Motivational systems and preferences for social support strategies

The behavioral inhibition system (BIS), behavioral approach system (BAS), and fight-flight-freeze system (FFFS) are motivational systems that guide people’s behavior. Motivational systems may be relevant to contexts of interpersonal communication, specifically those requiring social support. In these situations, people express preferences for approaching versus avoiding and emotion versus problem-focused comfort. This paper links people’s preferences for supportive strategies with their motivational systems. 335 participants reported their preferences for different strategies of social support and their motivational system orientations. As expected, BAS was associated with preferences for involving, problem-focused support. BIS, BAS, and FFFS were significantly associated with emotion-focused support, and FFFS was negatively associated with comfort that downplays affect. The motivational systems interact when manifesting associations with preferences for support strategies, and the BAS reward responsiveness subscale emerged as the most influential BAS subscale. These results indicate that BIS, BAS, and FFFS influence people’s preferences in contexts of interpersonal communication.     

Patient preferences for psychological counsellors: Evidence of a similarity effect

This study sought to examine the individual difference variables that affect potential patient preferences for hypothetical psychological counsellors. A representative British sample of 257 adults indicated their preferences for eight psychological counsellors differentiated by sex, age, and training location. A five-way mixed analysis of variance (participant sex and age as within variables, and counsellor sex, age, ethnicity as between variables) indicated a significant main effect for only counsellors’ ethnicity. There were also sex and age interactions showing evidence of a matching hypothesis: participants preferred counsellors of their own sex and age. The implications of these findings are considered.     

The pantomime of persuasion: Fit between nonverbal communication and influence strategies

How can we be more successful in persuading others and increase the odds of behavioral compliance? We argue that when a verbal influence strategy is embedded in a nonverbal style that fits its orientation, this boosts the strategy's effectiveness, whereas a misfit attenuates its impact. In field-experiment 1, agents tried to persuade participants in buying a candybox by using an approach-oriented strategy (Door-In-The-Face, DITF). An eager nonverbal style increased the impact of the DITF, whereas vigilant nonverbal cues rendered it ineffective. Conversely, field-experiment 2 showed that an avoidance-oriented strategy (Disrupt-Then-Reframe) benefited from being presented in a vigilant, rather than an eager nonverbal style, which similarly attenuated its impact. Hence, eager nonverbal cues promote the effectiveness of approach-oriented influence strategies whereas vigilant cues do the opposite and increase the impact of avoidance-oriented influence strategies.     

How preferences for eager versus vigilant judgment strategies affect self-serving conclusions

People are often motivated to reach self-serving conclusions during judgment. This article examines how such self-serving judgment outcomes are influenced by preferences for different judgment strategies. Two studies tested how preferences for eager (promotion-oriented) versus vigilant (prevention-oriented) judgment strategies affected self-serving explanations for success or failure. Regardless of their performance, those preferring vigilant strategies selectively endorsed a few explanations above others, whereas those preferring eager strategies more evenly endorsed multiple explanations. Furthermore, although the explanations selected by those preferring vigilant strategies were indeed self-serving (emphasizing personal responsibility for success and external circumstances for failure), the more balanced endorsement of multiple explanations by those preferring eager strategies was associated with attenuated self-serving tendencies. Finally, those preferring eager strategies were also less self-serving in their generalization from explanations of current performance to predictions of future performance. The larger implications of these findings for the role of strategic preferences in judgment are discussed.     

Patient choices, family interests, and physician obligations

Recent articles in biomedical ethics have begun to explore both the relevance of family interests in treatment decisions and the resultant ramifications for physicians' obligations to patients. This article addresses two important questions regarding physicians' obligations vis-a-vis family interests: (1) What should a physician do when the exercise of patient autonomy threatens to negate the patient's moral obligations to other family members? (2) Does respect for patient autonomy typically require efforts on the part of physicians to keep patients' treatment decisions from being influenced by family considerations? A series of clarifications about the concept of autonomy is also presented.     

Mutual persuasion as a model for doctor-patient communication

From an ethical point of view, shared decision-making is preferable to either physician paternalism or patient sovereignty. The traditional model of doctor-patient communication is too directive and too unconcerned with the patient's values to support truly shared decision-making. The traditional distinction between rhetoric and sophistic can provide the basis for a new model of mutual persuasion that does not limit communication to information, and that avoids the spectre of manipulation.     

Vivid persuasion in the courtroom

When witnesses at a trial offer testimony that is vivid, it may be more persuasive than the same testimony offered in a pallid manner. In this paper we elucidate three categories of variables (inferential, attentional/memorial, and affective) that are likely to mediate the effects of the vividness of testimony on jury judgments. These variables are then used to explain discrepant findings among mock juror experiments investigating vividness effects. Finally, we discuss the implications of vividness effects for the legal system.     

Attribution versus persuasion as a means for modifying behavior.

The present research compared the relative effectiveness of an attribution strategy with a persuasion strategy in changing behavior. Study 1 attempted to teach fifth graders not to litter and to clean up after others. An attribution group was repeatedly told that they were neat and tidy people, a persuasion group was repeatedly told that they should be neat and tidy, and a control group received no treatment. Attribution proved considerably more effective in modifying behavior. Study 2 tried to discover whether similar effects would hold for a more central aspect of school performance, math achievement and self-esteem, and whether an attribution of ability would be as effective as an attribution of motivation. Repeatedly attributing to second graders either the ability or the motivation to do well in math proved more effective than comparable persuasion or no-treatment control groups, although a group receiving straight reinforcement for math problem-solving behavior also did well. It is suggested that persuasion often suffers because it involves a negative attribution (a person should be what he is not), while attribution generally gains because it disguises persuasive intent.     

Trichotomous preferences for gambles

Let G_X be the set of all gambles on a set X of decision outcomes. Trichotomous preferences divide G_X into three disjoint subsets, viz., the set P⁺ of preferable gambles, the set P⁰ of indifferent gambles, and the set P^- of unpreferable gambles. Those preference comparisons are made against the status quo, i.e., the do-nothing alternative. This paper presents and discusses dyadic representations of such trichotomous preferences and identifies necessary and sufficient axioms for the existence of those representations.     

Reasons for sequence preferences

Much research shows that when it comes to preferences over sequences of money, such as a monthly paycheck, people do not always maximize present value. Rather, they often choose the lower‐valued of a pair of sequences, especially when it has attractive properties such as an increasing trend. To unearth the reasons for sequence preferences we conducted a verbal‐protocol analysis of choices between money sequences, including lifetime and one‐year earnings and one‐year lottery winnings, as well as lifetime health sequences. Participants thought aloud while choosing between visual representations of sequences. Their verbalizations contained reference to a wide range of previously hypothesized, as well as new, reasons for choice. These reasons were also correlated in sensible ways with the choices made. There was some evidence of solid economic reasoning (which we called maximization), although this was largely restricted to choices for one‐year earnings. More commonly, respondents did not distinguish between earnings and consumption, and thought about money as if they would automatically spend it at the rate it was received. This meant the most frequently given reason was what we called appropriateness—how well the money received at a given point matched the desired consumption at that point. Other common explanations include the expectedness of a sequence (we argue this is mediated by appropriateness), the way that parts of the sequence constitute reference points for other parts, and the ease with which incoming money can be managed (convenience). Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Contextual contrast and perceived knowledge: Exploring the implications for persuasion

The present research tested the notion that perceived target knowledge can be affected by the amount of information one has about other recently encountered stimuli—whether that information is relevant or not. Furthermore, the present research tested the implications of this effect for persuasion. In 4 experiments, participants were presented with a persuasive message promoting a fictitious department store, but first received another message containing more or less information about something else (e.g., another store, a car, or a person). Regardless of the type or valence of initial information received, the initial message had a contrast effect on perceived target knowledge, which influenced target attitudes. The less information the initial message contained, the more persuasive knowledge participants thought they received from the target message, and the more their attitudes agreed with that message. These findings suggest that the perceived amount of persuasive information one has about a target stimulus can be manipulated to increase persuasion, even when the actual amount of information about the target stimulus does not vary.     

Prior source exposure and persuasion: further evidence for misattributional processes

To assess the persuasive impact of prior source exposure, two studies paired persuasive messages with a source to whom participants had previously been exposed subliminally, explicitly, or not at all. In Experiment 2, participants' attention also was drawn to information that potentially undermined the implications of any reaction to re-exposure. Compared to no exposure, prior subliminal exposure increased the source's persuasiveness, an effect not mediated by source liking. Explicit exposure increased source persuasiveness to the extent that the source was liked more and only absent a recall cue. Results favored misattributional accounts of prior exposure effects.