Partial awareness distinguishes between measuring conscious perception and conscious content: Reply to Dienes and Seth

In their comment on Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, and Cleeremans (2010), Dienes and Seth argue that increased sensitivity of the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) is a consequence of the scale being less exclusive rather than more exhaustive. According to Dienes and Seth, this is because PAS may measure some conscious content, though not necessarily relevant conscious content, “If one saw a square but was only aware of seeing a flash of something, then one has not consciously seen a square.” In this reply, we claim that there is a difference between conscious visual experience, which may be partial, and the resulting conscious content, which is conceptual. Whereas PAS measures the first, confidence judgments and post-decision wagering measure the second.     

The perception of visual emotion: Comparing different measures of awareness

Here, we explore the sensitivity of different awareness scales in revealing conscious reports on visual emotion perception. Participants were exposed to a backward masking task involving fearful faces and asked to rate their conscious awareness in perceiving emotion in facial expression using three different subjective measures: confidence ratings (CRs), with the conventional taxonomy of certainty, the perceptual awareness scale (PAS), through which participants categorize “raw” visual experience, and post-decision wagering (PDW), which involves economic categorization. Our results show that the CR measure was the most exhaustive and the most graded. In contrast, the PAS and PDW measures suggested instead that consciousness of emotional stimuli is dichotomous. Possible explanations of the inconsistency were discussed. Finally, our results also indicate that PDW biases awareness ratings by enhancing first-order accuracy of emotion perception. This effect was possibly a result of higher motivation induced by monetary incentives.     

The role of levels of processing in disentangling the ERP signatures of conscious visual processing

We aimed to distinguish electrophysiological signatures of visual awareness from other task-related processes through manipulating the level of processing of visual stimuli. During an event-related EEG experiment, 36 subjects performed either color (low-level condition) or magnitude (high-level condition) evaluations of masked digits. Participants also assessed subjective visibility of each stimulus using the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS). Mean amplitude of the components of interest was analyzed (VAN − 140–240 ms; LP − 380–480 ms) with weighted regression mixed model. In the VAN component time window the mean amplitude correlated with PAS rating in both conditions. Mean amplitude in the LP time window correlated with PAS ratings in the high-level condition, but not in the low-level condition. Our results support the temporal unfolding of ERP makers of conscious processing, with an early component reflecting the initial perceptual experience and a late component being a correlate of the conscious experience of non-perceptual information.     

The hare and the snail: Dissociating visual orienting from conscious perception

A method for investigating attentional effects of peripheral visual objects, independently of perceptual identification, is described. We report an experiment using this method which shows that visual processing of peripheral objects differs radically, depending on whether participants move attention in response to an object or consciously perceive that object. When luminance contrast was reduced, conscious perceptual discrimination of peripheral letters was massively slower and less accurate—but both low and high contrast letters elicited rapid attentional orienting effects and these rapid orienting effects were equal in magnitude across low and high contrast. This pattern is consistent with known differences in luminance sensitivity between the dorsal and ventral visual processing streams, and with rapid dorsal–ventral interaction mediated via re-entrant feedback. Our findings show that the control system responsible for rapid movements of attention is exquisitely sensitive to visual form information at low levels of contrast, and involves a different neurocognitive pathway to that which gives rise to conscious perception.     

The P3 component of the ERP reflects conscious perception, not confidence

Consistent with numerous electrophysiological studies, we recently reported that conscious perception is associated with a widely distributed modulation of the P3 component (Lamy, Salti, & Bar-Haim, 2009). We also showed that correct objective performance in the absence of subjective awareness is associated with a spatially more restricted modulation of the P3. The relatively late occurrence of the P3 along with lack of control for post-perceptual processes suggests that this component might reflect processes related to stimulus evaluation or confidence rather than to visual awareness or objective performance. The main aim of the current study was to test this hypothesis. While EEG was recorded, participants performed a forced-choice localization task and reported their subjective perception of the target on a 3-level scale that also indexed their confidence. The results showed that our previous findings are replicated when confidence is controlled for.     

Measuring consciousness: Is one measure better than the other?

What is the best way of assessing the extent to which people are aware of a stimulus? Here, using a masked visual identification task, we compared three measures of subjective awareness: The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), through which participants are asked to rate the clarity of their visual experience; confidence ratings (CR), through which participants express their confidence in their identification decisions, and Post-decision wagering (PDW), in which participants place a monetary wager on their decisions. We conducted detailed explorations of the relationships between awareness and identification performance, looking to determine (1) which scale best correlates with performance, and (2) whether we can detect performance in the absence of awareness and how the scales differ from each other in terms of revealing such unconscious processing. Based on these findings we discuss whether perceptual awareness should be considered graded or dichotomous. Results showed that PAS showed a much stronger performance-awareness correlation than either CR or PDW, particularly for low stimulus intensities. In general, all scales indicated above-chance performance when participants claimed not to have seen anything. However, such above-chance performance only showed when we also observed a correlation between awareness and performance. Thus (1) PAS seems to be the most exhaustive measure of awareness, and (2) we find support for above-chance performance in the absence of subjective awareness, but such unconscious knowledge only contributes to performance when we observe conscious knowledge as well. Similarities and differences between scales are discussed in the light of consciousness theories and response strategies.     

Being confident without seeing: What subjective measures of visual consciousness are about

Can observers be confident about the accuracy of a discrimination response without a visual experience of the stimulus? In a series of five experiments, observers performed a masked orientation discrimination task, a masked shape discrimination task, or a random-dot motion discrimination task, followed by two subjective ratings after each trial, in which participants reported either their visual experience of the stimulus or their confidence in being correct. We observed that the threshold for ratings of the perception of the stimulus was above the threshold for ratings of a decision, that decision ratings outperformed stimulus ratings in predicting trial accuracy, and that different decision-related scales were more strongly associated with other decision-related scales than with ratings of stimulus clarity. We propose a taxonomy of subjective measures of consciousness that differentiates between subjective measures relating to the percept of the stimulus and measures relating to a discrimination decision and discuss the relation to type II blindsight.     

In search of the optimal measure of awareness: Discrete or continuous?

Studies of perceptual awareness require sensitive measures reflecting subjective judgments of visibility. Two scales have been proposed for this purpose: the Continuous Scale (CS) and the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS). Here we compare the scales in the context of the Gabor patch orientation discrimination task and propose a Continuous Perceptual Awareness Scale (C-PAS) that aims to combine their advantages. The results of the study shown no differences in sensitivity between the scales. However, we observed differences between the scales in awareness ratings frequencies and accuracy associated with the lowest ratings. We concluded that visibility ratings are often biased, and thus, the scale sensitivity may not be optimal. Furthermore, based on the additional analyses, we argued that there is an advantage of using C-PAS over CS. The scale allows to use an additional variability of judgment within PAS categories and thus it may enable more fine-grained measurement of visibility at near-threshold conditions.     

Gradedness of visual awareness depends on attentional scope: Global perception is more graded than local perception

The gradedness or discreteness of our visual awareness has been debated. Here, we investigate the influence of spatial scope of attention on the gradedness of visual awareness. We manipulated scope of attention using hierarchical letter-based tasks (global: broad scope; local: narrow scope). Participants reported the identity of a masked hierarchical letter either at the global level or at the local level. We measured subjective awareness using the perceptual awareness scale ratings and objective performance. The results indicate more graded visual awareness (lesser slope for the awareness rating curve) at the global level compared to the local level. Graded perception was also observed in visibility ratings usage with global level task showing higher usage of the middle PAS ratings. Our results are in line with the prediction of level of processing hypothesis and show that global/local attentional scope and contextual endogenous factors influence the graded nature of our visual awareness.     

Visual awareness judgments are sensitive to accuracy feedback in stimulus discrimination tasks

In this study we tested the hypothesis that perceptual awareness judgments are sensitive to accuracy feedback about the previous action. We used a perceptual discrimination task in which participants reported their stimulus awareness. We created two conditions: No-feedback and Feedback (discrimination accuracy feedback was provided at the end of each trial). The results showed that visual awareness judgments are related to the accuracy of current and previous responses. Participants reported lower stimulus awareness for incorrectly versus correctly discriminated stimuli in both conditions; they also reported lower stimulus awareness in trials preceded by incorrect discrimination responses, compared to trials preceded by correct discrimination responses. This difference was significantly stronger in the Feedback condition, in which we also observed post-error slowing for PAS ratings. We discuss the relation between visual awareness and the effects of performance monitoring and interpret the results in the context of current theories of consciousness.     

Tracking the processes behind conscious perception: a review of event-related potential correlates of visual consciousness

Event-related potential (ERP) studies have attempted to discover the processes that underlie conscious visual perception by contrasting ERPs produced by stimuli that are consciously perceived with those that are not. Variability of the proposed ERP correlates of consciousness is considerable: the earliest proposed ERP correlate of consciousness (P1) coincides with sensory processes and the last one (P3) marks postperceptual processes. A negative difference wave called visual awareness negativity (VAN), typically observed around 200 ms after stimulus onset in occipitotemporal sites, gains strong support for reflecting the processes that correlate with, and possibly enable, aware visual perception. Research suggests that the early parts of conscious processing can proceed independently of top-down attention, although top-down attention may modulate visual processing even before consciousness. Evidence implies that the contents of consciousness are provided by interactions in the ventral stream, but indispensable contributions from dorsal regions influence already low-level visual responses.     

Sources of confidence judgments in implicit cognition

Subjective reports of confidence are frequently used as a measure of awareness in a variety of fields, including artificial grammar learning. However, little is known about what information is used to make confidence judgments and whether there are any possible sources of information used to discriminate between items that are unrelated to confidence. The data reported here replicate an earlier experiment by Vokey and Brooks (1992) and show that grammaticality decisions are based on both the grammatical status of items and their similarity to study exemplars. The key finding is that confidence ratings made on a continuous scale (50%—100%) are closely related to grammaticality but are unrelated to all of the measures of similarity that were tested. By contrast, confidence ratings made on a binary scale (high vs. low) are related to both grammaticality and similarity. The data confirm an earlier finding (Tunney & Shanks, 2003) that binary confidence ratings are more sensitive to low levels of awareness than continuous ratings are and suggest that participants are conscious of all the information acquired in artificial grammar learning.     

Surprise-induced blindness: a stimulus-driven attentional limit to conscious perception

The cost of attending to a visual event can be the failure to consciously detect other events. This processing limitation is well illustrated by the attentional blink paradigm, in which searching for and attending to a target presented in a rapid serial visual presentation stream of distractors can impair one's ability to detect a second target presented soon thereafter. The attentional blink critically depends on 'top-down' attentional settings, for it does not occur if participants are asked to ignore the first target. Here we show that 'bottom-up' attention can also lead to a profound but ephemeral deficit in conscious perception: Presentation of a novel, unexpected, and task-irrelevant stimulus virtually abolishes conscious detection of a target presented within half a second after the 'Surprise' stimulus, but only for its earliest occurrences (generally 1 to 2 presentations). This powerful but short-lived deficit contrasts with a milder but more enduring form of attentional capture that accompanies singleton presentations in rapid serial visual presentations. We conclude that the capture of stimulus-driven attention alone can limit explicit perception.     

Somatovisceral interactions in visceral perception: abdominal masking of colonic stimuli.

Clinical and experimental evidence on referred pain and spinal-afferent convergence demonstrates a close relationship between visceral and somatosensory perception, which is important for current models of symptom perception and central body representation. The study uses a psychophysical approach to quantify these interactions at the perceptual level, taking into account problems of comparable intermodal scaling and the role of awareness. An experiment on somatosensory masking of distension stimuli in the colon is reported in which a multiple staircase method of forced choice discrimination with concurrent sensation ratings was employed. Results showed perceptual masking of visceral by abdominal stimuli but not vice versa. The masking effect was not enhanced by intratomal placement of the abdominal stimulus in the lower left quadrant. This contradicts the spinal sensory convergence model and points to perceptual interactions at higher brain levels. Loglinear analysis of relations between discrimination and subjective sensation revealed qualitative differences of somatovisceral perception at the preconscious as compared to the conscious level. This argues for a two-process model of integrative body perception.     

Somatovisceral interactions in visceral perception: Abdominal masking of colonic stimuli

Clinical and experimental evidence on referred pain and spinal-afferent convergence demonstrates a close relationship between visceral and somatosensory perception, which is important for current models of symptom perception and central body representation. The study uses a psychophysical approach to quantify these interactions at the perceptual level, taking into account problems of comparable intermodal scaling and the role of awareness. An experiment on somatosensory masking of distension stimuli in the colon is reported in which a multiple staircase method of forced choice discrimination with concurrent sensation ratings was employed. Results showed perceptual masking of visceral by abdominal stimuli but not vice versa. The masking effect was not enhanced by intratomal placement of the abdominal stimulus in the lower left quadrant. This contradicts the spinal sensory convergence model and points to perceptual interactions at higher brain levels. Loglinear analysis of relations between discrimination and subjective sensation revealed qualitative differences of somatovisceral perception at the preconscious as compared to the conscious level. This argues for a two-process model of integrative body perception.     

Somatovisceral interactions in visceral perception: Abdominal masking of colonic stimuli

Clinical and experimental evidence on referred pain and spinal-afferent convergence demonstrates a close relationship between visceral and somatosensory perception, which is important for current models of symptom perception and central body representation. The study uses a psychophysical approach to quantify these interactions at the perceptual level, taking into account problems of comparable intermodal scaling and the role of awareness. An experiment on somatosensory masking of distension stimuli in the colon is reported in which a multiple staircase method of forced choice discrimination with concurrent sensation ratings was employed. Results showed perceptual masking of visceral by abdominal stimuli but not vice versa. The masking effect was not enhanced by intratomal placement of the abdominal stimulus in the lower left quadrant. This contradicts the spinal sensory convergence model and points to perceptual interactions at higher brain levels. Loglinear analysis of relations between discrimination and subjective sensation revealed qualitative differences of somatovisceral perception at the preconscious as compared to the conscious level. This argues for a two-process model of integrative body perception.     

Cognitive phenomenology and conscious thought

How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing as conscious thought. So one must either accept that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology, or deny the existence of conscious thought. Once it is clear that conscious thought requires cognitive phenomenology, there is a pressing question about the exact relationship between a thought’s cognitive phenomenological properties and its content. I conclude with a discussion of the nature of this relationship.     

Measuring and testing awareness of emotional face expressions

Comparison of behavioural measures of consciousness has attracted much attention recently. In a recent article, Szczepanowski et al. conclude that confidence ratings (CR) predict accuracy better than both the perceptual awareness scale (PAS) and post-decision wagering (PDW) when using stimuli with emotional content (fearful vs. neutral faces). Although we find the study interesting, we disagree with the conclusion that CR is superior to PAS because of two methodological issues. First, the conclusion is not based on a formal test. We performed this test and found no evidence that CR predicted accuracy better than PAS (p = .4). Second, Szczepanowski et al. used the present version of PAS in a manner somewhat different from how it was originally intended, and the participants may not have been adequately instructed. We end our commentary with a set of recommendations for future studies using PAS.     

Knowledge applied to new domains: The unconscious succeeds where the conscious fails

A common view holds that consciousness is needed for knowledge acquired in one domain to be applied in a novel domain. We present evidence for the opposite; where the transfer of knowledge is achieved only in the absence of conscious awareness. Knowledge of artificial grammars was examined where training and testing occurred in different vocabularies or modalities. In all conditions grammaticality judgments attributed to random selection showed above-chance accuracy (60%), while those attributed to conscious decisions did not. Participants also rated each string’s familiarity and performed a perceptual task assessing fluency. Familiarity was predicted by repetition structure and was thus related to grammaticality. Fluency, though increasing familiarity, was unrelated to grammaticality. While familiarity predicted all judgments only those attributed to random selection showed a significant additional contribution of grammaticality, deriving primarily from chunk novelty. In knowledge transfer, as in visual perception (Marcel, 1993), the unconscious may outperform the conscious.     

Perceiving causality after the fact: postdiction in the temporal dynamics of causal perception

In simple dynamic events we can easily perceive not only motion, but also higher-level properties such as causality, as when we see one object collide with another. Several researchers have suggested that such causal perception is an automatic and stimulus-driven process, sensitive only to particular sorts of visual information, and a major research project has been to uncover the nature of these visual cues. Here, rather than investigating what information affects causal perception, we instead explore the temporal dynamics of when certain types of information are used. Surprisingly, we find that certain visual events can determine whether we perceive a collision in an ambiguous situation even when those events occur after the moment of potential 'impact' in the putative collision has already passed. This illustrates a type of postdictive perception: our conscious perception of the world is not an instantaneous moment-by-moment construction, but rather is formed by integrating information presented within short temporal windows, so that new information which is obtained can influence the immediate past in our conscious awareness. Such effects have been previously demonstrated for low-level motion phenomena, but the present results demonstrate that postdictive processes can influence higher-level event perception. These findings help to characterize not only the 'rules' of causal perception, but also the temporal dynamics of how and when those rules operate.