The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Libertarianism: A Critique of Pruss

Philosophia - Alexander Pruss’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) states that every contingent true proposition has an explanation. Pruss thinks that he can plausibly maintain both his PSR...     

从心灵到语言 ——语言研究与人文科学

该文概述西方学术主流从“心灵”到“语言”的范式转换;清理以语言为批评范式的思想家们对语言“本质”的不同理解以及由此而产生的不同学术立场;凸显语用学对人文学术之重构的巨大影响;指出乔姆斯基的“普遍语法”以及与之似乎针锋相对的“认知语言学”,都在相当程度上代表了索绪尔之前的本质主义语言观对语言决定论的抵制。     

The ‘Anti-Social’ Nature of Prosocial Research; A Psychosocial Critique

This article provides a critical review of recent psychological articles on prosocial behaviour. Even though it focuses on a specific section of this literature – giving to charities and prosocial responses to humanitarian disasters – the paper aims to offer a wider critique as it interrogates the epistemological and methodological underpinnings of the prosocial literature as a whole. It aims to illustrate how the problematic aspects of traditional quantitative, deductive, experimental research in prosocial behaviour in general, when applied to giving to charities, preclude a deeper and more complex understanding of a phenomenon quintessentially social and altruistic. I identify three specific issues that make mainstream approaches to prosocial behaviour problematic and limited in scope. The first relates to the insularity of mainstream psychology and the lack of contextualisation of its findings, in particular the problematic neglect of ideological and socio-historical factors in prosocial behaviour. The second relates to mainstream psychology's disregard for the role played by conflict, contradiction and ambivalence, in attitudes and decision making as well as in the emotional aspects of prosocial behaviour. The third looks at the constraints imposed by scientifically inspired methods, how they predetermine the range of participants' responses and make it hard to apply the findings to real life situations. I claim that these epistemological and methodological constraints severely limit the applicability and comprehensiveness of current research. The discussion of these issues is woven through the review and uses some specific studies to illustrate the limitations imposed by these constraints. Throughout the paper I also argue for the need to incorporate a psychosocial approach to research into prosocial behaviour.     

The Relational–Linguistic Spiral: A Model of Language for Theology

This article attempts to sketch out a view of language as a relational–linguistic spiral by discussing some implications of the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein for language in general. Language is cast as a spiral which revolves around a center of 'human relationality' that anchors all our speech and concepts but which revolves in an ever–widening way into an arena of meaning we call language. Language creates linguistic space for experience and invites one into these new experiences. The borders of our language are thus not the absolute limits of our world but the admitted limits of our experience. Because the enterprise of language is inherently open, there must be a space for theological language and for the possibility at least of the kind of experiences described therein. Tracing the relational 'vectors' involved in language can also provide a platform for theological and even inter–religious dialogue.     

The Neo‐Barthian Critique of Reinhold Niebuhr

The author notes an unclarity in David Novak's defense of Reinhold Niebuhr against Stanley Hauerwas's critique and identifies some issues left unsettled in the exchange between Novak and Hauerwas over Niebuhr's ethics. Specifically, the author proposes that the Barthian‐Hauerwasian communitarian rejection of Niebuhrian natural theology and natural law ignores the historical abuse of biblical theology in the German Christian response to the Nazis, fails to account for the fact of general moral revulsion against Nazism, and flirts itself with a conventionalist form of nihilism.     

Theology and Institutions — A Partisan British Perspective

Books reviewed in this article:
Willi Braun and Russell T. McCutcheon, (eds.) Guide to the Study of Religion
J'annine Jobling and Ian Markham, (eds) Theological Liberalism, Creative and Critical     

Kantian Schemata: A Critique Consistent with the Critique

Kant posits the schema as a hybrid bridging the generality of pure concepts and the particularity of sensible intuitions. However, I argue that countenancing such schemata leads to a third‐man regress. Siding with those who think that the mid‐way posit of the Critique of Pure Reason's schematism section is untenable, my diagnosis is that Kant's transcendental inquiry goes awry because it attempts to analyse a form/matter union that is primitive. I therefore sketch a nonrepresentational stance aimed at respecting this primitivity.     

Meritocracy: A Critique

Herpes Simplex, by T. Natasha Posner, The Experience of Illness Series, London: Routledge, 1998, 143 pages, paperback £13.99     

A Critique of Frankfurt-Libertarianism

Most libertarians think that some version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is true. A number of libertarians, which I call ‘Frankfurt-libertarians,’ think that they need not embrace any version of PAP. In this paper, I examine the writings of one such Frankfurt-libertarian, Eleonore Stump, for her evaluation of the impact of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP. I show how, contrary to her own claims, Stump does need a PAP-like principle for her account of free action. I briefly argue that this discussion also goes some distance to showing that any Frankfurt-libertarian is in a similar position regarding the need for some PAP-like principle. If I am correct, then Frankfurt-libertarians must either renounce their incompatibilism or concede that FSCs fail to show all PAP-like principles to be false.

The Social Model of Disability: A Philosophical Critique

abstract Emerging from the political activism of disabled people's movements and mainly theorised by the scholar Michael Oliver, the social model of disability is central to current debates in Disability Studies as well as to related perspectives on inclusive education. This article presents a philosophical critique of the social model of disability and outlines some of its theoretical problems. It argues that in conceptualising disability as unilaterally socially caused, the social model presents a partial and, to a certain extent, flawed understanding of the relation between impairment, disability and society, thus setting a framework that needs clarifications and extensions and presents limits to the achievement of its own aim of inclusion. This article concludes by suggesting that, despite its theoretical limits, the social model acts as a powerful and important reminder to face issues of inclusion as fundamental, moral issues.