具身认知:身体主题在心身关系研究中的回归

上世纪80年代以来,随着经典认知研究的步履维艰,认知研究逐渐显示出具身化的特点。具身认知是第二代认知科学的代表,它强调身体在认知形成中的重要性,认为身体对认知有限制、分配和调节作用,并具有与经典认知不同的运动观。近年来研究者们以实验手段力求为具身认知的存在提供证据,着力考察认知与身体感知运动状态的相互影响。具身认知理论在认知构建、生态效度等方面具有自己的优势,但目前具身认知还是一个新兴的研究领域,有待进一步的深入探讨。     

The perception/cognition distincton: Challenging the representational account

A central goal for cognitive science and philosophy of mind is to distinguish between perception and cognition. The representational approach has emerged as a prominent candidate to draw such a distinction. The idea is that perception and cognition differ in the content and the format in which the information is represented —just as perceptual representations are nonconceptual in content and iconic in format, cognitive representations are conceptual in content and discursive in format. This paper argues against this view. I argue that both perception and cognition can use conceptual and nonconceptual contents and be vehiculated in iconic and discursive formats. If correct, the representational strategy to distinguish perception from cognition fails.     

A commentary on Rönnberg's distinction between perception and cognition

In a commentary on a note by Rönnberg (Rönnberg, J. On the distinction between perception and cognition. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology , 1990, 31 , 154–156), it is argued that one of Rönnberg's criteria for theoretically distinguishing perception from cognition, that of different biological purposes, is invalid. Congruent with a broad definition of perception and cognition which most researchers agree upon, Rönnberg's two other criteria essentially state that how internally represented information is processed distinguishes between perception and cognition. However, the more strict criterion of whether explicit retrieval of information from memory is necessary is too dependent on a particular, rather limited theoretical framework. A third, less theory-dependent criterion of whether the information available in the stimulus is sufficient to account for comprehension may be useful in research which investigates hypotheses about similarities between perception and cognition.     

Differentiation and unification in perception and cognition

It has been suggested that the development of distinctions between perception and cognition depends upon the perspective and the level of analysis chosen. Similarly, the unification of perception and cognition may be achieved from other perspectives and when other levels of analyses are applied. The fruitfulness, and disadvantages, of diverse suggestions for differentation/unification of perception and cognition are discussed briefly.     

Let's call the whole thing off: a response to Dawes (2001)

There has been a recent controversy regarding the validity of the Rorschach test. This comment is in response to criticism levied by R. M. Dawes (2001) on the incremental validity of the Ego Impairment Index (EII), a Rorschach-derived measure of cognition, perception, and reasoning. The Dawes articles (1999 and 2001) serve as an example of the recent practice of placing extraordinary challenges on the Rorschach test. Dawes's arguments are examined and parallel examples are provided that demonstrate the bias used to judge the validity of the EII, the Rorschach, and psychological assessment. Still, in the face of criticism, the results (see Dawes, 2001) support the incremental validity of the EII. Thus, the conclusion presented in this Comment is that it is time for us to "call the whole thing off" and end the Rorschach controversy that has occupied so much recent attention and generated so few new ideas.     

Incremental validity of the Ego Impairment Index: a re-examination of Dawes (1999)

This article examined the incremental validity of the Ego Impairment Index (EII), a Rorschach measure of cognition, perception, and reasoning. R. M. Dawes (1999) borrowed 2 previously published data sets to assess the incremental validity of the EII. Dawes determined that in order for the EII to be considered a valid measure, the overall EII score should "outperform" 2 of the variables that compose the index. Using this approach, Dawes reported that the EII had "deficient" (p = .059) incremental validity. In this study, the incremental validity of the EII was re-examined using 1 of the data sets used by R. M. Dawes (1999). Applying the same strategy as Dawes, the author tested the incremental validity of the EII in predicting positive symptoms of schizophrenia, a more appropriate and clinically relevant criterion measure of impairment. The EII significantly predicted positive symptoms (p < .005) even after the 2 EII variables selected by Dawes and the measure of social competence were 1st entered into the equation. The results suggest that the EII adds meaningful information in the assessment of thought disturbance.     

Social understanding through direct perception? Yes,by interacting

This paper comments on Gallagher’s recently published direct perception proposal about social cognition [Gallagher, S. (2008a). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 535–543]. I show that direct perception is in danger of being appropriated by the very cognitivist accounts criticised by Gallagher (theory theory and simulation theory). Then I argue that the experiential directness of perception in social situations can be understood only in the context of the role of the interaction process in social cognition. I elaborate on the role of social interaction with a discussion of participatory sense-making to show that direct perception, rather than being a perception enriched by mainly individual capacities, can be best understood as an interactional phenomenon.     

Emotion as patheception

Emotions cannot be fully understood in purely cognitive terms. Nor can they be fully understood as mere feelings with no content. But it has not been easy to give an account of the relation of affect and cognition in a way that preserves the perceived unity of emotional experience. Consequently, emotion theories tend to lean either toward cognitivism, or, alternatively, the view that emotions are basically non-cognitive affairs. The aim of this paper is to argue for an account of emotion as a unity of affect and cognition. Emotions, it will be suggested, do not combine, blend, add, or causally relate cognition to affect, or affect to cognition, but are rather original unities which should be viewed as coordinate with, rather than subordinate to, either cognition, perception, feeling, or any other basic mental category.     

New perspectives on the effects of action on perceptual and cognitive development

This special section was motivated by a resurgence in the view that it is impossible to investigate perceptual and cognitive development without considering how it is affected by, and intertwined with, infants' and children's action in the world. This view has long been foundational to the field, yet contemporary investigations of the effects of acting on cognition and perception have been limited. The research showcased in this section indicates that this trend is changing as researchers consider anew the ways in which cognition derives structure from action. The work presented here illustrates the breadth of these potential effects across ages and domains of development, and it highlights the breadth of methods that can be recruited to investigate them. This new research focus provides insight for the mechanisms by which action affects perception and cognition and at the same time reveals that much remains to be learned.     

Marking the Perception–Cognition Boundary: The Criterion of Stimulus-Dependence

Philosophy, scientific psychology, and common sense all distinguish perception from cognition. While there is little agreement about how the perception–cognition boundary ought to be drawn, one prominent idea is that perceptual states are dependent on a stimulus, or are stimulus-dependent, in a way that cognitive states are not. This paper seeks to develop this idea in a way that can accommodate two apparent counterexamples: hallucinations, which are prima facie perceptual yet stimulus-independent; and demonstrative thoughts, which are prima facie cognitive yet stimulus-dependent. The payoff is not only a specific proposal for marking the perception–cognition boundary, but also a deeper understanding of the natures of hallucination and demonstrative thought.     

生物运动及其在社会认知障碍研究中的应用

人类对生物运动具有较强的视觉敏感性,即使在视觉线索有限的情况下,仍能提取其中的社会性信息。本研究系统梳理了当前生物运动视知觉实验研究涉及的各类社会性信息,并归纳分析社会认知缺陷与生物运动视知觉加工之间的内在联系,以期促进对生物运动视知觉加工心理机制问题的深入探讨     

Incidental sounds of locomotion in animal cognition

The highly synchronized formations that characterize schooling in fish and the flight of certain bird groups have frequently been explained as reducing energy expenditure. I present an alternative, or complimentary, hypothesis that synchronization of group movements may improve hearing perception. Although incidental sounds produced as a by-product of locomotion (ISOL) will be an almost constant presence to most animals, the impact on perception and cognition has been little discussed. A consequence of ISOL may be masking of critical sound signals in the surroundings. Birds in flight may generate significant noise; some produce wing beats that are readily heard on the ground at some distance from the source. Synchronization of group movements might reduce auditory masking through periods of relative silence and facilitate auditory grouping processes. Respiratory locomotor coupling and intermittent flight may be other means of reducing masking and improving hearing perception. A distinct border between ISOL and communicative signals is difficult to delineate. ISOL seems to be used by schooling fish as an aid to staying in formation and avoiding collisions. Bird and bat flocks may use ISOL in an analogous way. ISOL and interaction with animal perception, cognition, and synchronized behavior provide an interesting area for future study.     

La perception multisource : une nouvelle approche de la perception de scènes

Research conducted these last years in the field of spatial cognition report empirical findings that are difficult to account for with the traditional visual cognitive model of scene perception. One of the major contributions of these findings has been to invite rethinking scene perception, which would benefit from not being apprehended as centered mainly on the sensory modality considered. On the contrary, the Multisource model of scene perception developed by Intraub et al. offers an alternative theoretical framework considering visual perception as an act of spatial cognition, with spatial information at its core. According to this model, during the initial understanding of a view, the cognitive system would be elaborating a multisource representation, with spatial information constituting an egocentric framework that conveys to the observer a sense of the environment in which he/she is embedded. Scene representation would be organized around an amodal spatial structure combining different sources of information: a bottom-up and external source of information derived from different modalities (e.g., visual, haptic), as well as internal sources of high-level information (i.e., amodal, conceptual and contextual information). These different sources of information would work together to create a simulation of the likely environment, integrating the perceived view into a broader spatial context. Beyond rethinking scene perception, one of the advances of the model is to unify different fields of cognition apprehended until then in isolation. The current paper aims to present this model and some of the results it allows to account for.     

孤独症谱系障碍者基于运动线索的生命知觉

生命知觉是人们将客体自动加工为可以相互作用的生命体的认知过程。ASD者基于运动线索的生命知觉的研究方法包括追逐检测范式、运动特性参数化范式和因果知觉范例。其生命知觉的异常主要表现为运动信息整合能力不足、社会因果知觉缺陷以及对高复杂度运动的神经追踪较弱。相关理论假设从神经病理、认知加工及脑结构和功能障碍层面进行解释。未来应提升研究方法的生态效度,推进追踪与系统化研究,促进相关干预方案的开发。     

Subjective experience is probably not limited to humans: the evidence from neurobiology and behavior

In humans, conscious perception and cognition depends upon the thalamocortical (T-C) complex, which supports perception, explicit cognition, memory, language, planning, and strategic control. When parts of the T-C system are damaged or stimulated, corresponding effects are found on conscious contents and state, as assessed by reliable reports. In contrast, large regions like cerebellum and basal ganglia can be damaged without affecting conscious cognition directly. Functional brain recordings also show robust activity differences in cortex between experimentally matched conscious and unconscious events. This basic anatomy and physiology is highly conserved in mammals and perhaps ancestral reptiles. While language is absent in other species, homologies in perception, memory, and motor cortex suggest that consciousness of one kind or another may be biologically fundamental and phylogenetically ancient. In humans we infer subjective experiences from behavioral and brain evidence. This evidence is quite similar in other mammals and perhaps some non-mammalian species. On the weight of the biological evidence, therefore, subjectivity may be conserved in species with human-like brains and behavior.     

Paranoia and self-consciousness.

A new instrument designed to assess paranoid thought in college students, together with reliability and validity data, was presented in Study 1. A single general factor accounted for a substantial portion of the variance in the full scale. Public self-consciousness was consistently and significantly correlated with the present measure of paranoia. In Study 2, both pretested paranoia and public self-consciousness were related to feelings of being watched (a classical manifestation of paranoia), although public self-consciousness had an effect only when there was a 2-way mirror present. In Study 3, self-attention, experimentally induced using a story construction task, again resulted in a heightened sense of being observed. Discussion focuses on paranoid cognition as characteristic of everyday thought and the implications of self-attention for social perception processes.     

Four themes from 20 years of research on infant perception and cognition

This paper reviews progress over the past 20 years in four areas of research on infant perception and cognition. Work on perception of dynamic events has identified perceptual constraints on perception of object unity and object trajectory continuity that have led to a perceptual account of early development that supplements Nativist accounts. Work on face processing has charted developmental changes that clarify the way innate systems are modified by experience. Research on perception of goal‐directed action and animacy has made significant progress in uncovering the roots of social cognition from 6 months onwards. New methods such as eye tracking and measures of brain activity have done much to confirm and clarify conclusions arising from more conventional looking preference methods. It is likely that future progress in theory and understanding will be made increasingly as a result of triangulation between data arising from conventional and newer methods. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Convergent and Discriminant Validity of the Need for Cognition Scale

This article reports two studies that examined the convergent and discriminant validity of the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Using samples of college students and prison inmates, need for cognition scores were found to be positively associated with measures of self-esteem, masculine sex role attitudes, absorption, and private self-consciousness. Modest negative associations between need for cognition and measures of public self-consciousness and social anxiety were also uncovered. Need for cognition scores were generally unrelated to measures of feminine and androgynous sex role attitudes, shyness, sociability, and loneliness. These findings add further evidence supporting the construct validity of the Need for Cognition Scale and expand our understanding of the construct of need for cognition.     

Prospects of enactivist approaches to intentionality and cognition

We discuss various implications of some radical anti-representationalist views of cognition and what they have to offer with regard to the naturalization of intentionality and the explanation of cognitive phenomena. Our focus is on recent arguments from proponents of enactive views of cognition to the effect that basic cognition is intentional but not representational and that cognition is co-extensive with life. We focus on lower rather than higher forms of cognition, namely the question regarding the intentional and representational nature of cognition found in organisms simpler than human beings, because enactivists do not deny that more sophisticated cognitive phenomena are representational and involve content. After introducing the debate on the naturalization of intentionality (Sect. 2), we briefly review different varieties of enactivism and introduce their central claims (Sect. 3). In Sect. 4 we turn to radical enactivism in order to focus on the arguments for a thoroughly non-representational, enactive account of perception and basic cognition. In particular, we discuss three major issues: First, what is supposed to replace the representational analysis of perception in a radical-enactive explanation of perception? How does the enactive explanation of perception compare to the best scientific work on the neuroscience of perception? Second, what is—on an enactive account—the function of neural processing in the brain for the generation of perception if not to produce representations? This question is especially pressing since one implication of autopoietic enactivism (accepted by radical enactivists) is that even the simplest organisms, i.e. single-celled organisms, have cognitive capacities (Sect. 5). Since they lack brains and nervous systems, enactivists must specify the (possibly) unique contribution of the brain and nervous system in those animals who have them. In Sect. 5, we evaluate the advantages of an autopoietic–enactive approach to the naturalization of intentionality and end with a suggestion how cognition may relate to intentionality and representation.