Properties of Being in Heidegger’s Being and Time

Abstract

While it is well known that the early Heidegger distinguishes between different ‘kinds of being’ and identifies various ‘structures’ that compose them, there has been little discussion about what these kinds and structures of being are. This paper defends the ‘Property Thesis’, the position that kinds of being (and their structures) are properties of the entities that have them. I give two arguments for this thesis. The first is grounded in the fact that Heidegger refers to kinds and structures of being as ‘characteristics’ and ‘determinations’, which are just two different words for ‘properties’, in the broadest senses of these terms. The second argument is based on the fact that kinds and structures of being play three roles that properties are supposed to play: they account for similarities between things, they are what predicates express, and they are what abstract nouns refer to.     

Being articulate: Rede in Heidegger’s Being and Time

Being and Time’s emphasis on practical activities has attracted much attention as an approach to meaning not modelled exclusively on language. However, understanding this emphasis is made more difficult by Heidegger’s notion of Rede (‘Articulacy’ or ‘Discourse’), which he routinely characterizes as both language-like and basic to all disclosure. This paper assesses whether this notion can be both interpreted coherently and reconciled with Heidegger’s emphasis on intelligent nonlinguistic behaviours. It begins by identifying two functions of Articulacy – the demonstrative and articulatory – and a potential source of incoherence in Heidegger’s analysis. Having reviewed some standard approaches to Heideggerian Articulacy, I show how Heidegger’s discussion of predicative judgements (‘Statements’) implies that language can be linked with different kinds of content. This allows Heidegger’s analysis to be read coherently, provided Articulacy is understood as having distinct purposive and predicative modes. The final section shows how this reading preserves a close connection between Articulacy and language while accommodating intelligent nonlinguistic behaviours.     

Common Sense and the Natural Light in George Berkeley’s Philosophy

Philosophia - It is argued that George Berkeley’s term ‘common sense’ does not indicate shared conviction, but the shared capacity of reasonable judgement, and is therefore to be...     

The Ways of ‘Being’ and ‘Becoming’ Human

We argue that developing integrative models of psychological phenomenon require dealing simultaneously with information-theoretic and meaning making processes at the individual and group levels. Attempts to fuse these across levels based on intentionality become difficult because phenomena at the lower level organisms are conceptualized employing concrete systems language, while in case of human and social systems both concrete and abstracted systems concepts are used. Intentionality also needs to be looked at as arising out of the processes of both being and becoming. Fusing of psycho-and socio-logics necessarily requires taking into consideration psychological processes and notions of intentionality and future within cultural contexts in a more holistic manner. It is also argued that both at personal and collective levels, human intentionality operate as bounded intentionality alternating between states of being and becoming.     

Parents’ Understanding of Adopted Children’s Ways of Being,Belonging, and Becoming

Internationally-adopted children experience a range of challenges as they cope with the demands of everyday functioning and strive to develop a healthy identity. Research shows that family context such as parenting practices impact the level of adoptees' adjustment and their eventual identity development. In this study, we examined the process of how relationships are built between Ethiopia adoptees and their adoptive families within the new family setting. Using data obtained through semi-structured interviews, a brief survey, and focus group discussion from 25 North American families who adopted 35 Ethiopia children, we conducted a systematic content analysis to examine parents' way of being, way of understanding, and way of intervening. Based on results of this study, we provide a framework that explains the dynamic of Ethiopian adoptees' existence and belonging from pre- to post-adoption in the adoptive family. Implications for future research regarding the need for multiculturally competent parenting practices and family level strategies to reduce barriers to the child and parent relationship are addressed.     

Evelyn Underhill (1875–1941): mysticism and worship

This article focuses on some themes in the work of Evelyn Underhill (1875–1941). It is now over a century since she began work on the first version of Mysticism (1911). She was a pioneer not only in the study she undertook for this book, but in the specifically Christian theology she was bold enough to work out from it, with Christ in person the paradigm mystic. The Latin Mass of her day she deemed both as recapitulating Christ's own experience, as well as re-presenting the stability and growth of his ‘Body’ present at the Eucharist. Once recommitted to the Church of England in 1921, at a time of liturgical revision and in a deeply troubled political era, her concentration on Christ's sacrifice led her to embrace pacifism as the world lurched towards World War II. Her theological work, summed up in her final major book Worship (1936), reveals her continuing preoccupation with the question of how Christology integrates with liturgy, and therefore with the living of a distinctively Christian life.     

Literature and the Expressions of Being in Merleau-Ponty’s Unpublished Course Notes

In this article I examine Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the relation between literature, being and perception. I focus especially on two of Merleau-Ponty’s courses at Collège de France: the first course, Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression, and the unpublished course Sur le problème de la parole. In the former Merleau-Ponty presents a new understanding of perception, according to which being is expressed in perception through the style of movement of the perceived phenomenon. In the latter he advances a notion of literary writing as an expression of the being that is itself expressed to us in perception. Through a reading of Proust’s work, he discusses how the literary writer makes his experience expressive by means of a stylization of what is experienced. Hence, literature expresses perception through an enhancement of the expressiveness that it already contains. This capacity of literature will be the main focus of my investigation.     

Animate being: an inquiry into Being in Heidegger’s Being and Time

Continental Philosophy Review - This paper questions the ontological integrity of Dasein as Heidegger specifies Being in Being and Time. It does so with reference to the real-life, real-time...     

Political Theory and Linguistic Criteria in Han Feizi’s Philosophy

Han Feizi’s 韓非子 thought, I argue, contains a political theory that justifies principled, law-governed government. A key element of his theory is a solution to the problem of rectifying names. He recognized that the same word can have varying criteria of application depending on the purpose of the practice that requires a criterion. Some criteria for a practice are good and some bad. A wise ruler knows which criteria are good and appropriate to ruling. His view is illuminated by considering the phenomenon of paradiastole and a contemporary view about the relationship between meaning and criteria of application.     

Well-Being’s Relation to Religiosity and Spirituality in Children and Adolescents in Zambia

The relations among dimensions of subjective well-being (i.e., happiness and life satisfaction), spirituality and religiousness were assessed in children (aged 7–12, n = 391) and adolescents (aged 13–19, n = 902) in Zambia. These participants were sampled from schools in both urban and rural regions that represented a relatively wide range of affluence. Participants self-reported their happiness using the Faces Scale and the Subjective Happiness Scale, and their life satisfaction using the Student Life Satisfaction Scale. The surveys were available in English as well as two local languages, and were delivered in classroom settings. To assess religiosity, participants were asked about the frequency that they attended church and about the importance of religion in their life. To assess spirituality, participants were asked about whether they considered themselves to be a spiritual person and about the nature domain of spirituality (e.g., “I feel connected to nature”). Results indicated that age, gender, grade and religiosity were not strong predictors of children’s well-being. However, spirituality accounted for 21 % of the variance in life satisfaction beyond these demographic variables and religiosity, but did not account for additional variance in happiness. The results were similar for adolescents except that the demographic variables were weakly predictive of their life satisfaction, and religiosity was a modest predictor of their happiness. Spirituality predicted variance in happiness and life satisfaction more so among adolescents than among children. These results confirm earlier work showing that spirituality, but not necessarily religiosity, is associated with children’s and adolescents’ well-being.     

Identification of the People and Critique of the Ideas in Meyer’s Philosophy of Occupation Therapy

This article identifies the people Meyer mentions in his article, “Philosophy of Occupation Therapy,” published in Archives of Occupational Therapy (Meyer, 1922c Meyer, A. (1922c). Philosophy of occupation therapy. Archives of Occupational Therapy, 1(1), 1–10. [Reprinted in American Journal of Occupational Therapy, 31(10), 639–642]. [Google Scholar]) and critiques the ideas discussed. Because there is no list of references provided within the article itself, the researcher selected the methodology of source criticism to identify the names of individuals appearing in the text—locating each person’s publications and analyzing the publications for influential ideas. Twenty-one names were found and publications were located for 15. Ideas were identified and analyzed. Finally, Meyer’s ideas were compared to current models of practice and a proposed reference list was created.     

Philosophy and the ‘anteriority complex’

The project of naturalising phenomenology is examined within the larger context of the philosophy of science. Transcendental phenomenology, as defended by Husserl, in opposition to the naturalistic enterprise, reflects a particular way of thinking about philosophy and its relationship to the empirical sciences that stands as an obstacle to the project of naturalisation. This paper develops a critique of a basic assumption made in this conception of philosophy, namely that it is possible to ask and answer questions concerning knowledge in the abstract, prior to and independently of the various investigative contexts which are the immediate concern of practicing scientists. To successfully naturalise phenomenology, we need to abandon this conception of philosophy.     

Second Nature and Historical Change in Hegel’s Philosophy of History

Hegel’s philosophy of history is fundamentally concerned with how shapes of life collapse and transition into new shapes of life. One of the distinguishing features of Hegel’s concern with how a shape of life falls apart and becomes inadequate is the role that habit plays in the transition. A shape of life is an embodied form of existence for Hegel. The animating concepts of a shape of life are affectively inscribed on subjects through complex cultural processes. This paper examines the argument Hegel puts forward in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History for why civilizations come to atrophy and examines the decisive role habit plays in this process. The paper concludes with a discussion of the way in which the central role of second nature in historical transitions and norm formation conflicts with Brandom’s account of norm formation in Hegel’s thought.     

Benedykt Bornstein’s Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics

The aim of this paper is to present and discuss main philosophical ideas concerning logic and mathematics of a significant but forgotten Polish philosopher Benedykt Bornstein. He received his doctoral degree with Kazimierz Twardowski but is not included into the Lvov–Warsaw School of Philosophy founded by the latter. His philosophical views were unique and quite different from the views of main representatives of Lvov–Warsaw School. We shall discuss Bornstein’s considerations on the philosophy of geometry, on the infinity, on the foundations of set theory and his polemics with Stanis?aw Le?niewski as well as his conception of a geometrization of logic, of the categorial logic and of the mathematics of quality.     

Fales’s Defense of the Given and Requirements for Being a Reason

Fales defends the doctrine of the given against the Sellarsian dilemma. On his view, sensory experiences, to which one has direct access, can justify basic beliefs. He upholds this view by way of defending an expansive conception of inference, according to which a broadly inferential relation can hold between sensory experiences and perceptual beliefs. The purpose of this paper is to show that Fales’s defense of the given fails. For this purpose, I argue that there are two requirements for being a good reason, and that his conception of direct apprehension faces a serious dilemma with regard to these requirements. In addition, I argue that his expansive conception of inference is unfounded.     

Sub-Abstract Bodies: The Epistemic and Ethical Role of the Body-Mind Relationship in Adorno’s Philosophy

Abstract

The aim of this paper is threefold. In the first place, I should like to show that Adorno’s philosophy is dependent, to a degree perhaps not always directly recognized in the literature, on a deeply contentious view on the relationship between the mind and the body. In order to show this, I explore and bring out the epistemic and ethical stakes for Adorno’s theory of the relationship between mind and body. Secondly, I move to better articulate precisely what Adorno’s view on the nature of this relationship is. I hold that his position revolves around positing a porous boundary between the domains of the somatic and the cognitive. In closing, I show that Adorno’s account relies on this domain boundary being unidirectionally porous, in that determination of somatic impulses by cognitive content does not seem a live option for Adorno. I go on to note that this smuggles in a dubious position which does a lot of unearned work. The stakes which his implicit account of the body and mind relationship served to secure thereby come once more to look highly vulnerable.