We need to move beyond rating scales,white faces and adult perceivers: Invited Commentary on Sutherland & Young (2022), understanding trait impressions from faces

Sutherland and Young's perspective is a timely and rigorous examination of trait impressions based on facial cues. We propose three strtegies to further advance the field: incorporating natural language processing, including diverse facial stimuli, and re-interpreting developmental data.     

Incidental learning of trust from eye-gaze: Effects of race and facial trustworthiness

Humans rapidly make inferences about individuals’ trustworthiness on the basis of their facial features and perceived group membership. We examine whether incidental learning about trust from shifts in gaze direction is influenced by these facial features. To do so, we examined two types of face category: the race of the face and the initial trustworthiness of the face based on physical appearance. We find that cueing of attention by eye-gaze is unaffected by race or initial levels of trust, whereas incidental learning of trust from gaze behaviour is selectively influenced. That is, learning of trust is reduced for other-race faces, as predicted by reduced abilities to identify members of other races (Experiment 1). In contrast, converging findings from an independently gathered set of data showed that the initial trustworthiness of faces did not influence learning of trust (Experiment 2). These results show that learning about the behaviour of other-race faces is poorer than for own-race faces, but that this cannot be explained by differences in the perceived trustworthiness of different groups.     

Age differences in facial trustworthiness judgement based on multiple facial cues

Multiple facial cues such as facial expression and face gender simultaneously influence facial trustworthiness judgement in adults. The current work was to examine the effect of multiple facial cues on trustworthiness judgement across age groups. Eight-, 10-year-olds, and adults detect trustworthiness from happy and neutral adult faces (female and male faces) in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 included both adult and child faces wearing happy, angry, and neutral expressions. Nine-, 11-, 13-year-olds, and adults had to rate facial trustworthiness with a 7-point Likert scale. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that facial expression and face gender independently affected facial trustworthiness judgement in children aged 10 and below but simultaneously affected judgement in children aged 11 and above, adolescents, and adults. There was no own-age bias in children and adults. The results showed that children younger than 10 could not process multiple facial cues in the same manner as in older children and adults when judging trustworthiness. The current findings provide evidence for the stable-feature account, but not for the own-age bias account or the expertise account.     

First impressions from faces in the real world: Commentary on Sutherland and Young (2022)

The study of first impressions from faces now emphasizes the need to understand trait inferences made to naturalistic face images (British Journal of Psychology, 113, 2022, 1056). Face recognition algorithms based on deep convolutional neural networks simultaneously represent invariant, changeable and environmental variables in face images. Therefore, we suggest them as a comprehensive ‘face space’ model of first impressions of naturalistic faces. We also suggest that to understand trait inferences in the real world, a logical next step is to consider trait inferences made to whole people (faces and bodies). On the role of cultural contributions to trait perception, we think it is important for the field to begin to consider the way in which trait inferences motivate (or not) behaviour in independent and interdependent cultures.     

Young children use pedagogical cues to modulate the strength of normative inferences

Young children understand pedagogical demonstrations as conveying generic, kind‐relevant information. But, in some contexts, they also see almost any confident, intentional action on a novel artefact as normative and thus generic, regardless of whether this action was pedagogically demonstrated for them. Thus, although pedagogy may not be necessary for inferences to the generic, it may nevertheless be sufficient to produce inductive inferences on which the child relies more strongly. This study addresses this tension by bridging the literature on normative reasoning with that on social learning and inductive inference. Three‐year‐old children learned about a novel artefact from either a pedagogical or non‐pedagogical demonstration, and then, a series of new actors acted on that artefact in novel ways. Although children protested normatively in both conditions (e.g., ‘No, not like that’), they persisted longer in enforcing the learned norms in the face of repeated non‐conformity by the new actors. This finding suggests that not all generic, normative inferences are created equal, but rather they depend – at least for their strength – on the nature of the acquisition process.     

Development of category formation for faces differing by age in 9‐ to 12‐month‐olds: An effect of experience with infant faces

We examined category formation for faces differing in age in 9‐ and 12‐month‐olds, and the influence of exposure to infant faces on such ability. Infants were familiarized with adult or infant faces, and then tested with a novel exemplar from the familiarized category paired with a novel exemplar from a novel category (Experiment 1). Both age groups formed discrete categories of adult and infant faces, but exposure to infant faces in everyday life did not modulate performance. The same task was conducted with child versus infant faces (Experiment 2). Whereas 9‐month‐olds preferred infant faces after familiarization with child faces, but not child faces after familiarization with infant faces, 12‐month‐olds formed discrete categories of child and infant faces. Moreover, more exposure to infant faces correlated with higher novel category preference scores when infants were familiarized with infant faces in 12‐month‐olds, but not 9‐month‐olds. The 9‐month‐old asymmetry did not reflect spontaneous preference for infant over child faces (Experiment 3). These findings indicate that 9‐ and 12‐month‐olds can form age‐based categories of faces. The ability of 12‐month‐olds to form separate child and infant categories suggests that they have a more exclusive representation of face age, one that may be influenced by prior experience with infant faces.     

Facial first impressions from another angle: How social judgements are influenced by changeable and invariant facial properties

First impressions made to photographs of faces can depend as much on momentary characteristics of the photographed image (within‐person variability) as on consistent properties of the face of the person depicted (between‐person variability). Here, we examine two important sources of within‐person variability: emotional expression and viewpoint. We find more within‐person variability than between‐person variability for social impressions of key traits of trustworthiness, dominance, and attractiveness, which index the main dimensions in theoretical models of facial impressions. The most important source of this variability is the emotional expression of the face, but the viewpoint of the photograph also affects impressions and modulates the effects of expression. For example, faces look most trustworthy with a happy expression when they are facing the perceiver, compared to when they are facing elsewhere, whereas the opposite is true for anger and disgust. Our findings highlight the integration of these different sources of variability in social impression formation.     

It's not all in the face: reduced face visibility does not modulate social segmentation

Humans rely on social information to parse environmental content into social and nonsocial events. Here, we assessed if information conveyed by faces was necessary for this process. We asked participants to view a video clip depicting a social interaction and mark social and nonsocial events while actors’ faces were either visible or blurred. Keypress and eye-movement data were collected. Participants consistently identified social and nonsocial event boundaries independently of face availability, with greater agreement and less variability in keypresses for social relative to nonsocial events. Eye-tracking revealed that participants attended more to actors’ faces when they were visible and more to bodies when faces were blurred. Thus, face information is not necessary for social segmentation, which appears to be a flexible process that depends on a range of information conveyed by both faces and bodies.     

Anti-equality: Social comparison in young children

Young children dislike getting less than others, which might suggest a general preference for equal outcomes. However, young children are typically not averse to others receiving less than themselves. These results are consistent with two alternatives: young children might not have any preferences about others receiving less than themselves, or they might have preferences for others receiving less than themselves. We test these alternatives with 5- to 10-year-old children. We replicate previous findings that children will take a cost to avoid being at a relative disadvantage, but also find that 5- and 6-year-olds will spitefully take a cost to ensure that another’s welfare falls below their own. This result suggests that the development of fairness includes overcoming an initial social comparison preference for others to get less relative to oneself.     

The flip side of the other‐race coin: They all look different to me

Poorer recognition of other‐race faces than own‐races faces has been attributed to a problem of discrimination (i.e., telling faces apart). The conclusion that ‘they all look the same to me' is based on studies measuring the perception/memory of highly controlled stimuli, typically involving only one or two images of each identity. We hypothesized that such studies underestimate the challenge involved in recognizing other‐race faces because in the real world, an individual's appearance varies in a number of ways (e.g., lighting, expression, hairstyle), reducing the utility of relying on pictorial cues to identity. In two experiments, Caucasian and East Asian participants completed a perceptual sorting task in which they were asked to sort 40 photographs of two unfamiliar identities into piles such that each pile contained all photographs of a single identity. Participants perceived more identities when sorting other‐race faces than own‐race faces, both when sorting celebrity (Experiment 1) and non‐celebrity (Experiment 2) faces, suggesting that in the real world, ‘they all look different to me'. We discuss these results in the light of models in which each identity is represented as a region in a multidimensional face space; we argue that this region is smaller for other‐race than own‐race faces.     

Trust and distrust: the perception of trustworthiness of faces in psychopathic and non-psychopathic offenders

Psychopathy is a disorder linked to impairments in social cognition. Individuals with psychopathy and comparison individuals, as defined by the Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised (Hare, 1991), completed a task requiring complex social judgments. Participants viewed a series of male faces, and made judgments concerning how trustworthy they considered the person pictured to be and the degree to which each face was displaying specific emotions. Judgments of trustworthiness did not differ between the individuals with psychopathy and the comparison individuals. Trustworthiness judgments of the faces negatively correlated with, in particular, ratings of anger in the faces for both groups of participants. The data are discussed with reference to the neural systems, including the amygdala, considered to be involved in the mediation of task performance and also neuro-cognitive models of psychopathy.     

Time perception in response to ashamed faces in children and adults

The present study investigated the effect of the perception of faces expressing shame on time perception in children aged 5 and 8 years, as well as in adults, as a function of their ability to recognize this emotional expression. The participants' ability to recognize the expression of shame among faces expressing different emotions was tested. They were then asked to perform a temporal bisection task involving both neutral and ashamed faces. The results showed that, from the age of 8 years, the participants who recognized the facial expressions of shame underestimated their presentation time compared to that of neutral faces. In contrast, no time distortion was observed in the children who did not recognize the ashamed faces or in those younger children who did recognize them. The results are discussed in terms of self-conscious emotions which develop to involve an attentional mechanism.     

The social-encoding benefit in face recognition is generalized to other-race faces

Faces are visual stimuli that convey rich social information. Previous experiments found better recognition for faces that were evaluated based on their social traits than on their perceptual features during encoding. Here, we ask whether this social-encoding benefit in face recognition is also found for categories of faces that we have no previous social experience with, such as other-race faces. To answer this question, we first explored whether social and perceptual evaluations for other-race faces are consistent and valid. We then asked whether social evaluations during encoding improve recognition for other-race faces. Results show that social and perceptual evaluations of own- and other-race faces were valid. We also found high agreement in social and perceptual evaluations across individuals from different races. This indicates that evaluations of other-race faces are not random but meaningful. Furthermore, we found that social evaluations facilitated face recognition regardless of race, demonstrating a social-encoding benefit for both own- and other-race faces. Our findings highlight the role of social information in face recognition and show how it can be used to improve recognition of categories of faces that are hard to recognize due to lack of experience with them.     

Normal perception of Mooney faces in developmental prosopagnosia: Evidence from the N170 component and rapid neural adaptation

Individuals with developmental prosopagnosia (DP) have a severe difficulty recognizing the faces of known individuals in the absence of any history of neurological damage. These recognition problems may be linked to selective deficits in the holistic/configural processing of faces. We used two‐tone Mooney images to study the processing of faces versus non‐face objects in DP when it is based on holistic information (or the facial gestalt) in the absence of obvious local cues about facial features. A rapid adaptation procedure was employed for a group of 16 DPs. Naturalistic photographs of upright faces were preceded by upright or inverted Mooney faces or by Mooney houses. DPs showed face‐sensitive N170 components in response to Mooney faces versus houses, and N170 amplitude reductions for inverted as compared to upright Mooney faces. They also showed the typical pattern of N170 adaptation effects, with reduced N170 components when upright naturalistic test faces were preceded by upright Mooney faces, demonstrating that the perception of Mooney and naturalistic faces recruits shared neural populations. Our findings demonstrate that individuals with DP can utilize global information about face configurations for categorical discriminations between faces and non‐face objects, and suggest that face processing deficits emerge primarily at more fine‐grained higher level stages of face perception.     

First‐hand sensory experience plays a limited role in children's early understanding of seeing and hearing as sources of knowledge: Evidence from typically hearing and deaf children

One early‐developing component of theory of mind is an understanding of the link between sensory perception and knowledge formation. We know little about the extent to which children's first‐hand sensory experiences drive the development of this understanding, as most tasks capturing this early understanding target vision, with less attention paid to the other senses. In this study, 64 typically hearing children (M_age = 4.0 years) and 21 orally educated deaf children (M_age = 5.44 years) were asked to identify which of two informants knew the identity of a toy animal when each had differing perceptual access to the animal. In the ‘seeing’ condition, one informant saw the animal and the other did not; in the ‘hearing’ condition, one informant heard the animal and the other did not. For both hearing and deaf children, there was no difference between performance on hearing and seeing trials, but deaf children were delayed in both conditions. Further, within both the hearing and deaf groups, older children outperformed younger children on these tasks, indicating that there is a developmental progression. Taken together, the pattern of results suggests that experiences other than first‐hand sensory experiences drive children's developing understanding that sensory perception is associated with knowledge.     

The evolutionary origins of natural pedagogy: Rhesus monkeys show sustained attention following nonsocial cues versus social communicative signals

The natural pedagogy hypothesis proposes that human infants preferentially attend to communicative signals from others, facilitating rapid cultural learning. In this view, sensitivity to such signals is a uniquely human adaptation and as such nonhuman animals should not produce or utilize these communicative signals. We test these evolutionary predictions by examining sensitivity to communicative cues in 206 rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) using an expectancy looking time task modeled on prior work with infants. Monkeys observed a human actor who either made eye contact and vocalized to the monkey (social cue), or waved a fruit in front of her face and produced a tapping sound (nonsocial cue). The actor then either looked at an object (referential look) or looked toward empty space (look away). We found that, unlike human infants in analogous situations, rhesus monkeys looked longer at events following nonsocial cues, regardless of the demonstrator's subsequent looking behavior. Moreover younger and older monkeys showed similar patterns of responses across development. These results provide support for the natural pedagogy hypothesis, while also highlighting evolutionary changes in human sensitivity to communicative signals.