Consciousness during dreams

Two aspects of consciousness are first considered: consciousness as awareness (phenomenological meaning) and consciousness as strategic control (functional meaning). As to awareness, three types can be distinguished: first, awareness as the phenomenal experiences of objects and events; second, awareness as meta-awareness, i.e., the awareness of mental life itself; third, awareness as self-awareness, i.e., the awareness of being oneself. While phenomenal experience and self-awareness are usually present during dreaming (even if many modifications are possible), meta-awareness is usually absent (apart from some particular experiences of self-reflectiveness) with the major exception of lucid dreaming. Consciousness as strategic control may also be present in dreams. The functioning of consciousness is then analyzed, following a cognitive model of dream production. In such a model, the dream is supposed to be the product of the interaction of three components: (a) the bottom-up activation of mnemonic elements coming from LTM systems, (b) interpretative and elaborative top-down processes, and (c) monitoring of phenomenal experience. A feedback circulation is activated among the components, where the top-down interpretative organization and the conscious monitoring of the oneiric scene elicitates other mnemonic contents, according to the requirements of the dream plot. This dream productive activity is submitted to unconscious and conscious processes.     

Bizarreness of size and shape in dream images

Bizarreness in dreams is defined as an unusual combination of features in the phenomenal unified consciousness, that is, an incoherent simulation of the waking world. The present study investigated the specific mechanisms underlying dream image production and the phenomenal unity of consciousness by focusing on size and shape bizarreness. Data were derived from a Dream Data Bank of experimental dream studies. Analyses revealed that feature distortion was quite infrequent. Results are discussed in terms of cognitive processes proposed in a dream production model. Theoretical cognitive constructs, such as Kosslyn's imagery model, memory systems functioning, and binding, were used to speculate about these two specific types of bizarreness.     

Affect integration in dreams and dreaming

The processes by which dreaming aids in the ongoing integration of affects into the mind are approached here from complementary psychoanalytic and nonpsychoanalytic perspectives. One relevant notion is that the dream provides a psychological space wherein overwhelming, contradictory, or highly complex affects that under waking conditions are subject to dissociation, splitting, or disavowal may be brought together for observation by the dreaming ego. This process serves the need for psychological balance and equilibrium. A brief discussion of how the mind processes information during dreaming is followed by a consideration of four component aspects of the integrative process: the nature and use of the dream-space, the oscillating "me / not me" quality of the dream, the apparent reality of the dream, and the use of nonpathological projective identification in dreaming. Three clinical illustrations are offered and discussed.     

The immersive spatiotemporal hallucination model of dreaming

The paper proposes a minimal definition of dreaming in terms of immersive spatiotemporal hallucination (ISTH) occurring in sleep or during sleep–wake transitions and under the assumption of reportability. I take these conditions to be both necessary and sufficient for dreaming to arise. While empirical research results may, in the future, allow for an extension of the concept of dreaming beyond sleep and possibly even independently of reportability, ISTH is part of any possible extension of this definition and thus is a constitutive condition of dreaming. I also argue that the proposed ISTH model of dreaming, in conjunction with considerations on the epistemic relationship between dreaming and dream reports, raises important questions about the extent to which dreams typically involve a detailed body representation—an assumption that plays an important role in philosophical work on dreaming. As a commonly accepted definition of dreaming is lacking in current dream research, the ISTH model, which integrates conceptual analysis and epistemological considerations with results from empirical research, is an important contribution to this field. By linking dreaming to felt presence, full-body illusions, and autoscopic phenomena such as out-of-body experiences in wakefulness and in the hypnagogic state, the ISTH model of dreaming also helps integrate dream research, both theoretically and experimentally, with the study of other altered states of consciousness involving hallucinations. It makes straightforward and investigable predictions by claiming that all of these experiences have amodal spatiotemporal hallucinations as their common denominator. Finally, it is theoretically relevant for the philosophical discussion on minimal phenomenal selfhood.     

Frequency of lucid dreaming in a representative German sample

Lucid dreams occur when a person is aware that he is dreaming while he is dreaming. In a representative sample of German adults (N = 919), 51% of the participants reported that they had experienced a lucid dream at least once. Lucid dream recall was significantly higher in women and negatively correlated with age. However, these effects might be explained by the frequency of dream recall, as there was a correlation of .57 between frequency of dream recall and frequency of lucid dreams. Other sociodemographic variables like education, marital status, or monthly income were not related to lucid dream frequency. Given the relatively high prevalence of lucid dreaming reported in the present study, research on lucid dreams might be pursued in the sleep laboratory to expand the knowledge about sleep, dreaming, and consciousness processes in general.     

Enactive or inactive? Cranially envatted dream experience and the extended conscious mind

When we dream, it is often assumed, we are isolated from the external environment. It is also commonly believed that dreams can be, at times, accurate, convincing replicas of waking experience. Here I analyse some of the implications of this view for an enactive theory of conscious experience. If dreams are, as described by the received view, “inactive”, or “cranially envatted” whilst replicating the experience of being awake, this would be problematic for certain extended conscious mind theories. Focusing specifically on Alva Noë’s enactive view, according to which the vehicles of perceptual experience extend beyond the brain, I argue that dreams are a quandary. Noë’s view is that dreaming is consistent with enactivism because even if dreams are inactive and shut off from the external environment, they are not “full-blown” perceptual consciousness, and also, there is some reason to reject the inactive claim. However, this view rests on an unjustified and reductive account of dreams which is not supported by empirical evidence. Dreams can indeed replicate waking phenomenal experience during inactive periods of sleep, and we have no reason to suspect that dreams which are more inactive are less “full-blown”. Taken together, this shows that dreams are indeed relevant to extended conscious mind theories and need to be taken into account by enactivists.     

Dreaming

The aim is to discover a principle governing the formation of the dream. Now dreaming has an analogy with consciousness in that it is a seeming-consciousness. Meanwhile consciousness exhibits a tripartite structure consisting of (A) understanding oneself to be situated in a world endowed with given properties, (B) the mental processes responsible for the state, and (C) the concrete perceptual encounter of awareness with the world. The dream analogues of these three elements are investigated in the hope of discovering the source of the kinship between dream and consciousness. The dream world (A) proves to be a logically impossible world, limited by nothing more than sheer narratability. The internal world (B) of the dreamer is notable for the limitlessness of the scope allotted to the imagination (exactly taking over the offices of rational function), together with the presence of two important phenomena encountered in waking consciousness: a measure of interiority, and the positing of a world. Finally (C), the dream further replicates consciousness in so far as we seem in dreaming concretely to experience our physical surrounds in the form of perceptual imagining. These properties play their part in enabling the dream to be a seeming-consciousness. At the same time they are such as to necessitate its not being consciousness. It is proposed that in the light of these properties, and those composing the state of consciousness, the dream simply is the imagining of consciousness.     

Another look at dreaming: disentangling Freud's primary and secondary process theories

The Interpretation of Dreams contains Freud's first and most complete articulation of the primary and secondary mental processes that serve as a framework for the workings of mind, conscious and unconscious. While it is generally believed that Freud proposed a single theory of dreaming, based on the primary process, a number of ambiguities, inconsistencies, and contradictions reflect an incomplete differentiation of the parts played by the two mental processes in dreaming. It is proposed that two radically different hypotheses about dreaming are embedded in Freud's work. The one implicit in classical dream interpretation is based on the assumption that dreams, like waking language, are representational, and are made up of symbols connected to latent unconscious thoughts. Whereas the symbols that constitute waking language are largely verbal and only partly unconscious, those that constitute dreams are presumably more thoroughly disguised and represented as arcane hallucinated hieroglyphs. From this perspective, both the language of the dream and that of waking life are secondary process manifestations. Interpretation of the dream using the secondary process model involves the assumption of a linear two-way "road" connecting manifest and latent aspects, which in one direction involves the work of dream construction and in the other permits the associative process of decoding and interpretation. Freud's more revolutionary hypothesis, whose implications he did not fully elaborate, is that dreams are the expression of a primary mental process that differs qualitatively from waking thought and hence are incomprehensible through a secondary process model. This seems more adequately to account for what is now known about dreaming, and is more consistent with the way dream interpretation is ordinarily conducted in clinical practice. Recognition that dreams are qualitatively distinctive expressions of mind may help to restore dreaming to its privileged position as a unique source of mental status information.     

Cognitive and emotional processes during dreaming: a neuroimaging view

Dream is a state of consciousness characterized by internally-generated sensory, cognitive and emotional experiences occurring during sleep. Dream reports tend to be particularly abundant, with complex, emotional, and perceptually vivid experiences after awakenings from rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. This is why our current knowledge of the cerebral correlates of dreaming, mainly derives from studies of REM sleep. Neuroimaging results show that REM sleep is characterized by a specific pattern of regional brain activity. We demonstrate that this heterogeneous distribution of brain activity during sleep explains many typical features in dreams. Reciprocally, specific dream characteristics suggest the activation of selective brain regions during sleep. Such an integration of neuroimaging data of human sleep, mental imagery, and the content of dreams is critical for current models of dreaming; it also provides neurobiological support for an implication of sleep and dreaming in some important functions such as emotional regulation.     

Partial memory reinstatement while (lucid) dreaming to change the dream environment

Lucid dreams often coincide with having control over dream events in real-time, although the limitations of dream control are not completely understood. The current study probed the ability of lucid dreamers to reinstate waking scene memories while dreaming. After brief exposure to an experimental scene, participants were asked to reinstate the scene while lucid dreaming (i.e., change dream scenery to match real-world scene). Qualitative analysis revealed that successful dream scene reinstatements were overwhelmingly inaccurate with respect to the original experimental scene. Importantly, reinstatement inaccuracies held even when the dreamer was aware of them during the dream, suggesting a dissociation between memory access while dreaming and dream imagery. The ability to change the environment of a dream speaks to the high amount of lucid dream control, yet the inaccuracies speak to a lack of detailed control. Reinstating context during lucid sleep offers an experimental method to investigate sleep, dreams, and memory.     

Blackout of my nights: Contentless,timeless and selfless report from the night in patients with central hypersomnias

At the extreme spectrum of consciousness during sleep, some patients with rare hypersomnias reported experiencing a specific night ‘blackout’ when sleeping, i.e., an absence of experiences or recall of them from sleep onset to offset. Thus, we explored through questionnaires the conscious experiences (dreaming experience, mind, self) during the night in 133 patients with idiopathic hypersomnia, 108 patients with narcolepsy, and 128 healthy controls. The night blackout was more frequent in idiopathic hypersomnia than in narcolepsy and control groups. Patients with idiopathic hypersomnia and frequent night amnesia had lower dream recall frequencies, and felt more often sleep as deep and mind as blank during the night. They had a higher proportion of slow wave sleep on their (retrospectively collected) sleep recordings than those without night blackout. This night blackout provides a new model for studying loss of consciousness during sleep, here as a contentless, selfless and timeless feeling upon awakening.     

Lost in the Sauce: The Effects of Alcohol on Mind Wandering

ABSTRACT— Alcohol consumption alters consciousness in ways that make drinking both alluring and hazardous. Recent advances in the study of consciousness using a mind-wandering paradigm permit a rigorous examination of the effects of alcohol on experiential consciousness and metaconsciousness. Fifty-four male social drinkers consumed alcohol (0.82 g/kg) or a placebo beverage and then performed a mind-wandering reading task. This task indexed both self-caught and probe-caught zone-outs to distinguish between mind wandering inside and outside of awareness. Compared with participants who drank the placebo, those who drank alcohol were significantly more likely to report that they were zoning out when probed. After this increase in mind wandering was accounted for, alcohol also lowered the probability of catching oneself zoning out. The results suggest that alcohol increases mind wandering while simultaneously reducing the likelihood of noticing one's mind wandering. Findings are discussed with regard to theories of alcohol and theories of consciousness.     

How to integrate dreaming into a general theory of consciousness--a critical review of existing positions and suggestions for future research

In this paper, we address the different ways in which dream research can contribute to interdisciplinary consciousness research. As a second global state of consciousness aside from wakefulness, dreaming is an important contrast condition for theories of waking consciousness. However, programmatic suggestions for integrating dreaming into broader theories of consciousness, for instance by regarding dreams as a model system of standard or pathological wake states, have not yielded straightforward results. We review existing proposals for using dreaming as a model system, taking into account concerns about the concept of modeling and the adequacy and practical feasibility of dreaming as a model system. We conclude that existing modeling approaches are premature and rely on controversial background assumptions. Instead, we suggest that contrastive analysis of dreaming and wakefulness presents a more promising strategy for integrating dreaming into a broader research context and solving many of the problems involved in the modeling approach.     

The dynamic framework of mind wandering revisited: How mindful meta-awareness affects mental states’ constraints

The dynamic framework of mind wandering (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-Hanna, 2016) is reviewed and modified through integrating the construct of mindful meta-awareness. The dynamic framework maintains that mind wandering belongs to a family of spontaneous thought phenomena. The key defining feature of mind wandering is ‘spontaneity’ which characterizes the dynamic nature of thoughts in the framework. The argument is made that incorporating the mindful meta-awareness construct modifies the dynamic framework as follows: (1) the framework’s criteria for mind wandering do not hold anymore as meta-awareness changes the relationship between thoughts and constraints, and (2) lucid dreaming can be categorized as unguided thought while at the same time being dependent on deliberate constraints. Finally, the application of this modified framework will be discussed in terms of the treatment of mental disorders related to spontaneous thought alterations, in particular depression and nightmares.     

Personality Judgment at Zero Acquaintance: Agreement,Assumed Similarity,and Implicit Simplicity

Measures of frequency of dream recall for 47 Ss and of amount of dreaming for 18 Ss, as determined by the Dement-Kleitman method, were available as part of a larger investigation of the influence of personality factors on dream recall. Rorschach Test indices obtained from these Ss were intercorrelated among themselves and correlated with the appropriate dream variable in order to assess the presumed affinity of dream phenomena and Rorschach response processes. The results were: (1) indices of fantasy predominance correlated positively with both amount of dreaming and frequency of dream recall; (2) indices of associative productivity correlated positively with frequency of dream recall; (3) an index of introspective constriction correlated negatively with frequency of dream recall. Further exploration of this area seems promising.     

Encountering the dream: Intersecting anthropological and psychoanalytical approaches

The human dream has been a central and contested therapeutic resource for the various schools of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. However, anthropology has been less concerned with human dreaming, though many anthropologists have studied indigenous peoples' dream theories as a consequence of the importance that such people gave to their dreaming. During the twentieth century there has been a fertile interaction between psychoanalytical approaches to dreaming and pertinent anthropological studies. This paper situates these interconnected disciplinary approaches to dreaming in the context of the historical development of thinking about culture and dreaming. The dream is considered as a multiple human resource. Discussion focuses on a fourfold approach to the dream: as therapeutic and existential encounter; as potential social knowledge; as cultural template; and finally as reflexive opportunity. Overall, the paper asserts the centrality of the dream as both a cultural and therapeutic resource.     

The neural substrate for dreaming: is it a subsystem of the default network?

Building on the content, developmental, and neurological evidence that there are numerous parallels between waking cognition and dreaming, this article argues that the likely neural substrate that supports dreaming, which was discovered through converging lesion and neuroimaging studies, may be a subsystem of the waking default network, which is active during mind wandering, daydreaming, and simulation. Support for this hypothesis would strengthen the case for a more general neurocognitive theory of dreaming that starts with established findings and concepts derived from studies of waking cognition and neurocognition. If this theory is correct, then dreaming may be the quintessential cognitive simulation because it is often highly complex, often includes a vivid sensory environment, unfolds over a duration of a few minutes to a half hour, and is usually experienced as real while it is happening.     

Representationalism and the phenomenology of mental imagery

This paper sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery and uses it to criticize representationalism and the internalist-versus-externalist framework for understanding consciousness. Contrary to internalist views of mental imagery imagery experience is not the experience of a phenomenal mental picture inspected by the mind’s eye, but rather the mental simulation of perceptual experience. Furthermore, there are experiential differences in perceiving and imagining that are not differences in the properties represented by these experiences. Therefore, externalist representationalism, which maintains that the properties of experience are the external properties represented by experience, is an inadequate account of conscious experience.     

Dreaming and consciousness

Abstract

Research in the second half of the twentieth century may finally have succeeded in constraining the boundaries of reasonable discussion about dreams and dreaming. Largely owing to physiological discoveries and psychophysiological methods for the representative sampling of human dreamlife, we now have a body of observations that delimits plausible explanations and theories.

For example, we now know that neither REM sleep nor its dreaming is a sporadic, fleeting response to intense psychic needs or peripheral organ states, but rather is an autonomous, cyclically recurring process which consumes relatively much of our sleep, indeed of our lives. We also know that the content of representatively sampled dreams of both adults (Snyder, 1970) and children (Foulkes, 1982) is generally realistic and mundane, rather than fantastic and bizarre. From this finding, and from direct com parisons of representatively sampled laboratory-collected dreams with spon taneously remembered home dreams (e.g. Foulkes. 1979). it has become apparent that the idea of dreaming as being full of strange and discontinuous imagery is a stereotype based on limited acquaintance with our own dreamlife. Specifically, our most ordinarily memorable dreams seem to be those relatively few that are particularly emotionally engaging, particularly unrealistic, or particularly odd in their imagery or thematic sequence. This leads us to underestimate the orderliness of a process that typically functions plausibly and coherently, in a similar if not identical manner to that which we believe (perhaps also stereotypically) characterises our non-dreaming experience.

Thus, studies of representatively sampled dreaming have shown that dream imagery itself typically is realistic or plausible (Dorus, Dorus, & Rechtschaffen, 1971). that dream speech typically is both grammatically correct and appropriate to the imagined situation in which it is embedded (Heynick, 1983). that the feelings accompanying dream imagery typically are appropriate to the imagined situations which they accompany (Foulkes, Sullivan, Kerr, & Brown, 1988), and that, overwhelmingly often, dreams progress over time in a continuous rather than a discontinuous way (Foulkes & Schmidt, 1983).

Such data indicate the need to radically revise or replace most older dream theories from the clinical tradition. Given the role that physiologists and physiological methods played in the development of these data, it was perhaps inevitable that dream theories would begin to be framed in reductionist terms. And, since the 19505, there have been many attempts to “explain” dream phenomena through their reduction to neurophysiological processes (e.g. Crick & Mitchison, 1983; Hobson & McCarley, 1977)