 (7/7), London bombings, and completed a battery of individual difference scales. Results showed that stronger belief in 7/7 conspiracy theories was predicted by stronger belief in other real-world conspiracy theories, greater exposure to conspiracist ideation, higher political cynicism, greater support for democratic principles, more negative attitudes to authority, lower self-esteem, and lower Agreeableness. In Study 2, 281 Austrians indicated their agreement with an entirely fictitious conspiracy theory and completed a battery of individual difference measures not examined in Study 1. Results showed that belief in the entirely fictitious conspiracy theory was significantly associated with stronger belief in other real-world conspiracy theories, stronger paranormal beliefs, and lower crystallized intelligence. These results are discussed in terms of the potential of identifying individual difference constellations among conspiracy theorists.  相似文献   

19.
The relation between narcissism and other‐derogation has been examined primarily in the context of ego threat. In three studies, we investigated whether narcissistic individuals derogate others in the absence of ego threat. In Study 1, 79 judges watched four videotaped dyadic interactions and rated the personality of the same four people. In Study 2, 66 judges rated the personality of a friend. In Study 3, 72 judges considered the average Northeastern University student and rated the personality of this hypothetical person. Across the three studies, targets' personality characteristics were described on the 100‐item California Adult Q‐Sort (CAQ; Block, 2008). Judges' ratings of targets were compared to a CAQ prototype of the optimally adjusted person to assess target‐derogation. Judges' narcissism and other‐derogation were positively related in Studies 1 and 2. Narcissism positively predicted and self‐esteem negatively predicted target‐derogation after controlling for each other in Study 3. Narcissistic individuals derogate others more than non‐narcissistic individuals regardless of whether ego threat is present or absent.  相似文献   

20.
Results of five studies (N = 1596) linked collective narcissism—a belief in in‐group exaggerated greatness contingent on external validation—to direct and indirect, retaliatory hostility in response to situations that collective narcissists perceived as insulting to the in‐group but which fell well beyond the definition of an insult. In Turkey, collective narcissists responded with schadenfreude to the European economic crisis after feeling humiliated by the Turkish wait to be admitted to the European Union (Study 1). In Portugal, they supported hostile actions towards Germans and rejoiced in the German economic crisis after perceiving Germany's position in the European Union as more important than the position of Portugal (Study 2). In Poland, they supported hostile actions towards the makers of a movie they found offensive to Poland (Studies 3 and 5) and responded with direct and indirect hostility towards a celebrity whose jokes about the Polish government they found offensive (Study 4). Comparisons with self‐positivity and in‐group positivity indices and predictors of intergroup hostility indicated that collective narcissism is the only systematic predictor of hypersensitivity to in‐group insult followed by direct and indirect, retaliatory intergroup hostility. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号