Software development for computer-assisted instruction in experimental psychology

The introduction of CAI modules was pursued as a means of strengthening an experimental psychology course. After securing 12 Apple II-Plus microcomputers and a Winchester hard-disk system, we turned to the search for and development of relevant software. Our efforts were initially frustrated due to several inadequacies in extant software that are discussed herein. A surprising source of software turned out to be the commercial market; two well known commercial programs have been modified for educational use, and one of these programs has provided a pleasant solution to student computerphobia. These two old modules are discussed, along with others that are either borrowed or new. Although total computerization has been avoided for reasons discussed herein, extensive evaluation has indicated that the modules have greatly facilitated the realization of course goals and have especially minimized the three complaints (irrelevant, boring, too difficult) most often heard in traditional research methods courses. In addition, our Attitude Toward Computers Scale indicates that students develop a more positive attitude toward computers as a result of their usage in the course. This positive attitude is seen as most adaptive in a society within which computers will play an increasingly dominant role.     

Seeing what is not seen

This paper connects ideas from twentieth century Gestalt psychology, experiments in vision science, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. I propose that when we engage in simple sensorimotor tasks whose successful completion is open, our behavior may be motivated by practical perceptual awareness alone, responding to invariant features of the perceptual field that are invisible to other forms of perceptual awareness. On this view, we see more than we think we see, as evidenced by our skillful bodily behavior.     

The basis of shared intentions in human and robot cognition

There is a fundamental difference between robots that are equipped with sensory, motor and cognitive capabilities, vs. simulations or non-embodied cognitive systems. Via their perceptual and motor capabilities, these robotic systems can interact with humans in an increasingly more “natural” way, physically interacting with shared objects in cooperative action settings. Indeed, such cognitive robotic systems provide a unique opportunity to developmental psychologists for implementing their theories and testing their hypotheses on systems that are becoming increasingly “at home” in the sensory--motor and social worlds, where such hypotheses are relevant. The current research is the result of interaction between research in computational neuroscience and robotics on the one hand, and developmental psychology on the other. One of the key findings in the developmental psychology context is that with respect to other primates, humans appear to have a unique ability and motivation to share goals and intentions with others. This ability is expressed in cooperative behavior very early in life, and appears to be the basis for subsequent development of social cognition. Here we attempt to identify a set of core functional elements of cooperative behavior and the corresponding shared intentional representations. We then begin to specify how these capabilities can be implemented in a robotic system, the Cooperator, and tested in human–robot interaction experiments. Based on the results of these experiments we discuss the mutual benefit for both fields of the interaction between robotics and developmental psychology.     

Implicit visual learning and the expression of learning

Although the existence of implicit motor learning is now widely accepted, the findings concerning perceptual implicit learning are ambiguous. Some researchers have observed perceptual learning whereas other authors have not. The review of the literature provides different reasons to explain this ambiguous picture, such as differences in the underlying learning processes, selective attention, or differences in the difficulty to express this knowledge. In three experiments, we investigated implicit visual learning within the original serial reaction time task. We used different response devices (keyboard vs. mouse) in order to manipulate selective attention towards response dimensions. Results showed that visual and motor sequence learning differed in terms of RT-benefits, but not in terms of the amount of knowledge assessed after training. Furthermore, visual sequence learning was modulated by selective attention. However, the findings of all three experiments suggest that selective attention did not alter implicit but rather explicit learning processes.     

Perceptual span,visual span,and visual attention span: Three potential ways to quantify limits on visual processing during reading

Many lines of evidence have revealed limitations of the human visual system, most notably that only a portion of available information is processed in a single glance. A degree of conceptual confusion has emerged, however, regarding the underlying concepts or mechanisms explaining limited visual processing in reading; perceptual span, visual span, or visual attention span. While the original definitions of these three concepts are clear and well-differentiated, they are routinely used inconsistently in the literature. The primary goal of the present review is to re-specify these three concepts in terms of what they correspond to and how they are determined. Further, we investigate whether these three spans refer to vision-related measurements and/or are based on general cognitive abilities. This review should lead to a better understanding of the involvement of visual functions in reading performance.     

视觉掩蔽研究现状及展望

视觉掩蔽是指某个物体因另一在空间或时间上与其相邻的物体的呈现而导致可见度降低的现象。目前,掩蔽的研究集中于那些涉及到特征、目标和场景表征,注意控制机制,以及现象知觉有关的加工等。该综述主要介绍了视觉掩蔽的概念和范式,研究的典型现象及参数,并介绍了相关的神经科学研究,概述并评论了4类重要的视觉掩蔽理论模型：知觉修正、双通道、边界轮廓系统以及目标替换。最后讨论了目前视觉掩蔽研究遇到的一些困难和挑战,包括刺激与任务的不统一带来的影响、神经科学方法的局限性以及模型模拟的复杂性,并从神经意识相关、功能性观点与模型发展三方面对视觉掩蔽未来的研究方向进行了展望。     

Transfer between vision and haptics: Memory for 2-D patterns and 3-D objects

Explicit memory tests such as recognition typically access semantic, modality-independent representations, while perceptual implicit memory tests typically access presemantic, modality-specific representations. By demonstrating comparable cross- and within-modal priming using vision and haptics with verbal materials (Easton, Srinivas, & Greene, 1997), we recently questioned whether the representations underlying perceptual implicit tests were modality specific. Unlike vision and audition, with vision and haptics verbal information can be presented in geometric terms to both modalities. The present experiments extend this line of research by assessing implicit and explicit memory within and between vision and haptics in the nonverbal domain, using both 2-D patterns and 3-D objects. Implicit test results revealed robust cross-modal priming for both 2-D patterns and 3-D objects, indicating that vision and haptics shared abstract representations of object shape and structure. Explicit test results for 3-D objects revealed modality specificity, indicating that the recognition system keeps track of the modality through which an object is experienced.     

Independence of long-term contextual memory and short-term perceptual hypotheses: Evidence from contextual cueing of interrupted search

Observers are able to resume an interrupted search trial faster relative to responding to a new, unseen display. This finding of rapid resumption is attributed to short-term perceptual hypotheses generated on the current look and confirmed upon subsequent looks at the same display. It has been suggested that the contents of perceptual hypotheses are similar to those of other forms of memory acquired long-term through repeated exposure to the same search displays over the course of several trials, that is, the memory supporting “contextual cueing.” In three experiments, we investigated the relationship between short-term perceptual hypotheses and long-term contextual memory. The results indicated that long-term, contextual memory of repeated displays neither affected the generation nor the confirmation of short-term perceptual hypotheses for these displays. Furthermore, the analysis of eye movements suggests that long-term memory provides an initial benefit in guiding attention to the target, whereas in subsequent looks guidance is entirely based on short-term perceptual hypotheses. Overall, the results reveal a picture of both long- and short-term memory contributing to reliable performance gains in interrupted search, while exerting their effects in an independent manner.     

A theory of phenomenal geometry and its applications

The geometry of perceived space (phenomenal geometry) is specified in terms of three basic factors: the perception of direction, the perception of distance or depth, and the perception of the observer's own position or motion. The apparent spatial locations of stimulus points resulting from these three factors thereupon determine the derived perceptions of size, orientation, shape, and motion. Phenomenal geometry is expected to apply to both veridical and illusory perceptions. It is applied here to explain a number of representative illusions, including the illusory rotation of an inverted mask (Gregory, 1970), a trapezoidal window (Ames, 1952), and any single or multiple point stimuli in which errors in one or more of the three basic factors are present. It is concluded from phenomenal geometry that the size-distance and motion-distance invariance hypotheses are special cases of the head motion paradigm, and that proposed explanations in terms of compensation, expectation, or logical processes often are unnecessary for predicting responses to single or multiple stimuli involving head or stimulus motion. Two hypotheses are identified in applying phenomenal geometry. It is assumed that the perceptual localization of stimulus points determines the same derived perceptions, regardless of the source of perceptual information supporting the localizations. This assumption of cue equivalence or cue substitution provides considerable parsimony to the geometry. Also, it is assumed that the perceptions specified by the geometry are internally consistent. Departures from this internal consistency, such as those which occur in the size-distance paradox, are considered to often reflect the intrusion of nonperceptual (cognitive) processes into the responses. Some theoretical implications of this analysis of phenomenal geometry are discussed.     

Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons

According to T.M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value, to be valuable is not to possess intrinsic value as a simple and unanalysable property, but rather to have other properties that provide reasons to take up an attitude in favour of their owner or against it. The 'wrong kind of reasons' objection to this view is that we may have reasons to respond for or against something without this having any bearing on its value. The challenge is to explain why such reasons are of the wrong kind. This is what I set out to do, after illustrating the objection more thoroughly.     

心理学经验主义、理性主义与解释学认识论比较研究

虽然现代心理学一直想摆脱哲学的束缚与羁绊,但心理学的发展中总是自觉不自觉地表露出不同的认识论取向。经验主义、理性主义和解释学哲学对现代心理学的发展产生了重要影响。三种取向的心理学在心理学研究对象本质的理解、知识形成的途径、研究结果的表现形式以及研究方法的选择上各执己见,由此展现出三种不同的心理学风景。经验主义认识论注重事物各种特征的描述,经验材料的收集,主张采用自然科学研究方法以揭示现象的规律与法则。理性主义认识论关注现象背后的深层次结构,主张用信息加工、记忆检索、图式与结构、感觉输入等方式获得对现象本质的认识,并以形式结构的方式呈现研究结果。解释学认识论则注重对人类实践活动的理解,重视人与环境的相互作用,主张以语义的言说阐明研究结果。在未来,心理学仍需寻求完善的认识论基础,真正确立适于人性的心理学研究方式,以期展示人的完整本质。     

The Neural Basis of Selective Attention: Cortical Sources and Targets of Attentional Modulation

ABSTRACT— Selective attention is an intrinsic component of perceptual representation in a visual system that is hierarchically organized. Modulatory signals originate in brain regions that represent behavioral goals; these signals specify which perceptual objects are to be represented by sensory neurons that are subject to contextual modulation. Attention can be deployed to spatial locations, features, or objects, and corresponding modulatory signals must be targeted within these domains. Open questions include how nonspatial perceptual domains are modulated by attention and how abstract goals are transformed into targeted modulatory signals.     

Embodying the psychological attitude: types of consciousness in the transformation of culture

It is time to reclaim C.G. Jung’s vision of psychology as the foundational science upon which all sciences and institutions would be based, and as the discipline, theory, and practice necessary for fostering humanity’s overall psychocultural development. Jung identified eight distinct ‘types’ of consciousness through which humankind engages its emerging psychological attitude. Jung’s view of psychological development as hingeing on the differentiation of function-attitudes provides the means for understanding not only ourselves and each other, but our society as well. This paper offers an example of such an analysis by focusing on the current conflict within American political culture. The goal is as lofty as it is necessary: the operationalization of Jung’s vision of psychology as the powerful influencer of human cultural evolution that it has the potential to be. The immediate goal is to instigate the first step toward this vision of Jung’s ‘complex psychology’ by stimulating conversations among Jungians about how they can foster that vision, leading them towards taking up roles as ‘citizen therapists’, actively involved in their communities in cultivating greater empathy and the withdrawal of projections in the interest of furthering ‘collective consciousness’.     

The Visual Guide to Morality: Vision as an Integrative Analogy for Moral Experience,Variability and Mechanism

Analogies help organize, communicate and reveal scientific phenomena. Vision may be the best analogy for understanding moral judgment. Although moral psychology has long noted similarities between seeing and judging, we systematically review the “morality is like vision” analogy through three elements: experience, variability and mechanism. Both vision and morality are experienced as automatic, durable and objective. However, despite feelings of objectivity, both vision and morality show substantial variability across biology, culture and situation. The paradox of objective experience and cultural subjectivity is best understood through constructionism, as both vision and morality involve the flexible combination of more basic ingredients. Specifically, both vision and morality involve a mechanism that demonstrates Gestalt, combination and coherence. The “morality is like vision” analogy not only provides intuitive organization and compelling communication for moral psychology but also speaks to debates in the field, such as intuition versus reason, pluralism versus universalism and modularity versus constructionism.     

Transcendental Phenomenology and the Way to Happiness: Husserl’s Reply to Csikszentmihalyi

It is an unprecedented task to interpret Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology as a fundamental philosophy of happiness. Although happiness has been discussed in many psychologies, Csikszentmihalyi’s positive psychology defines happiness as “flow”, a psychic state of ongoing immersion guided by intrinsic motivations and rewards. In this paper, I interpret our transcendental consciousness as a radical “flow” maker and claim that in our transcendental life, happiness is what we ourselves are. Then, I propose this not only as an appeal to a change of attitude (i.e. reduction) for happiness, but also as a deep hermeneutics of the mental skills and activity designs suggested by positive psychology. In this way, worldly happiness dictums can be profoundly re-examined. Understood as such, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology leaves us the task of how to make a concrete form of qualitative or hermeneutical research on happiness out of it.     

The lost direction in binocular vision: the neglected signs posted by Wells, Towne, and LeConte

Studies of vision have informed theories first in philosophy and then in psychology. Over the centuries, an increasing number of phenomena have been enlisted to refute or reinforce particular theories. Nowhere has this been more evident than in binocular vision. How we see a single world with two eyes is one of the oldest and most consistently studied topics in vision research. It has been discussed at least since the time of Aristotle and it has been examined experimentally since the second century, when Ptolemy defined lines of visual correspondence for the two eyes. Prior to Wheatstone's invention of the stereoscope in the 1830s, binocular vision had been studied in terms of visual directions. The stereoscope established distance (or depth) as well as direction as dimensions of binocular vision. Subsequently, depth rather than direction has been the principal concern of students of vision, and texts in English devoted to analyses of direction rather than depth have been neglected. We examine the experiments on binocular visual direction conducted by Wells before Wheatstone, and by Towne and LeConte after him, and discuss the reasons for their neglect.     

动允直接知觉的共鸣原理

传统认知理论认为我们只能间接知觉动允,而生态认知心理学则认为对动允的知觉是个体与环境信息直接共鸣的过程。生态认知心理学首先判定动允并不是存在于我们头脑中的认识,而是实际存在于个体-环境系统中的事实,对动允的直接知觉就是对动允的检测而非推测,是对动允信息的拾取而非对记忆内容的提取。这种直接知觉表现为身体的相关动作机制（动作神经元、肌肉组织等）与环境中动允信息的共鸣。进化与学习在共鸣的形成与发展中具有重要作用。     

W H R Rivers (1864-1922): the founder of research in cross-cultural perception.

This paper presents a brief review of Rivers's contribution to psychology, especially to his cross-cultural studies of the basic perceptual processes of vision, and examines the lasting influence of his findings. It reports briefly on the scientific milieu in which Rivers carried out his work and traces the growth of his interest in the psychology of perception from the early days of his medical work to his appointment as a foundation lecturer of two English universities, London and Cambridge. It is argued that Rivers's contribution has been undervalued by psychologists.