Classifying emotion: a developmental account

The aim of this paper is to propose a systematic classification of emotions which can also characterize their nature. The first challenge we address is the submission of clear criteria for a theory of emotions that determine which mental phenomena are emotions and which are not. We suggest that emotions as a subclass of mental states are determined by their functional roles. The second and main challenge is the presentation of a classification and theory of emotions that can account for all existing varieties. We argue that we must classify emotions according to four developmental stages: 1. pre-emotions as unfocussed expressive emotion states, 2. basic emotions, 3. primary cognitive emotions, and 4. secondary cognitive emotions. We suggest four types of basic emotions (fear, anger, joy and sadness) which are systematically differentiated into a diversity of more complex emotions during emotional development. The classification distinguishes between basic and non-basic emotions and our multi-factorial account considers cognitive, experiential, physiological and behavioral parameters as relevant for constituting an emotion. However, each emotion type is constituted by a typical pattern according to which some features may be more significant than others. Emotions differ strongly where these patterns of features are concerned, while their essential functional roles are the same. We argue that emotions form a unified ontological category that is coherent and can be well defined by their characteristic functional roles. Our account of emotions is supported by data from developmental psychology, neurobiology, evolutionary biology and sociology.     

Test–retest reliability of an emotion maintenance task

Research on working memory has suggested domain-specific components for visual, verbal, and spatial information, and more recently for emotion. Affective working memory has been proposed as the set of processes involved in the maintenance of emotions to guide behaviour. The current study examined the reliability of an emotion maintenance/affective working memory task over two experimental sessions separated by one week. Subjective accuracy based on individual ratings was found to correlate over time and was highest for negatively valenced pictures. Results suggest that this paradigm is a reliable measure of emotion maintenance, underscoring the utility of this measure as an assessment tool for normative and clinical populations.     

Instituting impairment: Extended cognition and the construction of Female Sexual Dysfunction

I further the argument for a socially extended mind by examining gender and the role it plays in cognition. My first claim is that gender is a social institution that often if not always subtends our cognitive processes, especially those that are maximally embodied. The social institution of gender often serves to inhibit female embodied cognitive processing, as a quick glance at the myriad of oppressive forces at play in gender dynamics illustrates. To combat the potential objection that gender is not a vehicle for extending cognitive processes, but rather plays a shaping role in embodied practice, I propose looking at the history of Female Sexual Dysfunction and its construction by the social institutions of the pharmaceutical companies and media. By doing so, I claim a case can be made that these institutions have actually invaded the minds of many women to the point that cognition pertaining to sex, sexual functioning, and health are wholly dependent upon and constituted by the interplay of these social systems.     

Thinking and feeling in the People's Republic of China: testing the generality of the "laws of emotion"

Cognitive theories of emotion assert that emotional reactions to events depend on the manner in which events are interpreted and appraised. From this perspective, the same outcome can produce different emotions. For example, a score of 85% on a test can evoke positive feelings if it is considered a success or negative feelings if it is considered a failure. Among the various appraisal dimensions that have been identified, causal attributions are thought to play a particularly influential role in shaping emotional reactions to various events. For example, success can evoke pride if it is attributed to high ability, gratitude if it is attributed to help from others, relief if it is attributed to a stroke of good fortune, or guilt if it is attained fraudulently or at the expense of others. These cognitive-affective linkages are thought to be universal. In this paper, we report two studies that tested the cross-cultural generality of some of these assumptions. In Study 1, participants from the People's Republic of China were led to succeed or fail on an (alleged) test of their intelligence and creativity. Consistent with previous findings with Western samples, attributions to ability predicted participants' emotional reactions to their test performance, with high ability attributions linked to greater pride following success. In Study 2, we extended these findings with American and Chinese participants, using a different experimental manipulation of success and failure, and a measure of attributions to effort. For both cultural groups, attributions to ability (but not attributions to effort) predicted greater emotional reactions to success. We conclude that attribution-emotion linkages have cross-cultural validity, and that pride is maximized when success is attributed to high ability.     

Extended cognition & constitution: Re-evaluating the constitutive claim of extended cognition

This paper explores several paths by which the extended cognition (EC) thesis may overcome the coupling-constitution fallacy. In so doing, I address a couple of shortcomings in the contemporary literature. First, on the dimension of first-wave EC, I argue that constitutive arguments based on functional parity suffer from either a threat of cognitive bloat or an impasse with respect to determining the correct level of grain in the attribution of causal-functional roles. Second, on the dimension of second-wave EC, I argue that especially the complementarity approach suffers from a similar sort of dilemma as first-wave EC: an inability to justify just what entails the ontological claim of EC over the scaffolding claim of weaker approaches in cognitive science. In this paper I show that two much more promising explanations by which to ground the ontological claim of EC are available, both starting from an exploration of the coordination dynamics between environmental resources and neural resources. On the one hand, I argue that second-wave EC based on cognitive integration, with its focus on bodily manipulations constrained by cognitive norms, is capable of resolving the coupling-constitution fallacy. On the other hand, I argue that the framework of cognitive integration can be supplemented by philosophical accounts of mechanistic explanation, because such accounts enable us to explain the emergence of higher-level cognitive properties due to a system's organization-dependent structure.     

Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories

This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.

Ten questions concerning extended cognition

This paper considers ten questions that those puzzled by or skeptical of extended cognition have posed. Discussion of these questions ranges across substantive, methodological, and dialectical issues in the ongoing debate over extended cognition, such as whether the issue between proponents and opponents of extended cognition is merely semantic or a matter of convention; whether extended cognition should be treated in the same way as extended biology; and whether conscious mental states pose a special problem for the extended mind thesis. Lethocerus, the giant water bug, will be a recurrent reference point for much of the discussion.     

Physiology and functioning: Parents' vagal tone, emotion socialization, and children's emotion knowledge

This study examined relationships among parents’ physiological regulation, their emotion socialization behaviors, and their children’s emotion knowledge. Parents’ resting cardiac vagal tone was measured, and parents provided information regarding their socialization behaviors and family emotional expressiveness. Their 4- or 5-year-old children (N = 42) participated in a laboratory session in which their knowledge of emotional facial expressions and situations was tested and their own resting vagal tone was monitored. Results showed that parents’ vagal tone was related to their socialization behaviors, and several parent socialization variables were related to their children’s emotion knowledge. These findings suggest that parents’ physiological regulation may affect the emotional development of their children by influencing their parenting behaviors.     

Parents' inconsistent emotion socialization and children's socioemotional adjustment

Parents socialize children's emotion through active, purposeful strategies and through their own expressivity; yet little research has examined whether parents are inconsistent within or between these socialization domains. The author presents a heuristic model of inconsistency in parents' emotion socialization. Parents (M age = 34.8 years, 85% mothers) of preschool-aged children (M age = 4.5 years, 53% female) reported on their responses to children's emotions, their own expressivity, child emotion regulation and expressivity, child social competence, and child internalizing and externalizing. Parents were largely consistent in their emotion socialization, with one exception being that some highly negatively expressive parents punished children's negative expressivity. This pairing of inconsistent socialization behaviors interacted to explain variance in child emotion regulation and internalizing. The author discusses the implications and limitations of the findings and directions for future research.     

Study on emotion spaces with centrality measure

In this paper, we study existing models of emotion space using centrality, which is borrowed from network theory, to identify key emotions as the central nodes in a network, for the purposes of understanding the existing emotion spaces better in a new way. With several different definitions of centrality, key emotions are identified for four existing emotion space models. We also propose a method for integrating existing spaces to build a refined space with more emotion terms. Each model identified different key emotions. When we reduced emotion spaces such that they each contained 21 common emotions, the key emotions identified remained different, implying fundamental structural differences among existing emotion space models. These findings call for further experimental verification and the refinement of emotion models for future research to make it more useful in emotion research.     

Managing emotion online

I apply emotion work to a case study of reader responses on the blog, Young House Love, owned by Sherry and John Petersik. The author performed a qualitative analysis of 1070 comments, examining readers' collective emotion work. After learning of the bloggers' hiatus, YHL readers responded using interpersonal and personal emotion management techniques. Comments exhibit deep acting and surface acting strategies directed primarily at the bloggers and their perceived emotional state. Positive sentiment emerged among comments as readers shared personal stories of connection, influence, expressions of support, and accounts. Furthermore, readers' comments reveal feeling rules guiding the YHL bloggers and readers. Thus, discursive efforts to influence the bloggers' emotions are conceptually linked to readers' attempts to rescue and repair the bloggers' public persona on YHL. This analysis confirms the relevance of Goffman's (1959) and Hochschild's (1979) work online and explores blogs as a tool for managing emotion. I also discuss the importance of the comments section in the co-creation of a blog.     

Children acquire emotion categories gradually

Some accounts imply that basic-level emotion categories are acquired early and quickly, whereas others imply that they are acquired later and more gradually. Our study examined this question for fear, happiness, sadness, and anger in the context of children's categorization of emotional facial expressions. Children (N = 168, 2–5 years) first labeled facial expressions of six emotions and were then shown a box and asked to put all and only, e.g., scared people in it. Before using fear in labeling, children had begun to include ‘fear’ faces and to exclude other (especially positive) faces from the fear box/category; after using fear, children continued to include other (especially negative) faces. The same pattern was observed for happiness, sadness, and anger. Emotion categories begin broad, including all emotions/faces of the same valence, and then gradually narrow over the preschool years.     

Action and emotion in everyday life

This study of naturally occurring behaviour employed a "beeper technique" to investigate the actions carried out by 152 subjects in eight different groups, viz. adult students, employed students who were also parents, unemployed, art students, doctoral students, alcoholics, retired people and a control group. Actions were sampled for seven subsequent days, five times per day between 8 a.m. and 10 p.m. at randomly selected occasions. Each action was rated on a number of variables, shortly after it was sampled (median delay approximately 10 min). Some of the findings were: Time allocation corresponded well with national estimates. Being under situational control was highly aversive. Instrumental and consummatory orientations correlated positively. The background variables were, on the whole, only rather weakly related to action ratings, but it was found that women and retired persons tended to report a higher level of well-being.     

Humour as emotion regulation: The differential consequences of negative versus positive humour

Humour is often seen as an adaptive coping strategy; however, the empirical literature is inconclusive. One possible explanation is that different types of humour have different adaptive consequences. In the present research, we predicted that positive (good-natured) humour would be more effective at regulating negative emotions than negative (mean-spirited) humour. In Study 1, participants were shown negative pictures two times. First, they simply viewed the pictures and rated their levels of positive and negative emotions. Second, they were instructed to: (a) view; (b) use positive humour; or (c) use negative humour, and then rate their reactions. Compared to negative humour, positive humour was more successful at down-regulating negative and up-regulating positive emotion. In Study 2, we replicated these findings and showed that these effects cannot be explained by differences in difficulty between the two humour conditions, participants’ expectations, or social desirability. Taken together, these findings suggest that positive (but not negative) humour may be an effective form of emotion regulation.     

Modeling of emotion elicitation conditions for a cognitive-emotive architecture

To cater to the need of embodying emotional behavior in an autonomous agent, there is a need for modeling computationally apt definitions of emotions. A number of emotion theories have been developed that provide an understanding of human psychology and their emotional behaviors, but it is difficult to directly decipher a theory into a computational model of emotion. Nevertheless, these theories together can serve as the theoretical foundation for designing a model for emotion-eliciting conditions. In this study, the salient features of OCC, Scherer, and Roseman theories of emotions are identified, which complement each other. The features are unified and standardized to bring consistency in deriving the computationally apt definition of five emotions viz. Happiness/Joy, Sadness, Fear, Anger, and Surprise. The objective of this hybridization is to set a ground framework for appraising the emotion-triggering cues (e.g., an event) for a simple, flexible and tolerant computational model of emotions. The underlying emotion-eliciting processes are designed using Fuzzy Logic. Fuzzy rules are framed to model the conditions behind emotion elicitation. Furthermore, the ISEAR data set and the real test-case scenarios are used to validate the accuracy of emotion prediction and rule fulfillment respectively.     

Cognitive externalism meets bounded rationality

When proponents of cognitive externalism (CE) turn to empirical studies in cognitive science to put the framework to use and to assess its explanatory success, they typically refer to perception, memory, or motor coordination. In contrast, not much has been said about reasoning. One promising avenue to explore in this respect is the theory of bounded rationality (BR). To clarify the relationship between CE and BR, we criticize Andy Clark's understanding of BR, as well as his claim that BR does not fit his version of CE. We then propose and defend a version of CE—“scaffolded cognition”—that is not committed to constitutive claims about the mind, but still differs from mainstream internalism. Finally, we analyze BR from our own CE perspective, thereby clarifying its vague appeals to the environment, and argue that cognitive internalism cannot explain important aspects of the BR program.     

Remembering the silver lining: Reappraisal and positive bias in memory for emotion

Reappraisal and distraction, unlike suppression, are known to decrease the intensity of negative emotion in the short term. Little is known about long-term characteristics associated with emotion regulation strategies, however. In a longitudinal study, we examined the relation between the strategies people reported using to regulate emotions during a stressful situation and their later memory for their emotions. Students in Italy rated the intensity of positive and negative emotions they were experiencing as they prepared for their high school exit exam. They also rated the extent to which they were regulating emotion using reappraisal, distraction, and suppression. Six weeks later, students recalled their pre-exam emotions. The more students reported engaging in reappraisal before the exam, the more they overestimated positive emotion and underestimated negative emotion when recalling their experience. The association between reported reappraisal and memory bias was partially mediated by positive changes over time in students’ appraisals of the exam preparation experience. Reports of engaging in distraction and suppression were not associated with memory bias. Because remembered emotion guides future choices, these findings suggest that reappraisal is a highly adaptive strategy for coping with stressful situations, not only in the short run, but also in the long run.     

Why emotion recognition is not simulational

According to a dominant interpretation of the simulation hypothesis, in recognizing an emotion we use the same neural processes used in experiencing that emotion. This paper argues that the view is fundamentally misguided. I will examine the simulational arguments for the three basic emotions of fear, disgust, and anger and argue that the simulational account relies strongly on a narrow sense of emotion processing which hardly squares with evidence on how, in fact, emotion recognition is processed. I contend that the current body of empirical evidence suggests that emotion recognition is processed in an integrative system involving multiple cross-regional interactions in the brain, a view which squares with understanding emotion recognition as an information-rich, rather than simulational, process. In the final section, I discuss possible objections.     

The elements of emotion

I join the growing ranks of theorists who reject the terms of traditional debates about the nature of emotion, debates that have long focused on the question of whether emotions should be understood as either cognitive or somatic kinds of states. Here, I propose and defend a way of incorporating both into a single theory, which I label the “Integrated Representational Theory” of emotion (IRT). In Section 2 I begin to construct the theory, defining and explaining emotions in terms of three pieces of content: representations of (1) the emoter’s body, (2) something in the world, and (3) a relevance relation between the objects of these first two pieces of content. I describe four general advantages I think the IRT offers. Finally, in Section 3, I elucidate and defend my account by contrasting it with another, similar proposal: Barlassina and Newen’s Impure Somatic Theory. In so doing, I explain two additional advantages of my view: first, it supports a unified explanation of all types of emotional response; and second, it offers the best framework for explaining how the representational contents of an emotion are integrated.     

Toward a cumulative science of emotion: a functional-cognitive framework for emotion research

ABSTRACT

Definitions of emotion and emotional phenomena are often infused with intuitions and theoretical ideas about what is “truly” emotional. Although these intuitions and ideas motivate people to study emotion, their prominence at the conceptual level can hamper progress in emotion research. In this paper, we argue that there is merit in defining emotional phenomena as much as possible in terms of behavioural principles that have been developed outside of emotion research. We clarify that such a functional approach is compatible with, and can even strengthen, cognitive approaches to emotion research. This functional-cognitive perspective reveals ways to increase the cumulative nature of emotion research and to surpass initial intuitions and theoretical ideas.