Can eternity be saved? A comment on Stump and Rogers

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - Eleonore Stump and Katherin Rogers have recently defended the doctrine of divine timelessness in separate essays, arguing that the doctrine is...     

Agriculture. A War on Nature?

ABSTRACT  Agriculture, in the ubiquitous debate concerning the environment, is often accused of being environmentally destructive as if farmers are waging a war on nature. The article discusses the role of aggression, competition and killing in agriculture and concludes that those warlike characteristics are a necessary part of agricultural practice. The article stresses, however, that agriculture is not literally a war on nature and points to a number of unwarlike characteristics that also belong to agriculture.     

A simple effect size indicator for two-group comparisons? A comment on r equivalent

R. Rosenthal and D. B. Rubin (2003) proposed an effect size, r equivalent, to be used when (a) only sample size and p values are known for a study, (b) there are no generally accepted effect size indicators, or (c) sample sizes are so small or the data so non-normal that the directly computed effect sizes would be more misleading than the simple effect size. The limitations of their proposal, however, are many, and much more serious than the authors suggested, and should be carefully considered before this effect size is applied, as well as in developing other effect sizes using similar methods.     

Does the Worm Live in the Ground? Reflections on Native American Spirituality

Native American spirituality is described through the 4 basic cultural elements of Medicine, Harmony, Relation, and Vision. Based on these 4 cultural elements, practical implications for counseling are offered concerning greeting, hospitality, silence, space, eye contact, intention, and collaboration.     

How persuasive is a good fit? A comment on theory testing

Quantitative theories with free parameters often gain credence when they closely fit data. This is a mistake. A good fit reveals nothing about the flexibility of the theory (how much it cannot fit), the variability of the data (how firmly the data rule out what the theory cannot fit), or the likelihood of other outcomes (perhaps the theory could have fit any plausible result), and a reader needs all 3 pieces of information to decide how much the fit should increase belief in the theory. The use of good fits as evidence is not supported by philosophers of science nor by the history of psychology; there seem to be no examples of a theory supported mainly by good fits that has led to demonstrable progress. A better way to test a theory with free parameters is to determine how the theory constrains possible outcomes (i.e., what it predicts), assess how firmly actual outcomes agree with those constraints, and determine if plausible alternative outcomes would have been inconsistent with the theory, allowing for the variability of the data.     

Does coaching work? A meta-analysis on the effects of coaching on individual level outcomes in an organizational context

Whereas coaching is very popular as a management tool, research on coaching effectiveness is lagging behind. Moreover, the studies on coaching that are currently available have focused on a large variety of processes and outcome measures and generally lack a firm theoretical foundation. With the meta-analysis presented in this article, we aim to shed light on the effectiveness of coaching within an organizational context. We address the question whether coaching has an effect on five both theoretically and practically relevant individual-level outcome categories: performance/skills, well-being, coping, work attitudes, and goal-directed self-regulation. The results show that coaching has significant positive effects on all outcomes with effect sizes ranging from g = 0.43 (coping) to g = 0.74 (goal-directed self-regulation). These findings indicate that coaching is, overall, an effective intervention in organizations.     

Does grasping in patient D.F. depend on vision?

A recently published study of grasping in patient D.F. challenges the well-known dissociation between vision-for-perception and vision-for-action, suggesting instead that D.F.'s preserved grip scaling depends entirely on haptic feedback. We argue that the results of the study are in fact fully consistent with the perception-action account.     

What wealth-happiness paradox? A short note on the American case

Happiness scholars have tried to resolve the seeming paradox that as Americans’ wealth increased substantially over the last few decades, their happiness did not. This article questions whether the paradox is real. Demonstrations of the paradox almost always rely on GDP per capita as the measure of wealth, but that is a poor measure of a people’s well-being. It is heavily and increasingly skewed; it does not account for effort. Using instead measures of household income, male income, and average wages eliminates the paradox; these indicators of affluence have grown only slowly or declined in the same period, paralleling the changes in happiness scores. Moreover, using these indicators reveals a modest but real correlation between material well-being and national happiness.     

What Does It Mean to Be an American? Patriotism,Nationalism, and American Identity After 9/11

The period of heightened nationalism in the United States that followed the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 provided unusual conditions for investigating issues surrounding the distinction between patriotism and nationalism and the relationship between national identification and pluralistic values. In a survey of national identity and social attitudes conducted in late September 2001, two different definitions of national unity were inserted in the introduction to the questionnaire in an attempt to prime activation of different conceptualizations of nationality. Results demonstrated that the priming conditions did have an effect on the pattern of interrelationships among measures of patriotism, nationalism, and tolerance for cultural diversity.     

Does Belief Have an Aim?

The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs `at will. I argue that the truth-aim hypothesis cannot explain any of these facts. In this respect believing differs from guessing since the hypothesis that guessing aims at the truth can explain the three analogous features of guessing. I conclude that, unlike guessing, believing is not purposive in any interesting sense.     

Is choice a reliable predictor of choice? A comment on Sagarin and Skowronski

In a recent working paper, Chen (2008) argues that a methodology central to the cognitive dissonance literature (the free-choice paradigm) has suffered from an inability to separately measure how much choices affect people’s preferences, and how much they simply reflect those preferences, by failing to fully control for the fact that subjects tend to choose goods they prefer. Although Sagarin and Skowronski concede this, they discount Chen’s argument, claiming that for revealed preferences to completely account for observed choice-effects the relationship between choice and preference would have to be unrealistically high. In this comment, we argue that their critique both misses the crux of Chen’s analysis, and is incorrect. Specifically, to properly test whether choices affect preferences, it is essential that researchers experimentally control for revealed preferences rather than speculate how much of a role they may play. Moreover, Sagarin and Skowronski’s critique rests on two fundamental errors—a misunderstanding of the function of the null-hypothesis and a misunderstanding of preference-measurement psychometrics. These errors leads Sagarin and Skowronski to suggest alternative experimental designs which while a good first step, do not address the problems identified in Chen (2008).     

How valid is the psychoticism scale? A comment on the Van Kampen critique

Van Kampen (1993) has published a paper in which he criticizes the concept of psychoticism and the use of the P scale as a measuring device, and advances measures for his own S scale and its validity. This reply attempts to clarify the notion of ‘validity’, and to demonstrate that there is a considerable body of experimental evidence to show that P has a high degree of construct validity, whereas the Van Kampen S scale lacks completely any degree of construct validity. Several examples are given of how the experimental evidence legitimates both the P scale, and the theory (nomological network) on which it is based.     

Does the philosophy of medicine exist? A commentary on Caplan

Caplan has argued that the philosophy of medicine does not exist. Although I will not deny the points he makes, I will argue that the philosophy of medicine has characteristics of a developing field with the potential to meet all of Caplan's criteria. The argument is based on Dewey's established views on logical development for a field of inquiry, as well as pointing out how other criteria Caplan imposes can be fulfilled.The U.S. Government right to retain a non-exclusive, royalty free licence in and to any copyright is acknowledged.     

Does a panel discussion on analytic technique have any effect on an audience of analysts?

This is a report of a followup study to determine whether attending a panel discussion group on post-termination patient-analyst contact influenced the analytic audience's attitude on that subject. A questionnaire about post-termination contact was given to 21 analysts who did not attend the discussion group and to 45 analysts before they attended. The same questionnaire was given again to both groups six months later. Responses by the 21 analysts who had not been present remained essentially unchanged. Responses of the 45 analysts, after attending the discussion group, when compared to responses of an earlier group of 300 analysts, showed an increase in the proportion of analysts who said, in reference to psychoanalytic psychotherapy patients, either that they hoped to hear from the patient or that they would like the patient to return to see them at some specified period after treatment termination. Attendance at the discussion seems responsible for a significant effect on the analytic audience's attitude on post-termination patient-analyst contact.     

The effect of an extinction cue on ABA-renewal: Does valence matter?

The present human fear conditioning study examined whether the valence of an extinction cue has a differential effect on attenuating renewal that is induced by removal of the extinction context. Additionally, the study aimed to assess whether such attenuating effect is based on a modulatory or safety-signal role of the cue. In acquisition, extinction, and test stages of the experiment, human participants received pairings of human faces, presented against a particular background color, with the presence or absence of an aversive auditory stimulus. Experimental groups differed in the valence of a cue that was presented during extinction, in whether or not extinction took place against a different background color than present during acquisition and testing, and in whether the extinction cue was present or absent at test. The conditioned response consisted of auditory-stimulus expectancy ratings. It was hypothesized that a positively valued extinction cue yields faster extinction, stronger attenuation of renewal, and better transfer of its inhibitory power to non-extinguished stimuli than a negatively valued cue. All three hypotheses were confirmed, suggesting that the positive, but not the negative, cue had become a safety signal. The results were discussed in the framework of extinction-based exposure treatments.