Phenomenological Argumentative Structure

The nontechnical ability to identify or match argumentative structure seems to be an important reasoning skill. Instruments that have questions designed to measure this skill include major standardized tests for graduate school admission, for example, the United States-Canadian Law School Admission Test (LSAT), the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE), and the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT). Writers and reviewers of such tests need an appropriate foundation for developing such questions – they need a proper representation of phenomenological argumentative structure – for legitimacy, and because these tests affect people's lives. This paper attempts to construct an adequate and appropriate representation of such structure, that is, the logical structure that an argument is perceived to have by mature reasoners, albeit ones who are untrained in logic.     

A Note on Formality and Logical Consequence

Logic is formal in the sense that all arguments of the same form as logically valid arguments are also logically valid and hence truth-preserving. However, it is not known whether all arguments that are valid in the usual model-theoretic sense are truth-preserving. Tarski claimed that it could be proved that all arguments that are valid (in the sense of validity he contemplated in his 1936 paper on logical consequence) are truth-preserving. But he did not offer the proof. The question arises whether the usual model-theoretic sense of validity and Tarski's 1936 sense are the same. I argue in this paper that they probably are not, and that the proof Tarski had in mind, although unusable to prove that model-theoretically valid arguments are truth-preserving, can be used to prove that arguments valid in Tarski's 1936 sense are truth-preserving.     

The "Natural" and the "Formal"

The paper presents an argument against a metaphysical conception of logic according to which logic spells out a specific kind of mathematical structure that is somehow inherently related to our factual reasoning. In contrast, it is argued that it is always an empirical question as to whether a given mathematical structure really does captures a principle of reasoning. (More generally, it is argued that it is not meaningful to replace an empirical investigation of a thing by an investigation of its a priori analyzable structure without paying due attention to the question of whether it really is the structure of the thing in question.) It is proposed to elucidate the situation by distinguishing two essentially different realms with which our reason must deal: the realm of the natural, constituted by the things of our empirical world, and the realm of the formal, constituted by the structures that we use as prisms to view, to make sense of, and to reconstruct the world. It is suggested that this vantage point may throw light on many foundational problems of logic.     

Infants discriminate manners and paths in non-linguistic dynamic events

Do 14- to 17-month-olds notice the paths and manners of motion events? English- and Spanish-learning infants were habituated to an animated motion event including a manner (e.g., spinning) and a path (e.g., over). They were then tested on four types of events that changed either the manner, the path, both, or neither component. Both English- and Spanish-learning infants attended to changes of manner and changes of path. Thus, infants from two different language communities proved sensitive to components of events that undergird relational term learning.     

Partially Interpreted Relations and Partially Interpreted Quantifiers

Logics in which a relation R is semantically incomplete in a particular universe E, i.e. the union of the extension of R with its anti-extension does not exhaust the whole universe E, have been studied quite extensively in the last years. (Cf. van Benthem (1985), Blamey (1986), and Langholm (1988), for partial predicate logic; Muskens (1996), for the applications of partial predicates to formal semantics, and Doherty (1996) for applications to modal logic.) This is not so with semantically incomplete generalized quantifiers which constitute the subject of the present paper. The only systematic study of these quantifiers from a purely logical point of view, is, to the best of my knowledge, that by van Eijck (1995). We shall take here a different approach than that of van Eijck and mention some of the abstract properties of the resulting logic. Finally we shall prove that the two approaches are interdefinable.     

Quantifying disablers in reasoning with universal and existential rules

People accept conclusions of valid conditional inferences (e.g., if p then q, p therefore q) less, the more disablers (circumstances that prevent q to happen although p is true) exist. We investigated whether rules that through their phrasing exclude disablers evoke higher acceptance ratings than rules that do not exclude disablers. In three experiments we re-phrased content-rich conditionals from the literature as either universal or existential rules and embedded these rules in Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens inferences. In Experiments 2 and 3, we also used abstract rules. The acceptance of conclusions increased when the rule was phrased with “all” instead of “some” and the number of disablers had a higher impact on existential rules than on universal rules. Further, the effect of quantifier was more pronounced for abstract rules and when tested within subjects. We discuss the relevance of phrasing, quantifiers and knowledge on reasoning.     

Logical Operations and Invariance

I present a notion of invariance under arbitrary surjective mappings for operators on a relational finite type hierarchy generalizing the so-called Tarski–Sher criterion for logicality and I characterize the invariant operators as definable in a fragment of the first-order language. These results are compared with those obtained by Feferman and it is argued that further clarification of the notion of invariance is needed if one wants to use it to characterize logicality.     

Quality and Quantifiers

I examine three ‘anti-object’ metaphysical views: nihilism (there are no objects at all), generalism (reality is ultimately qualitative), and anti-quantificationalism (quantification over objects does not perspicuously represent the world). After setting aside nihilism, I argue that generalists should be anti-quantificationalists. Along the way, I attempt to articulate what a ‘metaphysically perspicuous’ language might even be.     

Relativism and Assertion

Relativism entails that sentences like ‘Liquorice is tasty’ are used to assert relativistic propositions—that is, propositions whose truth-value is relative to a taste standard. I will defend this view against two objections. According to the first objection, relativism is incompatible with a Stalnakerian account of assertion. I will show that this objection fails because Stalnakerian assertions are proposals rather than attempts to update the common ground. According to the second objection, relativism problematically predicts that we can correctly assess beliefs as false but faultless. I will show that it doesn't. Such assessments come out as incorrect because correct relativistic assertion requires the absence of a presupposition of non-commonality.     

Dissociating linguistic and non-linguistic gesture processing: electrophysiological evidence from American Sign Language

A fundamental advance in our understanding of human language would come from a detailed account of how non-linguistic and linguistic manual actions are differentiated in real time by language users. To explore this issue, we targeted the N400, an ERP component known to be sensitive to semantic context. Deaf signers saw 120 American Sign Language sentences, each consisting of a “frame” (a sentence without the last word; e.g. BOY SLEEP IN HIS) followed by a “last item” belonging to one of four categories: a high-close-probability sign (a “semantically reasonable” completion to the sentence; e.g. BED), a low-close-probability sign (a real sign that is nonetheless a “semantically odd” completion to the sentence; e.g. LEMON), a pseudo-sign (phonologically legal but non-lexical form), or a non-linguistic grooming gesture (e.g. the performer scratching her face). We found significant N400-like responses in the incongruent and pseudo-sign contexts, while the gestures elicited a large positivity.     

Uniform Interpolation and Propositional Quantifiers in Modal Logics

We investigate uniform interpolants in propositional modal logics from the proof-theoretical point of view. Our approach is adopted from Pitts’ proof of uniform interpolationin intuitionistic propositional logic [15]. The method is based on a simulation of certain quantifiers ranging over propositional variables and uses a terminating sequent calculus for which structural rules are admissible. We shall present such a proof of the uniform interpolation theorem for normal modal logics K and T. It provides an explicit algorithm constructing the interpolants. Presented by Heinrich Wansing     

Evidence for a non-linguistic distinction between singular and plural sets in rhesus monkeys

Set representations are explicitly expressed in natural language. For example, many languages distinguish between sets and subsets (all vs. some), as well as between singular and plural sets (a cat vs. some cats). Three experiments explored the hypothesis that these representations are language specific, and thus absent from the conceptual resources of non-linguistic animals. We found that rhesus monkeys spontaneously discriminate sets based on a conceptual singular-plural distinction. Under conditions that do not elicit comparisons based on approximate magnitudes or one-to-one correspondence, rhesus monkeys distinguished between singular and plural sets (1 vs. 2 and 1 vs. 5), but not between two plural sets (2 vs. 3, 2 vs. 4, and 2 vs. 5). These results suggest that set-relational distinctions are not a privileged part of natural language, and may have evolved in non-linguistic species to support domain general quantitative computations.     

Can First-Order Logical Truth be Defined in Purely Extensional Terms?

W. V. Quine thinks logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms, as follows: a logical truth is a true sentence that exemplifies a logical form all of whose instances are true. P. F. Strawson objects that one cannot say what it is for a particular use of a sentence to exemplify a logical form without appealing to intensional notions, and hence that Quine's efforts to define logical truth in purely extensional terms cannot succeed. Quine's reply to this criticism is confused in ways that have not yet been noticed in the literature. This may seem to favour Strawson's side of the debate. In fact, however, a proper analysis of the difficulties that Quine's reply faces suggests a new way to clarify and defend the view that logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms.     

Four Covariance Structure Models for Canonical Correlation Analysis: A COSAN Modeling Approach

The mathematical connection between canonical correlation analysis (CCA) and covariance structure analysis was first discussed through the Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes (MIMIC) approach. However, the MIMIC approach has several technical and practical challenges. To address these challenges, a comprehensive COSAN modeling approach is proposed. Specifically, we define four COSAN-CCA models to correspond with four possible combinations of the data to be analyzed and the unique parameters to be estimated. In terms of the data, one can analyze either the unstandardized or standardized variables. In terms of the unique parameters, one can estimate either the weights or loadings. Besides the unique parameters of each COSAN-CCA model, all four COSAN-CCA models also estimate the canonical correlations as their common parameters. Taken together, the four COSAN-CCA models provide the correct point estimates and standard error estimates for all commonly used CCA parameters. Two numeric examples are used to compare the standard error estimates obtained from the MIMIC approach and the COSAN modeling approach. Moreover, the standard error estimates from the COSAN modeling approach are validated by a simulation study and the asymptotic theory. Finally, software implementation and future extensions are discussed.     

近现代中西医教育课程内容和教育形式的演变

近现代的中西医教育从课程内容和学位教育形式方面表现出完全不同的发展态势,主要原因是在中西医的学术内部.中医学理论属于哲学范畴,缺少自我更新的能力,只停留在形式上的表面进步.而西医学是以自然科学为基础,科技水平的进步也会带动其迅速发展.这就是当前中医教育面临的结症所在,需要中医人士潜心研究,为中医教育开辟新路.     

Some Varieties of Particularism

Analytic particularism claims that judgments of moral wrongness are about particular acts rather than general principles. Metaphysical particularism claims that what makes true moral judgments true is not general principles but nonmoral properties of particular acts. Epistemological particularism claims that studying particular acts apart from general principles can justify beliefs in moral judgments. Methodological particularism claims that we will do better morally in everyday life if we look carefully at each particular decision as it arises and give up the search for a complete moral theory. This paper raises problems for each of these versions of particularism.     

Plural Action Sentences and Logical Form: Reply to Himmelreich

This paper replies to Himmelreich's ‘The Paraphrase Argument Against Collective Actions’ [2017], which presents three putative counterexamples to the multiple agents analysis of plural action sentences. The paper shows that the argument from the first example, the discursive dilemma, fails because it relies crucially on a simplification of the target analysis, and that the others don't bear on the question because they turn out on examination to be about individual rather than group action sentences.     

内容类别与表征方式对判定THOG问题的影响

用两因素完全随机实验方法研究了“内容类别”与“表征方式”两个因素对被试判定THOG过程中的作用。结果表明 ,被试正确解决THOG问题的成绩与用抽象内容或用具体内容来构建问题无显著差异 ,但主词是否一致的不同表征方式对被试解决这类问题的成绩有显著影响     

Some Remarks on Ultrafilter and Normality Logics

The paper presents the main ideas of Ultrafilter Logic (UL), as introduced by Veloso and others. A new proposal, Normality Logic (NL), is outlined for expanding the expressive power of UL. The system NL appears to offer a simpler solution to the problem of expressive power than the sorting strategy of Carnielli and Veloso. Interpretations of NL are discussed and an important point of contact to Hansson's notion of non-prioritized belief revision is observed. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.