Same old, same old: the same-order representation theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor

The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them–the theory ‘divides the phenomenal labor’ in an illicit fashion. This ‘failure of intimacy’ is exposed by the possibility of misrepresentation by higher-order states. In this paper, I argue that despite appearances, the same-order theory fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles with intimacy. A version of this paper was presented at the ‘Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness’ conference, Center for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona, March 18th–20th, 2005.     

Jerry Fodor on non-conceptual content

Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In a recent paper he characterizes non-conceptual content in a particular way and argues that it is plausible that it plays an explanatory role in accounting for certain auditory and visual phenomena. So he thinks that there is reason to believe that there is non-conceptual content. On the other hand, Fodor thinks that non-conceptual content has a limited role. It occurs only in the very early stages of perceptual processing prior to conscious awareness. My paper is examines Fodor’s characterization of non-conceptual content and his claims for its explanatory importance. I also discuss if Fodor has made a case for limiting non-conceptual content to non-conscious, sub-personal mental states. This paper has grown out of comments I made on Fodor’s paper “Revenge of the Given,” delivered at The Steven Humphrey Excellence in Philosophy Conference: “Content and Concepts: A Conference on the Philosophy of Mind” at the University of California, Santa Barbara, February 14, 2004. Thanks to Jerry Fodor for useful feedback, and to Barry Loewer for discussing with me the ideas that went into this paper.     

3~5岁儿童理解和使用空间表征的特点

以96名3~5儿童为被试,采用自编的儿童空间表征实验任务,在语言表征、模型表征和图画表征三种空间表征形式上,考察了儿童理解和使用空间表征的发展特点。结果表明:(1)总体上,3~5岁儿童理解空间表征的发展水平均显著高于使用空间表征的发展水平。(2)3~5岁儿童理解和使用空间表征的发展表现出显著的年龄效应。(3)从不同的空间表证形式来看,3岁儿童理解语言表征的能力与理解模型表征的能力之间差异显著,4岁儿童使用语言表征的能力与使用模型表征的能力之间的差异、使用语言表征的能力与使用图画表征的能力之间的差异、以及使用模型表征的能力与使用图画表征的能力之间的差异都显著,其余形式的空间表征理解之间的差异或空间表征使用之间的差异在各年龄段中均不显著。     

Phenomenological coping skills and the striatal memory system

Most cognitive scientists are committed to some version of representationalism, the view that intelligent behavior is caused by internal processes that involve computations over representations. Phenomenologists, however, argue that certain types of intelligent behavior, engaged coping skills, are nonrepresentational. Recent neuroscientific work on multiple memory systems indicates that while many types of intelligent behavior are representational, the types of intelligent behavior cited by phenomenologists are indeed nonrepresentational. This neuroscientific research thus vindicates a key phenomenological claim about the nature of intelligent behaviour. It also provides a framework for the ongoing reconciliation of cognitive science and phenomenology.     

Muscular Imaginings—A Phenomenological and Enactive Model for Imagination*

A phenomenological model (labeled ‘EC’) is developed as an alternative to current analyses of the imagination in sport philosophy, heirs to an Enlightenment notion that conceptualizes imaginings as abstract, eidetic, and representational. EC describes how Eidetic and Corporeal Imaginings (EIs & CIs) phenomenologically structure our imaginative undertakings. EIs keep the ‘ideal’ aspect, but CIs—enacted, corporeal, non-representational—are more fundamental and foundational. Sports are particularly suited to express CIs’ muscular imaginings, which result in novel performances. An enactive framework theorizes CIs as non-representational interactions.     

Habermas and validity claims

At the heart of Jürgen Habermas’s explication of communicative rationality is the contention that all speech acts oriented to understanding raise three different kinds of validity claims simultaneously: claims to truth, truthfulness, and normative rightness. This paper argues that Habermas presents exactly three distinct, logically independent arguments for his simultaneity thesis: an argument from structure; an argument from criticizability/rejectability; and an argument from understanding/reaching understanding. It is further maintained that the simultaneity thesis receives cogent support only from the Argument from understanding/reaching understanding, and only if the notion of ‘understanding’ is expanded to that of ‘agreement’.     

Kantian non-conceptualism

There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or subpersonal mental states. Both my argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual content and my theory of its structure and function have a Kantian provenance.

To point a finger: attentional and motor consequences of observing pointing movements

Recent studies showed that action observation activates neural circuits used in performing the same action and facilitates execution of a similar motor program. This system for direct mapping of observed actions onto observer’s own motor representation is considered critical for human imitation capabilities. The present study shows that observing a pointing action activates a representation of that action in anatomical space, irrespectively of whether the action is shown in allocentric or egocentric perspective. This finding is at odds with the studies on imitation which showed that humans tend to imitate in a spatially compatible (specular) way, as if looking in a mirror. Our results suggest that shared representations for actions are organized in the same spatial coordinates; however, a transformation of this representation might be required for imitation tasks in order to accommodate the goals of imitative action.     

An account of consciousness in physical and functional terms: A target for research in the neurosciences

The neurophysiology of mental events cannot be fully understood unless that of consciousness is understood. As the first step in a top-down approach to that problem, one needs to find an account of consciousness as a property of the biological organism that can be clearly defined as such. However, if it is to deliver what must be expected of it, it should address what is commonly meant by the wordconsciousness. Unless the last condition is satisfied, the theory will fail to deliver what must ultimately be expected of it. Although current interest lies mainly in the higher functions of consciousness, such as its role in language and social relationships, the common usage of the word relates to modes of awareness that are not denied to creatures lacking language or social relationships. The basic features to be covered include awareness of the surrounding world, of the self, and of one’s thoughts and feelings; the subjective qualities of phenomenal experience (qualia); the conditions a brain event must satisfy to enter consciousness; and the main divisions of mental events, such as sensations, feelings, perceptions, desires, volitions, and mental images.     

Representation,Presentation and the Epistemic Role of Perceptual Experience

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the representational theory of perception, on which the world is represented as being a certain way in perceptual experience, cannot explain how there can be a genuinely epistemic connection between experience and belief. I try to show that we are positively required to deny that perceptual consciousness is contentful if we want to make its fitness for epistemic duties intelligible. (So versions of the representational theory on which experience has a merely causal purchase on belief are not considered.) But my aim is not just negative. I try to defeat representationalism in such a way as to motivate a robustly presentational theory of perception. According to such a theory, perceptions are relations not between a subject and a content but between a subject and an ordinary object (such that if the relation holds at t, an appropriate subject and object must exist at t, and the object must be presented to the subject). I end by sketching an account of perceptual experience that is meant to show that, contrary to a very popular misconception, there is a way to conceive perceptual consciousness as relational and presentational (not intentional and representational) that does not succumb to the celebrated ‘myth of the Given’.     

Mental effort causes vigilance decrease due to resource depletion

The resource view on vigilance performance was tested. First, a low demanding task was compared with a similar low demanding task in which stimulus presentation was less monotonous due to added, irrelevant, stimuli. The resource view, maintaining that vigilance is lowered by hard mental work, predicts that addition of irrelevant stimuli will not affect performance. The classic arousal theory, however, states that arousal drops due to monotonous stimulus presentation and predicts that decreasing monotony will enhance performance. Results showed that performance was unaffected by added stimuli. Second, we tested whether a high-demanding task (with identical stimulus presentation as the low demanding task, but different instruction) would cause a greater decline in performance than the low demanding task. Indeed, in the high-demanding task performance was affected most. In sum, it appears that vigilance decreases due to hard mental work, which requires many resources. Both overall performance and decrement in performance can be explained in terms of resources, and this suggests that vigilance tasks should be resource-demanding tasks, which do not have to be of long duration.     

Phenomenology and psychophysics

Recent philosophy of mind has tended to treat “inner” states, including both qualia and intentional states, as “theoretical posits” of either folk or scientific psychology. This article argues that phenomenology in fact plays a very different role in the most mature part of psychology, psychophysics. Methodologically, phenomenology plays a crucial role in obtaining psychophysical results. And more importantly, many psychophysical data are best interpreted as reporting relations between stimuli and phenomenological states, both qualitative and intentional. Three examples are used to argue for this thesis: the Weber–Fechner laws, the Craik-O’Brien–Cornsweet effect, and subjective contour figures. The phenomenological properties that play a role here do so in the role of data that ultimately constrain theoretical work (in this case theory of vision), and not as theoretical posits.     

Unconscious task application

The nature of unconscious information processing is a heavily debated issue in cognitive science (e.g., Kouider & Dehaene, 2007), and neuroscience (e.g., Crick & Koch, 1998). Traditionally, it has been thought that unconscious cognitive processing is restricted to knowledge that is strongly prepared by conscious processes (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998). In three experiments, we show that the task that is performed consciously can also be applied unconsciously to items outside the current task set. We found that a same–different judgment of two target stimuli was also performed on two subliminally presented prime stimuli. This was true for target and prime stimuli from entirely different categories, as well as for prime and target stimuli at different levels of abstraction. These results reveal that unconscious processing can generalize more widely than previously accepted.     

决策与决策执行的关系——一种行动理性的观点

本文以分析决策与执行的关系为出发点,对人类理性的本质进行了讨论。指出决策研究中存在的“理性分析范式”偏面地把认知分析当作人类理性的本质,忽视了行动的作用,提出了人类理性是“行动理性”的思想。行动既是一种分析方法,是人们深化对客观世界的认识,理解决策问题的独特手段,也是人们创造外界环境、实现决策目标的有效途径。由此提出,决策研究,尤其是组织决策研究,应该重视“行动分析范式”。