Perceiving Smellscapes

We perceive smells as perduring complex entities within a distal array. However, odor theories have been recently criticized for their conception of the spatiotemporal nature of olfactory perception and the individuation of distal odors. The paper does not aim to dispute these criticisms. Rather, what will be shown is that molecular structure theory, a refinement of odor theory, can be further developed to handle these challenges. The theory is further refined by focusing on distal perception that requires considering the perceptual object as mereologically complex persisting odor against a background scene conceived of as a smellscape.     

Dispositions and interferences

In this paper I argue that olfactory experience, like visual experience, is exteroceptive: it seems to one that odours, when one smells them, are external to the body, as it seems to one that objects are external to the body when one sees them. Where the sense of smell has been discussed by philosophers, it has often been supposed to be non-exteroceptive. The strangeness of this philosophical orthodoxy makes it natural to ask what would lead to its widespread acceptance. I argue that philosophers have been misled by a visuocentric model of what exteroceptivity involves. Since olfaction lacks the spatial features that make vision exteroceptive the conclusion that olfaction is nonexteroceptive can appear quite compelling, particularly in the absence of an alternative model of exteroceptivity appropriate to olfaction. I offer a model according to which odours seem to be external to the body because they seem to be brought into the nose from without by sniffing and breathing through the nostrils. I argue that some natural-seeming objections to this model rely on substantive assumptions about how the senses are distinguished from one another, and how perceptual experience is put together out of its modality-specific parts, that require defence.     

Odors Can Serve as Landmarks in Human Wayfinding

Scientists have shown that many non‐human animals such as ants, dogs, or rats are very good at using smells to find their way through their environments. But are humans also capable of navigating through their environment based on olfactory cues? There is not much research on this topic, a gap that the present research seeks to bridge. We here provide one of the first empirical studies investigating the possibility of using olfactory cues as landmarks in human wayfinding. Forty subjects participated in a piloting study to determine the olfactory material for the main experiment. Then, 24 subjects completed a wayfinding experiment with 12 odors as orientation cues. Our results are astonishing: Participants were rather good at what we call “odor‐based wayfinding.” This indicates that the ability of humans to use olfactory cues for navigation is often underestimated. We discuss two different cognitive explanations and rule out the idea that our results are just an instance of sequential learning. Rather, we argue that humans can enrich their cognitive map of the environment with olfactory landmarks and may use them for wayfinding.     

Phenomenological Naturalism

Naturalists seek to ground what exists in a set of fundamental metaphysical principles that they call ‘nature’. But metaphysical principles can’t function as fundamental explanatory grounds, since their ability to explain anything depends on the intelligibility granted by transcendental structures. What makes metaphysical principles intelligible, what unifies them, and allows them to characterize the being of worldly objects are the transcendental structures through which worldly objects are manifest. This means that the search for fundamental explanatory grounds must go deeper than the postulation of brute metaphysical facts. But this search cannot end with transcendental structures either, since the mode of being of transcendental subjects also calls out for explanation. Conceiving of transcendental subjects through the concept of being-in-the-world ties the mode of being of subjects to the world they inhabit. What grounds the existence of worldly objects, and what grounds our existence as being-in-the-world is nature: a principle that is neither an object, nor a subject – a principle that makes possible our encounters with intelligible worldly things.     

Stage theory and proper names

In the contemporary debate about the nature of persistence, stage theory is the view that ordinary objects (artefacts, animals, persons, etc.) are instantaneous and ??persist?? by being suitably related to other instantaneous objects. In this paper I focus on the issue of what stage theorists should say about the semantics of ordinary proper names, like ??Socrates?? or ??London??. I consider the remarks that stage theorists actually make about this issue, present some problems they face, and finally offer what I take to be the best alternative available for them.     

Fictions of the internal object

This paper examines internal objects in their role as theoretical constructs which analysts use to make sense of human experience. Object relations theory is based upon a vision that the personality is divided or split into parts. Clinical experience reveals that such splits are commonly expressed in the language of our analysing. However, a lexical reality is not a thing-in-itself, but a way of organizing and understanding experience. Jung's vision of the dynamics of the split self encompass a unique 'object relations theory' that is both similar and yet quite different from the object relations theories of Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott and Thomas Ogden A clinical example is used to examine the way in which these different theoretical views explain the same clinical phenomenon. The last section of the paper is devoted to a narrational analysis of the place of internal objects in analytic theory. The split self, dynamic is seen as a narrative device - one that makes sense and provides coherence, but is neither the only view of psychic reality nor necessarily an accurate reflection of the nature of the internal world.     

Logical structuralism and Benacerraf’s problem

There are two general questions which many views in the philosophy of mathematics can be seen as addressing: what are mathematical objects, and how do we have knowledge of them? Naturally, the answers given to these questions are linked, since whatever account we give of how we have knowledge of mathematical objects surely has to take into account what sorts of things we claim they are; conversely, whatever account we give of the nature of mathematical objects must be accompanied by a corresponding account of how it is that we acquire knowledge of those objects. The connection between these problems results in what is often called “Benacerraf’s Problem”, which is a dilemma that many philosophical views about mathematical objects face. It will be my goal here to present a view, attributed to Richard Dedekind, which approaches the initial questions in a different way than many other philosophical views do, and in doing so, avoids the dilemma given by Benacerraf’s problem.     

What's That Smell?

In philosophical discussions of the secondary qualities, color has taken center stage. Smells, tastes, sounds, and feels have been treated, by and large, as mere accessories to colors. We are, as it is said, visual creatures. This, at least, has been the working assumption in the philosophy of perception and in those metaphysical discussions about the nature of the secondary qualities. The result has been a scarcity of work on the “other” secondary qualities. In this paper, I take smells and place them front and center. I ask: What are smells? For many philosophers, the view that colors can be explained in purely physicalistic terms has seemed very appealing. In the case of smells, this kind of nonrelational view has seemed much less appealing. Philosophers have been drawn to versions of relationalism—the view that the nature of smells must be explained (at least in part) in terms of the effects they have on perceivers. In this paper, I consider a contemporary argument for this view. I argue that nonrelationalist views of smell have little to fear from this argument.     

Spatial aspects of olfactory experience

Abstract

Several theorists argue that one does not experience something as being at or coming from a distance or direction in olfaction. In contrast to this, I suggest that there can be a variety of spatial aspects of both synchronic and diachronic olfactory experiences, including spatial distance and direction. I emphasise, however, that these are not aspects of every olfactory experience. Thus, I suggest renouncing the widespread assumption there is a uniform account of the nature, including the spatial nature, of what is experienced in olfactory experience.     

Contextual variation and objectivity in olfactory perception

Synthese - According to Smell Objectivism, the smells we perceive in olfactory experience are objective and independent of perceivers, their experiences, and their perceptual systems. Variations in...     

Amie Thomasson's Easy Approach to Ontology

Philosophers have long debated whether abstract objects such as numbers and properties exist, but in recent years philosophical debate about what things exist has been ratcheted up more than a notch to question whether even ordinary objects such as pineapples and tables exist. One view has it that all existence questions are difficult questions whose answers hang on achieving an ontological theory that succeeds in carving nature at its joints. Some proponents of this view further claim to have succeeded in that carving, even without the benefit of any instrument sharper than the a priori arguments conjured in their armchairs, and to have discovered, alas, that no ordinary concrete objects exist. Naturally, many of us have been made to wonder what premise in the argument for that conclusion enjoys a plausibility greater than that of the negation of the argument's conclusion. In her remarkable new book, Ontology Made Easy, Amie Thomasson strives to do much more than that in defense of common‐sense ontology. But not only for common‐sense ontology. She propounds a unified approach to all existence questions—whether about the existence of dogs, shoes or tables, or about the existence of numbers, propositions or fictional characters—according to which existence questions “are not deep and difficult subjects for metaphysical dispute, but rather questions to be resolved straightforwardly by employing our conceptual competence, often combining this with empirical investigations” (20). Thomasson calls her way of resolving existence questions the easy approach to ontology, and to that I now turn.     

The human first hypothesis: identification of conspecifics and individuation of objects in the young infant

How do infants individuate and track objects, and among them objects belonging to their species, when they can only rely on information about the properties of those objects? We propose the Human First Hypothesis (HFH), which posits that infants possess information about their conspecifics and use it to identify and count objects. F. Xu and S. Carey [Cognitive Psychology, 30(2), 111-153, 1996] argued that before the age of 1 year, infants fail to use property information. To explain their results, Xu and Carey proposed the Object First Hypothesis (OFH), according to which infants under 1 year of age have only the general concept of physical object to identify and count objects. We show that infants have a more extensive knowledge of sortals than that claimed by the OFH. When 10-month-olds see one humanlike and one non-humanlike object, they successfully identify and count them by using the contrast in their properties, as predicted by the HFH. We also show that infants succeed even when they make a decision based on differences between two close basic-level categories such as humanlike objects and doglike objects, but fail when they have to use differences within the human category. Thus, infants treat "human" as a basic sortal, as predicted by the HFH. We argue that our results cannot be accounted for by general purpose mechanisms. Neither the strong version of the OFH and its explanation in terms of object indexing mechanisms [A. M. Leslie, F. Xu, P. Tremoulet, & B. J. Scholl, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2(1), 10-18, 1998] nor explanations in terms of task demands [T. Wilcox & R. Baillargeon, Cognitive Psychology, 37(2), 97-155, 1998] are sufficient to explain our results.     

Olfactory stimulation induces filial preferences for huddling in rat pups.

Rat pups of all ages huddle with conspecifics, but the senosory control of contact behavior changes ontogenetically. Thermal cues control huddling until about Day 15, at which time species' odors become the dominant stimulus. The present experiments indicate that the filial response to conspecifics is dependent on olfactory experience. A synthetic chemical scent was added to the smells of the dam from Day 1 to Day 20 postpartum. Standardized videographic tests were used to assess the development of huddling preference. Preferences for nest-typical smells emerged by Day 15 in pups from both scented and nonscented litters. Pups from scented nests preferred to huddle with a scented stimulus rat, whereas control pups preferred a nonadulterated rat stimulus. Additional testing indicated that the affiliative preferences were specific to rearing odor and were not based on decreased aversion to test scents, or on disrupted olfactory discrimination. The ontogeny of species-typical contact behavior is discussed in terms of the induction of a perceptual preference that is based on early odor stimulation.     

Odour memory and odour hedonics in children

The characteristics of olfactory memory during development were investigated and the hypothesis that the pleasantness of smells may be affected by previous associations with pleasant or unpleasant objects or events was tested. This type of emotional memory was compared in the immediate and long-term recognition of olfactory stimuli. Children from three different age groups (mean ages: 6 years 6 months; 8 years 9 months; and 10 years 5 months) were subdivided into two groups. One group was presented with six different odours, each with a slide depicting a pleasant picture. The other group was presented with the odours accompanied by unpleasant pictures. Immediately after stimulus presentation the subjects underwent a recognition test. One month later the subjects underwent a second recognition test, at the end of which they were required to give an evaluation of the pleasantness of each odour on a nine-point scale. At no age level did the pictures matched to the odours affect the recognition score. Olfactory memory varied with age, chiefly because memory decay increased with age, perhaps because of greater proactive interference. With increasing age more rapid decay was set against better immediate recognition. The hypothesis that the hedonic characteristics of odours are partially learned and are affected by events experienced in other modalities was supported.     

悟践疗法与中国心理治疗本土化

中国心理学家在心理治疗本土化方面进行了许多尝试,其中开本土化之先河的是悟践疗法.从悟践疗法的发展可以了解在不同社会历史背景下中国心理治疗本土化的早期特征.悟践疗法的人性主义理论是中国心理治疗本土化的理论产物,强调人性是由生物性、心理性和社会性三方面融合的全方位、全息的整体.悟践疗法的认知与行为的有机结合是中国心理治疗本土化的实践特色.理论和实践证明:悟践疗法具有承前启后、与时俱进的历史和现实意义.     

Smelling objects

Objects are central to perception and our interactions with the world. We perceive the world as parsed into discrete entities that instantiate particular properties, and these items capture our attention and shape how we interact with the environment. Recently there has been some debate about whether the sense of smell allows us to perceive odours as discrete objects, with some suggesting that olfaction is aspatial and doesn’t allow for object-individuation. This paper offers two empirically tractable criteria for assessing whether particular objects are exhibited in perceptual experience—(1) susceptibility to figure-ground segregation and (2) perceptual constancies—and argues that these criteria are fulfilled by olfactory perception, and thus there are olfactory objects. I argue that there are, in fact, two different ways that olfaction allows for figure-ground segregation. First, I look at various Gestalt grouping principles, which are thought to govern when features are perceived as grouped into structured wholes, segregated from everything around them. I argue that these principles apply to olfactory experience, providing evidence of non-spatial figure-ground segregation. Second, I defend the contentious idea that a spatial variety of figure-ground segregation can also occur in olfaction. To see this, however, we need to look to empirical evidence showing that tactile stimulation and bodily movements play a crucial role in olfactory phenomenology. Finally, I draw on empirical evidence and olfactory phenomenology to argue that there are perceptual constancies in olfactory experience, allowing us to perceive odours as coherent objects that survive shifts in our perspectives on the world.

     

The role of taste and oral somatosensation in olfactory localization

Although there is only one set of olfactory receptors, odours are experienced as smells when sniffing things (e.g., sniffing a wine's bouquet) and as flavours when the olfactory stimulus is present in the mouth (e.g., drinking wine). How this location binding—external versus internal environment—is achieved is poorly understood. Experiment 1 employed a new procedure to study localization, which was then used to explore whether localization is primarily dependent upon simultaneous oral somatosensation. Experiment 2, using solutions of varying viscosity, and Experiment 3, using oral movement of varying vigour, revealed that sniffed odours are not localized to the mouth by somatosensation alone. Instead, Experiment 4 demonstrated that a tastant needs to be present and that increasing tastant concentration generates increasing oral localization. Experiment 5 found that this reliance upon gustation reflects the previously observed “confusion” that people show for taste and smell stimuli in the mouth. We suggest that this “confusion” reflects the gustatory system's superior ability to suppress olfactory attention, thus assisting flavour binding.     

Physicalism and the sortalist conception of objects

Many hold an Aristotelian metaphysic of objects: fundamentally, objects fall under sortals and have persistence conditions befitting their sort. Though sometimes offered as a theory of material objects, I argue this view is in fact incompatible with physicalism. Call a ‘sortal’ a kind of object, a ‘sortal identity’ a particular’s nature specified in sortal terms, and ‘sortal properties’ properties that are determined by an object’s sortal identity, such as its persistence conditions. From here the argument runs as follows. Something is physical only if it is physically fundamental or is determined by what is physically fundamental (P1), but sortal identities and properties are neither physically fundamental (P2) nor determined by the physically fundamental (P3). I defend each premise in turn. P1 falls out of the standard conception of physicalism. Rejecting P2 is tantamount to positing Aristotelian substantial forms and formal causes—which are themselves incompatible with physicalism. I defend P3 by showing that extant solutions to “the grounding problem”—the problem of showing how (nonfundamental) sortal properties are determined by (nonsortal) physical properties—are either physicalistically unacceptable, or else physicalistically acceptable but opposed to the sortalist metaphysic.     

How do humans group non-rigid objects in multiple object tracking?: Evidence from grouping by self-rotation

Previous studies on perceptual grouping found that people can use spatiotemporal and featural information to group spatially separated rigid objects into a unit while tracking moving objects. However, few studies have tested the role of objects’ self-motion information in perceptual grouping, although it is of great significance to the motion perception in the three-dimensional space. In natural environments, objects always move in translation and rotation at the same time. The self-rotation of the objects seriously destroys objects’ rigidity and topology, creates conflicting movement signals and results in crowding effects. Thus, this study sought to examine the specific role played by self-rotation information on grouping spatially separated non-rigid objects through a modified multiple object tracking (MOT) paradigm with self-rotating objects. Experiment 1 found that people could use self-rotation information to group spatially separated non-rigid objects, even though this information was deleterious for attentive tracking and irrelevant to the task requirements, and people seemed to use it strategically rather than automatically. Experiment 2 provided stronger evidence that this grouping advantage did come from the self-rotation per se rather than surface-level cues arising from self-rotation (e.g. similar 2D motion signals and common shapes). Experiment 3 changed the stimuli to more natural 3D cubes to strengthen the impression of self-rotation and again found that self-rotation improved grouping. Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrated that grouping by self-rotation and grouping by changing shape were statistically comparable but additive, suggesting that they were two different sources of the object information. Thus, grouping by self-rotation mainly benefited from the perceptual differences in motion flow fields rather than in deformation. Overall, this study is the first attempt to identify self-motion as a new feature that people can use to group objects in dynamic scenes and shed light on debates about what entities/units we group and what kinds of information about a target we process while tracking objects.