Two tales of functional explanation

This paper considers two ways functions figure into scientific explanations: (i) via laws—events are causally explained by subsuming those events under functional laws; and (ii) via designs—capacities are explained by specifying the functional design of a system. We argue that a proper understanding of how functions figure into design explanations of capacities makes it clear why such functions are ill-suited to figure into functional-cum-causal law explanations of events, as those explanations are typically understood. We further argue that a proper understanding of how functions enter into design explanations of capacities enables us to show why two prominent objections to functionalism in the philosophy mind—the argument from metaphysically necessary effects (Bennett, 2007; Rupert, 2006) and causal exclusion (Kim, 1993, 1998; Malcolm, 1968)—are misguided when interpreted as posing a threat to functional explanation in science across the board. If those arguments pose a threat at all, they pose it to instances of (i); however, a great number of the functional explanations we find in psychology—and the sciences generally—are instances of (ii).     

Wilhelm Wundt and the cognitive shift

This paper compares Wundtian and cognitive psychology with respect to immediate and mediate experience, non-functionalism, and the status of the experiment. It is pointed out that the perspective of immediate experience, which can also be found in early American functionalism, has disappeared in the wake of behaviorism. Next cognitive psychology, which to some extent represents a correction of behaviorism, is compared with Wundt's system. It is concluded that in spite of certain similarities the Wundtian and the cognitive perspective are irreconcilably opposed.     

Social Judgement Theory

This paper first explores a number of themes in the psychological system developed by the Austrian-American psychologist, Egon Brunswik, focusing on those that had a formative influence on Social Judgement Theory. We show that while perception was a recurring ground for Brunswik's empirical and theoretical work, his psychology was a psychology of cognition in the broadest sense. Next, two major themes in Social Judgement Theory— functionalism and probabilism— are described, and the elegant formulation known as Brunswik's Lens Model is introduced. Some methodological and theoretical implications of these themes are presented. The paper concludes with Hammond's Cognitive Continuum Theory (CCT), which is a theory describing modes of cognition and how those modes are influenced by task characteristics.     

Why some surprises are more surprising than others: Surprise as a metacognitive sense of explanatory difficulty

Early theories of surprise, including Darwin’s, argued that it was predominantly a basic emotion. Recently, theories have taken a more cognitive view of surprise, casting it as a process of “making sense of surprising events”. The current paper advances the view that the essence of this sense-making process is explanation; specifically, that people’s perception of surprise is a metacognitive estimate of the cognitive work involved in explaining an abnormal event. So, some surprises are more surprising because they are harder to explain. This proposal is tested in eight experiments that explore how (i) the contents of memory can influence surprise, (ii) different classes of scenarios can retrieve more/less relevant knowledge from memory to explain surprising outcomes, (iii) how partial explanations constrain the explanation process, reducing surprise, and (iv) how, overall, any factor that acts to increase the cognitive work in explaining a surprising event, results in higher levels of surprise (e.g., task demands to find three rather than one explanations). Across the present studies, using different materials, paradigms and measures, it is consistently and repeatedly found that the difficulty of explaining a surprising outcome is the best predictor for people’s perceptions of the surprisingness of events. Alternative accounts of these results are considered, as are future directions for this research.     

Toward an integrative approach of cognitive neuroscientific and evolutionary psychological studies of art

This paper examines explanations for human artistic behavior in two reductionist research programs, cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary psychology. Despite their different methodological outlooks, both approaches converge on an explanation of art production and appreciation as byproducts of normal perceptual and motivational cognitive skills that evolved in response to problems originally not related to art, such as the discrimination of salient visual stimuli and speech sounds. The explanatory power of this reductionist framework does not obviate the need for higher-level accounts of art from the humanities, such as aesthetics, art history or anthropology of art.     

The joy-maker in the garden: cognitive behavioural therapy in The Secret Garden (1911)

Cogntive Behavioural Therapy appears in the classic children’s novel The Secret Garden (1911) by Frances Hodgson Burnett. This essay demonstrates how “thinking about thinking” helps three central characters (Mary, Colin, and Archie) overcome depression and prolonged grief. They learn to challenge habitual cognitive distortions and socially endorsed absolutist myths such as: 1) I alone am special. 2) What I can see with my eyes is all that is real; there is no supernatural realm. 3) If people must speak of God, they should use the (only) proper name. 4) I must suffer without hope. The essay explains CBT, a form of psychotherapy that began in the 1980s and is used around the world today. It also explains Burnett’s “Beautiful Thought” which is rooted in the New Testament and also in the New Thought Movement of mid-1800s. After an analysis of how CBT appears in the characters and plot of The Secret Garden, the essay provides guidance for how adults can help children to think criticially about beliefs; to be self-reflective; to experience beauty through nature, the arts, and gardening; and to trust in benevolent spiritual forces.     

生成认知与具身机能主义的比较——表征的取舍

在具身认知不同的思潮中，生成认知以其激进的观点反对表征和计算主义，可以称之为是具身认知思潮中的最为激进的一部分。另一方面，由于标准认知中表征和计算的解释力和影响力，具身认知诞生出各种不同程度上的“妥协”性理论，其中，以克拉克为代表的具身的“机能主义”为目前具身认知的主流观点。表征尽管在当前阶段中表现出强大的生命力，但依然无法在所有领域中都得到运用。随着表征的改造与发展，未来的激进具身认知工作者应该将更多的精力投入到具身认知与更多学科的融合研究中。     

5-13岁儿童对物种起源认知的发展

本研究采用临床访谈法,采用开放式和封闭式问题情境,测查了5-13岁儿童对物种起源认知的发展。结果显示儿童对物种起源的解释越来越符合科学的解释,这种认知发展过程并不是以一种起源认知替代另一种起源认知的过程,而是多种起源认知以某种方式共存于儿童的认知系统中。本研究结果既显示了儿童对物种起源认知发展的跨文化一致性,也体现了不同文化和宗教环境影响下的差异性。     

Is Psychology a Cognitive Science?

ABSTRACT Since the 1970s there has been a significant paradigm shift in psychology away from behaviourism and towards cognitive psychology. Indeed a recent survey discovered that by 1983 more than half American psychologists were describing their approaches as cognitive. However, while behaviourism has had an identifiable philosophical 'line' in positivism, reductionism and the hypothetico-deductive model, such a framework has been noticeably lacking from cognitive psychology. A view of cognitive psychology based on functionalism and ideas from systems analysis is put forward.     

The limits of unification for theory appraisal: a case of economics and psychology

In this paper I examine Don Ross’s application of unificationism as a methodological criterion of theory appraisal in economics and cognitive science. Against Ross’s critique that explanations of the preference reversal phenomenon by the ‘heuristics and biases’ programme is ad hoc or ‘Ptolemaic’, I argue that the compatibility hypothesis, one of the explanations offerd by this programme, is theoretically and empirically well-motivated. A careful examination of this hypothesis suggests several strengths of a procedural approach to modelling cognitive processes underlying individual decision making, compared to a multiple-agent approach which Ross promotes. I argue that the debate between economists and psychologists are both theoretical and empirical, but cannot be resolved by appealing to the ideal of unification.     

Reasoning Through Instructional Analogies

This article aims to account for students’ assessments of the plausibility and applicability of analogical explanations, and individual differences in these assessments, by analyzing properties of students’ underlying knowledge systems. We developed a model of explanation and change in explanation focusing on knowledge elements that provide a sense of satisfaction to those judging the explanation. We call these elements “explanatory primitives.” In this model, explanations are accepted or rejected on the basis of (a) the individual's convictions concerning particular explanatory primitives and (b) the fit of these primitives to current circumstances. Data are drawn from clinical interviews with three high school students who worked through a bridging analogies tutoring sequence on the existence of the normal force in mechanics. Methodologically, our work involves fine-grain analysis of process data and explicit principles of empirical accountability; we believe it marks a methodological advance over most previously reported empirical studies of analogical reasoning.     

Appraisal of certain methodologies in cognitive science based on Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programmes

Attempts to apply the mathematical tools of dynamical systems theory to cognition in a systematic way has been well under way since the early 90s and has been recognised as a “third contender” to computationalist and connectionist approaches (Eliasmith in Philos Psychol 9(4):441–463, 1996). Nevertheless, it was also realised that such an application will not lead to a solid paradigm as straightforwardly as was initially hoped (Eliasmith 1996; van Leeuwen in Minds Mach 15:271–333, 2005). In this paper I explicate a method for assessing such proposals by drawing upon Lakatos’s (in: Lakatos, Musgrave (eds) Criticism and the growth of knowledge, Cambridge University Press, London, pp 91–195, 1970) methodology of scientific research programs (hereafter: “MSRP”). MSRP focuses on the heuristics of a particular field and gauges the model/theory building stratagems by reference to theoretical and empirical progress, on the one hand, and the continuity and the autonomy of the way the field’s heuristic generates its series of models/theories, on the other. The requirement of continuity and autonomy afford distinct senses of ad hoc-ness, which serve as an effective tool to detect various subtleties which may otherwise be missed: the present approach identifies shortcomings missed by Chemero’s (Radical embodied cognitive science, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2009) radical embodied cognitive science and falsifies Chemero’s claim that the methodological powers of his model-based account is on a par with computationalism. In general, I claim that MSRP is relevant to current methodological issues in cognitive science and can supplement debates regarding “local” assessments of methodologies, such as that between mechanical versus covering-law explanations. MSRP must at least be viewed as a necessary constraint for any methodological considerations in cognitive science.

     

Knowledge of Counterfactual Interventions through Cognitive Models of Mechanisms

Here I consider the relative merits of two recent models of explanation, James Woodward’s interventionist‐counterfactual model and the model model. According to the former, explanations are largely constituted by information about the consequences of counterfactual interventions. Problems arise for this approach because countless relevant interventions are possible in most cases and because it overlooks other kinds of equally relevant information. According the model model, explanations are largely constituted by cognitive models of actual mechanisms. On this approach, explanations tend not to represent any of the aforementioned information explicitly but can instead be used to produce it on demand. The model model thus offers the more plausible account of the information of which we are aware when we have an explanation and of the ratiocinative process through which we derive many kinds of information that are relevant to the evaluation of explanations.     

Epistemic presentism

Commonsense functionalism is taken to entail a version of the extended mind thesis, according to which one’s dispositional beliefs may be partly constituted by artifacts. As several opponents of the extended mind thesis have objected, claiming so can generate a cognitive/knowledge bloat, according to which we may count as knowing the contents of trusted websites, even before looking them up (!). One way to retain commonsense functionalism, but avoid the ensuing “cognitive/knowledge bloat” worry is to introduce epistemic presentism—the view that there are no dispositional beliefs and that we can only believe, and thereby know, things in the present. Independently of the above problem, epistemic presentism can be further motivated by shedding light on two central epistemological questions: (1) how to understand the distinction between doxastic and propositional justification and (2) how to interpret the closure principle. The view also aligns with strong intuitions about what we may take ourselves to know, what the relation between action and belief is, and what may count as part of our minds.     

Conceptual analysis as armchair psychology: in defense of methodological naturalism

Three proponents of the Canberra Plan, namely Jackson, Pettit, and Smith, have developed a collective functionalist program—Canberra Functionalism—spanning from philosophical psychology to ethics. They argue that conceptual analysis is an indispensible tool for research on cognitive processes since it reveals that there are some folk concepts, like belief and desire, whose functional roles must be preserved rather than eliminated by future scientific explanations. Some naturalists have recently challenged this indispensability argument, though the point of that challenge has been blunted by a mutual conflation of metaphysical and methodological strands of naturalism. I argue that the naturalist’s challenge to the indispensability argument, like naturalism itself, ought to be reformulated as a strictly methodological thesis. So understood, the challenge succeeds by showing (1) that we cannot know a priori on the basis of conceptual analysis of folk platitudes that something must occupy the functional roles specified for beliefs and desires, and (2) that proponents of Canberra Functionalism sometimes tacitly concede this point by treating substantive psychological theories as the deliverances of a priori platitudes analysis.     

Assessing ‘good’ qualitative research in the work psychology field: A narrative analysis

This paper considers how work psychologists define ‘good’ qualitative research in the work psychology domain. In addressing the assessment of quality in work psychology research, we draw on 22 in‐depth interviews with work psychologists about their current practices and expectations around qualitative research. Using narrative analysis, the various plots and narratives that constitute how interviewees understand good qualitative research are identified. The implications of the use of these narratives for both how quality is understood and the use of qualitative research in this area are addressed. Drawing on Weick's concept of sensemaking as a theoretical framework, it is argued that the narratives identified enable the construction of a hegemonic understanding of what is good methodological practice within the work psychology discipline. The implications of this for the work psychology field and the methodological practices of work psychologists are considered.     

Social cognition: learning about what matters in the social world

Social‐cognitive principles underlie people's learning about what matters in the social world. The benefits of these social‐cognitive principles reveal essential aspects of what it means to be human. But these social‐cognitive principles also have inherent costs , which highlight what it means to be ‘only human’. Social cognition is ‘social’ because what is learned concerns the social world, and where the learning takes place is in the social world. This paper reviews the benefits and costs of both sides of social cognition: (1) the cognition of social psychology principles of organization, explanation, knowledge activation and use; and (2) the social psychology of cognition principles of shared reality role enactment, social positions and identities and internal audiences. The fact that there are inherent costs of the same social‐cognitive principles for which there are essential benefits affords a new perspective on social‐cognitive costs that is different from either the classic ‘conflict’ perspective or the more current ‘limited capacity’ and ‘dual‐process’ perspectives. This ‘trade‐off’ perspective deepens both our understanding of the true nature of these principles and our appreciation of our common humanity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.