The Metaphysics of Meaning: Hopkins on Wittgenstein

Abstract

Jim Hopkins (2012 Hopkins, Jim (2012) ‘Rules, Privacy, and Physicalism’, in Jonathan Ellis and Daniel Guevara (eds) Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) defends a ‘straight’ (non-skeptical) response to Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, a response he ascribes to Wittgenstein himself. According to this response, what makes it the case that A means that P is that it is possible for another to (correctly) interpret A as meaning that P. Hopkins thus advances a form of interpretivist judgment-dependence about meaning. I argue that this response, as well as a variant, does not succeed.     

The Role of Picture Books in Children's Spiritual Development and Meaning Making [1]

This paper sets out to explore how spiritual development might be addressed through the use of picture books in the primary classroom. The working definition for what is meant by ‘spiritual development’ is drawn from a variety of sources but is principally informed by the National Curriculum Council (NCC) and Ofsted discussion papers and the work of John Hull. Thus the work centres on the aspects of spirituality that are developed through experiencing relationships with other human beings and the world in which we live. The paper draws upon original classroom based research carried out with a group of 8 year old children in an inner city school. The children's group discussions centre around the picture book ‘Dogger’ by Shirley Hughes. The paper explores how the children are able to make and negotiate meaning as they address ‘spiritual’ issues.     

《周易》古经咸卦本义正解——兼论诸家得失并及艮解二卦

以往对咸卦的解读多不能切近其本义。事实上,咸卦的主题是讲交往处事的道理或原则。关于卦辞,传统解读多基于男女相感来理解,其实卦辞着重强调的是屈身虚己、礼贤下士。关于初爻,诸家均未着眼于足拇趾与其他足趾的不同去体会“拇”的本质特征。依此角度理解,初爻讲的是要重视与外界的交往。解卦九四亦取“拇”象,且与“朋”象相合,比喻能力再强者遇到险难时往往也需要他人的配合支持。关于二爻,诸家多以腓体躁动取象,认为二爻“感物以躁”乃“凶之道”,实则二爻取象腿肚抽筋,喻勿与坏人、恶人相交。艮卦六二亦与腿肚抽筋有关,喻本当止而不得止之,是以有憾。关于三爻,诸家多以股随足或随身而动,不能自处,喻人无主见而听任摆布,基本得其正解。艮卦九三不取股象而取腰限之象,体现了取象的唯变所适之理,喻本不当止而强止之,将会导致严重后果。关于四爻,诸家皆以九四为有心之感而未及无心之感,其实四爻讲的是交往处事要心思端正、以心交心。关于五爻,诸家皆未抓住脢的本质特征。该爻实则是讲交往处事要有奉献精神,甘于做配角。关于上爻,诸家解读大致能得其正解,讲的是交往处事不能夸夸其谈,务必言实相符。     

The Metaphysics of Degrees

Degree‐sentences, i.e. sentences that seem to refer to things that allow of degrees, are widely used both inside and outside of philosophy, even though the metaphysics of degrees is much of an untrodden field. This paper aims to fill this lacuna by addressing the following four questions: [A] Is there some one thing, such that it is degree sensitive? [B] Are there things x, y, and z that stand in a certain relation to each other, viz. the relation that x has more y than z? [C] In those cases in which degree sentences do not refer to phenomena that are degree sensitive, what is responsible for their prima facie seeming to do so? [D] If there are degree sensitive things, to which ontological categories do they belong? We answer each of these questions by arguing that there are, metaphysically speaking, different phenomena that degree sentences refer to: some refer to determinates that emanate from a certain determinable, others to tokens that are instantiations of a certain type, and yet others to what we call ‘complex, resultant properties that are constituted by stereotypical properties’. Finally, we show the relevance of our answers by applying them to the notions of freedom and belief.     

The Metaphysics of Velocity

Some authors have recently arguedthat an objects velocity is logicallyindependent of its locations throughout time.Their aim is to deny the Russellianview that motion is merely a change oflocation, and to promote a rival account onwhich the connection between velocities andtrajectories is provided by the laws ofnature. I defend the Russellian view of motionagainst these attacks.     

西方历史编纂的形而上学

历史不是一种时间,而是多种时间,彼此交错并彼此包含.因此,应该用多元时间观替代旧的时间观.--福柯(<读与写>第2卷,第279页)     

The Metaphysics of Mental Files

There is much to be said for a diachronic or interpersonal individuation of singular modes of presentation (MOPs) in terms of a criterion of epistemic transparency between thought tokens. This way of individuating MOPs has been discussed recently within the mental files framework, though the issues discussed here arise for all theories that individuate MOPs in terms of relations among tokens. All such theories face objections concerning apparent failures of the transitivity of the ‘same MOP’ relation. For mental files, these transitivity failures most obviously occur because mental files can merge or undergo fission. In this paper I argue that this problem is easily resolved once mental files are properly construed as continuants, whose metaphysics is analogous to that of persons or physical objects. All continuants can undergo fission or fusion, leading to similar transitivity problems, but there are well-established theories of persistence that accommodate this. I suggest that, in particular, the stage theory best suits the purposes of a continuant theory of MOPs.     

The Metaphysics of Causal Models

This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of causal processes—of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe—into a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible causal processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths, the original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc. These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late pre?mption and other cases that have proved problematic for causal models.

The Value Question in Metaphysics

Much seems to be at stake in metaphysical questions about, for example, God, free will or morality. One thing that could be at stake is the value of the universe we inhabit—how good or bad it is. We can think of competing philosophical positions as describing possibilities, ways the world might turn out to be, and to which value can be assigned. When, for example, people hope that God exists, or fear that we do not possess free will, they express attitudes towards these possibilities, attitudes that presuppose answers to questions about their comparative value. My aim in this paper is to distinguish these evaluative questions from related questions with which they can be confused, to identify structural constraints on their proper pursuit, and to address objections to their very coherence. Answers to such evaluative questions offer one measure of the importance of philosophical disputes.